JUDGMENT Yashwant Varma, J. Heard Sri Santosh Kumar Chaubey, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Manav Chaurasiya, who has appeared for the Union-respondents. 2. This petition challenges an order dated 4 December 2018 pursuant to which the candidature of the petitioner for being granted appointment as Constable Driver has been rejected on the ground that he did not possess a driving licence for Heavy Motor Vehicles on the last date of submission of application forms. The issue itself arises in the backdrop of the petitioner having obtained a licence for Heavy Motor Vehicle/Transport Vehicle on 1 May 2018 whereas the last date for submission of the application forms was 19 March 2018. 3. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner did possess a licence for Light Motor Vehicle and Motor Cycle with gear issued in 2014 and he was therefore incorrectly found to be ineligible. It is further contended that the clause in the advertisement dealing with “Experience” required an applicant to establish that he had three years' experience of driving “Heavy Motor Vehicle/Transport Vehicle or Light Motor Vehicle and Motor Cycle with gear” as on the last date of submission of application. According to the learned counsel, this must necessarily be viewed as enabling candidates to possess a licence in either of the categories. Dealing with the stages of the recruitment process itself it was lastly urged that the testimonials could have been filed right upto the end of the recruitment exercise itself and that merely because the last date of application was prescribed to be 19 March 2018, the same alone would not merit rejection of the application made by the petitioner. 4. This Court finds itself unable to sustain these submissions for the following reasons. 5. As is evident from a reading of Clause 4(c) of the eligibility criteria as set forth in the advertisement, all candidates were liable to hold a valid licence for (a) Heavy Motor Vehicle or Transport Vehicle, (b) Light Motor Vehicle and (c) Motor Cycle with gear. As this Court reads the said clause it is manifest that the applicants should have been in possession of a licence in respect of all three categories of vehicles and not in any one or either of them. As this Court reads the said clause it is manifest that the applicants should have been in possession of a licence in respect of all three categories of vehicles and not in any one or either of them. As is evident from a reading of the particular clause, the requirement clearly was of holding a license in all three categories. The clause as framed and set forth in the advertisement did not envisage the three categories to be read as mutually exclusive or the holder of a license in any one of the categories to be eligible. 6. Insofar as the submission resting on the clause with respect to “Experience” is concerned, the Court is of the considered view that this clause cannot possibly be read or conferred a construction which militates against the clause relating to the essential eligibility criteria as framed. The mere usage of the “forward slash” symbol also known as the “virgule” also does not carry the case of the petitioner any further for the following reasons. 7. Firstly the virgule is used in the clause only to separate the expressions “Heavy Motor Vehicle” and “Transport Vehicle”. This punctuation symbol is not used to separate the other categories of vehicles mentioned in that clause. 8. Secondly the Court notes the settled position struck by the English Courts which hold that punctuation plays a minor role in the construction of statutes unless it is found that the statute has been carefully or elaborately punctuated embodying the intent of the framers thereof to give effect to the same. In India the position was succinctly noticed in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Reliance Industries Ltd, (2017) 16 SCC 28 ., in the following terms:- 16. The manner in which punctuations are to be interpreted is provided by this Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra [Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 591 ] in the following manner: (SCC pp. 628-29, paras 68-70) “68. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rajinder Singh v. Kultar Singh, (1980) AIR(P&H) 1 : 1979 SCCOnLine(P&H) 145 : ILR (1979) 2 P&H 486 touching the same topic stated thus: (SCC OnLine P&H paras 22, 24-25 & 33 : AIR p. 1) “22. ... 628-29, paras 68-70) “68. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rajinder Singh v. Kultar Singh, (1980) AIR(P&H) 1 : 1979 SCCOnLine(P&H) 145 : ILR (1979) 2 P&H 486 touching the same topic stated thus: (SCC OnLine P&H paras 22, 24-25 & 33 : AIR p. 1) “22. ... so far as the High Courts are concerned, the topic of jurisdiction and powers in general is not separately mentioned in any of the entries of List I, but “Administration of Justice” as a distinct topic finds a place in Entry 3 of List II (now Entry 11-A of List III). *** 24. ... The expression “Administration of Justice” occurring in Schedule VII List II Entry 3 has also to be construed in its widest sense so as to give power to the State Legislature to legislate on all matters relating to administration of justice. 25. ... After the words “Administration of Justice” in Entry 3 there is a semicolon and this punctuation cannot be discarded as being inappropriate. The punctuation has been put with a definite object of making this topic as distinct and not having relation only to the topic that follows thereafter. *** 33. ... under Entry 78 of List I, the topic of jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts is not dealt with and that under Entry 3 of List II the State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers or restrict or withdraw the jurisdiction and powers already conferred on any of the courts except the Supreme Court, in respect of any statute and therefore, the State Legislature has the power to make a law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court.' 69. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose [Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, (1952) AIR SC 369], Mukherjea, J. in AIR para 57 has observed that: (AIR p. 383 : SCR p. 41) '57. ... Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English courts. ... When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation.' 70. ... Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English courts. ... When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation.' 70. In our view the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was right in giving emphasis and meaning to semicolon in Entry 3 of the list after the words “administration of justice” in Rajinder Singh [Rajinder Singh v. Kultar Singh, (1980) AIR(P&H) 1: 1979 SCC OnLine P&H 145 : ILR (1979) 2 P&H 486] . Semicolon after the words “administration of justice” in Entry 11-A, in our view, has significance in dealing with the topic whether “administration of justice” includes conferring general jurisdiction on High Court in addition to the subordinate courts within the State.” 9. The Bombay High Court in a lucid decision in Abdul Sajid Abdul Sadiq Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 4 MhLJ 306 elaborated on the legal position in the following terms:- “4. In order to deal with the arguments advanced by the learned A.P.P., it will be necessary to first refer to principles of interpretation relating to punctuations. The American view has noted down in N.S. Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, IX Edition under Chapter 2 note (h) Punctuations and Brackets at pages 98-99 is as under:-- “American view -- Punctuation is a most fallible standard by which to interpret a writing; it may be resorted to when all other means fail, but the Court will first take the instrument by its four corners, in order to ascertain its true meaning; if that is apparent on judicially inspecting the whole, the punctuation will not be suffered to change it. For the purpose of arriving at the true meaning of a statute Courts read with such stops as are manifestly required. Punctuation is a minor, and not a controlling, element in interpretation, and the Courts will disregard the punctuation of a statute, or re-punctuate it, if need be, to give effect to what otherwise appears to be its purpose and true meaning. Punctuation marks are no part of an Act. Punctuation is a minor, and not a controlling, element in interpretation, and the Courts will disregard the punctuation of a statute, or re-punctuate it, if need be, to give effect to what otherwise appears to be its purpose and true meaning. Punctuation marks are no part of an Act. To determine the intent of the law, the Court, in construing a statute, will disregard the punctuation or will re-punctuate it, if that be necessary, in order to arrive at the natural meaning of the words employed.” 5. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes has dealt with punctuation as under:-- “Punctuation is disregarded in the construction of statutes, since there was generally no punctuation in old statutes as engrossed on the Parliament Roll, and not all of the modern vellum prints of statutes are punctuated. “In an Act of Parliament there are no such things as brackets any more than there are such things as stops.” “Before 1850 there was no punctuation in the manuscript copy of an Act which received the Royal Assent, and it does not appear that the printers had any statutory authority to insert punctuation thereafter. So even if punctuation in more modern Acts can be looked at (which is very doubtful), I do not thing that one can have any regard to punctuation in older Acts.” In the same way, the manner in which a statute has been printed, the indentation of the paragraphs and so on, is irrelevant. The irrelevance of punctuation has two consequences. First, a provision in a statute may be read as though the punctuation which appears on the face of the Act were omitted. By section 113(4) of the Housing Act 1957, “the local authority shall from time to time review rents and make such changes, either of rents generally or of particular rents, and rebates (if any) as circumstances may require.” This is to be read as though there were no comma after “rents” where that word occurs for the third time. By section 113(4) of the Housing Act 1957, “the local authority shall from time to time review rents and make such changes, either of rents generally or of particular rents, and rebates (if any) as circumstances may require.” This is to be read as though there were no comma after “rents” where that word occurs for the third time. “The obligation,” said Harman L.J., “is not to make rebates, as grammatically it should be if the comma were there, but to make changes of rebates (if any).” Secondly, where it is necessary to give a provision a particular construction which is at variance with the way in which the section is punctuated, it may be read as though there were in fact punctuation where none appears on the fact of the Act. Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 conferred on a superior Court power to discharge a fugitive where “by reason of the trivial nature of the case, or by reason of the application for the return of a fugitive not being made in good faith in the interests of justice or otherwise... it would be unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment to return” him. It was held that, apart from cases of a trivial nature, the Court's discretion to discharge a fugitive could be exercised in any case in which the return of the man would be unjust or oppressive or too severe, and was not confined to cases in which the application appeared not to have been made in good faith. In other words, the section was given a wide construction, as though a comma had been inserted before “or otherwise.” 6. Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, under sub-head 'Construction where no punctuation' in Chapter X, foot note 60 at page 198 has referred to the case of Alexander v. Mackenzie, 1947 JC 155 (Scot.) in which Lord Jamieson said, “While notice may be taken of punctuation in construing a statute, a comma or the absence of a comma must be disregarded if to give effect to it would so alter the sense as to be contrary to the plain intention of the statute.” 