JUDGMENT : Gita Mittal, J. By way of the instant Appeal, the respondent has laid a challenge to the decision dated 18th August, 2014 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu in the case arising out of FIR No. 126/2009 registered at Police Station, Bahu Fort, Jammu for commission of offence under Section 307 of the Ranbir Penal Code. By this judgment, the learned trial Judge held that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish the allegations against the respondent who had been charged for commission of the offence of murder and acquitted him there from. 2. The case of the prosecution to the extent necessary is encapsulated hereafter. On 24th of May, 2009, at around 10 p.m, information was received by Head Constable Taru Ram, who was on patrolling duty at Ajay Road Line Transport Company, which fell within the jurisdiction of Police Post, Narwal, Jammu. The information was to the effect that near Ajay Road Lines Transport Company, accused Ram Bhadur attacked the deceased Ashok Bahadur, who was an employee of Kashmir Auto Aids Petrol Pump at Narwal with some weapon and thereafter ran away from the place of occurrence. 3. Head Constable Taru Ram along with the patrol party rushed to the spot and found Ashok Bhadur, an employee of Kashmir Auto Petrol Pump, Narwal, lying in a pool of blood with severe head injury. The victim was unconscious and was shifted to Government Medical College Hospital, Jammu. A docket was separately sent to the Police Post Narwal. Based on this information, FIR No. 126/2009 was registered by the Police Station, Bahu Fort, Jammu on 24th May, 2009 for commission of an offence under Section 307 Ranbir Penal code. 4. Initially, the investigation in the case was entrusted to ASI Parvez Sajad (PW-14), who went on spot, prepared site plan EXTP-14, seized samples of simple and blood stained clay and sealed the same. This Investigating Officer also made a request to the doctor for recording the statement of the victim. However, the doctor certified that the injured was incapable of making any statement. Subsequently, the investigation was conducted by Abdul Wahid Giri (PW-15) who was the SHO, Police Station Trikuta Nagar, Jammu. 5. The victim unfortunately succumbed to injuries on 30th May, 2009, whereupon the commission of offence was converted into Section 302 of the Ranbir Penal Code. 6. However, the doctor certified that the injured was incapable of making any statement. Subsequently, the investigation was conducted by Abdul Wahid Giri (PW-15) who was the SHO, Police Station Trikuta Nagar, Jammu. 5. The victim unfortunately succumbed to injuries on 30th May, 2009, whereupon the commission of offence was converted into Section 302 of the Ranbir Penal Code. 6. The post-mortem was conducted on the dead body of Ashok Bhadur on 30th May, 2009 by Dr. K.K.Thakur. In the postmortem report (EXTP-13), the doctor has opined that:- “Death in this case was due to craniocerebral damage as a result of blunt trauma to head, which could be sustained in assault as alleged.” 7. It is noteworthy that in the postmortem conducted on 31st May, 2009, while noting the alleged cause of death, the doctor has noted the history of the injuries as an “assault by some person”. 8. During investigation, statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C by the Investigating Officer as well as got recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164-A Cr.P. C. 9. The seized items were also sent for forensic examination. 10. During the course of investigation, the police arrested the respondent Ram Bhadur (by arrest memo EXTP-8/1) on 30th June, 2009. It is alleged that the respondent made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of a Bamboo stick in the bushes near pond located in Narwal market which was propounded as weapon of offence. The disclosure memo (EXTP-8/1) was witnessed by SGCT Brij Lal (examined as PW-9), who was posted as PSO to SHO Police Station Trikuta Nagar, Jammu and Constable Krishal Lal (PW-8), who was posted as PSO to SHO, Police Station Bahu Fort, Jammu. 11. The Investigating Officer recorded the statement of one Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) as well as Suman Kumar (PW-4) as eye witnesses. 12. The investigation was, at this stage, transferred to Inspector Vijay Singh. 13. On completion of the investigation, the challan under Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was presented against the respondent before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, who committed the same to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jammu who assigned the trial to the court of learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu. 14. 13. On completion of the investigation, the challan under Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was presented against the respondent before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, who committed the same to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jammu who assigned the trial to the court of learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu. 14. On 18th November, 2009, after consideration of the material on record, the learned trial Judge framed charges for commission of offence under Section 302 Ranbir Penal code against the respondent. 