ORDER : Narendra Singh Dhaddha, J. 1. This special appeal has been filed by the appellant - Senior Medical Officer/In-charge Hospital, ESI Hospital No. 2, MIA, Alwar against the order dated 23.10.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge had dismissed the writ petition challenging the award dated 24.11.2015 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Alwar (for short "the Tribunal") whereby the Tribunal allowed the claim petition of the workman. The action of department was held to be illegal & unjustified. Consequential directions were issued to be reinstated with 25% back wages with full allowances from the date of his termination and from the date of award i.e. 24.11.2015, the respondent workman would be entitled to get the full allowances in accordance with rules and the services of the respondent workman were directed to be in continuous from the date of his termination i.e. 01.11.1995. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the respondent workman submitted a statement of claim before the learned Labour Court, Alwar that he was working as Security Guard since 5.12.1989 at the rate of Rs. 5/- per day rendering 12 hours duty. Services of the respondent were terminated on 01.11.1995 without any reason. Respondent workman had worked 240 days in a calendar year. The Tribunal after hearing both the parties passed an award in favour of respondent workman on 24.11.2015 holding that due to non-compliance of section 25(F) of the I.D. Act the action of the appellant in terminating the service of the workman is illegal & unjustified. The workman applicant is entitled to be reinstated by 25% back wages with full allowances from the date of his termination i.e. 01.11.1995. The action of department was held to be illegal & unjustified. Consequential directions were issued to be reinstated with 25% back wages with allowance from the date of his termination and from the date of award i.e. 24.11.2015, the respondent workman would be entitled to get the full allowances in accordance with rules and the services of the respondent workman were directed to be in continuous from the date of his termination i.e. 01.11.1995. The learned Single Judge dismissed writ petition. 3. This Court while issuing notices of the appeal to the respondent, stayed operation of the award on 23.1.2018 requiring the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs with Registrar (Judicial). The learned Single Judge dismissed writ petition. 3. This Court while issuing notices of the appeal to the respondent, stayed operation of the award on 23.1.2018 requiring the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs with Registrar (Judicial). Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the impugned order dated 23.10.2017 is perverse and illegal. The learned Single Judge has committed a serious error in dismissing the writ petition. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent workman had not completed 240 days. He also submitted that the respondent was never appointed against the sanctioned post of Security Guard, rather, he was engaged as Gardener on daily wages basis for working not more than 2 hours per day. He submitted that the respondent was never terminated from service, he willfully abandoned the job and stopped coming on duty. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that provisions of Act are not applicable to the daily wager. So, the learned Single Judge had committed a serious legal error in passing the impugned order. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. The respondent in his evidence before learned Tribunal clearly stated that he was employed as Security Guard on 5.12.1989. The respondent workman had completed 240 days in preceding 12 months from the date of his termination i.e. 01.11.1995. So, the appeal be dismissed. 5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by both the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and the material available on record. 6. Considering that the workman in the instant case was removed from the service on 1.11.1995, i.e., 24 years ago, reference of the industrial dispute was made on 9.6.1997, award of the Tribunal was passed on 24.11.2015 and the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed on 23.10.2017, almost 24 years have elapsed after the date of termination, we therefore deem it more appropriate to award lump sum compensation to the respondent instead of reinstatement. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan and Anr. Vs. Amar Singh and Anr., RLW 2007 (1) Raj. 546, has observed as under:- "10. A Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan and Ors. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan and Anr. Vs. Amar Singh and Anr., RLW 2007 (1) Raj. 546, has observed as under:- "10. A Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan and Ors. V. Rashid Mohammad 2004 (5) WLC 463 was dealing with the case where the respondent Rashid Mohammad was appointed as a Guard on daily wages basis on 01.02.1990 and was finally removed on 17.5.1994. The Division bench while taking into consideration the facts that already nine years have elapsed, modified the judgment of the learned Single Judge by directing that instead of reinstatement, the petitioner would be entitled to a lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation for full and final settlement of all his claim. In doing so the learned Division Bench of this Court relied upon the various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court which may be summarized as under: (1) In Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 95 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court has discretion to award compensation instead of reinstatement if the circumstances of a particular case are unusual or exceptional so as to make the reinstatement in expedient or improper. (2) In Chandu Lal Vs. The Management of PAN American World Airways, (1985) II LLJ 181 SC, the Apex Court, instead of granting the relief of reinstatement, granted compensation. (3) In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Malu Amra, (1994) II LLJ 552 SC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the aspect of long lapse of time between the termination and the date of Award and held that the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement was proper. (4) In Sain Steel Products v. Naipal Singh and Ors. AIR 2001 SCW 2426 the Hon'ble Apex Court granted a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the workman in lieu of reinstatement or back wages on the ground that there had been an inordinate delay as the services had been terminated long back. (4) In Sain Steel Products v. Naipal Singh and Ors. AIR 2001 SCW 2426 the Hon'ble Apex Court granted a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the workman in lieu of reinstatement or back wages on the ground that there had been an inordinate delay as the services had been terminated long back. (5) In O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. And Ors., (1986) II LLJ 509 SC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court propounded the formula to award compensation equivalent to 3.33 years' salary (including allowances as admissible) on the basis of the last pay and allowances drawn by the appellant therein, to be a reasonable amount to be awarded in lieu of reinstatement as the appellant therein had served for eight years. (6) In Rolston Johan v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 131 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted a lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation in full and final settlement of the claim and in lieu of reinstatement and consequential benefits to the workman. 11. In another judgment in Arjun Singh and 4 Ors. V. Labour Court, Jodhpur and Ors. 2004 (4) WLC 145 : RLW 2005 (1) Raj. 435 a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which the workman Arjun Singh was appointed on 1.1.1988 and was removed from service on 1.4.1990. Apart from this, similar case of two more workmen was also considered therein. The matter came to the learned Labour Court on a reference being made to it by the appropriate Government. The Labour Court on a reference being made to it by the appropriate Government. The Labour Court found that the termination of workman was in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, instead of directing reinstatement of the workman it granted compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ratan Singh V. Union of India and Anr. reported in, wherein nearly 20 years had elapsed from the date when the services of the workman were terminated in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, while directing the payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement observed as under:- The services of the appellant were terminated in the year 1976. Nearly 20 years have elapsed since then, in these circumstances, we are not inclined to direct reinstatement of the appellant. Nearly 20 years have elapsed since then, in these circumstances, we are not inclined to direct reinstatement of the appellant. But having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that a consolidated sum of Rs. 25,000/- be paid to the appellant in lieu of compensation for back wages as well as reinstatement." 7. In the present case also in given facts, it would be evident that almost 24 years have elapsed after the termination of respondent, it would not be just and proper to reinstatement of the respondent workman. 8. With the above discussion, we allow the appeal in part. In lieu of reinstatement, respondent workman is held entitled to received as Rs. 3,00,000/- as lump sum compensation which has been deposited with the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. The impugned order of learned Single Judge dated 23.10.2017 and the award passed by the Labour Court, Alwar dated 24.11.2015 are modified accordingly. 8.1. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to pay the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/-, which was deposited by the appellant in view of order dated 23.01.2018 passed by this Court, to the respondent in his Bank account on his furnishing complete details. 9. Hence, the appeal is partly allowed.