JUDGMENT : Sunil B. Shukre, J. Heard. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The petitioner, Union of India, has questioned the illegality and correctness of the order dated 10.03.2017 rendered in Original Application No. 211/00247/2016 by Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Camp at Nagpur. 3. The Original Application was filed by the respondent in the year 2016. It was the case of the respondent that he was working as Postal Assistant in the Department of Posts w.e.f. 01.12.1979. However, he was placed under suspension from 27.01.1987 on account of his alleged serious misconduct. The departmental enquiry was thereafter held against the respondent and he was removed from service w.e.f. 26.12.1992 when the final order imposing major penalty of removal from service dated 26.06.1992 was served upon the respondent. The order imposing penalty of removal from service did not contain anything about the grant of compassionate allowance in terms of Rule 41(1) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules,1972 (in short 'Rules of 1972'). The respondent, therefore, preferred the Original Application in which the order impugned herein came to be passed. 4. By the impugned order, the Tribunal granted compassionate allowance along with arrears which were restricted to 3 years immediately preceding the date of the order. The Tribunal did not elaborate anything with regard to special considerations which favoured the case of the respondent and the Tribunal was of the view that the respondent ought to have been granted the compassionate allowance. The petitioners have challenged this order in the present petition. 5. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the matter of grant of compassionate allowance lies entirely within the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority and, therefore, when the discretion was not exercised in favour of the respondent, there was no reason for the Tribunal to embark upon the process of exercising its own discretion in favour of the respondent. The learned counsel further submits that in any case, the application ought not to have been granted for the reason that there was inordinate delay in filing Original Application for grant of compassionate allowance by the respondent. The learned counsel further submits that in any case, the application ought not to have been granted for the reason that there was inordinate delay in filing Original Application for grant of compassionate allowance by the respondent. She pointed out that the respondent was removed from service in the year 1992 and whereas, the respondent claimed the compassionate allowance for the first time in the year 2016 when the application was filed by him before the Tribunal. The respondent did not explain the inordinate delay nor did the Tribunal apply its mind to this material aspect of the case, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners. She further submits that the impugned order is arbitrary and illegal. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, opposing the petition, supported the impugned order. She submits that although no detailed reasons have been recorded by the Tribunal in allowing the claim of the petitioner, overall reading of the impugned order would disclose that the Tribunal has considered all the relevant aspects of the matter and therefore, has rightly held that the respondent is entitled for grant of compassionate allowance. She also submits that since the Disciplinary Authority refused to grant compassionate allowance and such refusal was challenged by respondent before the Tribunal, this cannot be termed to be the case of exercising the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority for the first time by the Tribunal and all that the Tribunal has done in the present case is to examine legality and correctness of the action of the Disciplinary Authority in refusing payment of such allowance to the respondent. Thus, the learned counsel submits that there is no substance in the petition. 7. In order to appreciate the rival arguments, it would be necessary for us to consider Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1972. It reads thus :- (1) A Government servant who is dismissed or removed from service shall forfeit his pension and gratuity; Provided that the authority competent to dismiss or remove him from service may, if the case is deserving of special consideration, sanction a compassionate allowance not exceeding two thirds of pension or gratuity or both which would have been admissible to him if he had retired on compensation pension. 8. 8. A bare perusal of the Rule would make it clear that compassionate allowance has to be granted only upon special consideration and not casually or in the routine manner. The grant of compassionate allowance is only by way of an exception and after considering all the factors which would clinch the issue in favour of the delinquent employee. The very nomenclature of the term "allowance" gives an indication of the intention of the Legislator. The intention is to prevent vagrancy of the delinquent employee and his family members which would visit him when the drastic and major penalty like dismissal or removal from service is imposed. This allowance is offered to delinquent employee to enable him to tide over a financial crisis which would instantaneously hit him after his removal or dismissal from service and as such has more relevance at the time of passing of order imposing major penalty than after a long time past the penalty. Apart from such consideration, there are other considerations as well, which would be material for the Authority to exercise the discretion, one way or the other. The other considerations would relate to something good done by the employee during his entire service period. Although, his misconduct proved in the departmental enquiry, would have its own impact upon the exercise of discretion in the matter, the Authority can nevertheless consider grant of such allowance to the employee, if it is of the view that apart from his proved misconduct there were some other things which spoke good of the employee. So, the whole exercise to be carried out by the Disciplinary Authority in such a case would be an act of balancing with each other the aggravating and mitigating factors and it is only upon completion of such exercise that the compassionate allowance can be granted. To enable the authority to undertake such an exercise, it would also be necessary for an employee to render all the assistance by placing on record and bringing to the notice of the Authority the facts and circumstances which stand in his favour. This will have to be done by the delinquent employee at the time when hearing is granted to him before major penalty is imposed. In the present case, we find no such material has been placed before the disciplinary authority by the respondent. 9. This will have to be done by the delinquent employee at the time when hearing is granted to him before major penalty is imposed. In the present case, we find no such material has been placed before the disciplinary authority by the respondent. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners has invited our attention to the view taken by Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of S. C. Sharma Vs. Union of India and others,2019 3 SCT 119. The view is that compassionate allowance cannot be granted to an employee dismissed or removed from service casually and it has to be done only in deserving cases on account of existence of special considerations and circumstances. It has also been held that the Tribunal and for that matter even the High Court cannot sit over the judgment of the Authorities and it is for the Authorities to consider any claim made in this regard, it being not something which would accrue to the employee as a matter of right. This view of the Pubjab and Haryana High Court commends to us. 10. On going through the impugned order, we find, and, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the Tribunal has exercised the discretion of the authority as if it is a forum of the first instance, which is not permissible in law. Here in this case, the authority has imposed the major penalty without saying anything about compassionate allowance and that means it is not granted by it. The respondent has also not pointed out any material facts and circumstances of the case to the Tribunal and which were available on record of Departmental Enquiry proceeding, which in his opinion constituted the special consideration as contemplated in Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1972 so that appropriate decision for weighty reasons could have been taken by the Tribunal. Here, in this case no material which was relevant for deciding the issue of compassionate allowance was placed before the disciplinary authority by the respondent and so it is clear, there was no occasion for the authority to have exercised it's discretion in favour of the respondent. That being the position, there was no way for the Tribunal to have exercised the discretion in the matter as if it were an authority of the first instance. That being the position, there was no way for the Tribunal to have exercised the discretion in the matter as if it were an authority of the first instance. Besides, there was inordinate delay in raising the claim for grant of compassionate allowance and this delay itself shows that the respondent had managed to come out of the financial crisis and if this were not so, the respondent would have knocked at the door of the Tribunal much earlier. The respondent also did not explain in any manner the delay occurred in filing of the Original Application. With all these facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the Original Application, the manner in which it has been done in the present case. The impugned order, therefore, cannot sustain the scrutiny of law and it must go. 11. The petition is allowed and impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. The claim of the respondent regarding compassionate allowance stands dismissed. 12. Legal remuneration of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten Thousand only) be paid to the learned appointed counsel for the respondent. 13. Rule is made absolute in these terms. No costs.