ORDER Rusia, J -- 1. Heard on I. A. No. 1736/2019 an application for condonation of delay. 2. As per office objection, the appeal is barred by 269 days. 3. According to the appellant, against the impugned order dated 11.4.2018, Review Petition was filed which has been dismissed vide order dated 29.8.2018. Thereafter, legal opinion was sought from the Govt. Advocate which was received on 9.10.2018 and sent to the Law Department. Vide order dated 04.12.2018, the Law Department granted the permission to file writ appeal which was received by the OIC on 27.12.2018, thereafter, writ appeal was prepared and filed before this Court. 4. Considering the aforesaid procedure delay and contents of application as supported by an affidavit of Office-in-Charge of the Case , the delay in filing of this appeal is hereby condoned. 5. Also heard on the question of admission. 6. The appellant/State of Madhya Pradesh and others ( respondents in the writ petition) have filed the present appeal being aggrieved by order dated 11.4.2018 passed in Writ Petition No. 1273/2017 whereby the writ petition was allowed by giving direction to the respondent to consider the claim of the petitioner for compensate appointment in view of the policy dated 31.8.2016. 7. The facts of the case in short are that father of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petitioner’) was appointed as linemen in Public Health Engineering Department, Ujjain in the year 1985. Vide order dated 24.6.2013, he was given appointment in contingency establishment. While working in the department, he died on 4.7.2016. The petitioner, being one of the dependent, filed a representation for grant of compassionate appointment to him. By order dated 25.10.2016, the respondent has rejected his claim on the ground that in the policy dated 31.8.2016, the dependent of deceased employee died while working in the work charge and contingency establishment have been held entitle for compassionate appointment w.e.f. 31.8.2016 since his father i.e. Punamchand Jatav died on 4.7.2016, therefore, he is not entitle for compassionate appointment. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner filed writ petition before this Court. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner filed writ petition before this Court. The petitioner/ respondent filed detailed reply in the writ petition by submitting that the claim of the petitioner was rightly considered in view of the policy dated 29.9.2014 which was in vogue at the time of death of his father in which there is no provision for grant of compassionate appointment to the dependent of deceased employee worked in the work charged & contingency establishment. The policy dated 31.8.2016 is prospective in nature, hence, the respondents have rightly rejected his claim. 9. In support of his contention, the respondents have placed reliance on the judgement passed in the case of Canara Bank and another. v. M. Mahesh Kumar reported in 2015 (7) SCC 417. 10. By order dated 11.4.2018, the writ Court has allowed the writ petition by placing reliance over the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate bench of this Court in the Case of Dilip More v. State of M.P. and another Passed in Writ Petition No. 2692/2017 decided on 21.3.2018 and directed the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner in view of the policy dated 31.8.2016 and will not reject on the ground that his father was the employee of work charge contingency paid establishment. 11. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondents have preferred this appeal before this Court. 12. We have heard the learned government advocate appearing for the appellants and also perused the record. 13. