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2019 DIGILAW 1955 (JHR)

Coal Mines Provident Fund Organization, Dhanbad v. Pankaj Kumar Sinha

2019-12-04

RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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JUDGMENT : 1. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 90. 2. This appeal is directed against the decision dated 16.11.2017 rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 4522 of 2017. 3. The writ petitioners-respondent nos. 1 to 90 filed a writ petition for quashing of memo no. CPF/2(3)/Electric/Sampada/Vol-II/150 dated 23.05.2017 (appended as Annexure-7 to the writ petition) which was issued by the Regional Commissioner-11/Estate, Coal Mines Provident Fund Organization, Dhanbad directing recovery of Rs.2.16 crore against electric charges from the employees of the Coal Mines Provident Fund Organization (hereinafter referred to as “CMPFO”) including the writ petitioners. The writ petitioners-respondents also sought for quashing of notice contained in memo no.CPF/2(3)/Electric Charge/Part-2/ Sampada/815 dated 20.02.2017 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) issued by the Assistant Commissioner-I, Estate, Coal Mines Provident Fund Organization, Dhanbad (respondent no.3 to the writ petition) communicating that the order has been passed for recovery of the amount of Rs.2.16 crore which the CMPFO has incurred against the payment of dues towards consumption of electricity. 4. Facts in brief which would be necessary for consideration of the lis, stand enumerated as under: 5. The writ petitioners-respondent nos. 1 to 90 are employees of CMPFO and were posted at Headquarters and Regional Office at Dhanbad and were allocated quarters for residential purpose. The authorities of CMPFO, for the benefits of the employees, had taken a decision that only electricity charges at fixed rate would be recovered from the employees who are occupying residential quarters. Obviously this step was taken for the benefit of the employees. The fixed rate was used to be revised time to time. However, it appears that the Audit Officer, Office of the Principal Director of Commercial Audit & Ex-Officio Member, Audit Board-II, Indian Audit & Account Department, Kolkata vide Preliminary Audit Query No. 02 dated 31.03.2015 made an observation that due to non-installation of meters in the residential quarters and charging nominal fixed rate from the officers and staffs for supply of electricity, this CMPFO had incurred electricity expenditure amounting to Rs.2.16 crore during the years 2011-12 to 2013-14 which was in disregard of the instructions issued by the Ministry of Coal. Thereafter, the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Coal vide its letter dated 24.01.2017 directed the Commissioner of CMPFO to immediately take steps to recover the electricity charges which was paid by the CMPFO. As a consequence thereof, the Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner, Ministry of Coal, Government of India, Dhanbad issued direction for recovery of Rs. 2.08 crores from the employees of CMPFO for the aforesaid period and also directed for recovery of the said amount in installments of six months and the same was intimated to the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Coal, Government of India vide letter dated 09.02.2017. Accordingly, the Assistant Commissioner-I, Estate, Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner issued notice dated 20.02.2017 intimating the officers regarding the order which has been passed for recovery of Rs.2.16 crore. The Union of the writ petitioners filed representation against the order of recovery but the Regional Commissioner-11/Estate, Coal Mines Provident Fund Organization, Dhanbad issued office order directing for such recovery from the salary of the employees, who were occupying the residential quarters of CMPFO at the rate mentioned in the office order. Hence, the writ petition was filed. 6. The learned Single Judge, after consideration of materials available on record and hearing the parties has come to the conclusion that the order of recovery which has got civil consequence has been passed without adhering to the principle of natural justice, i.e., without affording any opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners. As a consequence of the said impugned decision, recovery was to be made from the salary of the employees without any order having been passed after giving them opportunity of hearing or holding that the amount has been found to be appropriated or withdrawn illegally by the said employees. The learned Single Judge has also noticed that since consumption of electricity in each quarter is different, as such, the liability of each and every employee cannot be apportioned uniformly and that too being saddled retrospectively, merely on the basis of some observations in the audit report whereas the writ petitioners-respondents had admittedly all along paid the electricity charges at a fixed rate, so fixed by the respondents-appellants and revised time to time. 7. 7. Learned Single Judge has noticed that the only justification for passing the impugned order and issuing the impugned notice is that the recovery is being done in consonance with the instructions issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Coal, Government of India, New Delhi. It is not stated anywhere that the writ petitioners-respondents had violated any instruction or order of the CMPFO which was prevalent at the relevant time rather the decision for charging electricity at a fixed rate was obviously and admittedly taken by the respondents-appellants and that was revised also from time to time. That apart, since it cannot be assumed that all the employees were consuming electricity uniformly so the recovery can be made at a fixed rate assuming as if they were consuming it equally and thus would be liable to pay back the amount in equal share. Such decision according to the learned Single Judge has a fervor of arbitrariness. It has been held that it cannot be said that the writ petitioners-respondents have fastened equal liability, irrespective of the fact that every employee must have been consuming electricity of different quantum. 