JUDGMENT P.K. Lohra, J. - Appellant-Defendant, aggrieved by the judgment & decree dated 8th of January, 2019 passed by Addl. District Judge, Deedwana, District Nagaur (for short, 'learned trial Court'), has preferred this appeal. The learned trial Court, by the impugned judgment, decreed suit of first respondent-plaintiff for declaration and perpetual injunction. 2. The facts, apposite for the purpose of this appeal, are that first respondent-plaintiff instituted a civil suit against appellant and other respondents. It is, inter-alia, averred in the plaint that respondent-plaintiff's pre-deceased brother Kishna Ram and sister-in-law (Bhabhi) Smt. Soni Devi, jointly deposited handsome amount with State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Ladnu Branch as Fixed Deposit/Term Deposit. The details of the fixed deposits were also mentioned in the plaint amounting to Rs.6,51,000. Besides that, it is also averred that there are savings accounts in their names No.61012988796 and 51057703815 respectively wherein certain amount is lying. In the plaint, factum of death of Kishna Ram on 29th of September, 2006 and Soni Devi on 8th December, 2006 is also pleaded. The respondent-plaintiff also averred in the plaint that she is the lone successor of both the deceased persons inasmuch as Late Kishna Ram was her real brother, who died issueless. It is also pleaded that there is no surviving brother of deceased Kishna Ram and Soni Devi and both of them died intestate. 3. The fact about death of Jiyaram somewhere in the year 1958-60 is also pleaded in the plaint. The respondent-plaintiff also stated in the plaint that Kishna Ram and Chhoti Devi lived together for almost 20 years and due to serious acrimony and disputes the family became indebted. In the year 1978, Kishna Ram and legal heirs of Chhoti Devi settled their family dispute and as a consequence thereof mother of respondent No.2 to 5 executed a relinquish deed in favour of Kishna Ram on 6th of July, 1978. It is also averred that the amount lying in the fixed deposits is received by Late Kishna Ram from his ancestral property and therefore Chhoti Devi or his daughters are having no right in the said amount. In substance, the respondent-plaintiff pleaded that after death of Soni Devi, being only surviving heirs of Late Kishna Ram, she is entitled to receive the amount lying in the fixed deposits. 4. In substance, the respondent-plaintiff pleaded that after death of Soni Devi, being only surviving heirs of Late Kishna Ram, she is entitled to receive the amount lying in the fixed deposits. 4. Castigating appellant-defendant for his dubious and fraudulent act, it is averred in the plaint that he got his name entered in the Bank as nominee in respect of the amount lying in fixed deposits. As per version of respondent-plaintiff, the fixed deposits/term deposits were in the joint name of Late Kishna Ram and Soni Devi, therefore, she was not authorized to nominate anyone. Moreover, the thumb impression of Late Soni Devi was also obtained by appellant Ganesha Ram when she was seriously ill and even unable to speak. The respondent-plaintiff specifically pleaded that at the time of signing the form nominating appellant Ganesha Ram, Soni Devi was not in a sound state of mind so as to take a decision. It is also pleaded in the plaint that in connection with the aforesaid fixed deposits an endeavour was earlier made by Ganesha Ram to obtain succession certificate on the basis of nomination but the same was declined by Addl. District Judge, Deedwana. The entire suit of the respondent-plaintiff was based on Section 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act. 5. On behalf of respondent No.2 and legal heirs of respondent No.5 written statement was filed admitting all the averments with a prayer to grant reliefs to the respondent-plaintiff. The other respondents, i.e., respondent No.3, 4 and appellant, contested the suit by filing their written statement. It is inter-alia averred in the reply that appellant being nominee is entitled to receive the amount lying in fixed deposits. As per version of the appellant and two other respondents, Bhanwarlal respondent No.6 filed a suit for declaring him as adopted son of Kishna Ram but that suit was dismissed, wherein the respondent-plaintiff admitted that he is adopted son and therefore she is not entitled for grant of relief. The seventh respondent Bank also filed its written statement and pleaded that nomination form was filled-in by Late Soni Devi in sane state and there was no irregularity in acceptance of the nomination form. 6. The learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings, settled 3 issues for determination. The respondent-plaintiff, in support of her case, herself appeared in the witness box and produced 10 documents, which were exhibited. 6. The learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings, settled 3 issues for determination. The respondent-plaintiff, in support of her case, herself appeared in the witness box and produced 10 documents, which were exhibited. On behalf of contesting respondent-defendants, in counter, no documentary or oral evidence was produced despite availing many opportunities. Therefore, in that background the learned trial Court proceeded to hear final arguments, and by relying on unimpeached oral testimony of the respondent-plaintiff and other supporting documentary evidence, decided all the three issues in favour of respondent-plaintiff. While recording its finding in favour of respondent-plaintiff, the learned trial Court has observed that unimpeached oral and documentary evidence of respondentplaintiff cannot be brushed aside in the given facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, the learned trial Court also observed that respondent-plaintiff is the only surviving successor of Late Kishna Ram. 7. While dilating on nomination form, the learned trial Court held in clear terms that nominee is entitled to receive the amount of policy/bank deposits but amount can only be claimed by legal heirs of assured/account holder in accordance with law of succession governing the person. The learned trial Court has also relied on some authoritative pronouncements of Supreme Court in this behalf. In totality, the learned trial Court recorded a clear and unequivocal finding that respondent-plaintiff is the only surviving successor of deceased Kishna Ram and therefore her right to claim the amount lying in fixed deposits is unquestionable. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment. 9. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for respondentplaintiff has placed reliance on following judgments: i. Vishin N. Khanchandani & Anr. Vs. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 724 ii. Challamma Vs. Tilaga & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 299 iii. Shipra Sengupta Vs. Mridul Sengupta & Ors., (2009) 8 SRJ 3. 10. Well it is true that normally the first appellate Court is required to summon the record of trial Court before dismissing the appeal but after amendment Act No.46 of 1996 w.e.f. 1st of July, 2002, by resorting to Rule 11 of Order 41 CPC, regular first appeal can be dismissed in limine without sending for the record. The only requirement is that the appellate Court is expected to record reasons that the appeal is bereft of any merit. Supreme Court, in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. The only requirement is that the appellate Court is expected to record reasons that the appeal is bereft of any merit. Supreme Court, in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Sheo Narain Kushwaha & Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 456 , examined the true purport of Rule 11(1) of Order 41 CPC, and held: "It is evident from sub-rule (1) that an appellate court can dismiss an appeal after a preliminary hearing without calling for the records of the trial court and without issuing notice to the respondent, if it is satisfied that the appeal has no merit. Sub-rule (1) does not however state that such dismissal can be without assigning any reasons. xxx xxx xxx Sub-rule (4) of Rule 11 does not enable the High Court to dismiss first appeals by one-line orders to the effect that "appeal is dismissed" or by nonspeaking orders. The order of the High Court dismissing the first appeal should be sufficiently reasoned to disclose the application of mind to the grounds of appeal and make out that the High Court was resorting to dismissal in limine as it found the appeal either to be vexatious or wholly without merit. Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code, while relieving the High Court from the obligation to write a "judgment", does not dispense with the obligation to assign reasons in brief, when summarily dismissing the appeal. Unless the order is reasoned, there will be no way of knowing whether the appellate court has examined the appeal before deciding that it did not deserve admission. As a limited right to appeal to the Supreme Court is available against the appellate judgments of the High Court, unless there are reasons in the order of dismissal, it will not be possible for the Supreme Court to examine whether the High Court has rightly rejected the appeal. The appellant who has filed the first appeal in pursuance of a statutory right to file such appeal, paying necessary court fee, can legitimately expect reappreciation of the evidence and redetermination of the questions raised, unless the statute providing for the appeal provides otherwise." 11. Applying ratio of the judgment supra, if the impugned judgment is examined, then, it would ipso facto reveal that right of respondent-plaintiff to claim amount lying in fixed deposits of Late Kishna Ram and Smt. Soni Devi is unquestionable vis-a-vis appellant, the nominee indicated in the FDRs. 12. Applying ratio of the judgment supra, if the impugned judgment is examined, then, it would ipso facto reveal that right of respondent-plaintiff to claim amount lying in fixed deposits of Late Kishna Ram and Smt. Soni Devi is unquestionable vis-a-vis appellant, the nominee indicated in the FDRs. 12. Supreme Court in the matter of Smt. Sarbati Devi Vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424 had the occasion to examine Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act, 1938 and nominee's interest in the amount received under a policy when assured dies intestate. The Court held: "Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected Under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauja Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, over ruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made Under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy, The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them. 13. In a later judgment in Vishin N. Khanchandani & Anr. 13. In a later judgment in Vishin N. Khanchandani & Anr. (supra), Supreme Court considered Section 6, 7 & 8 of Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 and rights of a nominee of deceased holder of saving certificates vis-a-vis legal hairs of the deceased. Construing these provisions, the Court observed that nominee is entitled to receive the sum due on the savings certificates yet retains the same for the persons entitled to it under the relevant law of succession. The Court also rejected the contention that non-obstante clause under Section 6 entitles the nominee to utilize the sum so received by him. Following the judgment in Sarbati Devi (supra), the Court held: "The submission made on behalf of the appellants has no substance in view of sub-section (2) of Section 8 and the Statement of Objects and Reasons necessitating the passing of the Act. Subsection (1) of Section 8 provides that if any payment is made in accordance with the provisions of the Act to a nominee, the same shall be a full discharge from all further liabilities in respect of the sum so paid. Section 7 of the Act provides that after the death of the holder of the savings certificates payment of the sum shall be made to the nominee, if any, and sub-section (1) of Section 8 declares that such payment shall be a full discharge from all further liabilities in respect of the sum so paid. However, sub-section (2) of Section 8 specifies that the payment made to the nominee under sub-section (1) shall not preclude any executor or administrator or the legal representative of the deceased holder of a savings certificate from recovering from the person receiving the same under Section 7; the amount remaining in the nominee's hand after deducting the amount of all debts or other demands lawfully paid or discharged by him in the due course of administration. In other words though the nominee of the National Savings Certificates has a right to be paid the sum due on such savings certificates after the death of the holder, yet he retains the said amount for the benefit of the persons who are entitled to it under the law of succession applicable in the case, however, subject to the exception of deductions mentioned in the sub-section. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act it is stated: "The Post Office National Savings Certificate Ordinance, 1944 (42 of 1944), issued under Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, as originally enacted and continued in force by virtue of the provisions of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 (3 and 4 Geo. 6, Ch. 33) regulates the sale and discharge of National Savings Certificates issued through the post office. Suggestions have been made from time to time that as the production of legal proof of succession involves considerable delay and expense, the holders of savings certificates may be allowed the right to nominate one or more persons to receive the amounts due in respect of such certificates in the event of their death without the production of succession certificate or other proof of title. In seeking to amend that Ordinance for the above purpose, opportunity is taken to replace it by an Act of Parliament." (emphasis supplied) In the light of what has been noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that though the language and phraseology of Section 6 of the Act is different from the one used in Section 39 of the Insurance Act, yet, the effect of both the provisions is the same. The Act only makes the provisions regarding avoiding delay and expense in making the payment of the amount of the National Savings Certificates, to the nominee of holder, which has been considered to be beneficial both for the holder as also for the post office. Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased. Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. In other words, the law laid down by this Court in Sarbati Devi's case holds field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of National Savings Certificates received by him under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those, in whose favour the law creates beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. 14. In Challamma (supra), the Supreme Court, while following the dictum in Sarbati Devi's case, reiterated the same principle. 15. 14. In Challamma (supra), the Supreme Court, while following the dictum in Sarbati Devi's case, reiterated the same principle. 15. In yet another judgment in case of Shipra Sengupta (supra), Supreme Court, while examining Section 372 of the Succession Act, 1956, opined in clear and unequivocal terms that mere nomination made in favour of a particular person does not have the effect of conferring any beneficial interest in the property after death of the person concerned. The Court held: "Learned Counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Ashok Chand Aggarwala v. Delhi Administration and Ors., (1998) 7 AD(Del) 639 . This case related to the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act. The High Court while following Sarbati Devi case (supra) held that it is well settled that mere nomination made in favour of a particular person does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in property after the death of the person concerned. The nomination indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount or manage the property. The property or the amount, as the case may be, can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased, in accordance with the law of succession, governing them. The controversy involved in the instant case is no longer res integra. The nominee is entitled to receive the same, but the amount so received is to be distributed according to the law of succession. In terms of the factual foundation laid in this case, the deceased died on 8.11.1990 leaving behind his mother and widow as his only heirs and legal representatives entitled to succeed. Therefore, on the day when the right of succession opened, the appellant, his widow became entitled to one half of the amount of the general provident fund, the other half going to the mother and on her death, the other surviving son getting the same. In view of the clear legal position, it is made abundantly clear that the amount in any head can be received by the nominee, but the amount can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased in accordance with law of succession governing them. In other words, nomination does not confer any beneficial interest on the nominee. In the instant case amounts so received are to be distributed according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In other words, nomination does not confer any beneficial interest on the nominee. In the instant case amounts so received are to be distributed according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The State Bank of India is directed to release half of the amount of general provident fund to the appellant now within two months from today along with interest. 16. In view of law laid down by Supreme Court and the fact that evidence tendered by the appellant remained uncontroverted, unhesitatingly, in my view, findings and conclusions recorded by the learned trial Court on all the issues is founded on sound appreciation of evidence. The learned trial Court has decided the lis involved in the matter strictly in adherence of law by explaining and segregating rights of a successor vis-a-vis rights of a nominee. By any stretch of imagination, nomination of the estate of a deceased in the name of someone cannot deprive the legal heir/successor from his right of succession in accordance with relevant law. 17. Therefore, viewed from any angle, I find no merit in this appeal and consequently the same is hereby dismissed.