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/ State is that the case of the petitioner has rightly been considered in view of the policy dated 31.8.2016 in which first time the dependents of employee who died while working in the work charge & contingency establishment has been held entitle for the compassionate appointment and under the policy dated 29.9.2014 they were entitled only for the ex-gratia amount of compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. Since father of the petitioner died on 4.7.2016 i.e. prior to the policy dated 31.8.2016 came into force, the respondents have rejected his claim. 14. We are not agreeing to the above submission because the General Administration Department of State of M.P. came up with a comprehensive policy dated 29.9.2014 for grant of compassionate appointment to one of the dependent of deceased government employee by superseding all earlier policies issued time to time . 14. We are not agreeing to the above submission because the General Administration Department of State of M.P. came up with a comprehensive policy dated 29.9.2014 for grant of compassionate appointment to one of the dependent of deceased government employee by superseding all earlier policies issued time to time . Clause 11.1 provides that on account of death of employee working in work charge and contingency establishment and daily wager during service, the one of the dependent of the family member will be entitled for one time compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- . By Circular dated 31.8.2016, the General Administration Department of State Government has only amended the aforesaid clause 11.1 and directed that one of the dependent of deceased of contingency paid employee shall be entitled for compassionate appointment. 15. The core question for consideration before us is that whether the circular dated 31.8.2016 can be termed as a new policy of compassionate appointment or not? The State Government framed the new policy for compassionate appointment dated 29.9.2014 but by circular dated 31.8.2016 and only one Clause 11.1 has been amended,which reads as under : Þ11-1 dk;ZHkkfjrk@vkdfLedrk fuf/k ls osru ikus okys ,oa nSfud osruHkksxh deZpkfj;ksa ds fnoaxr gksus ij vuqdaik fu;qfDr dh ik=rk ugh gksxh ijUrq muds ifjokj ds vkfJr ukekafdr lnL; dks ,deq'r :i;s 2-00 yk[k ¼:i;s nks yk[k½ dh jkf'k vuqdaik vuqnku ds uke ls nh tk,xhA mlesa xzst;wVh dh jkf'k lfEefyr ugha gksxhA bl jkf'k dk Hkqxrku lacaf/kr ds dk;ZHkkfjr@vkdfLedrk ds en ds varxZr osru en ls fd;k tkosxkAÞ 16. The circular dated 31.8.2016 is not a new policy, but a circular by which the existing policy dated 29.9.2014 has been amended. The other conditions of policy dated 29.9.2014 are intact and all are still in force till today despite issuance of circular dated 31.8.2016 . Clause 11.1 provides for payment of compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- in lieu of compassionate appointment for the dependents of deceased employee who died while working under the work charged & contingency establishment. Vide circular dated 31.8.2016, respondents have only omitted Clause 11.1 and provided a new clause by which the dependent of the deceased employee has been held entitled for compassionate appointment subject to fulfilment of other condition of the policy dated 29.9.2014. 17. Vide circular dated 31.8.2016, respondents have only omitted Clause 11.1 and provided a new clause by which the dependent of the deceased employee has been held entitled for compassionate appointment subject to fulfilment of other condition of the policy dated 29.9.2014. 17. Hence it would be detrimental in the interst of dependents if it is held that new policy dated 31.8.2016 has come into force in which the dependent of the deceased employee working under the work charged and contingency establishment is not entitled for compassionate appointment. 