15. The respondent pleaded innocence and claimed trial. 16. During trial, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses out of 16 cited by it in support of the charges laid against the respondent. 17. After consideration of the entirety of the evidence, by the judgment dated 18th August, 2014, the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu was of the view that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish the charge against the respondent and acquitted him from the charge of murder with which he had been charged. 18. Aggrieved thereof, the State has filed the present application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 18th August, 2014. 19. We have heard Mr. Amit Gupta, learned Additional Advocate General on behalf of the State and Mr. Rajnesh Oswal, learned counsel for the respondent at length on this application. Both the counsels have taken us through the record of the case. 20. We may first and foremost examine the testimony of the two witnesses, Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) and Suman Kumar (PW-4), who were examined as eye witnesses to the occurrence. 21. The learned Trial Judge has carefully analyzed their statements and noted that these two witnesses contradicted each other in all material particulars. So far as Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) is concerned, this witness was the employer of the deceased. While in the witness box, this witness stated that on receipt of information from Suman Kumar (PW-4) that someone was beating the deceased, he had gone to the spot and had seen a person having beating Ashok Bhadur and running away from there. In court this witness identified the respondent as the person who had hit the deceased with lathi. 22. The cross-examination of the witness discloses two important facts. In court this witness identified the respondent as the person who had hit the deceased with lathi. 22. The cross-examination of the witness discloses two important facts. Statement of this witness had been recorded under Section 164-A Cr.P.C. The factual narration made by him in court was not stated by him in his statement recorded under Section 164-A Cr.P.C. Additionally, in the witness box, Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) clearly stated that he did not know the accused prior to the occurrence. He did not know the name, parentage or address of the accused person. An important disclosure by this witness was that there was no source of light at the place of occurrence and the incident occurred at night time when the light was very dim. 23. The testimony of this witness was recorded on 8th Jan, 2010, more than seven months after the occurrence of the incident when he, for the first time, identified the respondent in court. The witness admitted that no identification parade of the respondent had been conducted by the police or the Magistrate. 24. So what value is to be attached to a dock identification of a stranger by a witness who did not know the person being identified? More so, when this identification takes place many months after the incident and when a person identifying had seen the person being identified, only momentarily in dim, if any, light, in the night time? 25. The value of dock identification for the first time in the test identification parade has been considered by the Supreme Court in several judgments and it has been held that such identification cannot be relied upon. In this regard, our attention has been drawn by Mr. Rajnesh Oswal, Advocate to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at 2016 (3) SCC 325 ; Noorahammad and ors v. State of Karnataka, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:- “24. In the instant case, TIP of the accused-appellants should have been carried out at the instance of the investigating officer. The High Court, in this regard, has erred in appreciating the evidence on record in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case. From the material on record, it is sufficiently clear that the incident occurred in the night around 3.00 am, at a place where there was no proper light. The High Court, in this regard, has erred in appreciating the evidence on record in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case. From the material on record, it is sufficiently clear that the incident occurred in the night around 3.00 am, at a place where there was no proper light. From the material on record it is not clear whether the source of light in the form of torches and jeep flash light was sufficient to enable the forest officers to see the accused-appellants for the purpose of their identification in later stage of the case. No doubt, law with regard to the importance of TIP is well settled that identification in court is a substantive piece of evidence and TIP simply corroborates the same. 25. This Court in the case of Dana Yadav alias Dahu and Ors. v. State of Bihar has elaborated upon the importance of test identification parade in great details. The relevant para nos. 6, 7 and 8 read thus:- “6. It is also well settled that failure to hold test identification parade, which should be held with reasonable dispatch, does not make the evidence of identification in court inadmissible, rather the same is very much admissible in law. Question is, what is its probative value? Ordinarily, identification of an accused for the first time in court by a witness should not be relied upon, the same being from its very nature, inherently of a weak character, unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence. The purpose of test identification parade is to test the observation, grasp, memory, capacity to recapitulate what a witness has seen earlier, strength or trustworthiness of the evidence of identification of an accused and to ascertain if it can be used as reliable corroborative evidence of the witness identifying the accused at his trial in court. If a witness identifies the accused in court for the first time, the probative value of such uncorroborated evidence becomes minimal so much so that it becomes, as a rule of prudence and not law, unsafe to rely on such a piece of evidence. If a witness identifies the accused in court for the first time, the probative value of such uncorroborated evidence becomes minimal so much so that it becomes, as a rule of prudence and not law, unsafe to rely on such a piece of evidence. We are fortified in our view by a catena of decisions of this Court in the cases of Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Admn., Vaikuntam Chandrappa, Budhsen, Kanan v. State of Kerala, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, Bollavaram Pedda Narsi Reddy, State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab, Raju v. State of Maharashtra, Ronny, George v. State of Kerala, Rajesh Govind Jagesha, State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj and Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat. 7. Apart from the ordinary rule laid down in the aforesaid decisions, certain exceptions to the same have been carved out where identification of an accused for the first time in court without there being any corroboration whatsoever can form the sole basis for his conviction. In the case of Budhsen it was observed:- ‘7. …..There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule, when for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness, on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration.’ 8. In State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh it was laid down that if a witness had any particular reason to remember about the identity of an accused, in that event, the case can be brought under the exception and upon solitary evidence of identification of an accused in court for the first time, conviction can be based. In the case of Ronny it has been laid down that where the witness had a chance to interact with the accused or that in a case where the witness had an opportunity to notice the distinctive features of the accused which lends assurance to his testimony in court, the evidence of identification in court for the first time by such a witness cannot be thrown away merely because no test identification parade was held. In that case, the accused concerned had a talk with the identifying witnesses for about 7/8 minutes. In that case, the accused concerned had a talk with the identifying witnesses for about 7/8 minutes. In these circumstances, the conviction of the accused, on the basis of sworn testimony of witnesses identifying for the first time in court without the same being corroborated either by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence, was upheld by this Court. In the case of Rajesh Govind Jagesha it was laid down that the absence of test identification parade may not be fatal if the accused is sufficiently described in the complaint leaving no doubt in the mind of the court regarding his involvement or is arrested on the spot immediately after the occurrence and in either eventuality, the evidence of witnesses identifying the accused for the first time in court can form the basis for conviction without the same being corroborated by any other evidence and, accordingly, conviction of the accused was upheld by this Court. In the case of State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj it was observed (at SCC p. 253, para 3) that:- ‘test identification is considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them. There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely without such or other corroboration. In that case, laying down the aforesaid law, acquittal of one of the accused by the High Court was converted into conviction by this Court on the basis of identification by a witness for the first time in court without the same being corroborated by any other evidence. In Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel it was observed:- ’20. …..It, therefore, cannot be held, as tried to be submitted by learned counsel for the appellants, that in the absence of a test identification parade, the evidence of an eyewitness identifying the accused would become inadmissible or totally useless; whether the evidence deserves any credence or not would always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court further observed:- ’20. The Court further observed:- ’20. ….the fact remains that these eyewitnesses were seriously injured and they could have easily seen the faces of the persons assaulting them and their appearance and identity would well remain imprinted in their minds especially when they were assaulted in broad daylight. In these circumstances, conviction of the accused was upheld on the basis of solitary evidence of identification by a witness for the first time in court.” 