JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners for quashing of FIR No.17/2013, dated 29.11.2013 under Sections 406, 447, 201 and 120-B of IPC, registered by the Anti Corruption Unit at Dharamshala, District Kangra H.P., as well as consequent proceedings pending adjudication in the Court of learned Special Judge, Kangra, at Dharamshala. 2. For having bird’s eye view, certain undisputed facts which may be relevant for adjudication of the case at hand are that on 15th September, 2001, petitioner No.1, which was originally registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 vide Registration Certificate dated 8th June, 1990, made an application for allotment of land to develop and construct the world class cricket stadium at Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. The commissioner-cum-Secretary (Education) granted permission for transfer of land to the Himachal Pradesh Youth Services and Sports Department. A lease deed dated 29th July, 2002 was executed between petitioner No.1 and State of Himachal Pradesh through Director Himachal Pradesh Youth Services and Sports Department for the land situate at Village Mouja and Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., where after an international cricket stadium came to be constructed on the aforesaid land. On 14th July, 2005, a not for profit company in the name of Himachal Players Cricket Association was incorporated under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956, however subsequently on 31.8.2005 name of aforesaid company was changed to Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association. Since observers appointed by International Cricket Council after having inspected the cricket stadium at Dharamshala stressed for more facilities and hotel accommodation of desired quality, petitioner No.1 also decided to construct a club house on the aforesaid leased land. Petitioner No.1 made a request to the Director, Youth Services and Sports for allotment of additional land adjacent to the stadium vide letter dated 3rd July, 2008. Proposal of petitioner No.1 for allotment of additional land was duly processed with the authorities. Besides above, proposal also came to be placed before ACS-cum-FC Revenue to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, for approval to lease out a Government land in Mohal Kand, Mauja Khanyara, Tehsil, Dharamshala, District Kangra, measuring 32806 hectare in favour of petitioner No.1 vide letter dated 16th November, 2009. Besides above, proposal also came to be placed before ACS-cum-FC Revenue to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, for approval to lease out a Government land in Mohal Kand, Mauja Khanyara, Tehsil, Dharamshala, District Kangra, measuring 32806 hectare in favour of petitioner No.1 vide letter dated 16th November, 2009. Vide letter dated 18th November, 2009, approval to lease out the aforesaid land in favour of petitioner No.1 was conveyed, whereafter lease deed was executed inter se parties for lease of the said land situated at Mohal Kand, Mauza Khanyara, Tehsil, Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. The club house was constructed at the stadium premises at Dharamshala under the name and style of “Aveda HPCA Club House”. 3. Apart from above, petitioner No.1 also constructed a hotel under the name and style of “The Pavilion” on the land allotted in its favour at Mohal Kand, Mauja Khanyara, Tehsil, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. Aforesaid hotel also obtained registration with the Tourism Department of the State and Tariffs etc. were also fixed by the said department on 26th September, 2012. In the meantime, on 22nd September, 2012 a resolution was passed by petitioner No.1, company to take over the assets and liabilities of the society. Agreement dated 1st October, 2012 was also executed between the Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association (the society) and Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association (the company) to enable the society to convert itself into a Company. Aforesaid society was converted into a company and the Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association stood converted from a society to a not for profit company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. 4. Averments contained in the petition further reveal that after aforesaid developments, as have been taken note in paras (supra), there was change of guard in the State of Himachal Pradesh on account of the elections of legislative assembly. Petitioners have alleged that with the change of political power, new Government immediately after taking charge, started tirade against them and lodged formal FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1st August, 2013 against the petitioners and others. Apart from above, a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C was also instituted by one Sh. Vinay Sharma against petitioner No.1 and its office bearers, wherein Special Judge, Kangra vide order dated 2nd July, 2013 directed the police authorities to investigate the said case and submit the report to it. 5. Apart from above, a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C was also instituted by one Sh. Vinay Sharma against petitioner No.1 and its office bearers, wherein Special Judge, Kangra vide order dated 2nd July, 2013 directed the police authorities to investigate the said case and submit the report to it. 5. Pursuant to aforesaid, FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1st August, 2013, under Sections 406, 420, 120-B of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, FIR No.14 of 2013, dated 3rd October, 2013, under Section 447 read with Section 120-B of IPC, Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 13(2) of the PC Act, came to be registered against the petitioners and others. FIR No.17 of 2013, dated 29.11.2013 sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings is also a offshoot of FIR No.12/2013, dated 1st August, 2013. In FIR No.17 of 2013, dated 29.11.2013, the precise allegation against the petitioners herein is with regard to felling of trees without having obtained necessary permission from the Forest Department for construction of hotel, “The Pavilion”. As per the allegations contained in the FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, the Revenue officials while preparing Tatima of the land allotted to petitioner No.1 for construction of hotel purposely and willfully not shown the trees standing on the land. As per the allegations contained in the FIR a “Van Mahotsav’ was organized on the one part/parcel of the land allotted for the purpose of hotel, “The Pavilion’ in July-August, 2009 under the chairmanship of the then Industrial Minister, wherein allegedly 1500 plants of different varieties were planted by spending sum of Rs.18100/-. After completion of the investigation in the aforesaid FIR, challan stands filed in the Court of learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P., and same is still pending adjudication. 6. Petitioners herein by way of two separate petitions (Cr.MMO No.6 of 2014 and Cr. MMO No. 285 of 2015) filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, approached this Court, praying therein to quash the FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1.8.2013 and FIR No.14 of 2013 dated 3.10.2013. However, fact remains that aforesaid petitions, having been filed by the petitioners herein were dismissed by this Court vide judgments dated 25.4.2014 and 6.4.2017, respectively. 7. MMO No. 285 of 2015) filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, approached this Court, praying therein to quash the FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1.8.2013 and FIR No.14 of 2013 dated 3.10.2013. However, fact remains that aforesaid petitions, having been filed by the petitioners herein were dismissed by this Court vide judgments dated 25.4.2014 and 6.4.2017, respectively. 7. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgments passed by this Court, petitioners approached the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of Special Leave Petitions, which ultimately came to be registered as Criminal Appeal Nos. 1258-1259 of 2018 and Criminal Appeal Nos. 1570-1572 of 2018, titled as Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others. Hon’ble Apex Court vide judgments dated 2.11.2018 and 6.12.2018 allowed the aforesaid appeals having been filed by the petitioners herein and quashed the FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1.8.2013 under Sections 406, 420, 120-B of the IPC, Section 13(2) of the PC Act and FIR No.14 of 2013 dated 3.10.2013, under Section 447 read with Section 120-B of the IPC, Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 13(2) of the PC Act as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent courts of law. 8. In the aforesaid background, petitioners have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to quash the FIR No.17 of 2013, dated 29.11.2013 registered against them under Sections 406, 447, 201, 120-B of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998. 9. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and gone through the record carefully. 10. Before ascertaining the correctness of the submissions/grounds having been made/raised by learned counsel representing the parties vis-a-vis prayer made in the instant petition for quashment of FIR, this Court at the first instance deems it necessary to elaborate upon the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. 10. Before ascertaining the correctness of the submissions/grounds having been made/raised by learned counsel representing the parties vis-a-vis prayer made in the instant petition for quashment of FIR, this Court at the first instance deems it necessary to elaborate upon the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a threeJudge Bench of Hon’ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below :- “7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 11. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330 , paras 29-30) 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 13. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259 , has held as under: “12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482 : (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 14. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736 , according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". 15. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.” 14. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under S. 482 Cr.P.C. 15. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioners before making his submissions on merits invited attention of this Court to the decision taken by the Cabinet on 10.1.2018, whereby it decided to withdraw all the cases initiated against the petitioners by the previous Government. Aforesaid decision taken by the Cabinet is taken on record, perusal whereof reveals that State of Himachal Pradesh after having received representation dated 3.1.2018 made by Sh. Prem Kumar Dhumal, former Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, for withdrawal of prosecution sanction granted in FIR No.12/13, dated 1.8.2013 registered in police Station, SV&ACB, Dharamshala, decided to withdraw all politically motivated cases instituted by the previous government. 