18. Therefore, in the case of the petitioner, the policy dated 29.9.2014 as amended by circular dated 31.8.2016 ought to have been applied, which was in vogue at the time of death of his father on 4.7.2016 and also at the time of consideration .Therefore, in view of the above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. ;g dguk xyr gS fd vkjksihx.k us esjs ?kj ds vanj ?kqldj vk¡xu esa vkdj ek¡ cfgu dh xkfy;k¡ nh FkhA ;g dguk xyr gS fd dSyk'kh ckbZ us esjh pqfV;k idM dj iVd fn;k Fkk] vkseohj us M.Mk flj esa ekjk FkkA tks eq>s nkfgusa gkFk dh dykbZ esa yxk Fkk] bUnziky rksej M.Mk nkfgusa gkFk dh dykbZ esa ekjkA ;g dguk xyr gS fd yMdh vukfedk eq>s cpkus vkbZA iz'kkar us mls iVd fn;k vkSj mls M.Ms ekjsA ;g dguk xyr gS fd >xMk ?kj ds vUnj gqvk FkkA lk{kh us LOkr% dgk fd dsoy eqgkokn gqvk Fkk vkSj iwjh ?kVuk ?kj ds ckgj jksM ij gqbZ FkhA lk{kh dks mldk iqfyl dFku iz-ih- 3 vkSj dk , ls , vkSj ch ls ch Hkkx i<dj lquk, tkus ij lk{kh us dgk fd mlus ,slk dksbZ dFku iqfyl dks ugha fn;k FkkA fjiksVZ iz-ih-1 dk ch ls ch o lh ls lh Hkkx i<dj lquk;s tkus ij dgk fd mlus ,slh dksbZ fjiksVZ ys[k ughs djk;h FkhA dSls fy[kyh eSa dkj.k ugha crk ldrhA 2- ;g lgh gS fd esjk vkjksihx.k ls jkthukek gks x;k gSA ;g dguk xyr gS blfy, U;k;ky; esa vkt eSa vLkR; dFku ns jgh gwWA^^ eq[; ijh{k.k }kjk ,Mhihvks % 1- eSa vkjksihx.k dks tkurh gwW vkt ls djhc ,d lky iwoZ dh ckr gS esjk rFkk esjh eka dk vkjksihx.k ls eqgokn gks x;k FkkA eqgkokn esa >wek >iVh /kDdk eqDdh gks x;h Fkh ftlesa eq>s o esjh ek¡ dks pksV vkbZ FkhA iqfyl us eq>ls dksbZ iwNrkN ugha dhA uksV%&vfHkkstu vf/kdkjh }kjk lk{kh ls lwpd iz'u iw¡Nus dh vuqefr pkgh xbZ] fopkjksijkar lk{kh dks i{kfojks/kh ?kksf"kr dj iz'u iwaNus dh vuqefr iznku dh xbZA lwpd iz'u }kjk ,-Mh-ih- % 1- ;g dguk xyr gS fd vkjksihx.k us esjs ?kj ds vanj ?kqldj vkaxu esa vkdj ek¡ cfgu dh xkfy;k¡ nh FkhA ;g dguk xyr gS fd dSyk'kh ckbZ us esjh eka dh pqfV;k idMdj iVd fn;k Fkk] vkseohj us M.Mk flj esa ekjk FkkA tks esjh ek¡ dks nkfgusa gkFk dh dykbZ esa yxk Fkk] bUnziky rksej M.Mk nkfgusa gkFk dh dykbZ esa ekjkA ;g dguk xyr gS fd eSa cpkus vkbZ rks iz'kkar us eq>s iVd fn;k vkSj eq>s M.Ms ekjsA ;g dguk xyr gS fd >xMk ?kj ds vanj gqvk FkkA lk{kh us Lor% dgk fd dsoy eqgokn gqvk Fkk vkSj iwjh ?kVuk ?kj ds ckgj jksM ij gqbZ FkhA lk{kh dks mldk iqfyl dFku iz-ih-4 vkSj dk , ls , vkSj ch ls ch Hkkx i<dj lquk;s tkus ij lk{kh us dgk fd mlus ,slk dksbZ dFku iqfyl dks ugha fn;k FkkA dSls fy[kyh eSa dkj.k ugha crk ldrhA 2- ;g lgh gS fd esjk vkjksihx.k ls jkthukek gks x;k gSA ;g dguk xyr gS blfy, U;k;ky; esa vkt eSa vlR; dFku ns jgh gwWA izfrijh{k.k }kjk Jh ;tosUnz JhokLro okLrs vkjksihx.k& 2- dqN ughaA^^ PW-3 – Nathu Singh Tomar eq[; ijh{k.k }kjk ,Mhihvks % 1- eSa vkjksihx.k dks tkurk gw¡ vkt ls djhc ,d lky iwoZ dh ckr gS esjk rFkk esjh ifRu ,oa cPph dk vkjksihx.k ls eqgokn gks x;k FkkA eqgokn esa >wek >iVh /kDdk eqDdh gks xbZ Fkh ftlesa mUgsa pksV vk;h FkhA iqfyl us eq>ls dksbZ iwNrkN ugha dhA uksV%& vfHk;kstu vf/kdkjh }kjk lk{kh ls lwpd iz'u iw¡Nus dh vuqefr pkgh xbZ] fopkjksijkar lk{kh dks i{kfojks/kh ?kksf"kr dk iz'u iw¡Nus dh vuqefr iznku dh xbZA lwpd iz'u }kjk ,-Mh-ih- % 1- ;g dguk xyr gS fd vkjksihx.k us esjs ?kj ds vanj ?kqldj vk¡xu esa vkdj ek¡ cfgu dh xkfy;k¡ nh FkhA ;g dguk xyr gSs fd dSyk'kh ckbZ us esjh ifRu dh pqfV;k idM+dj iVd fn;k Fkk] vkseohj us M.Mk flj esa ekjk FkkA tks esjh iRuh dks nkfgusa gkaFk dh dykbZ esa yxk Fkk] bUnziky rksej M.Mk nkfgusa gkaFk dh dykbZ esa ekjkA ;g dguk xyr gS fd esjh yMdh cpkus vkbZ rks iz'kkUr us mls iVd fn;k vkSj mls M.Ms ekjsA ;g dguk xyr gS fd >xMk ?kj ds vanj gqvk FkkA lk{kh us LOkr% dgk fd dsoy eqgokn gqvk Fkk vkSj iwjh ?kVuk ?kj ds ckgj jksM ij gqbZ FkhA lk{kh dks mldk iqfyl dFku iz-ih-5 vkSj dk , ls , vkSj ch ls ch Hkkx i<dj lquk, tkus ij lk{kh us dgk fd mlus ,slk dksbZ dFku iqfyl dks ugha fn;k FkkA dSls fy[kyh eSa dkj.k ugha crk ldrkA 2- ;g lgh gS fd esjk vkjksihx.k ls jkthuke gks x;k gSA ;g dguk xyr gS blfy, U;k;ky; esa vkt eSa vlR; dFku ns jgk gw¡A izfrijh{k.k }kjk Jh ;tosUnz JhokLro okLrs vkjksihx.k % 2- dqN ughaA^^ 10. Close scrutiny of the aforesaid testimony of PW1, PW2 & PW3 reveals that all these statements in essentiality and substance are more or less in the same lines and therefore, for the purpose of this order and to avoid prolixity the testimony of complainant Suman Tomar (PW1) is being discussed. 