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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 2028 (HP)

Suman Aggarwal v. Municipal Council

2019-12-27

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2019
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - It was more than four decades back that the Hon''ble Supreme Court had observed that "it must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesses, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesses including award of jobs, contracts quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory (Refer: Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal,1975 AIR SC 26). 2. The instant case depicts sordid, despotic and nepotic functioning of respondent No.1. Despite there being no advertisement or even proposal on behalf of respondent No.1, the petitioner approached respondent No. 1 with the proposal for constructing a shop under self-financing scheme. What is more surprisingly is that respondent No. 1 entertained such request and asked the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.10,000/- as earnest money for construction of shop in near future and the balance amount was to be paid at the time of possession of the shop, as per the endorsement made by respondent No. 1 on the application. The petitioner deposited a sum of Rs.10,000/- on 27.01.2009. Thereafter petitioner repeatedly visited the office of respondent No. 1 to deposit the balance amount towards the cost of construction of the shop but the request of the petitioner was delayed on one pretext or the other. 3. In July 2013, petitioner came to know that respondent No. 1 was again planning to construct the shop for renting out to some third person. 3. In July 2013, petitioner came to know that respondent No. 1 was again planning to construct the shop for renting out to some third person. Therefore, she again approached the Chairman of respondent No. 1 seeking clarification and requested the authorities to permit her to deposit the balance amount towards the cost of the construction of shop, in addition to the amount of Rs.10,000/-already deposited. However, the said request was declined and petitioner was asked to take back the earnest money. Despite having no right much less legal right the petitioner, thereafter got served legal notice on respondent No. 1 seeking therein direction to respondent No. 1 to take immediate steps for construction of the shop for allotting the same in favour of the petitioner on lease basis. Respondent No. 1 did not pay any heed to the said notice and, therefore, the petitioner made a complaint to the SDM, Paonta Sahib to take necessary action. The petitioner thereafter on 14.10.2013 filed a civil suit in the court of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Paonta Sahib against the respondents/defendants for permanent prohibitory injunction and filed an application seeking interim relief for restraining defendants for renting out or delivering possession of the shop. The learned Court vide order dated 18.10.2013, restrained the defendant/respondent No. 1 for renting out or delivering the possession of the shop till the next date of hearing. 4. It was averred that despite interim order, respondent No. 1 permitted respondent No. 2 to raise construction of the shop in question, constraining the petitioner to lodge a complaint before the Police Station, Paonta Sahib on 20.10.2013. The police officials visited the spot and recorded the statement of the parties. 5. Respondent No. 1 filed written statement to the plaint and admitted to the receipt of earnest money of Rs.10,000/- from the petitioner as also the notice dated 22.08.2013. However, it was pointed out that respondent No. 2 had filed a suit, which was compromised in Loak Adalat by respondent No. 1 by giving a statement that respondent No. 1 is ready to give a shop to respondent No. 2 in M. C. Complex, Paonta Sahib within three months and the shop was allotted to respondent No. 2 vide a Resolution No. 2 on 30.08.2013 on monthly rent of Rs. 1650/-. 1650/-. It was further averred that respondent No. 2 had also deposited a sum of Rs.75,000/- with respondent No. 1 and had also installed the shutters and put the floor on the said shop. 6. The petitioner thereafter withdrew the suit with liberty to file the same afresh, as reflected in order dated 19.06.2014. However, the petitioner did not file a suit and rather filed the instant petition for grant of following substantive reliefs:- (i) The resolution No. 12 dated 30.08.2013, Annexure P15, passed by respondent No. 1 may kindly be held wrong, illegal and arbitrary and may kindly be set aside. (ii) That respondent No. 1 may kindly be directed to take back the possession of the shop in question from respondent No. 2 and thereafter allot the same to the petitioner in terms of acceptance of proposal of petitioner by respondent No. 1 on 27.01.2009. 7. Respondent No. 1 contested the petition raising various preliminary objections. It was averred that the petitioner has no indefeasible right to get the shop in the premises of the Municipal Council, Paonta Sahib. The shop No. 15 has already been given on rent basis to respondent No. 2 vide Resolution No. 2 on monthly rental of Rs.1650/-. 8. As regards respondent No. 2, he too, has contested the petition by filing a separate reply. The sum and substance of the reply is that since the petitioner had not been allotted the shop in question, therefore, she is not entitled to file and maintain the present petition, more particularly, after having withdrawn the civil suit that had been filed by her. 9. On 11.12.2017, this court passed the following order:- " It has been represented by Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the shop in question has been allotted to respondent No. 2 after holding a public auction wherein he was the successful bidder. He prays for and is granted two weeks'' time to file supplementary affidavit to this effect." 10. In the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 in compliance to the aforesaid order it was stated that on 20.08.2008 an auction notice was published by respondent No. 1 under the self financing scheme and date of auction was fixed for 04.09.2008. He prays for and is granted two weeks'' time to file supplementary affidavit to this effect." 10. In the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 in compliance to the aforesaid order it was stated that on 20.08.2008 an auction notice was published by respondent No. 1 under the self financing scheme and date of auction was fixed for 04.09.2008. Earlier to that respondent No. 2 had already applied for the shop on 23.07.2008 and later on he participated in the auction after depositing the advance amount of Rs.10,000/- with the respondent No.1- department. Two other persons, namely, Om Parkash and Shri Satish Kumar Sharma also participated in the auction, however, since the amount offered by respondent No. 2 was higher, therefore, the shop in question was allotted to him. 11. Respondent No. 2 has filed response to the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1, wherein it has been clarified that at the time of auction, the auctioned shop was actually a space meant for shop bearing No. 13 in the M. C. record and it could be in the Indira Market or whatsoever and wheresoever be the place available in municipal area under self employment scheme as a running number. It has been averred that despite being successful in the bid, neither any shop in the Indira Market was allotted nor the space/shop was handed over to respondent No. 2. Resultantly, he was constrained to file civil suit No. 58/1 of 2012 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, wherein following prayers was made:- ".... It is therefore prayed that a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to construct the shop near Mela Ground/Indira Market in Ward No. 8 at Paonta Sahib and allot the same to plaintiff or in the alternative provide the plaintiff with any other shop on rent basis and adjust the already deposited advance rent of Rs.60,000/- deposited with the defendant in the monthly rent of said shop be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant with the cost of the suit or any other relief which this Hon''ble Court deems fit may also be granted." 12. Respondent No. 1 in its written statement admitted the factual position but pleaded that there is no sufficient and suitable space near the Mela Ground Indira Market in ward No. 8 for construction of shop as there was existing public toilet which was in poor condition and for providing toilet facility to the public at large the defendant had constructed new public toilet over there and after the construction of the said public toilet there was no sufficient or suitable land available for construction of shop in the Indira Market/Mela Ground. 13. The civil suit was then referred to the Lok Adalat where on 27.07.2013, respondent No. 1 offered to give respondent No. 2 another shop in place of shop in Indira Market and the proposal was accepted by respondent No. 2. In view of the compromise, resolution was passed by respondent No. 1 on 30.07.2013 wherein it was resolved vide resolution No. 12 to hand over the vacant space sandwiched between two staircases in Municipal complex, Paonta Sahib to respondent No. 2 at a monthly rent of Rs.1650/- as against the bid amount of Rs.10,000/- of respondent No. 2. As against the earlier deposited earnest money of Rs.60,000/-, respondent No. 2 was directed to deposit a further sum of Rs.15,000/-, which was duly deposited by him. It was thereafter the space was allotted to respondent No. 2 and was given No. 13. After getting the possession of the shop, respondent No. 2 raised construction and built the shop (constructed the floor base, shutter work, main door, electricity work and whitewash) by investing more than Rs.50,000/- at that time and ever since thereafter running the shop and has generated the goodwill with the passage of time. 14. The petitioner has also filed his response to the response filed by respondent No. 2 wherein it has been averred that the petitioner had applied in the same and similar manner as respondent No. 2 who had been allotted a shop, which clearly shows that step-motherly treatment has been meted out to the petitioner and undue favour has been shown in favour of respondent No. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 15. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that the State Government has framed Rules for the purpose of leasing out of stalls/shops constructed by Municipalities in Himachal Pradesh. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 15. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that the State Government has framed Rules for the purpose of leasing out of stalls/shops constructed by Municipalities in Himachal Pradesh. In terms of these rules, the stalls/shops constructed by the Municipalities are to be leased out on the conditions laid down in the rules. As per Rule 4, lease amount of stalls/shops shall be determined by the Municipality on the basis of competitive bids. The minimum lease amount has to be worked out by the Municipalities on the market value of the land and cost of construction of stall/shop and other relevant factor such as location of stall/shop etc. The stall/shop has to be leased out to highest bidder of each category. In case, the amount of open auction bid is found less then the reserved price, then in that case, the shop/stall has to be put to fresh auction in order to fetch minimum reserve price so determined by the Municipality. Rules 5 provides for terms of the lease, which clearly stipulates that Municipality has to lease out the stalls/shop constructed by it for a period not exceeding 25 years with the stipulation of 10% increase in the rent after every five years. As regards the procedure for auction, the same is prescribed in Rule 6, which clearly stipulates that auction is to be made by giving wide publicity through newspaper of the region. The auction in terms of Rule 8 is required to be conducted by the Executive Officer or the Secretary of Municipality and the same, in turn, then has to be confirmed by Municipal Council through a proper resolution. 16. It is clearly evident from the aforesaid narration of facts that the mode and manner in which the petitioner applied for the shop is not even contemplated under the Rules. Even the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 2 is not in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, respondent No. 1 had no authority whatsoever to accept the application for allotment of shop submitted by the petitioner. The same is equally true in case of the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 2, as the same could have been made only after complying with the provisions of the rules. 17. Therefore, respondent No. 1 had no authority whatsoever to accept the application for allotment of shop submitted by the petitioner. The same is equally true in case of the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 2, as the same could have been made only after complying with the provisions of the rules. 17. Record reveals that no publicity of the auction as was required under Rule 6 was made by respondent No. 1 prior to putting the shop to auction to respondent No. 2. No reserve price was fixed. Even as per the admitted case of respondent No. 2 only a simple notice of auction was placed on the Notice Board and this Court has no hesitation to conclude that this entire exercise was undertaken simply to oblige respondent No. 2, who in addition to himself, arranged two other persons, who eventually after bidding for a sum of Rs. 680/- and Rs.850/-, respective, did not choose to bid any further and since respondent No. 2 had offered Rs.1000/- per month, the shop was allotted in his favour. 18. The respondents being creation of a statute are not free to act like an ordinary individual, in dealing with the public property, as it cannot act arbitrarily at its, sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with some standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The action of the respondent must not be arbitrary or capricious, but must be based on some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. After all, it is the principle of reasonableness and non - arbitrariness in governmental action that lies at the core of our entire constitutional scheme and structure. 19. It was observed by Wades Administrative Laws, 5th Edition at page 347 that "The first requirement is the recognition that all powers have legal limits, the next requirement, no less vital, is that the Court should draw this limit in a way which strikes the most suitable balance between executive efficiency and legal protection of the citizen. Parliament consistently confers upon public authorities powers which on their face seem absolute and arbitrary. But arbitrary power and unfettered discretion are what the Courts refuse to countenance. Parliament consistently confers upon public authorities powers which on their face seem absolute and arbitrary. But arbitrary power and unfettered discretion are what the Courts refuse to countenance. They have woven a net-work of restrictive principles which require statutory powers to be reasonable and in good faith and in accordance with the spirit and letter of the empowering Act." At page 359, it was also observed that "Discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That amounts at least to this that the statutory body must be guided by relevant consideration and not irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous consideration which ought not have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith, nevertheless, the decision will be set-aside." 20. Here, it shall be apposite to make a reference to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in New India Public School vs.Huda, (1996) 5 SCC 510 , wherein it was observed that when public authority discharges its public duty, it has to be consistent with the public purpose and clear and unequivocal guidelines or rules are necessary and the same cannot be acted at the whim and fancy of the public authorities or under their garb or cloak for any extraneous consideration. 21. The concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional spectrum and is a golden thread which runs through the whole fabric of the Constitution. Thus, Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution accords right to an equality or an equal treatment consistent with principles of natural justice. Therefore, any law made or action taken by the employer, corporate statutory or instrumentality under Article 12 must act fairly and reasonably. Right to fair treatment is an essential inbuilt of natural justice. 22. This Court can take judicial notice that it is a case of the wanton and unauthorised act on behalf of the officials of the respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation/local urban authorities like Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council, Municipal Corporation that there is rampant illegal/unauthorised construction. Right to fair treatment is an essential inbuilt of natural justice. 22. This Court can take judicial notice that it is a case of the wanton and unauthorised act on behalf of the officials of the respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation/local urban authorities like Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council, Municipal Corporation that there is rampant illegal/unauthorised construction. This fact has been duly noticed by this Court in CWP No. 10237 of 2012, titled as Anil Aggarwal vs. H. P. Housing and Urban Development Authority, Shimla and another, relating to unauthorised construction in the adjoining area of Nahan within the same District of Sirmour. 23. The entire scenario shocks the conscious of this Court to come across such a systematic fraud committed by those at the helm of affairs of the Municipal Council in dealing with property as it was its personal property. It has to be remembered that respondent No. 1 like anybody corporate has power to hold property and is capable to entering into contract strictly in accordance with the Rules that too in a fair and transparent manner without indulging in any favourtism or nepotism. 24. How the State largesses are to be distributed has been the subject matter of various decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court. In this regard, I need only refer to the one of the latest judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in J. S. Luthra Academy and another vs. State of Jammu and Kashimir and others, (2018) AIR SC 5367 , wherein it was categorically held that the process of allotting public largesses must be just, non-arbitrary and transparent. It would be relevant to reproduce relevant observations as contained in para-6, which reads as under:- "6. This Court in a series of cases including Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1 (popularly known as the "2G case"), in Natural Resources Allocation, In Re. Special Reference No. of 1/2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 , Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy., (2014) 9 SCC 516 , Bharti Airtel Limited v. Union Of India, (2015) 12 SCC 1 , and Goa Foundation v. Sesa Sterlite Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 218 has formulated the guidelines for allocation of natural resources by the State. Special Reference No. of 1/2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 , Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy., (2014) 9 SCC 516 , Bharti Airtel Limited v. Union Of India, (2015) 12 SCC 1 , and Goa Foundation v. Sesa Sterlite Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 218 has formulated the guidelines for allocation of natural resources by the State. In Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Union of India, (2015) 12 SCC 1 , this Court summed up the principles governing the allocation of natural resources by the State laid down in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1 ("the 2G case") as follows: "41. The licensor/Union of India does not have the freedom to act whimsically. As pointed out by this Court in 2G Case [ Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1 ] in the aboveextracted paragraph, the authority of the Union is fettered by two constitutional limitations: firstly, that any decision of the State to grant access to natural resources, which belong to the people, must ensure that the people are adequately compensated and, secondly, the process by which such access is granted must be just, nonarbitrary and transparent, vis vis private parties seeking such access." (emphasis supplied) Referring to the observations in the 2G case, the Court also highlighted that the State is bound to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to public interest, and that it must always adopt a rational method for disposal of public property, and ensure that a nondiscriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation, which would necessarily result in national/public interest. The principles governing the distribution of natural resources by the State were also discussed in the decision of the constitutional bench of this Court in Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 . In para 149 thereof, the Court observed as follows: "149. Regard being had to the aforesaid precepts, we have opined that auction as a mode cannot be conferred the status of a constitutional principle. Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. In para 149 thereof, the Court observed as follows: "149. Regard being had to the aforesaid precepts, we have opined that auction as a mode cannot be conferred the status of a constitutional principle. Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximising private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than 10 those that are competitive and maximise revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution." This decision emphasised that the ultimate goal to be served was that of the public good, and all methods of distribution of natural resources that ultimately served the public good would be valid, as reflected in the following observations: "120. ...There is no constitutional imperative in the matter of economic policies-Article 14 does not predefine any economic policy as a constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of Article 39(b) imposes no restrictions on the means adopted to subserve the public good and uses the broad term "distribution", suggesting that the methodology of distribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes that alienation/allocation of natural resources to the highest bidder may not necessarily be the only way to subserve the common good, and at times, may run counter to public good. Hence, it needs little emphasis that disposal of all natural resources through auctions is clearly not a constitutional mandate." It would be useful to note at this juncture that in this decision, the Court assessed the position of law developed through a catena of decisions, including Netai Bag and Ors. v. State of W.B. and Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 262 , 5 M and T Consultants v. S.Y. Nawab, (2003) 8 SCC 100 , and Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of 11 India, (2009) 7 SCC 561 , wherein it has been held that nonfloating of tenders or holding of auction by itself is not sufficient to hold that the exercise of power was arbitrary. It would be useful to reproduce the following observations from Netai Bag (supra), which were also relied upon by the Court in Natural Resources Allocation, In Re (supra) to highlight that the ultimate test is only that of fairness of the decision making process and compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution: "19. ... There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that generally when any State land is intended to be transferred or the State largesse decided to be conferred, resort should be had to public auction or transfer by way of inviting tenders from the people. That would be a sure method of guaranteeing compliance with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Non-floating of tenders or not holding of public auction would not in all cases be deemed to be the result of the exercise of the executive power in an arbitrary manner. Making an exception to the general rule could be justified by the State executive, if challenged in appropriate proceedings. The constitutional courts cannot be expected to presume the alleged irregularities, illegalities or unconstitutionality nor can the courts substitute their opinion for the bona fide opinion of the State executive. The courts are not concerned with the ultimate decision but only with the fairness of the decisionmaking process." The above principles were also reiterated in Manohar Lal Sharma (supra), wherein this Court observed at para 110: "It is not the domain of the Court to evaluate the advantages of competitive bidding vis vis other methods of distribution/disposal of natural resources. However, if the allocation of subject coal blocks is inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution and the procedure that has been followed in such allocation is found to be unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory, nontransparent, capricious or suffers from favouritism or nepotism and violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution, the consequences of such unconstitutional or illegal allocation must follow." In Ajar Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Satyanarayan Somani, (2018) 12 SCC 756 , this Court affirmed the above principles in the following terms: "49. ...Where a public authority exercises an executive prerogative, it must nonetheless act in a manner which would subserve public interest and facilitate the distribution of scarce natural resources in a manner that would achieve public good. ...Where a public authority exercises an executive prerogative, it must nonetheless act in a manner which would subserve public interest and facilitate the distribution of scarce natural resources in a manner that would achieve public good. Where a public authority implements a policy, which is backed by a constitutionally recognised social purpose intended to achieve the welfare of the community, the considerations which would govern would be different from those when it alienates natural resources for commercial exploitation. When a public body is actuated by a constitutional purpose embodied in the Directive 13 Principles, the considerations which weigh with it in determining the mode of alienation should be such as would achieve the underlying object." The position of law developed through these decisions was summed up in the following manner by this Court in Goa Foundation v. Sesa Sterlite Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 218 , after adverting to the various decisions referred to above: "80.1. It is not obligatory, constitutionally or otherwise, that a natural resource (other than spectrum) must be disposed of or alienated or allocated only through an auction or through competitive bidding; 80.2. Where the distribution, allocation, alienation or disposal of a natural resource is to a private party for a commercial pursuit of maximising profits, then an auction is a more preferable method of such allotment; 80.3. A decision to not auction a natural resource is liable to challenge and subject to restricted and limited judicial review under Article 14 of the Constitution; 80.4. A decision to not auction a natural resource and sacrifice maximisation of revenues might be justifiable if the decision is taken, inter alia, for the social good or the public good or the common good; 80.5. Unless the alienation or disposal of a natural resource is for the common good or a social or welfare purpose, it cannot be dissipated in favour of a private entrepreneur virtually free of cost or for a 14 consideration not commensurate with its worth without attracting Article 14 and Article 39(b) of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) From the above decisions, the following principles may be culled out: (i) Generally, when any land is intended to be transferred by the state, or any state largesse is to be conferred, resort should be had to public auction or transfer by way of inviting tenders from the people. The state must ensure that it receives adequate compensation for the allotted resource. However, nonfloating of tender or nonconducting of public auction would not be deemed in all cases to be an arbitrary exercise of executive power. The ultimate decision of the executive must be the result of a fair decisionmaking process. (ii) The allocation must be guided by the consideration of the common good as per Article 39(b), and must not be violative of Article 14. This does not necessarily entail auction of the resource; however, allocation of natural resources to private persons for commercial exploitation solely for private benefit, with no social or welfare purpose, attracts higher judicial scrutiny and may be held to be violative of Article 14 if done by noncompetitive and nonrevenue maximizing means. 15 Keeping in mind the aforementioned principles formulated by this Court in the aforementioned judgments, we have considered the entire material on record. It must be determined as to whether the allocation made in favour of the Academy fell foul of the above principles. In the instant case, the allocation has evidently been done to a private educational institution by nonrevenue maximizing means. Assuming that the Academy is engaged in commercial activities while engaging in its main activity of imparting education to students, two questions remain to be seen: first, whether there was any social or welfare purpose underlying the allocation, i.e., if the furtherance of the public good was the ultimate goal of the allocation so as to justify the nonauctioning of the land, and second, if the allocation is bad for lack of adequate compensation." 25. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that fraud has reached its cresendo. Deeds as foul as these are inconceivable much less could be permitted to be perpetrated. Shakespeare aptly described such sordid affairs in the following manners: thus much of this, will make Black, white; foul, fair; Wrong, right; Base, noble; Ha, you gods: why this? This is clearly evident from the fact that both the President and Vice President of respondent No. 1 have recently resigned from the office purportedly because of a video widely circulated showing them accepting bribe from the Contractor. 26. This is clearly evident from the fact that both the President and Vice President of respondent No. 1 have recently resigned from the office purportedly because of a video widely circulated showing them accepting bribe from the Contractor. 26. As observed earlier, it is highly regrettable that the holders of the office of respondent No. 1 Municipal Council have been completely oblivious to the fact that the office entrusted to them are sacred trust and were meant for use and not for abuse. 27. The office bearers of any local authorities be it Gram Panchayat, Municipal council cannot act as despots or monarchs and are obliged to act in accordance with the principles of democracy, equity, equality and solidarity. 28. Now once it is established that there is no credible mechanism in place to have even entertained the application of the petitioner as also respondent No. 2, respondent No. 1 could not have whimsically, arbitrarily and contrary to the rules allotted the shop in favour of respondent No. 2 as the same was required to be allotted strictly in accordance with the rules that too after giving wide publicity in newspapers having circulation in the area. 29. As regards the petitioner, she has simply jumped into bandwagon expecting illegal and undue favour as probably this was the order of the day. 30. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances, this Court deems it fit to pass the following orders:- i) The petition filed by the petitioner without any right is gross abuse of the process of law and is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-. ii) As regards the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 2, since the same was allotted to respondent No. 2 pursuant to the resolution passed by the Municipal Council of respondent No. 1 on 30.08.2013 ever since he has been in occupation thereof, I really see no reason to quash the said allotment. However, since the procedure for allotment as envisaged under the Rules has not been followed, therefore, respondent No. 2 is liable to pay the average auction price prevailing at the time of allocation, which shall be determined by the Superintending Engineer, HPPWD, Nahan. However, since the procedure for allotment as envisaged under the Rules has not been followed, therefore, respondent No. 2 is liable to pay the average auction price prevailing at the time of allocation, which shall be determined by the Superintending Engineer, HPPWD, Nahan. In addition thereto respondent No. 2 shall also liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of allotment till the date of payment and such payment shall be made within a period of three months from today. (iii) In case respondent No. 2 is not ready to pay the price as aforesaid then the shop in question be auctioned in accordance with rules. iv) Since respondent No. 1 has indulged in rampant violation and allotted State largesses contrary to law, therefore, in the given facts and circumstances, Mrs. Priyanka Verma, IAS, ADC, Sirmour is directed to look into the affairs particularly with grant of largesses etc. of respondent No. 1 for the last one decade commencing from 01.01.2009 till date and submit her report before this Court within a period of three months from today. 31. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. List on 30.03.2020.