16. It would be apt to take note of letter dated 21st March, 2018, issued from the Office of the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and addressed to the Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh herein: “From Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh To The Ld. Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla1 Dated, Shimla-171002, the 21st March, 2018 Subject: Regarding withdrawal of prosecution sanction in respect of Sh. Prem Kumar Dhumal, Ex. Chief Minister in case FIR No.12/13 dated 01.08.2013, Police Station SV& ACB, Dharamshala. Sir, I am directed to refer to the subject cited above and to say that Sh. Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla1 Dated, Shimla-171002, the 21st March, 2018 Subject: Regarding withdrawal of prosecution sanction in respect of Sh. Prem Kumar Dhumal, Ex. Chief Minister in case FIR No.12/13 dated 01.08.2013, Police Station SV& ACB, Dharamshala. Sir, I am directed to refer to the subject cited above and to say that Sh. Prem Kumar Dhumal, former Chief Minister has represented on 03.01.2018 in General Administration Department for withdrawal of his prosecution sanction granted in FIR No.12/13 dated 01.08.2013 registered in PS, SV & ACB, Dharamshala against him & others., the brief/present status of the said FIR is as under:- After conducting an enquiry on complaint in pursuance to the directions of Court of Ld. Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, u/s 202 of Cr.P.C, FIR No.12/13 dated 01.08.2013 was registered in PS, SV & ACB, Dharamshala against Sh. P.K.Dhumal, former Chief Minister & Ors. After completion of investigation, it was found that Sh.Prem Kumar Dhumal, former Chief Minister had misused his official authority and transferred the land of Education Department to Y.S.S. Department & later to HPCA and being patron-in-chief of HPCA & father of the main accused, Sh. Anurag Thakur, chaired the State Cabinet meeting & decided that he land so allotted to HPCA on lease of token amount of Rs.1/- only, whereas the market value of the said land was approximately Rs.5,24,00,000/-. Accordingly, final report (Challan) u/s 173 Cr.P.C was prepared and was presented in the Court of learned Special Judge, Dharamshala after obtaining the Prosecution sanction u/s 197 Cr.P.C from the competent authority. In the meantime, the HPCA had approached the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. for quashing the FIR, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court and has further been challenged by the HPCA in the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing SLP(Cr.) No.128-129 of 2015 which is still pending. In this SLP, the State Government has been arrayed as respondent through Secretary (Cooperation). ADG, SV&ACB and others were also made respondents in said SLP. An application/representation was made by Sh. Prem Kumar Dhumal, Former Chief Minister, H.P., to the Secretary (GAD) on 03-01-2018 for withdrawal of his Prosecution Sanction in said FIR. The above representation of the applicant was examined in General Administration Department of their departmental file No.GAD-C(D)7-3/2014 and it has been decided to bring the following facts/developments to the notice of Hon’ble Apex Court through your office: 1. Prem Kumar Dhumal, Former Chief Minister, H.P., to the Secretary (GAD) on 03-01-2018 for withdrawal of his Prosecution Sanction in said FIR. The above representation of the applicant was examined in General Administration Department of their departmental file No.GAD-C(D)7-3/2014 and it has been decided to bring the following facts/developments to the notice of Hon’ble Apex Court through your office: 1. State Government has decided to withdraw all politically motivated cases. (copy of Letter No. Home-E(B)16-2/2017 dated 24.01.2018 is enclosed at Annexure-A). 2. The Lease deeds with HPCA were restored by the State Government on 18.11.2013 (Copy of letter No. Rev. D(G)636/2009-loose dated 19.11.2013 issued by revenue Department consequent upon CMM decision dated 18.11.2013 is enclosed at Annexure-B) 3. The Sate Government has accepted the lease amount due from 2013 to 2018(copy of letter NO.302/ Hkw0lq0'kk0yht&536 Mh-,p dated 23.02.2018 alongwith its enclosures from the Deputy Commissioner Kangra is enclosed at Annexure AC). Your are, therefore, requested to take appropriate action in the matter accordingly. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (R.D.Dhiman) Principal Secretary(Cooperation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.” 17. During the hearing of the case, Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Advocate General, fairly acknowledged the factum with regard to aforesaid decision taken by the cabinet. It is also not in dispute that aforesaid decision of the Government has been taken note of by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 2.11.2018, passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.12581259 of 2018, wherein FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1.8.2013 and FIR No.14 of 2013, dated 3.10.2013 lodged against the petitioners herein and others came to be quashed. 18. Since there is no dispute inter se parties that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings arises out of the investigation conducted in FIR No.12 of 2013, which otherwise stands quashed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, there appears to be no necessity for this Court to state the facts as well as contentions in detail. 19. Issue with regard to construction of hotel, “The Pavilion”, which was otherwise subject matter of FIR No.12 of 2013 stands elaborately dealt in judgment dated 2.11.2018 passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.1258-1259 of 2018. Careful perusal of aforesaid judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, clearly reveals that it after having scanned the entire material placed before it arrived at a definite conclusion that the elements of criminal intent or criminal acts are lacking. Careful perusal of aforesaid judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, clearly reveals that it after having scanned the entire material placed before it arrived at a definite conclusion that the elements of criminal intent or criminal acts are lacking. Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held in the aforesaid judgment that assets which are subject matter of the FIR bearing No. 12 of 2013, dated 1.8.2013 and FIR No.14 of 2013, dated 3.10.2013, are for the use of public of the State and are being used. In the aforesaid background, Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that State Government continues to remain owner of the land which is on lease and on which the petitioners have constructed assets worth crores. Most importantly, Hon’ble Apex Court having taken note of the material made available to it has observed in its judgment that State Government intend to grab the control of the Cricket Association and such tendency on the part of the State authorities is condemned by a Committee headed by former Chief Justice R.M.Lodha and approved by this Court. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that when State Government failed to achieve the aforesaid purpose, it went after the petitioners and otherwise also, subject matter is/was a civil dispute between the petitioners and the respondents. 20. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce para Nos.24, 33 to 43 of the aforesaid judgment here-in-below: “24. Insofar as respondent No. 1 i.e. State of Himachal Pradesh is concerned, learned Advocate General submitted that State has already taken a decision not to continue with these criminal proceedings. He, in fact, supported the case of the appellants and submitted that State has no objection if these proceedings are quashed. However, there was a strong opposition on behalf of respondent No. 2 to the relief sought by the appellants and refutation of the arguments advanced by the appellants. (33) After the allotment of the land to appellant No. 1, it constructed cricket stadium thereupon. Appellant was desirous of making a world-class cricket stadium which could host international cricket matches as well. For this purpose, it submitted proposal to the ICC. The ICC got the stadium and playground inspected through Mr. Alan Hurst, it's match referee. He inspected the stadium and submitted his report dated September 20, 2007. The venue was not approved, at that stage, for hosting international matches. For this purpose, it submitted proposal to the ICC. The ICC got the stadium and playground inspected through Mr. Alan Hurst, it's match referee. He inspected the stadium and submitted his report dated September 20, 2007. The venue was not approved, at that stage, for hosting international matches. A perusal of the report submitted by the said referee would disclose that there were no adequate hotel facilities in the area and, therefore, 'tour support was lacking'. Two hotels were shown to Mr. Hurst and it was found by him that each of them were at substantial distance from the ground. Moreover, the facilities in the said hotels were also not adequate. Notwithstanding the same, insofar as the cricket ground is concerned, the match referee had lauded it for its quality and settings. It can be seen from the general comments/recommendations/conclusions in his report and the relevant portion whereof reads as under: "This ground has one of the best settings imaginable. The people involved in its development have been innovative and are passionate and visionary. They have done a great job so far in getting this ground to where it is and should be congratulated and encouraged. I have no doubt that with adequate finances, in the near future, this ground can become one of the best in the country. The idea of having a 'hotel' as an integral part of the ground with dual use as corporate boxes during games is not new, however, the circular restaurant planned for the top, with 360 deg views of the Himalayas and surrounding area will make it unique. Having said this, I believe that at this stage there is still a lot of work to be done that relates to its suitability for staging International cricket. I am informed that sufficient finance has recently been obtained to complete everything, and further work is now underway. I have listed below the issues I still have concerns with and things that need to be changed. If all of these things are addressed, I would have no hesitation in recommending this ground as suitable as an International ODI venue. The administrators have ensured me that all of these things will be addressed with urgency. They are extremely keen to get into the BCCI ground rotation system as soon as possible. (34) It is clear from the above that Mr. The administrators have ensured me that all of these things will be addressed with urgency. They are extremely keen to get into the BCCI ground rotation system as soon as possible. (34) It is clear from the above that Mr. Hurst was of the view that the cricket ground at this picturesque place with scenic beauty can be transformed into one of the best cricket grounds in the country, which would be suitable for international events if the deficiencies pointed out therein are taken care of. Apart from providing other facilities to improve the infrastructure (which could be easily taken care of), main concern was to have a hotel as an integral part of the ground with the dual use as corporate boxes during the game. Because of the above, appellant No.1 felt need to construct a club house on the lease land and also seek allotment of some other land for the purpose of construction of a hotel, keeping in view the observations contained in the aforesaid inspection report. Accordingly, it sent request for promotion to construct a club house on the lease land which was accorded by respondent No.1 through Directorate of Youth Services and Sports on June 23, 2008 subject to completing all the formalities. (35) As far as construction of hotel is concerned, the case of the appellants is that there was a parcel of idle land in the middle of the land allotted for the stadium and for allotment of this land, request was made to the Director, Youth Services and Sports. This land belongs to Gram Panchayat. Gram Panchayat issued no objection for the allotment of land on September 14, 2009 pursuant to which respondent No.1 granted approval to lease out this land in favour of appellant No.1 on November 16, 2009 and the lease deed was also executed on December 14, 2009. Thereafter, for the purpose of hotel, additional land was given. (36) Pertinently, insofar as this lease deed is concerned, since the land was to be used for commercial purpose, namely, the club house, it provided rental at commercial rate i.e. the market rate which the appellant No.1 was supposed to pay. After the execution of the lease, club house was constructed and the Town and Country Planning Department, Dharamshala also issued No Objection Certificate for the use of part of infrastructure of cricket stadium as club house for cricket activities. After the execution of the lease, club house was constructed and the Town and Country Planning Department, Dharamshala also issued No Objection Certificate for the use of part of infrastructure of cricket stadium as club house for cricket activities. It is also pertinent to mention that Principal Secretary (Revenue), Government of Himachal Pradesh issued no objection for execution of supplementary lease enabling commercial activities on additional land provided that lease money was charged in accordance with the Lease Rules, 2011. This led to execution of supplementary lease deed dated June 23, 2012 on which commercial hotel was constructed after obtaining requisite permissions. (37) From the aforesaid events, following aspects can be culled out: Appellant No.1 has been given lease of land on which cricket stadium was constructed and thereafter lease for additional land meant for club house and also supplementary lease for commercial activity i.e. the hotel. It is only in respect of the land which is meant for cricket stadium that rental of Re.1/per month was agreed to be charged by invoking proviso to Rule 8. Thus, it is not contrary to law. State of Himachal did not have any cricket ground, much less State of art cricket ground. It is, for this reason, that the land was given on lease for the purpose of constructing the cricket ground, which may become pride of Himachal Pradesh, at nominal rental. Insofar as lease in respect of club house and supplementary lease for commercial activity (i.e. hotel) is concerned, the lease money has been fixed in accordance with Lease Rules, 2011, namely, at commercial rates. There can hardly be any element of criminality in the afofresaid allotments inasmuch as six very senior officers in the State Government (four of them of IAS Cadre and one belongs to Himachal Pradesh Administrative Service) who had examined the matter and only after their approval, the allotments were made. There is no culpability attributed to them, which is a very crucial factor. (38) What is more important is that the matter was looked into by Director-cum-Special Secretary, Youth Services and Sports Department as well as Secretary, Youth Services and Sports Department and it is only after the examination of the proposal by them and their final approval, lands in question were allotted. (39) The respondents have submitted status report before the High Court, pursuant to the directions issued by it. (39) The respondents have submitted status report before the High Court, pursuant to the directions issued by it. As per the said status report as well as the FIRs, allegations against the appellants and others who are arrayed as accused persons are that appellant No.2 along with other accused indulged in illegal activities. It is alleged that Shri R.S. Gupta, the then Deputy Commissioner, had prepared report ignoring the report of Divisional Forest Officer who had assessed the value of trees at Rs.50 lakhs at that time, thereby causing wrongful loss to the Government. Further, one Shri Deepak Sanan, the then Revenue Secretary, provided a helping hand to the accused persons for granting permission to set up and run a commercial hotel and the matter was not taken to the Cabinet which was in violation of Schedule 20 of H.P. Rules of Business. It is also alleged that Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association Society was merged into a company just to prevent the State Government from controlling it. These are the main allegations. (40) Insofar as other allegations are concerned, two Officers, namely, Shri R.S. Gupta and Shri Deepak Sanan are implicated. While doing so, other senior Officers who took active part in decision making have not been touched. (41) In the two FIRs, seven IAS Officers, one Officer belonging to Himachal Pradesh Administrative Service and one Executive Engineer, Dharamshala Division in Himachal Pradesh PWD Department played their significant role at one stage or the other. Interstingly, in the FIRs, these nine Officers were also implicated and specific role attributed to them which has been already mentioned in the tabulated format while recording the arguments of Mr. Patwalia. This would demonstrate that insofar as Mr. Subhash Ahluwalia (IAS), Director-cum-Special Secretary, Youth Services and Sports Department is concerned, allegation against him was that he ignored the rules and did not mention the provisions of Lease Rules, 1993. He was also signatory to lease deed dated July 29, 2002. It is important to mention that entire FIRs proceed on the basis that appellants conspired with these Officers, among others. The imputation against Mr. Subhash Ahluwalia is that in fixing the rent at Re.1/per month, he not only ignored the rules and did not even mention in his noting thereby implying that he was party to the alleged conspiracy. Similar allegations are against other eight persons as well alleging their role at different stages. The imputation against Mr. Subhash Ahluwalia is that in fixing the rent at Re.1/per month, he not only ignored the rules and did not even mention in his noting thereby implying that he was party to the alleged conspiracy. Similar allegations are against other eight persons as well alleging their role at different stages. Notwithstanding the same, three Officers, namely, Subhash Ahluwalia, Subhash Negi and T.G. Negi were not even charged on the purported ground that there were not enough evidence and mala fide intention. In respect of Mr. Ajay Sharma, Central Government had declined the sanction. Though, State Government had accorded the sanction for prosecution earlier but it has also later withdrawn. Same is the position in respect of Deepak Sanan. Mr. Gopi Chand, who belongs to HPAS, though the prosecution sanction was granted earlier, in his case also, not only prosecution sanction was withdrawn by the State Government, he has even been promoted to IAS Cadre. In case of Mr. K.K. Pant and Mr. P.C. Dhiman, other IAS Officers, prosecution sanction is declined. This leaves us only Mr. Devi Chand Chauhan, Executive Engineer, Dharamshala Division in PWD, though in his case also, prosecution sanction was earlier rejected but subsequently granted on the recommendation of the then Chief Minister. There are two Gram Panchayat members, who had issued no objection for allotment of land for club house, who have been prosecuted. These three Officers are public servants who remain as accused persons. This Court gets an impression that in the entire conspiracy story put up by the prosecution, high Government officials are deliberately let off and very junior Officers were become scapegoat in order to ensure that a case under PC Act survives in respect of appellants as well who are not public servants. Even otherwise, when the aforesaid eight persons are not charged or proceeded against for want of prosecution, this lends support to the allegations of the appellants in imputing motives for their prosecution. (42) This Court, on a 360° scanning of the matter, arrives at the conclusion that the elements of criminal intent or criminal acts are lacking. Even otherwise, when the aforesaid eight persons are not charged or proceeded against for want of prosecution, this lends support to the allegations of the appellants in imputing motives for their prosecution. (42) This Court, on a 360° scanning of the matter, arrives at the conclusion that the elements of criminal intent or criminal acts are lacking. Following factors do stand established from record: (i) there is no criminal act on their part and the facts do not disclose any offence; (ii) none of the officers who processed the case of the appellants are not prosecuted; (iii) two Officers Subhash Ahluwalia and T.G. Negi who took active part in the decision making were made Principal Secretary to CM and Advisor to CM, respectively, by respondent No. 2 and were not prosecuted; (iv) As per the prosecution, there is no criminal act on the part of the officers and they performed their appropriate administrative duties due to which sanction stands declined by the Central Government and the CVC. That itself is sufficient to absolve others from any criminal prosecution; (x) even otherwise the State Government continues to remain owner of the land which is on lease and on which the appellants have constructed assets worth above 150 crores; (xi) these assets are for use of the public of the State and are being used as such. Further, filing of chargesheet and an order taking cognizance is not a final judicial order. It is a preliminary process in criminal law and is open to challenge in higher judicial for a such as this Court. (43) Insofar as conversion of Society into not for profit company under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 is concerned, it was obviously done as per the mandate of BCCI. There can hardly be an element of criminality therein. This Court fails to understand as to how any criminal intent can be attributed in merging the said society into a company, that too, to prevent the State Government from controlling it, which is the motive attributed by the respondents themselves. It rather shows the intent of the State Government which wanted to grab the control of the Cricket Association. Such a tendency on the part of the State authorities is condemned by a Committee headed by former Chief Justice R.M. Lodha and approved by this Court. If at all, this is a reflection upon the State Government. It rather shows the intent of the State Government which wanted to grab the control of the Cricket Association. Such a tendency on the part of the State authorities is condemned by a Committee headed by former Chief Justice R.M. Lodha and approved by this Court. If at all, this is a reflection upon the State Government. It also lends credence to the submission of the appellants that when the State Government fail to achieve the aforesaid purpose, it went after the appellants. If at all, the subject matter was a civil dispute between the appellants and the respondents.” 