ORDER : S.N. Pathak, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for direction upon the respondents to consider his case for appointed to the post of Anganwari Sewika, challenging the appointment of respondent No. 8 (however inadvertently the same has been mentioned as respondent No. 7 in the main writ application), namely, Dipti Singh, who has been duly appointed as Anganwari Sewika by Aam Sabha. 3. The factual exposition as has been delineated in the writ petition is that in view of the notification of the Department of Social Welfare, an Aam Sabha was held for appointment of Anganwari Sewika at Janghasi, Barnawa Tola. The petitioner having the requisite qualification, applied for the same and after considering every aspect of the matter and going through the certificates submitted by other candidates, including respondent No. 8 and based on the terms and conditions of appointment, was pleased to appoint respondent No. 8 as Anganwari Sewika. It is the specific case of the petitioner that respondent No. 8 does belong to Scheduled Caste category, which is an essential requirement for appointment to the said post, in view of the terms and conditions for appointment of Anganwari Sewika. Aggrieved by the non-consideration of her case and also appointment of respondent No. 8, the petitioner, assailing the impugned order, has knocked the door of this Court. 4. Mr. Pankaj Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that appointment of respondent No. 8 is de hors the rules, as she does not belong to the category of Scheduled Caste. Learned counsel further argues that petitioner is entitled for appointment to the post of Anganwari Sewika as she fulfills all the requisite qualifications and belongs to the same Tola. Learned counsel further argues that though respondent No. 8 is not the resident of that Tola where Aam Sabha was held, she has been appointed illegally and arbitrarily and as such, a direction be given to the respondents for cancellation of her appointment and for holding a fresh Aam Sabha. 5. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. R.K. Shahi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State argues that the writ petition itself is not maintainable on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. 5. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. R.K. Shahi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State argues that the writ petition itself is not maintainable on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. Learned counsel draws the attention of the Court towards writ petition itself and submits that appointment was done in the year 2010 i.e. on 9.8.2010 itself and the writ petition has been filed after a long delay of eight years and as such, the same is not maintainable on the ground of delay and laches. It has been further argued that as per the terms and conditions of appointment, respondent No. 8 has been appointed and she is still working and as such, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition, which should be dismissed in limine. 6. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for interference for the following reasons: (I) Petitioner has challenged the appointment of respondent No. 8, after delay of eight long years. The said delay has not been explained by the petitioner. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014)4 SCC 108 , has held as under: "Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not. be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not. be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill-health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect. others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons-who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold." (II) As per the terms and conditions of letter dated 2.6.2006, particularly, Clause-7(chh), if suitable candidate is not available under SC, ST, BC and Minority category, there is no bar for appointment of a candidate from general category. The petitioner has moved this Court after eight long years and till date no objection was raised by her. 7. As sequitur of the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and legal propositions, no interference is warranted and resultantly, the same is hereby dismissed.