JUDGMENT : 1. Respondents had faced trial in FIR No. 42 dated 14.2.2007 registered at Police Station Chiksana, Bharatpur under Section 302 and 120-B Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). 2. Prosecution story, in brief, is that on 8.1.2007, Rohtash had gone with Rajendra S/o. Ghamandi to his fields. Kalua, Sannu and Rajendra S/o. Nahariya were already present there. Accused gave beatings to Rohtash. The said fact was witnessed by Seema and Naresh (sisters of Rohtash). At that time complainant was not present in her house on account of death of Krishan S/o. Valla. Complainant had gone to Bharatpur for post-mortem examination of deceased Krishan. Complainant returned home at about 8.00 p.m. Since, Rohtash had not returned home, complainant party searched for him at their tubewell but he could not be located. On 9.1.2007 at about 7.00 a.m., he came to know that one dead body was lying on the roadside. Thereafter, complainant alongwith other family members reached the spot and found that her son was lying dead. They approached the police station and the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. Police filed a report under Section 174 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.'). On the basis of the private complaint filed by the complainant, formal FIR was registered. 3. After completion of investigation, negative final report was submitted by the Investigating Agency. 4. Thereafter, complainant preferred a protest petition and cognizance was taken by the Magistrate against accused Rajendra S/o. Ghamandi under Section 302 IPC and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial. 5. Charge was framed against accused Rajendra S/o. Ghamandi under Section 302 IPC on 18.11.2011. During trial, application was moved by the prosecution under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the same was allowed vide order dated 7.12.2012 and Sannu, Rajendra S/o. Nahariya and Kalua were summoned to face trial as additional accused. 6. During trial, prosecution examined 8 witnesses. After the close of prosecution evidence, accused when examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. prayed that they had been falsely involved in this case. 7. Trial Court vide judgment dated 31.10.2018 ordered the acquittal of respondents. Hence, the present application for leave to appeal by the complainant. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the record available on the file carefully. 9. Incident in the present case had occurred on 8.1.2007. 7. Trial Court vide judgment dated 31.10.2018 ordered the acquittal of respondents. Hence, the present application for leave to appeal by the complainant. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the record available on the file carefully. 9. Incident in the present case had occurred on 8.1.2007. Post-mortem examination of the deceased was conducted on 9.1.2007. Proceedings under Section 174 Cr.P.C. were initiated on 9.1.2007. Appellant filed a complaint on 27.1.2007 under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Thereafter, FIR Exhibit-14 was registered on 14.2.2007. After investigation, Investigating Agency submitted a negative final report and cognizance was taken by the Magistrate on a protest petition filed by the complainant/appellant. 10. Trial Court while ordering the acquittal of the respondents has taken into consideration the fact that as per PW-3 Naresh, she had seen the accused giving beatings to Rohtash. However, the said witness did not intervene and returned home. Said witness had not informed anybody on reaching home with regard to the incident. The said witness also stated that she had never seen the accused quarreling with Rohtash earlier to the incident. She had not seen the accused administering any poisonous substance to Rohtash. Although, the said witness had stated that she had witnessed the incident for 5 minutes, but she did not inform about the same to anybody. The said witness also stated that the accused were unarmed and she had not seen any injury on the person of the deceased. 11. Learned trial Court has further noticed that PW-6 Seema had corroborated the statement of PW-3 but in her cross-examination, she deposed that the well from where they had gone to take water, was at a distance about 2 Kilometers from their house and the entire village took water from the said well. Throughout the day villagers came to take water from the well. She stated that she had not informed the incident to her parents at night. She had not seen accused giving any poisonous substance to the deceased. The said witness deposed that the accused were armed with sticks and had inflicted injuries on the eye, ribs, hands and knees of the deceased, whereas, PW-3 had deposed that the accused were unarmed and there was no injury on the person of Rohtash. 12. As per the medical opinion, cause of death of Rohtash was Organophosphorus Insecticide poisoning. The said witness deposed that the accused were armed with sticks and had inflicted injuries on the eye, ribs, hands and knees of the deceased, whereas, PW-3 had deposed that the accused were unarmed and there was no injury on the person of Rohtash. 12. As per the medical opinion, cause of death of Rohtash was Organophosphorus Insecticide poisoning. The dead body of Rohtash was recovered on 9.1.2007, whereas, the complaint was filed by the complainant on 27.1.2007. 13. In view of the statements of PW3 and PW6, the delay in filing the complaint by the complainant gains significance. Dead body was found on the roadside and not in the fields. Statements of PW3 and PW6, star witnesses of the prosecution, fail to inspire confidence. In case, the said witnesses, who are none other than the sisters of the deceased, had actually witnessed the accused in an altercation with the deceased, they would have immediately informed their family members or any other villager immediately after reaching home. Hence, the possibility that the delay in filing the complaint might have been used to create a concocted story by the complainant party, cannot be ruled out. 14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the accused were liable to be acquitted of the charges framed against him. 15. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2002 (1) RCR (Criminal) 748, has held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court. 16. Similarly, in Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura, 2011 (9) SCC 479 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into various judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under: "It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed" 17. Hence, no ground for grant of leave to appeal is made out. Consequently, application for leave to appeal is dismissed.