21. Leaving everything aside, careful perusal of FIR No.17 of 2013, which is sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, nowhere reveals prima-facie case, if any, against the petitioners and other persons named in the FIR. There is no specific allegations, if any, with regard to uprooting/felling of tress, if any, standing on the land used by the petitioner for construction of the hotel, The Pavilion, rather allegations contained in the FIR is that in July-August, 2009, Van Mahotsav was organized under the chairmanship of Industry Minister, wherein 1500 trees were planted by spending sum of Rs.18100/-. Interestingly, it stands mentioned in the FIR that during investigation, DFO Dharamshala got the trees standing on the land in question counted and found that there are 2023 trees standing on the land leased out in favour of the Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association. Though, as per Investigating Agency, the age of the trees standing in and around the building constructed by petitioner No.1 on the land allotted in its favour has been found between 48 to 50 years, but definitely there appears to be no evidence, if any, with regard to illegal felling of tress on the land by the petitioners where hotel “The Pavilion”, came to be constructed. 22. 22. The judgment dated 2.11.2018 passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which has been otherwise taken note hereinabove, reveals that respondents had filed status report before the High Court, wherein it was alleged that Shri. R.S.Gupta, the then Deputy Commissioner, had prepared report ignoring the report of Divisional Forest Officer, who had assessed the value of trees at Rs.50 lakh at that time, but interestingly, such allegation is totally missing in the FIR No.17 of 2013, wherein precise allegation is with regard to illegal felling of trees for the construction of the hotel “The Pavilion”. Moreover, aforesaid assertion contained in the status report is nowhere recorded in the FIR, wherein specific allegation is that number of pine trees were standing on the land allotted to petitioner No.1 for construction of hotel, ‘The Pavilion”. Neither there is definite evidence with regard to existence, if any, of pine trees on the land allotted to petitioner No.1 for construction of hotel “The Pavilion” nor there is material available on record suggestive of the fact that trees, if any, standing on the land leased out for construction of hotel “The Pavilion” were illegally felled, rather allegations contained in the FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, are based upon mere presumption that since many trees have been found standing in and around the building/infrastructure developed on the land leased out in favour of petitioner No.1 at Khanyara, there is possibility of forging of record by the revenue officials, enabling petitioner No.1 to raise construction of hotel on the land in question. 23. Leaving everything aside, since main FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1.8.2013 stands quashed, no fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the present FIR alive, especially when State Government itself has decided to withdraw prosecution sanction in respect of FIR No.12 of 2013, dated 1.8.2013 registered with police Station, SV & ACV, Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. Though, nothing remains to be adjudicated in the instant case by this Court in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, but otherwise also, in totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds it to be a fit case to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for quashment of FIR as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent court of law. It is now well settled that High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C, is well within its jurisdiction to quash the FIR or pending proceedings, which if allowed to continue would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. Case arisen out of FIR No.12 of 2013, if permitted to continue would not only result in the abuse of the process of law, but would also not serve the ends of justice. To invoke inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. 24. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion made hereinabove as well as judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court coupled with the decision taken by the Cabinet, FIR No.17/2013,dated 29.11.2013, under Sections 447, 406 201 and 120-B of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998, registered by Anti Corruption Unit at Dharamshala as well as consequent proceedings pending adjudication in the Court of learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, are quashed and seta-side and the petitioners-accused are acquitted of the charges framed against them. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.