8. In the result, the writ petition was allowed and the impugned order and notices were quashed and set aside. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that since there was audit objection and since there was such instruction from the Ministry of Coal, Government of India, New Delhi, they are left with no other option than to recover the same. It has further been argued that it is not the case that the writ petitioners did not consume the electricity charge yet they are being saddled with such liability. The fact is that they have consumed electricity and, thus, if a decision has been taken to recover the amount as per their consumption it cannot be held to be suffered from the vice of illegality. 10. However, in our opinion, aforesaid limb of argument can be noted only to be rejected for the reasons that the learned Single Judge has correctly observed that without fixing as to what was the amount for the electricity energy consumed by a particular person occupying a particular quarter, they cannot be saddled with the liability of equal share for recovery of Rs.2.16 crore though there is no basis or foundation for charging in such manner. Further, it was their policy i.e. policy of the respondents-appellants under which they took a decision to give certain benefits to the employees by charging electricity at a fixed rate only knowing fully well that the CMPFO would have to incur the excess amount which would be consumed by the employees/staffs occupying the residential quarters. Once a policy decision was there and the employees without fail paid the amount which was charged from them, even after its revision time to time, they cannot be held to be responsible for such loss. In fact this cannot be taken as a loss because it was a decision of the respondents-appellants itself to grant such benefit to the staffs who were occupying the quarters. That apart, whether that can be done retrospectively, they would have changed the policy decision that in future they would not be granting such benefits to the employees. Recovery of amount with retrospective date, in our opinion, would suffer from illegality and would have fervor of arbitrariness. 11. Learned Single Judge has rightly placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in CIT Vs. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1 . For better appreciation, the paragraphs quoted in the writ petition are extracted and quoted here once again:- “29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectively is the principle of “fairness”, which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L’Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is different. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators’ object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective. In Govt. of India v. Indian Tobacco Assn., the doctrine of fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in Vijay v. State of Maharashtra. It was held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature. However, we are (sic not) confronted with any such situation here. 31. In such cases, retrospectively is attached to benefit the persons in contradistinction to the provision imposing some burden or liability where the presumption attaches towards prospectively. In the instant case, the proviso added to Section 113 of the Act is not beneficial to the assessee. On the contrary, it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this, we have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption against retrospective operation. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by outweighing factors.” 12. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by outweighing factors.” 12. In the case in hand, as noted by the learned Single Judge, the writ petitioners were paying electricity charges at the fixed rate which was fixed by the respondents-appellants as per their own decision and this fact has never been denied by them. The foundation of all the impugned decisions may it be of the intimation by the Central Government and thereafter certain orders having been passed by the authorities of the respondents-appellants are the observations made by the Audit Officer which is available at Annexure-2 to the writ petition. It appears therefrom that certain informations were sought from the CMPFO and one of them was as to why there was non-separation of domestic and industrial connections. Secondly, what was the reason for non-installation of electric meters in residential quarters; whether CMPFO has ever brought the issue before the BOT relating to non-installation of electric meters in residential quarters and expenditure incurred on electricity consumed by the staffs/officers in disregard of Ministry of Coal; if yes, the decision of BOT was required to be furnished. It has further been queried as to whether CMPFO has ever conducted any meeting with Jharkhand State Electricity Board/State Government on the issue of installment of meters in residential quarters and on the issue of installation of meters in residential quarters and on the issue of non-separation of domestic and industrial line, if yes, a copy of the minutes and agenda was required to be furnished. 13. From the materials available on record, it appears that in place of responding to the audit objection or the audit query, the respondents-appellants in a haste had taken an ex-parte decision without granting opportunity to the affected persons, for recovering of the amount at a fixed rate in equal shares from all employees who were occupying the residential quarters. In our opinion, the said decision suffers from illegality and arbitrariness and that cannot be allowed to survive. 14. Having said so and finding no reasons for interference in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, this appeal has to fail. 15. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs.