JUDGMENT : Jahangir Jamshed Munir, J. 1. This second appeal by the defendant is directed against a judgment and decree of Shri Subodh Kumar, the then XIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 31.8.1998 passed in Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1985, allowing the said appeal by the plaintiff and reversing an original decree of Shri B.B. Singh, the then Munsif (East), Allahabad, passed in Original Suit No. 572 of 1983, dismissing the plaintiff-respondent's suit for specific performance of contract and alternate relief for refund of earnest money with interest. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are these: that the plaintiff-respondent, Ajayab Lal, who shall hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff, instituted Original Suit No. 572 of 1983 with averments to the effect that Ram Nihor, defendant-appellant No. 1, since deceased, and now represented before this Court by his heirs and legal representatives, appellants Nos. 1/1 to 1/5, was the owner of the property as detailed at the foot of the plaint. The original defendant-appellant, Ram Nihor will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant, and for the sake of convenience, would be construed to bear reference to his five heirs and legal representatives, now on record in his stead. It was averred by the plaintiff that the defendant executed a registered agreement to sell, dated 2.7.1980 in favour of the defendant agreeing to convey property as detailed at the foot of the plaint (for short the suit property) for a total sale consideration of Rs. 8060/-. It was further pleaded that at the time of execution of the suit agreement, the defendant accepted by way of earnest, a sum of Rs. 1800/-, leaving a residue of Rs. 6260/- that the plaintiff covenanted to pay the defendant at the time of execution of the sale-deed. It was further specifically pleaded that the suit agreement carried a term that the sale-deed would be executed upto 2.2.1981. 3. It was averred further that in accordance with the terms of the suit agreement, the plaintiff always remained ready and willing to get a sale-deed executed, and that he requested the defendant a number of times, verbally, to execute a conveyance as contracted. 3. It was averred further that in accordance with the terms of the suit agreement, the plaintiff always remained ready and willing to get a sale-deed executed, and that he requested the defendant a number of times, verbally, to execute a conveyance as contracted. It is then pleaded that on 24.1.1982, he caused a notice to be sent to the plaintiff to come forward and execute a sale-deed in terms of the suit agreement, accepting the balance of sale consideration, and for the purpose to appear in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Karchhana on 2.2.1981. It is averred that the defendant on the scheduled date did not appear to execute the agreed conveyance. It is pleaded that thereafter the plaintiff sent further notices, dated 30.3.1981 and 19.4.1982, calling upon the defendant to discharge his obligations in terms of the suit agreement, both of which were duly served upon the defendant. It is averred that despite service of these notices, the defendant did not come forward to fulfill his obligations. It is then pleaded that defendant Nos. 2 to 6 to this appeal, who shall hereinafter be referred to as the purchasers, despite knowledge of the suit agreement, got a registered sale-deed dated 3.8.1983, executed in their favour by the defendant. 4. The plaintiff has described the sale-deed as one executed by conspiracy between the defendant and the purchasers, which has no binding effect on the rights of the plaintiff. It was on the basis of these facts that the plaintiff instituted the present suit on 10.8.1983, seeking to enforce the suit agreement against the defendant and the purchasers, by way of relief of specific performance; in defeasance of the plaintiff not being found entitled to specific performance, alternate relief by way of refund of the earnest money of Rs. 1800/- together with interest at the rate of 2% per mensem was sought, payable for the period past, pendente lite and future. The defendant filed his written statement dated 20.12.1982, whereas purchasers filed a written statement together, also dated 20.12.1982, independent of the defendant. 5. The stand taken by the defendant in his written statement was to the effect that he acknowledged execution of the suit agreement dated 2.7.1980 for an agreed sale consideration of Rs. 8060/-. He, however, pleaded that the plaintiff did not have with him the balance sale consideration to get a sale-deed executed as covenanted. 5. The stand taken by the defendant in his written statement was to the effect that he acknowledged execution of the suit agreement dated 2.7.1980 for an agreed sale consideration of Rs. 8060/-. He, however, pleaded that the plaintiff did not have with him the balance sale consideration to get a sale-deed executed as covenanted. The defendant further averred that he was in dire need of funds, and on that account, he had executed the suit agreement in favour of the plaintiff. It was also averred that considering his dire need for money, a specified date i.e. 2.2.1981 was covenanted, by which the plaintiff was obliged to get the sale-deed executed. The defendant has also said that upon the plaintiff failing to get a sale-deed executed as contracted, he sold the suit property by executing a sale-deed in favour of the purchasers on 3.8.1982, forfeiting the earnest paid by the plaintiff. The defendant has also averred that on 2.2.1982, he remained present in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Karchhana from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. in order to execute a sale-deed in terms of the suit agreement, but the plaintiff did not come forward. He has also averred in his written statement that he never received any notice from the plaintiff. 6. The purchasers in their separate written statement have averred that they are purchasers of the suit property. It is pleaded that in accordance with the suit agreement dated 2.7.1980, the plaintiff had a right to get the sale-deed executed by 2.2.1981, and that on account of his failure to do so by 2.2.1981, the suit agreement got discharged, putting an end to obligations inter se the plaintiff and the defendant on the suit agreement. The other pleadings put forward by the purchasers are to like effect as the defendant. 7. The Trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings of parties, struck the following issues (translated into English from Hindi vernacular): (1) Whether defendants Nos. 2 to 6 are bhumidhars in possession of the property in dispute? (2) Whether notices sent by the plaintiff were duly served upon the defendant? If so, its effect? (3) Whether the agreement to sell dated 2.7.1980 after 2.2.1981 is enforceable in law? (4) Whether defendant No. 1 executed an agreement to sell dated 2.7.1980 in favour of the plaintiff? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other relief? (2) Whether notices sent by the plaintiff were duly served upon the defendant? If so, its effect? (3) Whether the agreement to sell dated 2.7.1980 after 2.2.1981 is enforceable in law? (4) Whether defendant No. 1 executed an agreement to sell dated 2.7.1980 in favour of the plaintiff? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other relief? (6) Whether the instant suit is barred by time? (7) Whether the agreement to sell dated 2.7.1980 can be specifically enforced on the basis of grounds pleaded in the plaint? 8. The Trial Court held on issue No. 1 that the factum of execution of the sale-deed dated 3.8.1983 is acknowledged to the purchasers, and so is their possession on the basis of the sale-deed aforesaid. As such, the Trial Court held that the issue was not required to be adjudicated. Regarding issue No. 4, it was opined by the Trial Court that the execution of the suit agreement was admitted to the parties, and the issue between the parties was limited to the extent, whether the suit agreement remained enforceable in law, after 2.2.1981. And, if it was, whether it can be specifically enforced. It was, therefore, held by the Trial Court on the said issue that the same also did not call for a decision. The Trial Court proceeded to determine issues Nos. 2, 3 & 7, taking them up together and decided all of these in favour of the defendant and the purchasers. He held in conclusion that the suit agreement was not capable of being specifically enforced or any relief could be granted on its basis to the defendant as prayed. Issue No. 6 that relates to limitation and is a defendant's issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff, holding the suit within time. Upon the findings substantially recorded on issues Nos. 2, 3 & 7, the Trial Court dismissed the suit with costs. 9. That plaintiff appealed to the learned District Judge vide Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1985, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the Code). Upon the findings substantially recorded on issues Nos. 2, 3 & 7, the Trial Court dismissed the suit with costs. 9. That plaintiff appealed to the learned District Judge vide Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1985, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the Code). The appeal came up for determination before the learned XIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, who by means of his impugned decree, reversed the Trial Court and decreed the plaintiff's suit for specific performance, ordering the defendant and the purchasers together to execute the sale-deed in terms of the suit agreement, in favour of the plaintiff after accepting the balance sale consideration, within a period of one month. It was further decreed that in case the defendants do not execute a sale-deed, as ordered, despite the plaintiff paying the balance sale consideration within a month, the plaintiff would be entitled to get the sale-deed executed through process of Court. 10. Aggrieved, the defendant and the purchasers have joined in the present appeal preferred under Section 100 of the Code. This Appeal was admitted to hearing on 24.9.1998, on the following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the time was the essence of the agreement for sale in question and noncompliance of the terms of the suit agreement by the plaintiff-respondent would result in revocation of the agreement for sale by the appellant No. 1? (2) Whether the agreement for sale in question was voidable at the option of the appellant No. 1 in view of Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act? (3) Whether the judicial discretion exercised by the learned trial Court in refusing to decree the suit for specific performance could be interfered with by the lower appellate Court ignoring the provisions of Section 10, 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act?" 11. This Appeal was heard across a number of days. It was heard on 20.2.2019, 25.2.2019, 28.2.2019, 7.3.2019, 8.3.2019, 11.3.2019 and 27.3.2019 when judgment was reserved. On 11.3.2019, during the course of hearing, a further substantial question of law was framed, that reads: "Whether a suit for Specific Performance instituted by a vendee after the vendor has executed a sale-deed in favour of a third party can be decreed without there being a relief seeking cancellation of the sale-deed executed in favour of the third party?" 12. Sri K.M. Garg, learned Advocate has been heard on behalf of the Defendant and the purchasers (the appellants) and Sri C.S. Agnihotri, learned Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff (respondent). 13. The first submission advanced on behalf of the defendant to assail the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is that the finding of the learned Judge in Appeal to the effect that time was not essence of the contract is not the case of either part)', which according to the learned counsel for the defendant, could never have been arrived at on the pleadings and the evidence of parties. 14. Learned counsel for the defendant has, in this connection, invited the attention of the Court to the dock evidence of PW-1, where on 8.1.1985, he has testified as under: 02-07-1980 dks eSus jke fugksj dks 1800@& :i;k nsdj bdjkj ukek fy[kk;k Fkk vkSj bl bdjkj ukek esa ;g fy[kk x;k Fkk fd ckdh 6260@& :i;k nsdj ds fookfnr Hkwfe dk cSukek djk ysaxsA ;fn 2-2-81 cSukek dh jftLVªh ugha djk ywxk ;k 2-8-80 dk ekgn;k c; bdjkjukek jnn le>k tkosA^^ 15. In order to further buttress his contention that time was of the essence, learned counsel for the defendant has drawn the attention of the Court to the following recital in the suit agreement: ^^eq>dks eqcfyx 1800@& ,d gtkj vkB lkS :i;k vkt udn :c: lc jftLVªkj lkgc djNuk ds Jh vtk;cyky egktu etdwj ls crkSj tj c;kuk ds fey x;k ckdh eqcfyx 6260@& N% gtkj nkS lkS :i;k cjoDr cSukek :c: lc jftLVkj lkgc djNuk ds ywWxk ;g r; ik;k gS ysgktk c[kq'kh o jtkeanh viuh o fcuk ncko fdlh nwljs ds eSa ,djkj djrk gwW fd nks Qjojh lu 1981 bZŒ rd eS tc Hkh etdwj ds ikl iwjk :i;k gks tk;sxk vkSj egktu bldh lwpuk eq>s fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd tSls gh nsxs eSa mudh lqfo/kkuqlkj fuEufyf[kr tk;nkn dk cSukek muds gd esa dj nwWsxk vkSj vxj egktu vanj fe;kn eqdjZjk ds cSukek ugha djok ysrs rks mudk tj c;kuk jnn le>k tk;sxk vkSj eS tk;nkn fuEufyf[kr dks nwljs ds gkFk cspus dk vf/kdkjh gwWxkA^^ 16. Learned counsel for the defendant has urged that from the aforesaid recital in the agreement and the testimony of the plaintiff in the witness box extracted above, the intention of the parties on a true construction of the suit agreement about time being of the essence is indisputable. Learned counsel for the defendant has urged that from the aforesaid recital in the agreement and the testimony of the plaintiff in the witness box extracted above, the intention of the parties on a true construction of the suit agreement about time being of the essence is indisputable. He submits that determining a date in the agreement coupled with a covenant to the effect if by that date the plaintiff fails to get a sale-deed executed, the suit agreement would be deemed to be cancelled and further that the defendant would be free to alienate the suit property in favour of any third party, is clearly indicative of the intent that time was of essence. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the defendant has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Hind Construction Contractors by its sole proprietor Bhikamchand Mulchand Jain (Dead) by L.R's. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 720 , where in paragraph 7 of the report, it has been held: "7. The first question that arises for our consideration, therefore, is whether time was of the essence of the contract that was executed between the parties on July 12, 1955 (Ex. 34). It cannot be disputed that question whether or not time was of the essence of the contract would essentially be a question of the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract......" 17. Sri K.M. Garg, learned counsel for the defendant has further depended on the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Chand Rani (dead) by L.Rs. v. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1993 SC 1742 , where in paragraphs 12, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26 and 28 of the report, it has been said thus: "12. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in its construction of clause (1) of the suit agreement. In the case of an agreement for sale of immovable property time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. It would be an essence of the contract only when it is specifically stipulated or it clearly emerges by way of implication. That is not the case here. The word "only" occurring under clause (1) of the suit agreement would qualify only the amount and not the time for payment. It would be an essence of the contract only when it is specifically stipulated or it clearly emerges by way of implication. That is not the case here. The word "only" occurring under clause (1) of the suit agreement would qualify only the amount and not the time for payment. In support of this argument the learned counsel relied on Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Pallaniswami Nadar [ (1967) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1967 SC 868 ], Hind Construction Contractors v. State of Maharashtra [ (1979) 2 SCC 70 : (1979) 2 SCR 1147 ] and Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai [ AIR 1915 PC 83 ]. 18. It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the essence of the contract. This principle is not in any way different from that obtainable in England. Under the law of equity which governs the rights of the parties in the case of specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. It has to be ascertained whether under the terms of the contract the parties named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance it was intended that it should be completed within a reasonable time. An intention to make time the essence of the contract must be expressed in unequivocal language. 19. We will now refer to the decisions of this Court. In Gomathinayagam Pillai case [ (1967) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1967 SC 868 ] it was held at pages 231 to 233: "... An intention to make time the essence of the contract must be expressed in unequivocal language. 19. We will now refer to the decisions of this Court. In Gomathinayagam Pillai case [ (1967) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1967 SC 868 ] it was held at pages 231 to 233: "... Section 55 of the Contract Act which deals with the consequences of failure to perform an executor contract at or before the stipulated time provides by the first paragraph: "When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract.' It is not merely because of specification of time at or before which the thing to be done under the contract is promised to be done and default in compliance therewith, that the other party may avoid the contract. Such an option arises only if it is intended by the parties that time is of the essence of the contract. Intention to make time of the essence, if expressed in writing, must be in language which is unmistakable: it may also be inferred from the nature of the property agreed to be sold, conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the essence of the contract. Mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence. If the contract relates to sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the essence of the contract. Mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence. In Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunji bhai [ILR 40 Bom 289] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed that the principle underlying Section 55 of the Contract Act did not differ from those which obtained under the law of England as regards contracts for sale of land. The Judicial Committee observed: "Under that law equity, which governs the rights of the parties in cases of specific performance of contracts to sell real estate, looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement in order to ascertain whether the parties, notwithstanding that they named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance intended more than that it should take place within a reasonable time .... Their Lordships are of opinion that this is the doctrine which the section of Indian Statute adopts and embodies in reference to sales of land. It may be stated concisely in the language used by Lord Cairns in Tilley v. Thomas [(1867) 3 Ch App 61]: "The construction is, and must be, in equity the same as in a Court of law. A Court of equity will indeed relieve against, and enforce, specific performance, notwithstanding a failure to keep the dates assigned by the contract, either for completion, or for the steps towards completion, if it can do justice between the parties, and if (as Lord Justice Turner said in Roberts v. Berry [(1853) 3 De GM & G 284]) there is nothing in the "express stipulations between the parties, the nature of the property, or the surrounding circumstances' which would make it inequitable to interfere with and modify the legal right. This is what is meant, and all that is meant, when it is said that in equity time is not of the essence of the contract. Of the three grounds ... mentioned by Lord Justice Turner "express stipulations' requires no comment. The "nature of property' is illustrated by the case of reversions, mines, or trades. This is what is meant, and all that is meant, when it is said that in equity time is not of the essence of the contract. Of the three grounds ... mentioned by Lord Justice Turner "express stipulations' requires no comment. The "nature of property' is illustrated by the case of reversions, mines, or trades. The "surrounding circumstances' must depend on the facts of each particular case." Their Lordships will add to the statement just quoted these observations. The special jurisdiction of equity to disregard the letter of the contract in ascertaining what the parties to the contract are to be taken as having really and in substance intended as regards the time of its performance may be excluded by any plainly expressed stipulation. But to have this effect the language of the stipulation must show that the intention was to make the rights of the parties depend on the observance of the time-limits prescribed in a fashion which is unmistakable. The language will have this effect if it plainly excludes the notion that these time-limits were of merely secondary importance in the bargain, and that to disregard them would be to disregard nothing that lay as its foundation. "Prima facie, equity treats the importance of such time-limits as being subordinate to the main purpose of the parties, and it will enjoin specific performance notwithstanding that from the point of view of a Court of law the contract has not been literally performed by the plaintiff as regards the time-limit specified.'" 20. In Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dull Shastri [ (1977) 2 SCC 539 ] following the above ruling it was held at pages 543-544: (SCC para 5) "... It is settled law that the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time the essence of the contract. When a contract relates to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract. [Vide Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Pallaniswami Nadar [ (1967) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1967 SC 868 ] (at p. 233).] It may also be mentioned that the language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms that the time is of the essence of the contract. [Vide Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Pallaniswami Nadar [ (1967) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1967 SC 868 ] (at p. 233).] It may also be mentioned that the language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms that the time is of the essence of the contract. The intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract." (emphasis supplied) 24. From an analysis of the above case-law it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are: 1. From the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract. 25. In the above legal background, we will now look at the terms of the suit contract dated August 26, 1971. The agreement reads as under: "Now, therefore this agreement to sell witnesseth and the parties hereto have agreed as follows: 1. That in pursuance of the said agreement, the 1st party has received a sum of Rs. 30,000 (rupees thirty thousand only) from the second party as earnest money the receipt whereof the 1st party hereby separately acknowledges. Rs. 98,000 (rupees ninety-eight thousand only) will be paid by the second party to the 1st party within a period of ten days only and the balance of Rs. 50,000 (rupees fifty thousand only) at the time of registration of the sale-deed before the Sub-Registrar, New Delhi. 2. That the 1st party has completed the house with all fixtures and fittings and it has been agreed to between the parties that the 1st party shall take necessary steps for immediate redemption of the said property from the said mortgagee and shall inform the second party in writing about the completion of the said redemption. 3. 2. That the 1st party has completed the house with all fixtures and fittings and it has been agreed to between the parties that the 1st party shall take necessary steps for immediate redemption of the said property from the said mortgagee and shall inform the second party in writing about the completion of the said redemption. 3. That the 1st party shall apply immediately for the permission to sell to the income tax authorities and after getting the permission to sell by getting an income tax clearance certificate in respect of the said property the sale-deed of the same shall be executed by the 1st party in favour of the second party or her nominee/nominees on or before October 31, 1971. 4. That in case 1st party fails to execute and get the sale-deed registered within the period stipulated in para 3 above, the 2nd party shall have the right to get this agreement enforced by specific performance through the Court of law. 5. That if the second party fails to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale-deed executed and registered within the specific period mentioned in para 3 above, the earnest money of Rs. 30,000 (rupees thirty thousand only) shall stand forfeited to the 1st party and this agreement deemed null and void. 6. That the 1st party shall pay all taxes, rates municipal taxes up to the date of registration of the sale-deed and that the previous deeds and other documents pertaining to the said plot No. 30, Block "K' sanctioned place and completion certificate from the Municipal Corporation, Delhi in respect of the super-structure built on the said plot shall be handed over alongwith the vacant possession of first floor by September 30, 1971 and the front portion of the property by the first party to the second party at the time of registration of the sale-deed." 26. Then comes the question as to the payment of Rs. 98,000. The question is as to what is the meaning of the words "within a period of 10 days only"? Does it apply to the amount or the time-limit of 10 days from August 26, 1971. The trial Court was of the view that the word "only" was meant to stress and qualify the amount of Rs. 98,000 and cannot be read to mean as if payment within 10 days was the essence of the contract. Does it apply to the amount or the time-limit of 10 days from August 26, 1971. The trial Court was of the view that the word "only" was meant to stress and qualify the amount of Rs. 98,000 and cannot be read to mean as if payment within 10 days was the essence of the contract. On this aspect, the appellate Court takes the contrary view and holds that the amount of Rs. 98,000 ought to have been paid on or before September 6, 1971. Failure to do so would constitute a breach committed by the defendant. We are of the considered view that the Division Bench is right in its conclusion. As rightly pointed out in the judgment under appeal, the word "only" has been used twice over (1) to qualify the amount of Rs. 98,000 and (2) to qualify the period of 10 days. 28. The analysis of evidence would also point out that the plaintiff was not willing to pay this amount unless vacant delivery of possession of one room on the ground floor was given. In cross-examination it was deposed that since income tax clearance certificate had not been obtained the sum of Rs. 98,000 was not paid. Unless the property was redeemed the payment would not be made. If this was the attitude it is clear that the plaintiff was insisting upon delivery of possession as a condition precedent for making this payment. The income tax certificate was necessary only for completion of sale. We are unable to see how these obligations on the part of the defendant could be insisted upon for payment of Rs. 98,000. Therefore, we conclude that though as a general proposition of law time is not the essence of the contract in the case of a sale of immovable property yet the parties intended to make time as the essence under clause (1) of the suit agreement. From this point of view, we are unable to see how the case in Nathulal [ (1969) 3 SCC 120 : (1970) 2 SCR 854 ] could have any application to the facts of this case." 18. From this point of view, we are unable to see how the case in Nathulal [ (1969) 3 SCC 120 : (1970) 2 SCR 854 ] could have any application to the facts of this case." 18. Sri C.S. Agnihotri, learned counsel for the plaintiff countering the submission of Sri Garg, learned counsel for the defendant, submits that what is evident from the decision relied upon by the defendant, is that in cases relating to sale of immoveable property, the Rule is that time is not of the essence, even if a specific date for performance is specified. The presumption is always in favour of the time not being of the essence where the contract is about sale of immoveable property. In particular, he has submitted that the principles laid down by their Lordships in M/s. Hind Construction (supra) would not at all be attracted to the question involved in this case, inasmuch as, M/s. Hind Construction (supra) related to a works contract, and not a contract regarding sale of immoveable property. He has emphasized that contracts for the sale of immoveable property stand on a very different pedestal. So far as the question of time being of the essence is concerned, he submits that the other decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant in Chand Rani (supra) is more than eloquent in itself, and by reference to other authority noticed there, it is apparently a well-settled principle of law that in transactions of sale of immoveable property, time is not of the essence. 19. In order to appreciate the submissions on this question advanced by the learned counsel for parties, reference to the terms of the suit agreement are of prime importance. It has been noticed above that the covenant in the suit agreement, that has decisive bearing on the issue whether time is of essence, is encapsuled in the words that say, that the defendant agrees to execute a sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff upto 2.2.1981 whenever the plaintiff has the whole money ready on him, and he conveys information to the defendant to this effect, written or verbal, whereupon the defendant as per convenience of the plaintiff, would execute the sale-deed. If within the period of time agreed the plaintiff does not get a sale-deed executed, the said agreement would stand avoided, and the defendant shall have the right to alienate the suit property in favour of any third party. The fact that the parties, indeed, had covenanted in the aforesaid terms is affirmed by the dock evidence of the plaintiff, who deposing as PW-1, has said that in case by 2.2.1981, sale-deed was not got executed by him, it was agreed that the suit agreement would be deemed to be avoided. It, therefore, turns upon the true intention of parties to be gathered from a discernible construction to be placed upon the covenant regarding time in the suit agreement. 