7. Sutherland in Statutory Construction third edition, vol. 2 art. Sutherland in Statutory Construction third edition, vol. 2 art. 4939, pp 447-78 states -- “The better rule is that punctuation is a part of the Act and that it may be considered in the interpretation of the Act but may not be used to create doubt or to distort or defeat the intention of the Legislature. When the intent is uncertain, punctuation, if it affords some indication of the true intention, may be looked to as an aid. In such a case the punctuation may be disregarded, transposed, or the Act may be re-punctuated if the Act as originally punctuated does not reflect the true legislative purpose. An Act should be read as punctuated unless there is some reason to the contrary, and this is specially true where a statute has been repeatedly re-enacted with the same punctuation.” 8. In Indian Law, the position, however, is different and punctuation has often been taken into consideration. The use of hyphen was taken notice of by a Full Bench of Seven Judges in Isap Ahmed v. Abrahmji Ahmadi. In Gale v. Gale, 47 PR 1911 (FB), the interpretation of the last paragraph of section 3(1) of the Indian Divorce Act, IV of 1869 came for consideration and Sir Aurthur Reid, C.J., with whom Kensington, J., concurred, put the matter thus, “The punctuation of the words “the husband and wife reside or last resided together” indicates clearly that 'together' must be read with “last resided” only and had intention of the Legislature been to make 'together' apply to 'reside' we should have expected a comma after 'reside' and after 'resided'. Rattigan, J., who agreed hesitatingly with the majority opined: “Legal documents in strictness should not be punctuated, and that the rule applies equally to Acts of Legislatures, and it may have been for this reason that the comma was omitted after 'reside'. 9. In Jupiter Insurance Company v. Abdul Aziz, 1923 AIR(Rang) 185, the Bench did not consider it always safe to rely on punctuation as a deciding factor in a question of construction. In Niaz Ahmed v. Parsottam Chandra, (1931) AIR Allahabad 154, Sulaiman J. felt that the difficulty was caused mainly by the punctuation and following the dicta of the two Privy Council cases ignored the comma. In Niaz Ahmed v. Parsottam Chandra, (1931) AIR Allahabad 154, Sulaiman J. felt that the difficulty was caused mainly by the punctuation and following the dicta of the two Privy Council cases ignored the comma. In Birendra Lal Chaudhary v. Nagendra Nath Mukherjee, (1935) 39 CalWN 910, it was observed that, no doubt there is an old rule that the punctuation is not a part of the statute, but where it is not contended that the punctuation is wrongly placed, there is no reason why the punctuation should not be taken as a good guide for the purpose for which it is there, namely to understand the passage. In Indian Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Hari Poonjoo, (1937) AIR Bombay 39, the Court, after taking into consideration the previous Bombay case and the two Privy Council cases held that in considering the plain words of a section punctuation could not be relied upon. In re Krishnaji Gopal, AIR 1940 Bom. 360, the Court made full use of the comma after the word 'conditions' and of the omission thereof after the work 'circumstances', in the expression 'shall in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order...' 11. In Ashwin Kumar v. Arabindo Bose, (1952) AIR SC 369it has been laid down that when a Statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. Hence, punctuation may have its uses in cases, but it cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of the text. 13. It, therefore, follows that while marks of punctuation contained in a statute will not generally be wholly ignored by the Court in interpreting a statutory provision, it may not always be safe to rely or punctuation as a deciding factor. The Court is required to give importance to the language used by legislature and if it is found that the word used in the section when read as a whole, clearly furnish a clue to the legislative intent underlying the section and they admit of an interpretation consistent with the said legislative intent, any punctuation work which is inconsistent with such construction will be disregarded and the punctuation will not be allowed to control the plain meaning of the text.” 10. Bearing in mind the aforesaid legal principles in mind it is evident that not much turns on the use of punctuation in the clause in question. Even otherwise the Court finds no ambiguity in the clause relating to essential qualifications which may compel it to confer it an interpretation controlled by either the punctuation or language of the clause relating to Experience. 11. The Court finds itself unable to hold in favour of the petitioner for another reason. The virgule punctuation symbol need not and under all circumstances be read as 'or'. In many situations it may be liable to be viewed as a mere separator between two distinct subjects or in a given situation a denotation for the word 'and' as distinct from 'or'. Ultimately it would depend in the context in which it is used and upon a holistic overview of the entire provision. However, as noted above, in the facts of the present case, the punctuation mark as used in the clause in question neither impacts nor overshadows the clause prescribing the essential qualification. 12. The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that the testimonials could have been submitted after the last date for filing of applications is clearly not worthy of acceptance in light of the settled legal position that the eligibility criteria must be met by all prospective candidates on the last date of submission of the application forms. Undisputedly, the petitioner did not possess a licence to drive Heavy Motor Vehicle or Transport Vehicle on 19 March 2018. 13. The Court, therefore, finds no ground to interfere with the order impugned. The petition is consequently dismissed.