26. Another important fact which the High Court has failed to appreciate is that the prosecution witness identified the accused-appellants in court for the first time, during trial, in the year 1997-98 and the incident occurred in the year 1995. Thus, after considering some undisputed facts like occurrence of incident at night, at a place with improper lighting and all the accused-appellants were not known to the forest officers, except one present at the place of incident, there should have been TIP conducted at the instance of the investigating officer. Therefore, the identification of the accused-appellants by the prosecution witness for the first time after a gap of more than 2 years from the date of incident is not beyond reasonable doubt, the same should be seen with suspicion.” (Emphasis supplied) 26. The learned trial Judge has relied on the judgment of this Court reported at (2010) 1 SLJ 387 that where an accused person not known to the witness before occurrence, test of identification parade is necessary. 27. In the light of the established facts and circumstances, therefore, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) with regard to the identification of the accused. 28. The testimony of Sanjeev Mahajan has been discredited by the learned trial Judge for the reason that the statement of Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) that he had rushed to the spot and seen the respondent attacking the deceased is contradictory to the testimony of Suman Kumar (PW-4) who stated that when they reached the spot, the accused person ran away there from and the respondent did not hit the deceased in front of them when he along with Sanjeev Mahajan PW-2 and PW-4 reached the spot. 29. Significant doubt has been cast on the very presence of Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) and Suman Kumar (PW-4) on the spot in the evidence which has come on record. 29. Significant doubt has been cast on the very presence of Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) and Suman Kumar (PW-4) on the spot in the evidence which has come on record. Head Constable Taru Ram (PW-1) and Constable Surinder Pal Singh (PW-3) have categorically stated that when they reached on spot, no one was present there. In this background, there was doubt even with regard to the presence of Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) and Suman Kumar (PW-4) on the spot. 30. The testimony of Suman Kumar (PW-4) in court was a gross improvement over his statement recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. This witness made material improvements in the witness box to the effect that he had actually witnessed the respondent hitting the deceased. This witness has not so stated under Section 161 Cr.P.C which was read over to him. 31. It was admitted by even Suman Kumar (PW-4) that it was dark on the spot and that there was only one bulb that too on the opposite double storey building. This witness has clearly admitted in his crossexamination that the accused person had run away from the spot when they reached there and further that the accused had not hit the deceased in their presence. The trial Judge was correct in not accepting the evidence of Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) and Suman Kumar (PW-4) as being an eye witness account. 32. In support of the findings of the trial court, Mr. Rajnesh Oswal, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that given the improvements in the witness box in all material particulars over the statement given to the police, the learned trial Judge has rightly held that the testimony of this witness was not reliable. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the principles laid by the Supreme Court in (2001) 10 SCC 754 , Taruna v. State of Best Bengal, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the material improvements in the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C would discredit the versions placed in court. 33. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the principles laid by the Supreme Court in (2001) 10 SCC 754 , Taruna v. State of Best Bengal, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the material improvements in the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C would discredit the versions placed in court. 33. It is well settled that contradictions, material particulars and omissions of serious nature as well as improvements over the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P. C and Section 164-A Cr.P.C would cast substantial doubt on the prosecution story and discredit the testimony of the witness (Ref: 2004 (2) Crime 22 (SC); 2005 (8) Supreme today 386 and 2010 Apex Criminal Reports 1). The trial court was, therefore, right in disbelieving Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) and Suman Kumar (PW-4). 34. We find that the learned trial Judge has considered the suggestion of motive in the evidence which was led by the prosecution. In a case where the prosecution is relying on eye witness account, motive is irrelevant. In the present case, the prosecution examined Sanjeev Mahajan (PW-2) and Suman Kumar (PW-4) as eye witnesses. The question of existence or non-existence of motive, therefore, would be of little significance. 