JUDGMENT : 1. Appellant had faced trial in FIR No. 374 dated 12.11.2012 registered at Police Station Anta, District Baran under Section 307 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC')- Later offence under Section 302 IPC was added on account of death of the victim on 15.11.2012. 2. Prosecution case was set in motion on the basis of the statement of the victim recorded on 12.11.2012 by the police official. Victim stated that she was married to Radheyshyam about 18/20 years prior to the incident. Her mother-in-law and father-in-law were also living with her. On 11.11.2012 her husband Radheyshyam came home at about 10.30 p.m. under the influence of liquor and started quarreling with her. She came inside the room and slept on the bed. In the meantime, her husband Radheyshyam came with a can and threw kerosene oil on her and then set her on fire with a matchstick. She raised alarm and was removed to the hospital for treatment. Statement of the victim was also recorded by the Magistrate on the same day. Victim stated before the Magistrate in her statement Exhibit P-12 that she was married to Radheyshyam and on the day of incident, Radheyshyam had returned home from duty. Her husband Radheyshyam was under the influence of liquor. She told him to take his meals, but he refused. Radheyshyam brought a can full of kerosene oil and threw it on her. Then, he set her on fire with a matchstick. Victim died on 15.11.2012 at 9.25 p.m. 3. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the appellant. 4. Charge was framed against the appellant under Section 302 IPC. Appellant did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined seventeen witnesses. Appellant when examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after the close of prosecution evidence, prayed that he was innocent and not present in his house at the time of the incident. Rather he was present at his shop and had come home after the incident. 6. Appellant did not examine any witness in his defence. 7. Trial court vide the impugned judgment/order dated 15.04.2017 ordered the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rupees five thousand. Rather he was present at his shop and had come home after the incident. 6. Appellant did not examine any witness in his defence. 7. Trial court vide the impugned judgment/order dated 15.04.2017 ordered the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rupees five thousand. It was further ordered that in case of default of payment of fine, appellant would further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Hence, the present appeal by the appellant. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has been falsely involved in this case. Prosecution had failed to prove its case. 9. Learned State Counsel has opposed the appeal. 10. Present case relates to murder of Santosh Bai. Appellant is the husband of deceased Santosh Bai. FIR in the present case was registered on the statement of the victim. Thus, there are dying declarations suffered by the victim. 11. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthu Kutty And Another Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N., in (2005) 9 SCC 113 , as under:- "Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR(1992) SC 1817: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 764) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164) (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC 1994]. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 SCC 264). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v. State of M.P., AIR (1982) SC 1021]. (vi) A dying declaration with suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P., [1981] 2 SCC 654) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505]. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505]. (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1988) SC 912]. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Medan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519]. (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1982) SC 839]." 12. PW-1 Devi Shanker deposed that on 11.11.2012 he was sleeping in his room and suddenly he heard noise. He came to know that Radheyshyam has set his wife on fire with the help of kerosene oil. They informed the police. Radheyshyam was present in the house at that time. To the similar effect is the statement of PW-2 Yogendra Handa. 13. Victim has specifically stated before the police official in her statement Exhibit P-7 as well as before the Magistrate in her statement Exhibit P-12 that appellant had brought a can of kerosene oil and had poured it over her and had thereafter, set her on fire with a matchstick. 14. As per the postmortem examination report Exhibit P-11, cause of death of the deceased was septicemic shock as a result of antemortem flame burns. Thus, the version of the victim that she had suffered burn injuries at the hands of appellant finds corroboration from medical evidence. 15. PW-15 Dr. Devi Shanker Nagar deposed that on 12.11.2012 Santosh Bai was admitted in the Burns ward and was in a fit state to make a statement. Thus, the version of the victim that she had suffered burn injuries at the hands of appellant finds corroboration from medical evidence. 15. PW-15 Dr. Devi Shanker Nagar deposed that on 12.11.2012 Santosh Bai was admitted in the Burns ward and was in a fit state to make a statement. Magistrate had recorded the statement of the victim after obtaining certificate from him. 16. PW-16 Sumarth Lai Meena deposed that on 12.11.2012 he was posted as Magistrate at Kota and had recorded the statement of the victim Exhibit P-12 correctly. The statement was read over the victim and thereafter, she had thumb marked the same. 17. Thus, in the present case, the dying declarations suffered by the deceased were recorded by following proper procedure and have been duly proved on record. Victim has specifically alleged that she had been set on fire by the appellant with the help of kerosene oil. There was no reason for the victim to have falsely involved the appellant in this case. The dying declarations of the victim being natural and consistent inspire confidence. The plea taken by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he was not present at the spot is not corroborated by any other evidence on record. Moreover, there was no occasion for the appellant to have been present in his shop after 10.30 p.m. 18. Hence, in the facts of the present case, learned Trial Court had rightly ordered the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. 19. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. Conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC as ordered by the Trial Court are upheld. 20. Dismissed.