11. The complainant begins her cross-examination by stating that she knows the accused/petitioner and reveals that about one year back she and her daughter Anamika Tomar (PW2) had oral arguments and altercation with petitioner/accused in which Anamika Tomar (PW2) had sustained injury whereafter the incident was reported by FIR Ex.P-1 on which Suman Tomar (PW1) admits her signature. Suman Tomar (PW1) further admits that she had signed the spot map (Ex.P-2). Thereafter, she states in examination-in-chief that no further inquiry was made from her by the police. At this stage, Public Prosecutor sought permission from the Court to declare Suman Tomar (PW1) hostile to the prosecution and to cross-examine her. 12. In her cross-examination, Suman Tomar (PW1) categorically denied that petitioner/accused caused any house trespass by revealing that petitioner did not enter the premises of the house. PW1 further denied any assault to have taken place. She further denied that her daughter Anamika Tomar (PW2) came to her rescue. Suman Tomar (PW1) on her own reveals that only oral arguments took place with the petitioner/accused. The entire incident took place outside the house of complainant on the road. When Ex.-P-3, the statement of PW1 recorded u/s.161 of CrPC was read over to her, she denied having made any such statement to the police. Lastly, Suman Tomar (PW1) admitted that rival parties have entered into compromise but specifically denied that today she is incorrectly stating the facts. 13. Similar in tenor is the testimony of other two eye-witnesses Suman Tomar (PW1) and Nathu Singh Tomar (PW3). 14. On the basis of aforesaid evidence adduced the learned trial Judge recorded the following findings in Para-7 to 10 of the judgment : 1. None of the witnesses reveal anything about the accused causing house trespass after preparation of causing hurt, assault or wrongful restrain. 2. The complainant-Suman Tomar (PW1) has specifically denied of making any earlier statement u/s.161 of CrPC alleging house trespass. In fact PW-1 testified that the entire incident did not take place inside the house of complainant. 3. None of the witnesses reveal anything about the accused causing house trespass after preparation of causing hurt, assault or wrongful restrain. 2. The complainant-Suman Tomar (PW1) has specifically denied of making any earlier statement u/s.161 of CrPC alleging house trespass. In fact PW-1 testified that the entire incident did not take place inside the house of complainant. 3. There is total absence of evidence to support the charge of house trespass after preparation of causing hurt assault or wrongful restrain u/s. 452 of IPC. 4. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the charges beyond all reasonable doubt. 5. The petitioner alongwith other accused are acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt. From the aforesaid analysis what becomes vivid is that prosecution had alleged a case of house trespass alongwith preparation of causing hurt assault or wrongful restrain but the evidence. However the evidence adduced revealed that no house trespass took place, therefore, the offence punishable u/s. 452 of IPC was not found to be committed. In such a situation where there was total absence of prosecution evidence to support the charge u/s. 452 of CrPC, the acquittal which follows in essentiality an honorable one and a clean acquittal. Thus the expression used by the learned trial Judge of “benefit of doubt” is perverse and misnomer. 15. Consequently, the present petition to the extent indicated above is allowed with the following direction. 16. The impugned judgment passed on 21.10.2016 in Criminal Case No. 35/2016 by JMFC Gohad, District Bhind is interfered with to the extent of declaring that the acquittal of the petitioner by the said judgment from the charge u/s. 452 of IPC is clean and honorable. No cost.