35. Even otherwise, the evidence brought on record was only suggestive of some old enmity without any details. No evidence of enmity was brought on record. The learned trial Judge has in any case found the evidence of motive, untrustworthy. We see no reason to disagree. 36. Heavy reliance was placed by the prosecution on a disclosure statement (EXTP-8) attributed to the respondent as having been made on 30th May, 2019, after his arrest. This disclosure statement was sought to be proved by the prosecution through the testimony of Krishan Lal (examined as PW-8) who was posted as PSO to SHO in the year 2009 and the testimony of Constable Brij Lal (examined as PW-9) who was also posted as PSO to SHO Police Station, Trikuta Nagar. Unfortunately, the testimony of these two witnesses also contradicts each other in all material particulars. These witnesses contradict each other firstly in the important fact as to the place where the respondent made the disclosure statement. Unfortunately, the testimony of these two witnesses also contradicts each other in all material particulars. These witnesses contradict each other firstly in the important fact as to the place where the respondent made the disclosure statement. While Krishan Lal (PW-8) states that the respondent was arrested and taken to police station Narwal where he made the disclosure statement, Constable Brij Lal (PW-9) has stated that the disclosure statement was made at Narwal Chowk. 37. It has come in the testimony of Suman Kumar (PW-4) that several people were available on the spot. Yet no effort has been made to join any person as a witness at any stage in the investigation. 38. The prosecution has claimed that a Dunda (stick) was recovered on 3rd of June, 2009 pursuant to the disclosure statement (EXTP-2/7) from a place which was about ½ Kilometer from the place of occurrence. According to Krishan Lal (PW-8) the recovery of Danda was effected from a Talab near Narwal market and the seizure memo EXTP-7 was prepared. 39. Krishan Lal (PW-8) has categorically stated that the recovery was effected from an open place which was easily approachable. He has stated that the stick which was recovered was common in nature and is available in the market. There is no explanation worth coming on record as to why no public witness join in the investigation or to as witness to the disclosure or to the recovery memo. 40. It is in evidence that there were many shops adjoining the police post Narwal and that there is a thorough fare outside the police post yet even none of the persons from the shop were made to join as witness during the disclosure statement or effecting recovery. The witness has further stated that adjoining road remained busy 24 hours. 41. Mr. Rajnesh Oswal, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently contended that the recovery memos signed by the police personnel as witnesses in the police station have to be disbelieved. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at AIR 2011 SC 2769 ; Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- “24. In fact, the recovery of the weapons on disclosure of the Appellants itself becomes doubtful. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at AIR 2011 SC 2769 ; Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- “24. In fact, the recovery of the weapons on disclosure of the Appellants itself becomes doubtful. The witness of Recovery Memo P.W.1-Mohd Ayub Khan was declared hostile and another witness P.W.10-Chittar admitted that signatures were obtained on the memos and annexures at the Polkice Station itself. It is also pertinent to mention here that P.W.1- Mohd Ayub Khan was residing 4 Kms. Away from the place of recovery and P.W.10- Chittar was residing 8 Kms. away from the place of recovery and were also declared hostile. Prosecution failed to establish as to why none of the local persons were called to be the witnesses. xxxxxxxxxx.” (Emphasis supplied) 42. The recovery has been effected on the 3rd of June, 2009, i.e., more than ten days after the commission of offence on the 24th May, 2009 from an open place accessible to all. For this reason alone, the recovery of the Danda is completely unreliable and of no significance at all. 43. The learned trial Judge has observed that it has come in the testimony of Suman Kumar (PW-4) that apart from Rakesh Kumar, Ashok Bhadur and Ganesh Bhadur were also on duty on that day. No effort was made by the police to investigate these persons. 44. Mr. Rajnesh Oswal, learned counsel for the respondent has also pointed out the cuttings in the opinion of the doctor and submitted that the postmortem report also did not establish that injuries has been received on account of deceased having been attacked by the respondent. 45. The applicant has not been able to point out any error in the reasoning of the learned Trial Judge in the judgment dated 18th August, 2014. 46. In view of the above, the present application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 18th August, 2014 completely devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed.