JUDGMENT Sureshwar Thakur, J. - The petitioners becoming aggrieved, from, the impugned order, where through, the apposite, notice of accusation, was, ordered to put to them, hence, cast a challenge thereon, through theirs, constituting, the, instant criminal revision petition, before this Court. Before, the, learned Magistrate, hence ordered, for, the apposite notice, of, accusation, becoming put to the accused/petitioner herein, rather, the requisite preliminary evidence, became recorded, by him. (i) In sequel, the impugned order, is, concludable to be made, after theapt objective satisfaction becoming drawn, by the Magistrate concerned, vis--vis, the afore preliminary evidence, rather disclosing, qua the accused/petitioners herein, prima-facie, committing an offence, punishable, under, Section 500 of the I.P.C. In the exercise, of, the apt revisional jurisdiction, this Court cannot delve, into, the makings, of, the apt objective satisfaction, hence , by the learned trial Magistrate concerned, vis--vis, the adduced before him hence preliminary evidence, whereafter, it proceeded to make, the, impugned orders, against the accused, (ii) unless a bare perusal thereof, is, prima-facie, perse suggestive, vis--vis, the echoing(s), made therein, are, not, in concurrence, with the complaint, lodged before the learned trial Magistrate concerned. However, a, perusal, of, the preliminary evidence, as, became hence recorded by the trial Magistrate concerned, hence prior to his making, the, impugned order, does disclose, vis--vis, therein, the requisite echoing(s), rather bearing concurrence, with the complaint, lodged under Section 500 of the IPC, becoming hence articulated therein. Consequently, obviously, it becomes grossly impermissible for this Court, to, in the exercise, of, the apt revisional jurisdiction, hence make any interference(s), with, the impugned orders (iii) moreso when earlier thereto, the petitioners herein, had instituted Cr.MMO No. 85 of 2015, seeking therethrough, the, relief, of, quashing of the afore complaint, and, the afore petition, became dismissed, as withdrawn, through an order, recorded on 22.9.2016. (iv) In aftermath, the afore order dismissing, as withdrawn, the afore Cr. MMO No. 85 of 2015, estops the counsel for the petitioner, to, contend, that, the complaint, does not contain therein(s), any ingredient, rather conforming to the statutory requirement(s), as, embodied in Section 499 of the I.P.C. 2. (iv) In aftermath, the afore order dismissing, as withdrawn, the afore Cr. MMO No. 85 of 2015, estops the counsel for the petitioner, to, contend, that, the complaint, does not contain therein(s), any ingredient, rather conforming to the statutory requirement(s), as, embodied in Section 499 of the I.P.C. 2. However, lastly, the learned counsel, for, the petitioner, has made dependence, upon, the eighth exception, embodied, in, Section 499, of, the IPC, exception whereof, is, extracted hereinafter: "Eighth Exception- Accusation preferred in good faith to authorized person- It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation." And contends, that, the accusation(s) leveled, by co-petitioner No. 2, against the complainant, and, appertaining to the latter, abducting her husband, sequarely and pointedly falling, within the ambit, of, afore eighth exception, (i) as, the afore imputation, was, made in good faith, and also, was made by pesons, who, held, thereat the, apt lawful authority, over the person(s), of, her spouse. However, the afore submission, rather emanates from, his, making gross mis-reading(s), vis--vis, the, import, and, the apposite exculpatory effect(s), of, the afore eighth exception, (ii) as it, appertains, to, statutory validation, becoming visited, vis--vis, any libelous or slanderous imputations, as, made by the accused concerned, vis--vis, those persons, who, in contemporaneity, vis--vis, their making(s), hence thereat, as, masters hence hold, the, valid custody, vis--vis, the victims, qua whom, the purported libelous or slanderous imputations, is/are, made. For the benefit, of, the eightth exception, becoming leveraged, vis--vis, the petitioner, it was imperative, for the latter, to establish, that, the complainant, qua whom any purported libelous or slanderous imputations, hence were made, (iii) hence at the relevant time, coming under, the, lawful authority, of, any of the petitioners herein, and also were enjoined to establish, that, vis--vis, the afore purported libelous or slanderous imputations, both or one of, them, were under law, authorized, to, reprimand him/them. The innate nuances thereof, is, the purported slanderous or libelous imputations, emanating from bonafides, of, the makers, (iv) inasmuch as, the latter rearing them, hence with, a, holistic, and, improving hence mindset, and, without any animo-defamandi. (v) The person, to whom, the afore, are, made, at the relevant stage, holding the capacity, to, bring corrections, in, the misconduct, of, those persons'', against whom, they are made. 3. (v) The person, to whom, the afore, are, made, at the relevant stage, holding the capacity, to, bring corrections, in, the misconduct, of, those persons'', against whom, they are made. 3. However, the learned counsel, for, the petitioner, has, hence completely failed to establish, the, afore ingredients, rather when the purported libelous or slanderous imputation, is made, to, the police authorities concerned, and, whereafter, the Investigating Agency concerned, reported qua theirs being untraced, and, also being false, (ii) hence the afore purported libelous or slanderous imputations, as, made to the police, by the wife, of, one Mehar Chand, would not fall, in, the afore exception(s), (iii) as neither the complainant was, at any stage, hence subordinated, to any of the petitioners, nor the petitioners held any lawful apposite corrective authority, over his person, rather when the police authorities, prior, to, the apposite complaint being, concluded, to be, false rather purportedly illegally incarcerated, the, complainant. (iv) hence, prima-facie, it appears that the allegations constituted, in, the extant complaint, rather may be, ingrained, with veracity, thereupon the eighth exception, to, Section 499 of the I.P.C., as attempted to be leveraged, vis--vis, the petitioners, is, grossly un-workable, qua, the petitioner(s). 3. Consequently, there is no merit in the petition, and the same is dismissed. It is made clear that any observations made hereinabove, shall have no bearings on the merits of the case, pending before the learned trial Magistrate concerned. The parties are directed to appear before the learned trial Magistrate, on 17.1.2020. 4. Also, the pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.