20. The decision in Chand Rani (supra) indicates that mere stipulation of a date, or the fixation of a period of time within which the contract must be performed would not make it the essence of contract, in cases governing contracts relating to immoveable property. At the same time, if the language employed is couched in such unmistakable and specific terms, that leave no doubt about the matter that completion of transaction should be done within the specified time, or within a reasonable time, that intention to make time the essence may be inferred. The decision in Chand Rani (supra) would further indicate that the Court quoted with approval the principle in an earlier decision of their Lordships in Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dutt Shastri and another, (1977) 2 SCC 539 : AIR 1977 SC 1005 , to the effect that even if not regarded as the essence of the contract, inference as to time for its performance within a reasonable time period may be drawn under conditions enumerated in paragraph 24 of the report in Chand Rani (supra): (1) the express terms of the contract; (2) the nature of the property; and (3) the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract. 21. Here, time being essence of the contract falls to be examined under the category where the express terms of the contract make it so. The question about time being of the essence flows from Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 55 of the Contract Act, reads thus: "55. 21. Here, time being essence of the contract falls to be examined under the category where the express terms of the contract make it so. The question about time being of the essence flows from Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 55 of the Contract Act, reads thus: "55. When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor's failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so." 22. What is relevant in the context of the question that arises here is the first part of Section 55 (supra). It embodies a statutory principle that where time is specified for certain acts or things to be done by one party, who is the promisor in relation to that part, failure to do that act or thing at or before the time specified, renders the obligation voidable at the option of the other party, that is to say, the promisee in relation to the act or thing to be done. This principle, however, is applicable in relation to the contract where it is the intention of parties that time should be of the essence. This principle, however, is applicable in relation to the contract where it is the intention of parties that time should be of the essence. Now, Section 55 of the Contract Act is to be found in Chapter IV entitled 'OF THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS'; the Rule, therefore, embodied in Section 55 Part I belongs specifically to substantive law governing performance of contracts. If one were to go strictly by the terms of the statute, at least the one that is substantive law about it, violation of the time limit where the contracting parties have intended time to be of the essence, would render the contract voidable at the option of the party, who is the promisee. It is quite another thing that where under the second part of Section, parties did not intend time to be of the essence, different principles would apply. Likewise, under third part of Section 55 even in cases where time is of the essence, but the promisee accepts performance at a later time, the option to avoid the contract is not available. The Rule, however, that in cases of immovable property where a particular time is mentioned by parties for the performance of a contract, the presumption is strongly against time to be of the essence, appears to have origin in the conditions prevailing in England at the time when Courts of Equity there evolved this principle. Mention about the origins of this principle or Rule of presumption against time being of the essence in contracts relating to immovable property, is to be found in the celebrated treatise, Indian Contract and Specific Performance Act (Tenth Edition) by Pollock and Mulla, where the Learned Authors have described the origin of the Rule, thus: "In England accidental delays in the completion of contracts for the sale of land within the time named are frequent by reason of unexpected difficulties in verifying the seller's title under the very peculiar system of English real property law. Sharp practice would be unduly favoured by strict enforcement of clauses limiting the time of completion, and accordingly Courts of Equity have introduced a presumption, chiefly, if not wholly, applied in cases between vendors and purchasers of land, that time is not of the essence of the contract. But this presumption will give way to proof of a contrary intention by express words or by the nature of the transaction." 23. But this presumption will give way to proof of a contrary intention by express words or by the nature of the transaction." 23. The aforesaid principle, that was evolved by the Courts of Equity in England in the historical background of problems of the time relating to ascertainment about good title of the vendor made its way to a statutory provision in India by virtue of Explanation (I) appended to Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 10 of the Act last mentioned reads thus: "10. [12(b) & 12(c)] Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the Court, be enforced- (a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining actual damage caused by the non-performance of the act agreed to be done; or (b) when the act agreed to be done in such that compensation in money for its nonperformance would not afford adequate relief. Explanation.--Unless and until the contrary is proved, the Court shall presume-- (i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable properly cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money; and (ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be so relieved except in the following cases: (a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce, or is of special value or interest to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market; (b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff." (Emphasis by Court) 24. It was on this account that the consistent position of law governing contracts of sale of immovable property is that in these cases mere stipulation of a time limit or the fixation of a period within which a contract must be performed, would not make it the essence of contract. This as already referred to hereinbefore in Chand Rani (supra), has been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court consistently in subsequent decisions. However, the rule that time is not of the essence in contracts relating to sale of immovable property is subject to the three exceptions, also enumerated in Chand Rani (supra). This as already referred to hereinbefore in Chand Rani (supra), has been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court consistently in subsequent decisions. However, the rule that time is not of the essence in contracts relating to sale of immovable property is subject to the three exceptions, also enumerated in Chand Rani (supra). Since the words employed in the contract have been mooted to be express terms, that make time essence of the contract, it would be profitable in the matter of construction of terms of the contract here to do a comparison with some authorities, where terms limiting time in the contract were not regarded of the essence. 25. A sound guide about the construction of a term limiting performance in point of time is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dull Shastri (supra). In this connection paragraphs 5 & 6 of the Report, which carries salient terms of the contract as well as construction placed on it by their Lordships is apposite: "5. The first question that arises for consideration is whether time is of the essence of the contract. In order to determine this question it is necessary to set out the suit agreement which is marked as Ex. 23 at page 137 of the papers. It runs as follows: "Dear Pandit Govind Prasad Ji Chaturvedi, Sir. A litigation has been going on between you and us with respect to the Kothi of Bima Nagar, of which you are a tenant on behalf of us. The said dispute has been decided today through the mediation of Sri Chand Doneriya, on the terms and conditions given below which shall be fully binding on you as well as us. 1. That you are agreeable to purchase our Kothi of which you are a tenant and a transaction between you and us has been finally settled today; at Rs. 24,000 (rupees twenty four thousand), with respect to the said Kothi. 2. That you are paying us, at present, a sum of Rs. 4000 in cash, as earnest money, the receipt whereof has been acknowledged by us by affixing a revenue stamp at the foot of this letter, and that the remaining sum of Rs. 20,000 shall be paid by you to us at the time of registration. 3. That the expenses relating registration and cost of stamps etc. 4000 in cash, as earnest money, the receipt whereof has been acknowledged by us by affixing a revenue stamp at the foot of this letter, and that the remaining sum of Rs. 20,000 shall be paid by you to us at the time of registration. 3. That the expenses relating registration and cost of stamps etc. shall be borne by you and we shall be entitled to get a sum of Rupees 24,000 (rupees twenty four thousand) net. 4. That you must get the sale-deed executed within two months i.e. upto 24th May, 1964, and in case you do not get the sale-deed registered within two months then the earnest money amounting to rupees four thousand, paid by you shall stand forfeited without serving any notice.* But in case we in some way evade the execution of the sale-deed, then you will be entitled to compel us to execute the sale-deed legally and we shall be liable to pay the costs and damages incurred by you. 5. That we shall furnish you a guarantee of good title in respect of the property which is free and immune from all sorts of disputes. 6. That you shall be liable to pay the rent till the date you get the sale-deed registered and you shall clear off all amount due to us before registration. 7. That both the parties shall withdraw their respective cases or get the same dismissed and shall bear their own costs. 8. That neither party shall take any fresh legal steps during this period of two months by which any hindrance may be caused in execution of our sale-deed. In confirmation of the agreement which has been made between you and me through this letter, you too have affixed your signature on this letter. Yours, Signature of Hari Dutt Shastri 24-3-1964 Signature of Bhavbhooti Sharma 24-3-64 x x x x x" The relevant clause is clause 4 which provides that the appellant must get the sale-deed executed within two months i.e. upto 24th May, 1964, and in case the appellant did not get the sale-deed registered within two months then the earnest money amounting to Rs. 4000 paid by the appellant shall stand forfeited without serving any notice. 4000 paid by the appellant shall stand forfeited without serving any notice. The clause further provides that in case the respondents in some way evade the execution of the sale-deed then the appellant will be entitled to compel them to execute the sale-deed legally and the respondents shall be liable to pay the costs and damages incurred by the appellant. It is settled law that the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time the essence of the contract. When a contract relates to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract.** (Vide Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, 1967 1 SCR 227 at page 233 : ( AIR 1967 SC 868 at p. 871). It may also be mentioned that the language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms that the time is of the essence of the contract. The intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to lime is not the essence of the contract.** 6. Apart from the normal presumption that in the case of an agreement of sale of immovable property time is not the essence of the contract and the fact that the terms of the agreement do not unmistakably state that the time was understood to be the essence of the contract neither in the pleadings nor during the trial the respondents contended that time was of the essence of the contract, in the plaint the allegation was that the appellant has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he did all that he was bound to do under the agreement while the respondents committed breach of the contract. The respondents did not set up the plea that the time was of the essence of the contract. In paragraph 32 of the Written Statement all that was stated was that the appellant did not perform his part of the contract within the stipulated time and that the contract thereafter did not subsist and the suit is consequently misconceived. The respondents did not set up the plea that the time was of the essence of the contract. In paragraph 32 of the Written Statement all that was stated was that the appellant did not perform his part of the contract within the stipulated time and that the contract thereafter did not subsist and the suit is consequently misconceived. The parties did not go to trial on the basis that time was of the essence of the contract for no issue was framed regarding time being the essence of the contract. Neither is there any discussion in the judgment of the trial Court regarding this point. The trial Court after considering the evidence came to the conclusion that the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract while the respondents were not. In the circumstances therefore the High Court was in error in setting as one of the points for determination whether time was of the essence of the contract.** The High Court after referring to the agreement was of the view that the agreement was entered into between the parties during the course of a litigation between the appellant and the respondents and in pursuance of the agreement the parties were directed to withdraw their cases and were directed further not to take fresh legal steps during the period of the two months within which the sale-deed was to be executed. On taking into account the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties of serving on each other notices, counter notices and telegrams the High Court inferred an intention on the part of the parties to treat the time as of essence of the contract. We will refer to the terms of the contract and the correspondence between the parties in due course but at this stage it is sufficient to state that neither the terms of the agreement nor the correspondence would indicate that the parties treated time as of essence of the contract. In fact, according to the agreement the sale-deed ought to have been executed by the 24th May but it is the admitted case that both the parties consented to have the document registered on the 25th May. In fact, according to the agreement the sale-deed ought to have been executed by the 24th May but it is the admitted case that both the parties consented to have the document registered on the 25th May. On the question whether the time is of the essence of the contract or not we are satisfied that the High Court was in error in allowing the respondents to raise this question in the absence of specific pleadings or issues raided before the trial Court and when the case of time being the essence of the contract was not put forward by the respondents in the trial Court. Apart from the absence of pleadings we do not find any basis for the plea of the respondents that the time was of the essence of the contract.** 26. Again, a question of construction of a covenant in the agreement limiting the obligation in time fell for consideration of this Court in Govind Lal Chawla v. C.K. Sharma and others, AIR 1978 All 446 , where the Court was called upon to gather from the terms of the contract involved there, whether time was of the essence. The third and fourth paragraphs of the contract involved in the said decision carried clauses limiting obligation of parties in time, for the performance of it. This Court in Govind Lal Chawla (supra) also did not find it to be a case where time was of the essence. In paragraph 7 of the report (which also embodies the relevant terms of the compromise) reads thus: "7. I now proceed to examine whether the time was of the essence of the contract under the agreement in question. The vendors in this case had executed an agreement in favour of one Madanlal on 10-1-1966. The terms of the agreement Ex. B-20 have to be construed. The agreement was executed by Mrs. M. Lucas and Mrs. C. Gordon who claim to be the owners of 20, Muir Road. The agreement was executed in favour of Madanlal. According to the agreement the sale-deed was to be executed in favour of Madanlal and/or his nominee or nominees. The consideration for sale was to be Rupees 16,000/-. The sum of Rs. 500/- was paid as earnest money. The stipulations in the deed of agreement were as below: "1. The agreement was executed in favour of Madanlal. According to the agreement the sale-deed was to be executed in favour of Madanlal and/or his nominee or nominees. The consideration for sale was to be Rupees 16,000/-. The sum of Rs. 500/- was paid as earnest money. The stipulations in the deed of agreement were as below: "1. That in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the said sum of Rs. 16,000 (Rupees sixteen thousand only), to be paid by the second party and/or the nominee or nominees of the second party, the first party shall transfer by way of absolute sale, the said premises No. 20, Muir Road, Allahabad, together with all the rights of the First Party in the land, and constructions to the Second Party and/or the nominee or nominees of the Second Party free of encumbrances." 2. That, out of the said sum of Rupees 16,000/- the First Party has this day been paid a sum of Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred only) by way of earnest money, and the balance of Rs. 15,500/- (Rupees fifteen thousand and five hundred only) shall be paid to the First Party on the execution of the sale-deed, before the Sub-Registrar, Allahabad. 3. That the said property is subject to a mortgage in favour of Mr. G. Alphanzo and the dues of the mortgagee will be cleared and paid by the First Party before the execution of the sale-deed. 4. That the First Party shall execute the sale-deed within a period of six weeks from this date and in case of failure on his part to do so, the Second Party may adopt legal proceedings for specific performance or refund of his earnest money, as he may choose. 5. That in case the second party commits a default, the earnest money shall be forfeited." Conditions 3 and 4 are quite important. According to Condition 3, the mortgage deed in favour of Sri G. Alphanzo was to be cleared and paid by the vendors before the execution of the sale-deed. 5. That in case the second party commits a default, the earnest money shall be forfeited." Conditions 3 and 4 are quite important. According to Condition 3, the mortgage deed in favour of Sri G. Alphanzo was to be cleared and paid by the vendors before the execution of the sale-deed. According to Condition 4, the vendors were to execute the sale-deed within a period of six weeks from the date of the agreement and in case of his failure to do so, the Second Party was to adopt legal proceedings, and, according to the fifth condition in case of default of the vendees, the earnest money was to be forfeited. These stipulations show that before the sale-deed could be executed the mortgage of Sri G. Alphanzo was to be satisfied and the sale-deed was to be executed by the vendors within six weeks. Thus, in a case like the one before me the time could not be the essence of the contract. So far as the vendee in this case is concerned, he had to be satisfied about the fact that mortgage was cleared. It is also stated that before the sale-deed could be executed the vendors had to get their names mutated over the property. These conditions had therefore to be satisfied, and, till they were satisfied the sale-deed could not be executed. In Govind Prasad v. Hari Dutt ( AIR 1977 SC 1005 ) following Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar ( AIR 1967 SC 868 ) it was held that, it is settled law that," the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time of the essence of the contract. If the contract relates to sale of immoveable property it would normally be presumed that time is not of the essence of the contract. The intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by circumstances which should be sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract." The lower appellate Court has committed a grievous error by ignoring the basic rule laid down in these two cases, about presumption that in cases of immovable property time is not the essence of the contract. It has therefore to be inferred from the terms of the agreement and circumstances whether the time was the essence of the contract or not. So far as this case is concerned, as I have observed above, the time could not be the essence of the contract." (Emphasis Supplied) 27. Now, the terms of contract limiting obligations of parties in time that were involved in the decision of their Lordships in Govind Prasad Chaturvedi (supra) obliged the vendee to get the sale-deed executed within two months and also indicate the date by which execution of the sale-deed was to be secured by the vendee. This time limiting clause was attended with a consequence that in case of the vendee's failure to get the contracted sale-deed registered within two months, the earnest money would stand forfeited without service of any notice. This kind of language employed in the contract was not construed by their Lordships to indicate in unmistakable terms that time was of the essence. Of course, the intention of parties to make time the essence of the contract was also examined, where their Lordships noticed that neither was a plea taken in the written statement that time as of the essence or was there any discussion on the point in the judgment of the Trial Court. The Supreme Court concluded that apart from absence of pleadings to raise a plea regarding time being of the essence, there was no basis for the respondent to raise that kind of a plea. The latter part would refer to the employment of language in the contract, that was not found by their Lordships to be in unmistakable terms that parties intended time to be of the essence. 28. Again, the decision of this Court in Govind Lal Chawla (supra) had a term in the contract which said that a sale-deed was to be executed within a period of six weeks from the date of the agreement, and that in case of the vendor's failure to do so, the vendee could sue for specific performance, or refund of his earnest money according to his election. The Court in construing the terms of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the contract concluded that clause (3) of the contract envisaged mortgage of the suit property in favour of a certain Alphanzo to be redeemed first by the vendors, before execution of the sale-deed. The Court in construing the terms of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the contract concluded that clause (3) of the contract envisaged mortgage of the suit property in favour of a certain Alphanzo to be redeemed first by the vendors, before execution of the sale-deed. Clause (3) was then read together with time limiting clause (4), that obliged the vendor to execute a sale-deed within a period of six weeks from the date of the suit agreement. This Court concluded that the stipulations in the contract that required the prior discharge of a mortgage before performance, could not lead to an inference that the time was of the essence of contract. 29. In the present case, what is of prime importance is the fact that the parties have just not covenanted to the effect that the obligations under the suit agreement are to be performed by 2.2.1981, but have further provided that in the event the plaintiff within the agreed time does not get the sale-deed executed, the contract shall be deemed to be repudiated and the defendant shall be free to sell the suit property in favour of any third party. The consequences stipulated in the suit agreement in the contingency of a sale-deed not being executed within the specified time being repudiation of the contract, coupled with an express release of the defendant's right to sell the suit property in favour of any third party, is all that makes the difference about the suit agreement. It is these conditions ensuing upon a failure of the plaintiff to secure execution of the sale-deed by the date as covenanted, that makes time essence of the contract in this case. It, thus, has to be held that time is essence of the contract, so far as the suit agreement is concerned. It must also be held, therefore, that time being essence of the suit agreement, non-compliance with terms of the same as to date of performance by the plaintiff would entitle the defendant to repudiate the contract at his option, so far as the terms of the suit agreement go. Substantial question No. (I) is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. 30. It must also be held, therefore, that time being essence of the suit agreement, non-compliance with terms of the same as to date of performance by the plaintiff would entitle the defendant to repudiate the contract at his option, so far as the terms of the suit agreement go. Substantial question No. (I) is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. 30. Time being held to be the essence of the contract, the next question that arises is to determine rights of parties on the foundation of this premise, whether the plaintiff did all that was within his power, within time limited by the suit agreement, to secure execution of a sale-deed in his favour. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the defendant that the earliest that the plaintiff caused a notice to be issued to the defendant to come forward and execute a sale-deed, in accordance with the latter's obligation under the suit agreement, was on 24.1.1982. According to learned counsel for the defendant, two further notices that are said to be issued are those, dated 30.3.1981 and 19.4.1982. It is urged that in terms of the suit agreement, sale-deed was to be executed at any time, before 2.2.1981. The subsequent notices dated 30.3.1981 and 19.4.1982, according to the learned counsel for the defendant, do not count as these were admittedly issued after 2.2.1981, when obligations of the defendant contracted under the suit agreement, stood open to be avoided by lapse of time. So far as the notice dated 24.1.1982 is concerned, it is also pointed out by Sri Garg, learned counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff failed to perform his part of the contract that required him to appear on 2.2.1981 before the office of the Sub Registrar, Karchchana that was on the construction placed upon the covenant in the suit agreement about time, was the last date by which obligation could be enforced, time being the essence of it. 31. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that this notice that was issued allegedly during time when obligations under suit agreement were intact and binding was never served upon the defendant. It is argued by Shri Garg that the plaintiff has failed to prove by his pleadings and evidence that the notice dated 24.1.1982 was served upon the defendant at all. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that this notice that was issued allegedly during time when obligations under suit agreement were intact and binding was never served upon the defendant. It is argued by Shri Garg that the plaintiff has failed to prove by his pleadings and evidence that the notice dated 24.1.1982 was served upon the defendant at all. In this regard, learned counsel has invited the attention of the Court to paragraph 12 of the written statement where denial of receipt of this notice is pleaded, besides the others said to be issued later. In paragraph 12 of the written statement, the denial figures in the following words (in Hindi vernacular): ^^12- ;g fd izfroknh eqthc dh oknh dh dksbZ uksfVl fnŒ 24-1-1981 bZŒ fnŒ 30-3-1981 bZŒ o 19-4-1982 dh ugh izkIr gqbZA^^ 32. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the said stand taken in the pleadings of the defendant is corroborated by an admission of the plaintiff in his dock evidence, recorded on 8.1.1985, where in his cross-examination he has said thus about service of the notice dated 24.1.1981 (which also mentions the other two notices). The relevant part of the plaintiffs evidence where he testified as PW-1 is recorded by the Trial Court as follows: ^^----- eSus 2-2-81 ds igys uksfVl eSus ns pqdk FkkA 24-1-81 dks vkSj 30-3-81 dks 19-4-82 dks uksfVl fn;k FkkA vkSj gj ckj esa iz;kl djrk jgk 24-1-81 dh uksfVl dk eq>s dksbZ ,DuksystesaV ugha feyk FkkA ;g eq>s ekywe fd 24-1-81 dh uksfVl jke fugksj dks izkIr gqbZ fd ughA tks uksfVl eSua 31-3-81 o 19-4-82 dk jke fugksj ds ikl Hksth Fkh mldk ,DuksystesaV eq>s feyk Fkk mls eSusa vnkyr esa nkf[ky fd;k gSA^^ 33. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that there being a clear admission by the plaintiff that he did not know whether the notice dated 24.1.1981 was served upon the defendant or not, coupled with the fact that he did not admittedly receive an acknowledgment, would lead to an inference that the said notice was not served upon the defendant at all. About the presumption of service in ordinary course of post to be raised by virtue of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, learned Counsel for the defendant has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, (1989) 1 SCC 264 . About the presumption of service in ordinary course of post to be raised by virtue of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, learned Counsel for the defendant has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, (1989) 1 SCC 264 . He has relied upon paragraph 6 of the report in M/s. Madan & Co. (Supra) to submit that presumption of good service can only be raised if it is pleaded and proved that the registered cover bears the correct address; and, also that there was prepayment of the requisite postal charges by affixation of stamps. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s. Madan & Co. (Supra) on which learned counsel for the defendant relied have held thus: "6........All that a landlord can do to comply with this provision is to post a prepaid registered letter (acknowledgment due or otherwise) containing the tenant's correct address. Once he does this and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it. In either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by, the addressee. The difficulty is where the postman calls at the address mentioned and is unable to contact the addressee or a person authorised to receive the letter. All that he can then do is to return it to the sender. The Indian Post Office Rules do not prescribe any detailed procedure regarding the delivery of such registered letters. When the postman is unable to deliver it on his first visit, the general practice is for the postman to attempt to deliver it on the next one or two days also before returning it to the sender. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessee's absence. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessee's absence. His responsibilities cannot, therefore, be equated to those of a process server entrusted with the responsibilities of serving the summons of a Court under Order V of the CPC. The statutory provision has to be interpreted in the context of this difficulty and in the light of the very limited role that the post office can play in such a task. If we interpret provision as requiring that the letter must have been actually delivered to the addressee, we would be virtually rendering it a dead letter. The letter cannot be served where, as in this case, the tenant is away from the premises for some considerable time. Also, an addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receive it. He can so manipulate matters that it gets returned to the sender with vague endorsements such as "not found", "not in station", "addressee has left" and so on. It is suggested that a landlord, knowing that the tenant is away from station for some reasons, could go through the motions of posting a letter to him which he knows will not be served. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. But, as against this, if a registered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in the normal course and is returned, it can only be attributed to the addressee's own conduct. If he is staying in the premises, there is no reason why it should not be served on him. If he is compelled to be away for some time, all that he has to do is to leave necessary instructions with the postal authorities either to detain the letters addressed to him for some time until he returns or to forward them to the address where he has gone or to deliver them to some other person authorised by him. In this situation, we have to choose the more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical interpretation and that would be to read the word "served" as "sent by post", correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word "receipt" as the tender of the letter by the postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant." 34. Learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand has argued that it is admitted by the defendant that he met the plaintiff two days ahead of 2.2.1981. It is urged that this came about as a result of service of registered notice dated 24.1.1981 that had been sent on the correct address of the defendant and would, therefore, be deemed to have been served. It is urged that the fact about the notice being sent to the correct postal address by the plaintiff, burden was on the defendants to show that the said notice was not served. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Basant Singh and another v. Roman Catholic Mission, AIR 2002 SC 3557 , where regarding presumption of good service of communications sent by the registered post (in the case before their Lordship there was service of summons) it has been held thus in paragraph 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the report: "9. Order 5, proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 19-A CPC provides that where the summons are properly addressed, prepaid and duly sent by registered post with acknowledgment due, notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgment having been lost or mislaid, or for any other reason, has not been received by the Court within thirty days from the date of the issue of the summons, the Court shall presume that notice is duly served. Further, Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (in short "the Act") provides similar provision. The presumptions are rebuttable. It is always open to the defendants to rebut the presumption by leading convincing and cogent evidence. 10. It is nobody's case that the postal addresses of the defendants are not properly addressed and, therefore, the registered summons could not be served. The presumptions are rebuttable. It is always open to the defendants to rebut the presumption by leading convincing and cogent evidence. 10. It is nobody's case that the postal addresses of the defendants are not properly addressed and, therefore, the registered summons could not be served. It is also nobody's case that the registered summons are not prepaid and not duly sent. In fact the registered summons, bearing Receipts Nos. 875 and 876 dated 24-4-1986, were issued is borne out from the record. 11. Once it is proved that summons were sent by registered post to a correct and given address, the defendants' own conduct becomes important. Before the trial Court, the appellants were allowed to lead evidence in support of their contentions. An order to this effect was passed by the trial Court oh 11-1-1991. The premises in question are occupied by two defendants jointly -- Hari Singh and Basant Singh. Hari Singh appeared and examined himself stating that he did not receive the registered letter. However, the defendant Basant Singh did not appear and no evidence whatsoever, on his behalf, has been led to rebut the presumption in regard to service of summons sent to him under registered post with acknowledgment due. His own conduct shows that the registered summons had been duly served on him. As already noticed, Hari Singh appeared and save and except the bald statement that registered letter was not tendered to him, no evidence whatsoever was led to rebut the presumption. He could have examined the postman, who would have been the material witness and whose evidence would have bearing for proper adjudication. He has failed to discharge the onus cast upon him by the statute. This apart, it is inherently improbable that the registered summons were duly served on Basant Singh but not on Hari Singh when they occupied the tenanted premises jointly. 12. As noticed above, the registered summons were sent to Basant Singh and Hari Singh vide Postal Receipts Nos. 875 and 876 dated 24-4-1986 on the correct and given address, is borne out from the record. Ex parte proceedings were ordered on 22-8-1986 and ex parte decree was passed on 30-9-1986." 35. 12. As noticed above, the registered summons were sent to Basant Singh and Hari Singh vide Postal Receipts Nos. 875 and 876 dated 24-4-1986 on the correct and given address, is borne out from the record. Ex parte proceedings were ordered on 22-8-1986 and ex parte decree was passed on 30-9-1986." 35. So far as service of notice dated 24.1.1981 is concerned, no doubt no acknowledgment relating to the same being served upon the defendant has been filed in evidence by the plaintiff, but on the principles stated, as urged by the learned counsel for the defendant, it is not a case where presumption of service may be displaced due to failure by the plaintiff to establish that it was not properly addressed or not pre-paid and duly sent by registered post, acknowledgment due. In fact, the two other notices dated 30.1.1981 and 19.4.1982 were, likewise, sent by registered post on the same address as that mentioned on the notice dated 24.1.1981, and the service of those notices upon the defendant is established by acknowledgment cards filed in evidence. There is no good reason to believe that when the subsequent notices sent by the plaintiff at the same address by registered post, were delivered to the defendant proven by acknowledgment cards, the notice dated 24.1.1981 would also not be likewise served. But, in the case of this notice since there is no acknowledgment card, indicating the date of service on record, the issue would certainly be as to when the notice dated 24.1.1981 was served. Since the date of actual service of this notice is not proven by evidence aliunde, like the acknowledgment card relative to the said notice, or a certificate from the Post Office affirming the fact of delivery of this notice on a particular date, service has to be presumed under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Since the date of actual service of this notice is not proven by evidence aliunde, like the acknowledgment card relative to the said notice, or a certificate from the Post Office affirming the fact of delivery of this notice on a particular date, service has to be presumed under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is to the following effect: "Meaning of service by post.--Where any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or either of the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." (Emphasis by Court) 36. It would be noticed that under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, the presumption is not only about service in the case any document served by post, even in the absence of evidence of its actual service, but the presumption is also about the time during which the document so sent would have been served. In the present case, what is of relevance is time when the notice dated 24.1.1981 would have been served upon the defendant. This issue of time when the said notice was served, or more specifically saying it, deemed to be served assumes special significance in view of the fact that this notice was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant on the margin of time, when the period limited by the contract to a specified date over the covenanted performance of the suit agreement was running out. In fact, going by what has been held hereinabove on the issue of time being essence of the contract, 2.2.1981 was a watershed beyond which obligations of the defendant would stand determined, vis-a-vis., the plaintiff by efflux of time. The question, therefore, would be whether the notice dated 24.1.1981 sent by registered post to the defendant can be presumed to be served before 2.2.1981, or it can be presumed to be served, but beyond 2.2.1981. The question, therefore, would be whether the notice dated 24.1.1981 sent by registered post to the defendant can be presumed to be served before 2.2.1981, or it can be presumed to be served, but beyond 2.2.1981. And if beyond that date, how much beyond it, working out on the basis of presumption in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. 37. There is no guide about the period of time that the expression 'ordinary course of post' occurring in Section 27 of the Act last mentioned would mean. The best answer to it is to be found in the provisions of Order V, Rule 19-A [since omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (46 of 1999) w.e.f. 1.7.2000]. The said provision has now ceased to exist on the statute book, but during time to which the transaction as well as the impugned judgments by the Courts below relate, it was firmly there. The provisions of Rule 19-A of Order V of the Act (as it stood before its repeal) read as under: "19-A. Simultaneous issue of summons for service by post in addition to personal service.--(1) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service in the manner provided in Rules 9 to 19 (both inclusive), also direct the summons to be served by registered post, acknowledgment due, addressed to the defendant, or his agent empowered to accept the service, at the place where the defendant, or his agent, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall require the Court to issue a summons for service by registered post, where, in the circumstances of the case, the Court considers it unnecessary. (2) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the defendant or his agent is received by the Court or the postal article containing the summons is received back by the Court with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the defendant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the postal article containing the summons, when tendered to him, the Court issuing the summons shall declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant: Provided that where the summons was properly addressed, prepaid and duly sent by registered post, acknowledgment due, the declaration referred to in this sub-rule shall be made notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgment having been lost or mislaid, or for any other reason, has not been received by the Court within thirty days from the date of the issue of the summons." (Emphasis by Court) 38. Rule 19-A of Order V was about simultaneous issue of summons for service by posts, in addition to personal service. Though the Rule was applicable in the specific context of additional service of summons by registered post upon the defendant to a suit, it clearly provided for the period of time at the end of which presumption of service by registered post would arise in cases where the acknowledgment was lost or not available for any other reason. It fixed the period of time for this presumption to arise at 30 days. The period of time envisaged by the legislature based upon the conditions of the time is certainly a good guide about what period of time would constitute 'ordinary course of post', also under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Even in a case to which Rule 19-A of Order V did not apply, the period of time mentioned there may be taken as a rough estimate about what 'ordinary course of post' would imply in relation to a case like the present one. It could lead to the presumption being raised with a few days of variation, on either side of 30 days. It could lead to the presumption being raised with a few days of variation, on either side of 30 days. In this case, the time between the date of the registered notice dated 24.1.1981 and the outer date for covenanted performance in the suit agreement i.e. 2.2.1981 is a short period of 10 days (inclusive of the terminal days), that reckons to be one-third of the period of time which was stipulated by the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 19-A aforesaid. It was, indeed, too short a period of time during which presumption of good service could be drawn by the Court. 39. In fact, the Trial Court has dealt with this issue punctiliously recording the following finding about it (in Hindi vernacular): ^^bl lEca/k esa ;g Li"V gS fd oknh us Øe'k% fnukad 24-1-81] 30-3-81 rFkk 19-4-82 dks uksfVl nsus dk dFku fd;k gS rFkk dfFkr uksfVl ls lacf/kr jlhn ,oa udy uksfVl Øe'k% dkxtkr la[;k 24¼d½] 25¼x½] 20¼d½] 27¼d½] 28¼d½] 29¼d½ rFkk 30¼x½ nkf[ky fd;k gS] ftlls ;g Li”V gksrk gS fd okLro esa oknh us izfroknh la[;k&1 dks foØ; fu"ikfnr djus gsrq vius vk'k; dh lwpuk fn;k FkkA izFke uksfVl fnukad 2-2-81 ds iwoZ fnukad 24-1-81 dks nsuk Li”V dh x;h gS] bl laca/k esa dkxt la[;k&24¼d½ dk voyksdu fd;k tk;] rks ;g lacf/kr Mkd[kkus dh jlhn gS tks izfroknh la[;k&1 jkefugksj ds uke fnukad 24&1&81 dks Hksth x;h Fkh] ftlds tfj;s uksfVl dkxt laŒ25¼x½ dk Hkstuk Li”V fd;k x;k gS] dkxt laŒ 25¼x½ esa Hkh fnukad 24-1-81 dks izfroknh jkefugksj dks Hkstk Fkk] ysfdu ;g Hkh Li"V gS fd ;g rF; lkfcr ugha gksrk fd okLro esa ;g i= izfroknh jkefugksj dks dc feyk] vuqca/k ds fu"iknu dk vfUre fnukad 2-2-81 fu;r fd;k x;k Fkk vkSj 24-1-81 ,d ,slk fnukad gS] ftlls ;g fu"d”kZ fudkyk tk ldrk gS fd brus vYi le; es nh x;h og i= izfroknh ds izkIr u gqvk gksXkk ;g ,d ,slk iz'u gS fd ftlds ckor dksbZ lk{; i=koyh ij miyC/k ugha gSA vr% ;g dgk tk ldrk gS fd oknh dh vkSj tks Hkh i= fnŒ 24-1-81 dks Hkstk x;k mlesa le; dh bruh deh j[kh x;h ftlls bldk ykHk izfroknh dks gh feysxkA^^ 40. While it is true that it is not proved that the notice dated 24.1.1981 sent by registered post calling upon the defendant to appear before the Sub-Registrar, is not proved to be served in accordance with law before the date fixed in the notice, that is 2.2.1981, there is a categorical finding by the lower Appellate Court on the issue that on 2.2.1981, both the plaintiff and the defendant, remained present at the office of the Sub-Registrar, where the plaintiff got his attendance marked, but the defendant did not. The defendant has been noticed to have said in his evidence that the plaintiff had asked him to see him at the Sub-Registrar's office. It is further recorded by the lower Appellate Court that the defendant, indeed, remained present at the Sub-Registrar's office and waited for the plaintiff, sitting with one Balram Munshi. The lower Appellate Court has held from all this evidence of parties that once the defendant has acknowledged that the plaintiff had asked the defendant to see him at the Sub-Registrar's office, there is no ostensible reason for the defendant to have gone to the Sub-Registrar's office, but waited there for the plaintiff at the seat of Balram Munshi. The lower Appellate Court has inferred from this finding that the defendant did not deliberately appear at the Sub-Registrar's office to execute the sale-deed. This finding has been recorded by the lower Appellate Court in the context of answering the issue of readiness and willingness, and not with reference to the question whether time being of the essence, the plaintiff was entitled to exercise his option to avoid the contract under Section 55 of the Contract Act This Court, however, finds that the lower Appellate Court has drawn a reasonable conclusion from the evidence on record that the defendant was aware, through oral information conveyed to him, that he is to appear before the Sub-Registrar on 2.2.1981 to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff. According to the defendant's version, he did go to the Sub-Registrar's office, but perched himself in some corner of the precincts where Balram Munshi has his seat for the discharge of his professional duties. According to the defendant's version, he did go to the Sub-Registrar's office, but perched himself in some corner of the precincts where Balram Munshi has his seat for the discharge of his professional duties. As to the question involved here, it is not relevant whether the plaintiff did go to the Sub-Registrar's office, or he did not; what is relevant is that through an oral communication he was called upon by the plaintiff to visit the Sub-Registrar's office, which the defendant acknowledges. The fact that he did not or could not meet the plaintiff, because he spent time there at an unseemly location, or that he did not get his attendance marked with the Sub-Registrar, as held by the lower Appellate Court, go to show that the plaintiff had invoked the contract within the date specified, that is to say, 2.2.1981, asking the defendant to come forward and execute a sale-deed in its terms on the said date i.e. 2.2.1981. The fact that service of the written notice that was sent calling upon the defendant, may not have been proved to have been effected before the date fixed, but on findings of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court, in relation to the issue of readiness and willingness, it is firmly established that the plaintiff on admission of the defendant, called him over to the Sub-Registrar's office on 2.2.1981, clearly for the purpose of execution of a sale-deed. Thus, time though essence of the contract, it must be held that the contract was invoked before the time limited thereunder, if not by proof of service of the notice said to have been issued on 24.1.1981, that is before 2.2.1981, it was certainly invoked by an oral communication which the defendant has acknowledged. Under the terms of the agreement extracted hereinabove, the contract could be invoked at any time before the last date fixed i.e. 2.2.1981 by the plaintiff calling upon the defendant to execute a sale-deed, either through a written information, or oral communication. Under the terms of the agreement extracted hereinabove, the contract could be invoked at any time before the last date fixed i.e. 2.2.1981 by the plaintiff calling upon the defendant to execute a sale-deed, either through a written information, or oral communication. The fact of an oral communication being made by the plaintiff invoking the contract before 2.2.1981, that required the defendant to appear before the Sub-Registrar's office on 2.2.1981, the outer limit fixed for performance, otherwise found to be of essence, is well established on record and concluded by a finding of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court based on a plausible view of the evidence on record. Thus, notwithstanding the fact, that time is held to be essence of the contract, it cannot be said that the contract was not invoked before the outer time limit expired. As such, it must be held a fortiori that the defendant is not entitled to exercise his option under the first part of Section 55 of the Contract Act to avoid the same. Substantial question No. (2) is, therefore, answered in the negative. 41. It next falls for consideration whether the lower Appellate Court has recorded a reasonable finding regarding readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, that is sine qua non of a party's right to successfully establish his claim to a decree for specific performance. The obligations to establish that the plaintiff has always been ready and willing, and remained ready and willing, all through to get a sale-deed executed in terms of the contract ever since the performance fell due and throughout the course of the suit until decree was passed is the requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, as it stood before its amendment by Amending Act 18 of 2018, reads as under: "16. Personal bars to relief.--Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-- (a) xxxxxx (b) xxxxx or (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant." 42. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant that the lower Appellate Court has not said by as much as a whisper anything regarding proof by the plaintiff of his case under Section 16(c) (supra) by saying that he remained always ready and willing to perform his part of the suit agreement. It is to the contrary submitted that post execution of the suit agreement, there was total inaction on the plaintiff's part for two and a half years. He points out that the date of the suit agreement is 2.7.1980, where there was a covenant to get a sale-deed executed in terms thereof by the plaintiff by 2.2.1981. The earliest that the defendant acted is when he got a notice issued to the plaintiff to execute a sale-deed on 24.1.1981. It was just ten days before the date by which parties had agreed that the contract must be performed or not at all. Learned counsel points out that the plaintiff, after the notice dated 24.1.1981 was issued followed it up by two further notices, dated 30.1.1981 and 19.4.1982. But, he did not bring any action until 10.8.1983, when the present suit was filed. This suit was filed after the defendant had sold the suit property by way of a registered sale-deed in favour of the purchasers on 3.8.1983. Learned counsel submits that the suit was filed within a week of the defendant transferring the suit property in favour of the purchasers, but two and a half years after the suit agreement was executed on 2.7.1980. It is urged by the learned counsel for the defendant that the uneventful two and a half years, after execution of the suit agreement, without any action taken except for issue of a notice through registered post on the fringes of time before the stipulated date after which in terms of the covenant carried in the suit agreement, the defendant would be free to transfer the suit property in favour of any third party, clearly shows that the plaintiff has not at all proved his readiness and willingness to get a sale-deed executed. 43. 43. In support of his contention about the obligation of the plaintiff to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness from the date of agreement till a decree is passed, as a condition precedent to the grant of relief of specific performance, learned counsel for the defendant has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao (Dr.), (1995) 5 SCC 115 and has in the context of his submission referred to what their Lordships have held in paragraph 5 of the report. It reads thus: "5. It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the Court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short "the Act"). Under Section 20, the Court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was a valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the Court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit alongwith other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The Court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract." 44. Learned counsel for the defendant further placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani and others, (2009) 17 SCC 27 , to submit that the relief of specific performance not only requires proof of a continuous readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff, but also enjoins the Court to exercise its discretion in the matter of grant of that relief. Learned counsel for the defendant has also placed reliance on paragraphs 28, 29, 30 & 32 of the report in Azhar Sultana (supra), where their Lordships have held: "28. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 postulates continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff. It is a condition precedent for obtaining a relief of grant of specific performance of contract. The Court, keeping in view the fact that it exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, would be entitled to take into consideration as to whether the suit had been filed within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast law can be laid down therefor. The conduct of the parties in this behalf would also assume significance. 29. In Veerayee Ammal v. Seem Ammal [ (2002) 1 SCC 134 ] it was observed: (SCC p. 140, para 11) "11. When, concededly, the time was not of the essence of the contract, the appellant-plaintiff was required to approach the Court of law within a reasonable time. A Constitution Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani [ (1993) 1 SCC 519 ] held that in case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being of the essence of the contract. A Constitution Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani [ (1993) 1 SCC 519 ] held that in case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being of the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of contract, the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (i) from the express terms of the contract; (ii) from the nature of the property; and (iii) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of making the contract. For the purposes of granting relief, the reasonable time has to be ascertained from all the facts and circumstances of the case." It was furthermore observed; (Veerayee Ammal case [ (2002) 1 SCC 134 ], SCC pp. 140-41, para 13) "13. The word "reasonable' has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of "reasonable time' is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon it is defined to mean: "A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly"; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.'" 30. It is also a well-settled principle of law that not only the original vendor but also a subsequent purchaser would be entitled to raise a contention that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. It is also a well-settled principle of law that not only the original vendor but also a subsequent purchaser would be entitled to raise a contention that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. (See Ram Awadh v. Achhaibar Dubey [ (2000) 2 SCC 428 ], SCC p. 431 para 6.) 32. Furthermore, grant of decree for specific performance of contract is discretionary. The contesting respondents herein are living in the property since 1981 in their own right. There is absolutely no reason as to why they should be forced to vacate the said property at this juncture." 45. Learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand submits that the plaintiff has clearly averred in the plaint, and proved to the hilt that he has been ready and willing to perform his part of the suit agreement. At complete variance to what learned counsel for the defendant has submitted that the lower Appellate Court has not recorded any finding as to readiness and willingness, mandatorily required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the lower Appellate Court has recorded a clear finding as to readiness and willingness, being established by the plaintiff. He has, in particular, invited the attention of the Court to averments in the plaint, in this regard. He has relied upon paragraphs 4 & 5 of the plaint, in particular, that read thus: ^^4- ;g fd oknh ges'kk⩾'kk eqrkfcd ekfgnk fookfnr Hkwfe dk cSukek izfroknh uŒ 1 ofd;k tj leu fy[kkus dks rS;kj jgs vkSj vc Hkh gS ijarq izfroknh uaŒ1 dksbZ u dksbZ cgkuk djds Vkyrk pyk vk jgk gSA 5- ;g fd etcwju oknh us tfj, odhy izfroknh uaŒ1 dks uksfVl fnukad 24-1-81 dks rFkk okngw fnukad 30-3-81 rFkk fnukad 19-4-82 dks Hksth vkSj izfroknh uaŒ1 dks eqrkfcd ekfgnk c; fnukad 2-2-81 dks lc jftLVªkj dk;kZy; esa gkftj vkdj cSukek fy[kkus dh bŸkyk nh ijUrq izfroknh uaŒ1 mDr frfFk ij gkftj ugha vk;k tc fd oknh gkftj jgsA^^ 46. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has also referred to the following part of the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court, which reads: ^^izfroknh dk dFku izFke n`”V;k fo'oluh; ugha gS] D;ksfd oknh us fnŒ 2-2-81 dks mi fuca/kd djNuk ds le{k viuh mifLFkfr dk 'kiFk iwoZd dFku ds vfrfjDr vfHkys[kh; lk{; Hkh izLrqr fd;k gSA blds foijhr izfroknh laŒ1 dk mijksDr frfFk dks viuh mifLFkfr vafdr djkus dk dksbZ vfHkys[kh; lk{; izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA LokHkkfod :i ls izfroknh laŒ1 ;fn mi fuca/kd djNuk ds dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr Fkk rc og viuh mifLFkfr vafdr djkus gsrq izkFkZuki= ns ldrk FkkA bl laca/k esa jke fugksj us vius c;ku esa dFku fd;k gS fd fnŒ 2-2-81 dks jftLVªh vkfQl esa vkus ls nks fnu iwoZ oknh ls feyk Fkk rFkk r; gqvk Fkk fd jftLVªh vkfQl esa vk tk;sA ;g rF; Hkh oknh ds dFku ds leFkZu djrk gS fd oknh fnŒ 2-2-81 dks cSukek djkus ds fy, rS;kj Fkk rFkk uksfVl nsdj fnŒ2-2-81 dks cSUkkek djus ds vkxzg fd;k FkkA izfroknh dk dFku gS fd og ml fnu cyjke eqa'kh ds ikl cSBdj bartkj djrk jgkA izfroknh Loa; ;g dFku djrk gS fd oknh us lc jftLVªkj vkfQl esa feyus ds fy, dgk Fkk] rc ,slh n'kk esa izfroknh dks jftLVªh vkfQl esa feyuk pkfg, Fkk rFkk cyjke eq'kh ds ikl cSBus dk dksbZ dkj.k ugha FkkA ;g rF; bl ckr dk ifjpk;d gS fd izfroknh tkucw> dj mi fuca/kd ds dk;kZy; esa cSukek djus gsrq mifLFkr ugh gqvk rFkk oknh foØ; vuqca/k dh 'krksZ ds vuqikyu es lnSo rRij] bPNqd o rS;kj jgk Fkk rFkk blh vk'k; ls fnŒ 2-2-81 dks mi fuca/kd ds dk;kZy; esa igqWpk FkkA^^ 47. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal, (2001) 7 SCC 617 , where it has been held: "20. Coming to the facts of the case, there is no dispute that the appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent offering to pay the entire amount of Rs. 19,990 to the respondent well within the period specified in the agreement. The suit was also filed before 3-5-1979. Nothing further remained to be done by the appellant under the agreement. Coming to the facts of the case, there is no dispute that the appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent offering to pay the entire amount of Rs. 19,990 to the respondent well within the period specified in the agreement. The suit was also filed before 3-5-1979. Nothing further remained to be done by the appellant under the agreement. As far as the deposit of the balance consideration was concerned under Explanation (i) to Section 16(c)[Explanation.-- For the purposes of clause (c),--(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court;] of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the appellant could wait for an order of the Court to do so. That is what he did. Both the trial Court and the first appellate Court on a consideration of all the evidence therefore rightly came to the conclusion that the appellant was ready and willing to perform his obligations under the agreement and was entitled to specific performance of it." 48. He has further placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Smart Lal (Dr.) v. Brij Mohan Mehra, (1972) 2 SCC 757 . He has invited the attention of the Court to paragraph 13 of the report in Jiwan Lal (Dr.) (supra), which reads thus: "13. In his written statement Brij Mohan Mehra pleaded only waiver and not also that he would be prejudiced by specific performance. There was considerable correspondence between the parties between February 11, and April 27, 1960. In their letters the prospective vendees repeatedly asked Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a sale-deed in accordance with the agreement. They also said that they were ready and willing to pay the sale consideration stipulated in the agreement. But Brij Mohan Mehra persisted in his refusal to execute the sale-deed. Eventually on April 17, 1960 one Sardari Lal Sachdev, Advocate, gave notice on behalf of the prospective vendees to Shri Hans Raj Mittal, Advocate, for Brij Mohan Mehra. It is said in that notice that the prospective vendees would attend the office of the Sub-Registrar, Amritsar on April 30, 1960 between 10 a.m. and 12 noon and that Brij Mohan Mehra should reach there to get the sale-deed registered. It is said in that notice that the prospective vendees would attend the office of the Sub-Registrar, Amritsar on April 30, 1960 between 10 a.m. and 12 noon and that Brij Mohan Mehra should reach there to get the sale-deed registered. As April 30, 1960 was a holiday, the prospective vendees later sent a telegram to Brij Mohan Mehra to appear before the Sub-Registrar and produced before him a sum of Rs. 1,12,500. The money was counted by the clerk of the Sub-Registrar. Brij Mohan Mehra did not appear before the Sub-Registrar on that date. The Sub-Registrar has supported this version of the plaintiffs. Dr Jiwan Lal, one of the plaintiffs, has deposed that even after April 29, 1960, he had been asking Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a registered sale-deed but he had been evading. One Mr. Ranbir Mehta went alongwith him to Brij Mohan Mehra for the same purpose. But Brij Mohan Mehra told him that as the premises had been attached by the Rani of Kashmir he should wait for some time. Dr Jiwan Lal then added: "Thereafter I went and asked him to complete the same but he continued to evade." There appears to be no cross-examination on this part of his statement on behalf of Brij Mohan Mehra. Dr Jiwan Lal denied in his cross-examination that the plaintiffs had abandoned their claim. It is not possible to believe that the plaintiffs, who were so insistent on the execution of the sale-deed in their favour and who had actually appeared before the Sub-Registrar with the requisite amount of money for payment to the vendor, would abandon their claim after April 29 or August 1, 1960. There is no reason to disbelieve Dr. Jiwan Lal's statement that even after April 29, 1960, he had been pressing upon Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a registered sale-deed. In our opinion the plaintiffs did not abandon their rights under the agreement. The institution of the suit after two years does not appear to have caused any disadvantage to Brij Mohan Mehra. As already stated earlier, there is no such allegation in his written statement nor is there any evidence to that effect. Brij Mohan Mehra has admitted in his cross-examination that the prices of properties started depreciating in or about October, 1962 when there was Chinese aggression on India. The suit was instituted after the Chinese aggression. As already stated earlier, there is no such allegation in his written statement nor is there any evidence to that effect. Brij Mohan Mehra has admitted in his cross-examination that the prices of properties started depreciating in or about October, 1962 when there was Chinese aggression on India. The suit was instituted after the Chinese aggression. So it cannot be said that the specific performance of the agreement was likely to cause any prejudice to Brij Mohan Mehra on the date of the institution of the suit. The suit cannot accordingly be dismissed on account of delay. In view of our earlier findings, it is not necessary to decide whether the requisitioning of the premises was a manoeuvre of Brij Mohan Mehra to slide back from the agreement." 49. It is urged on the basis of the aforesaid decision that mere delay in filing the suit, without proof of prejudice occasioned to the defendant is no ground to refuse specific performance. 50. This Court has considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel on both sides. So far as this Court is concerned, it would settle down to a consideration whether in principle the lower Appellate Court has dealt with the issue of the plaintiff's establishing his readiness and willingness as mandated by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and if the answer be in the affirmative, whether the lower Appellate Court has drawn conclusions about it on facts, evidence and the law applicable, that may be termed as perverse. The finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court regarding readiness and willingness, that has been extracted hereinabove, indeed, shows that the lower Appellate Court has considered the matter with reference to the pleadings and the law. It has recorded a definitive finding in the judgment that the plaintiff has been always ready and willing to perform his part of the suit agreement. It is not a case where the lower Appellate Court has not touched the issue of readiness and willingness at all, as urged by the learned counsel for the defendant. 51. It has recorded a definitive finding in the judgment that the plaintiff has been always ready and willing to perform his part of the suit agreement. It is not a case where the lower Appellate Court has not touched the issue of readiness and willingness at all, as urged by the learned counsel for the defendant. 51. Turning to the question as to whether the conclusions drawn by the lower Appellate Court on the question of readiness and willingness are perverse bearing in mind the facts of the case, the evidence on record and the law applicable, this Court must take due note of the fact that the question of readiness and willingness has recently engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in R. Lakshmikantham v. Devaraji, wherein it has been held: "10. The High Court order is not correct in stating that readiness and willingness cannot be inferred because the letters dated 18.12.2002 and 19.12.2002 had not been sent to the defendant. The High Court also erred in holding that despite having the necessary funds, the plaintiff could not be said to be ready and willing. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court was also incorrect in putting a short delay in filing the Suit against the plaintiff to state that he was not ready and willing. In India, it is well-settled that the rule of equity that exists in England, does not apply, and so long as a Suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put against the plaintiff - See Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 (paragraph 7) which reads as under: "(7) Mr. Lakshmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a Court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems-English and Indian-qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay - the time lag depending upon circumstances - may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay - the time lag depending upon circumstances - may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises." (Emphasis by Court) 52. The question fell more recently for consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap and others v. Smt. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar and others, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1026, where considering the decisions, inter allia, in Azhar Sultana (supra), and the very recent decision in R. Lakshmikantham (supra), it has been held by their Lordships, thus: "44. So far the period between the year 1966 to the year 1968 is concerned, when the plaintiffs had the limitation of three years for filing the suit for specific performance, it cannot be said that during the aforesaid period, the plaintiffs were required to show overt act by them in furtherance of the agreement in question. The principles stated in the decisions in Azhar Sultana, Veerayee Ammal and Pushparani S. Sundaram (supra), as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, are not of any doubt or debate but each of the said cases had proceeded on its own facts. We may also observe that in the case of Azhar Sultana, the Court found that as against the agreement dated 4.12.1978, the suit for specific performance was filed on 7.12.1981, after the property was sold on 31.10.1981; and that the plaintiff failed to show that she was not having notice of the subsequent sale. However, in the said case, the Court directed monetary payment to the tune of twice the amount advanced by the plaintiff. In Veerayee Animal, this Court pointed out that the expression "reasonable time' for performance on the part of plaintiff would depend on the circumstances of the case, including the terms of contract. In Pushparani S. Sundaram, the basic requirements of Section 16 of the Act of 1963 were reiterated. In Veerayee Animal, this Court pointed out that the expression "reasonable time' for performance on the part of plaintiff would depend on the circumstances of the case, including the terms of contract. In Pushparani S. Sundaram, the basic requirements of Section 16 of the Act of 1963 were reiterated. In contrast to what is suggested on behalf of the appellants, we may point out that recently, in the case of R. Lakshmikantham v. Devaraji : Civil Appeal No. 2420 of 2018, decided on 10.7.2019, this Court has again explained that when the suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put against the plaintiff. This Court has said:-- "....In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court was also incorrect in putting a short delay in filing the Suit against the plaintiff to state that he was not ready and willing. In India, it is well-settled that the rule of equity that exists in England, does not apply, and so long as a Suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put against the plaintiff - See Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 (paragraph 7) which reads as under:-- "(7) Mr. Lakshamaihan cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a Court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems-English and Indian-qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay - the time lag depending upon circumstances - may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises."" 45. In the present case too, when the plaintiffs had the limitation of three years for filing the suit and have indeed filed the suit well within limitation; and looking to the overall circumstances of the case, no aspect of delay operates against them." 53. In the present case too, when the plaintiffs had the limitation of three years for filing the suit and have indeed filed the suit well within limitation; and looking to the overall circumstances of the case, no aspect of delay operates against them." 53. It must be remarked that though time has been found to be of the essence on a construction of the terms of the suit agreement here, it has been found also that within the time limited by the agreement, the plaintiff invoked the agreement requiring the defendant's presence at the office of the Sub-Registrar on 2.2.1981 to execute the sale-deed. The fact that after 2.2.1981, the plaintiff brought the present suit on 10.8.1983, post lapse of two years and six months of the date on which the cause of action had accrued would not ipso facto lead to the inference that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It has figured in evidence that apart from the notice dated 24.1.1982 through which the defendant alongwith a verbal communication had invoked performance of the contract before the date agreed between parties, the plaintiff also sent two further notices dated 30.3.1981 and 19.4.1982, calling upon the defendant to discharge his obligations by executing a conveyance in his favour. While service of notice dated 24.1.1982 before the date fixed in the contract as the limiting event of obligations has not been proved, invocation of the contract has been held proved on the basis of oral evidence on admission of parties before the due date; service of two subsequent notices, dated 30.3.1981 and 19.4.1982 is established by sterling evidence. The service of these two subsequent notices is established by postal acknowledgments filed by the plaintiff that have been marked as evidence at the trial. In these circumstances, it is evident that the plaintiff's readiness and willingness during the period of limitation prescribed by law of filing a suit cannot be doubted. There is no such evidence by which either readiness or willingness may be inferred out. In these circumstances, it is evident that the plaintiff's readiness and willingness during the period of limitation prescribed by law of filing a suit cannot be doubted. There is no such evidence by which either readiness or willingness may be inferred out. The fact that he waited for a period of two years and six months to institute a suit after he had invoked the contract, has been held by the decision of the Supreme Court in R. Lakshmikantham (supra) as a circumstance wherefrom an inference about lack of readiness or willingness could not be drawn; at least that inference could not be drawn in the absence of any evidence aliunde to show that the plaintiff during the period of limitation was not ready and willing. Though, in their Lordship's decision in R. Lakshmikantham (supra), the delay in filing the suit is described as a short one, it has been laid down as a rule that in India, the rule of equity that obtains in England against delay in bringing an action, does not apply in seeking specific performance so long as a suit for specific performance is filed within limitation. The finding of the Lower Appellate Court regarding readiness and willingness is based on a plausible view of the evidence which the law does not disapprove. This being so, the view of the Lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff has been ready and willing throughout cannot be said to be perverse. The finding of the Lower Appellate Court, on the question of readiness and willingness is, therefore, affirmed. 54. But, a finding that on the evidence available on record and the standards of law laid down, the plaintiff has been ready and willing throughout is a matter that may have no bearing at all on the question whether the Lower Appellate Court has exercised discretion to grant specific performance on reasoning that may not be found flawed for its perversity. 55. In the present case, notwithstanding the finding that the plaintiff throughout the period of limitation was rightly found by the last Court of fact to be ready and willing throughout, the standards regarding exercise of discretion to grant specific performance as spelt out by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act too have been reasonably adhered to, requires scrutiny. 55. In the present case, notwithstanding the finding that the plaintiff throughout the period of limitation was rightly found by the last Court of fact to be ready and willing throughout, the standards regarding exercise of discretion to grant specific performance as spelt out by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act too have been reasonably adhered to, requires scrutiny. The law about it generally is that specific performance is not to be granted merely because it is lawful to do so. Various factors that emerge from the facts of the case and evidence on record would go into a valid decision being arrived at, whether to grant specific performance or refuse the same by opting for some alternative relief to remedy the breach of contract, otherwise found in favour of the plaintiff. Again, so far as this Court is concerned, so long as the discretion that has been exercised by the last Court of fact, that is to say, the Lower Appellate Court, is not perverse, in the sense that no reasonable person under the circumstances could have taken the view under challenge, it is not for this Court to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. 56. It would again be profitable to look into the authority guiding exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has drawn the Court's attention in this regard to the decision of the Supreme Court again in V. Pechimulhu (Supra), where dealing with the issue of rise in prices of land and holding it to be a relevant factor in denying relief of specific performance by Courts of fact, it was held by their Lordship's thus: 25. Counsel for the respondent finally Urged that specific performance should not be granted to the appellant now because the price of land had risen astronomically in the last few years and it would do injustice to the respondent to compel her to reconvey property at prices fixed in 1978. 26. The argument is specious. Where the Court is considering whether or not to grant a decree for specific performance for the first time, the rise in the price of the land agreed to be conveyed may be a relevant factor in denying the relief of specific performance. 26. The argument is specious. Where the Court is considering whether or not to grant a decree for specific performance for the first time, the rise in the price of the land agreed to be conveyed may be a relevant factor in denying the relief of specific performance. (See K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan [ (1997) 3 SCC 1 ].) But in this case, the decree for specific performance has already been passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court. The only question before us is whether the High Court in second appeal was correct in reversing the decree. Consequently the principle enunciated in K.S. Vidyanadam [ (1997) 3 SCC 1 ] will not apply. 57. Reliance has further been placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff on the same point on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramathal v. Maruthathal and others, which again was a case where the issue of escalating prices of property was considered in the context of exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. In this case, the consideration was out rightly rejected to be relevant by their Lordship's holding thus: 23. The buyer has taken prompt steps to file a suit for specific performance as soon as the execution of the sale was stalled by the seller. From this discussion, it is clear that the buyer has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract at all stages. Moreover it is the seller who had always been trying to wriggle out of the contract. Now the seller cannot take advantage of their own wrong and then plead that the grant of decree of specific performance would be inequitable. Escalation of prices cannot be a ground for denying the relief of specific performance. Specific performance is an equitable relief and granting the relief is the discretion of the Court. The discretion has to be exercised by the Court judicially and within the settled principles of law. Absolutely there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgments of the Courts below which has judicially exercised its discretion and the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same. 58. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied on another authority of their Lordship's of the Supreme Court in Dr. Jivanlal and others v. Brij Mohan Mehra and another, AIR 1973 SC 559 . 58. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied on another authority of their Lordship's of the Supreme Court in Dr. Jivanlal and others v. Brij Mohan Mehra and another, AIR 1973 SC 559 . In that case, considering the exercise of discretion to grant or refuse specific performance, their Lordship's considered the prejudice that would be involved in granting that relief on account of the delay by the plaintiff in instituting the suit. In the case before their Lordship's, the suit had been instituted two years after performance fell due. The evidence and the circumstances obtaining in the case were very minutely considered to hold that by mere delay in instituting the suit, no prejudice was caused to the defendant. The suit for specific performance was, therefore, decreed by their Lordship's, which had been decreed by the Trial Court but reversed on appeal by the High Court. The reasoning in Dr. Jivanlal (supra) to hold in favour of specific performance by discounting delay of two years is enmeshed in the facts there that serve as a guiding light to the exercise of discretion under Section 20. It has been held in paragraph 12 and 13 of the report in Dr. Jivanlal (supra) thus: 12. The agreement was made on December 9, 1959. The premises were requisitioned by an order, dated January 23, 1960. Brij Mohan Mehra filed an appeal against the order of requisition. It was dismissed on August 1, 1960. The suit was instituted on November 5, 1962. As the appeal was pending, the plaintiffs could reasonably wait until August 1, 1960 in the hope that the order of requisition might be set aside in appeal. So no legitimate objection can be taken on the score of delay until August 1, 1960. The suit was instituted within two years, three months and four days of the dismissal of appeal on August 1, 1960. It is now to be seen whether this delay is such as would disentitle the plaintiffs to the relief of specific performance of the contract. In Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hunt [(1874) LR 5 PC 221 at 239]. Lord Selborne said: "The doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. It is now to be seen whether this delay is such as would disentitle the plaintiffs to the relief of specific performance of the contract. In Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hunt [(1874) LR 5 PC 221 at 239]. Lord Selborne said: "The doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as an equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases lapse of time and delay are most material." 13. In his written statement Brij Mohan Mehra pleaded only waiver and not also that he would be prejudiced by specific performance. There was considerable correspondence between the parties between February 11, and April 27, 1960. In their letters the prospective vendees repeatedly asked Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a sale-deed in accordance with the agreement. They also said that they were ready and willing to pay the sale consideration stipulated in the agreement. But Brij Mohan Mehra persisted in his refusal to execute the sale-deed. Eventually on April 17, 1960 one Sardari Lal Sachdev, Advocate, gave notice on behalf of the prospective vendees to Shri Hans Raj Mittal, Advocate, for Brij Mohan Mehra. It is said in that notice that the prospective vendees would attend the office of the Sub-Registrar, Amritsar on April 30, 1960 between 10 a.m. and 12 noon and that Brij Mohan Mehra should reach there to get the sale-deed registered. As April 30, 1960 was a holiday, the prospective vendees later sent a telegram to Brij Mohan Mehra to appear before the Sub-Registrar and produced before him a sum of Rs. 1,12,500. The money was counted by the clerk of the Sub-Registrar. Brij Mohan Mehra did not appear before the Sub-Registrar on that date. The Sub-Registrar has supported this version of the plaintiffs. Dr Jiwan Lal, one of the plaintiffs, has deposed that even after April 29, 1960, he had been asking Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a registered sale-deed but he had been evading. One Mr. Brij Mohan Mehra did not appear before the Sub-Registrar on that date. The Sub-Registrar has supported this version of the plaintiffs. Dr Jiwan Lal, one of the plaintiffs, has deposed that even after April 29, 1960, he had been asking Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a registered sale-deed but he had been evading. One Mr. Ranbir Mehta went alongwith him to Brij Mohan Mehra for the same purpose. But Brij Mohan Mehra told him that as the premises had been attached by the Rani of Kashmir he should wait for some time. Dr Jiwan Lal then added: "Thereafter I went and asked him to complete the same but he continued to evade." There appears to be no cross-examination on this part of his statement on behalf of Brij Mohan Mehra. Dr Jiwan Lal denied in his cross-examination that the plaintiffs had abandoned their claim. It is not possible to believe that the plaintiffs, who were so insistent on the execution of the sale-deed in their favour and who had actually appeared before the Sub-Registrar with the requisite amount of money for payment to the vendor, would abandon their claim after April 29 or August 1, 1960. There is no reason to disbelieve Dr. Jiwan Lal's statement that even after April 29, 1960, he had been pressing upon Brij Mohan Mehra to execute a registered sale-deed. In our opinion the plaintiffs did not abandon their rights under the agreement. The institution of the suit after two years does not appear to have caused any disadvantage to Brij Mohan Mehra As already stated earlier, there is no such allegation in his written statement nor is there any evidence to that effect. Brij Mohan Mehra has admitted in his cross-examination that the prices of properties started depreciating in or about October, 1962 when there was Chinese aggression on India. The suit was instituted after the Chinese aggression. So it cannot be said that the specific performance of the agreement was likely to cause any prejudice to Brij Mohan Mehra on the date of the institution of the suit. The suit cannot accordingly be dismissed on account of delay. In view of our earlier findings, it is not necessary to decide whether the requisitioning of the premises was a manoeuvre of Brij Mohan Mehra to slide back from the agreement. 59. The suit cannot accordingly be dismissed on account of delay. In view of our earlier findings, it is not necessary to decide whether the requisitioning of the premises was a manoeuvre of Brij Mohan Mehra to slide back from the agreement. 59. Learned counsel for the defendant on the other hand relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son, AIR 1987 SC 2328 , in support of the proposition that where conduct or neglect of the plaintiff induces the defendant to change his position to his prejudice, it would be a relevant factor to refuse relief. The said part of the reasoning is to be found in the decision of their Lordship's in Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew (supra) by way of a quotation with approval to an earlier authority of the Supreme Court in Satyanarayana v. Yellogi Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 . It has been further held that the discretion to exercise specific performance should be exercised after meticulous consideration of all facts and circumstances. Specific performance is not to be granted merely because it is lawful to do so. It has also been held that the Court should take care to see as to what is the motive behind the litigation. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the report in Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew (supra) are enlightening, where it held: 13. In Satyanarayana v. G. Yellogi Rao [ AIR 1965 SC 1405 : (1965) 2 SCR 221 , 230] this Court observed: "But as in England so in India, proof of abandonment or waiver of a right is not a precondition necessary to disentitle the plaintiff to the said relief, for if abandonment or waiver is established, no question of discretion on the part of the Court would arise. We have used the expression "waiver' in its legally accepted sense, namely, "waiver is contractual, and may constitute a cause of action: it is an agreement to release or not to assert a right': see Dawson's Bank Ltd. v. Nippon Menkwa Kabushiki Kaisha [1935 LR 62 IA 100, 108]. It is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which a Court can exercise its discretion against the plaintiff. It is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which a Court can exercise its discretion against the plaintiff. But they must be such that the representation by or the conduct or neglect of the plaintiff is directly responsible in inducing the defendant to change his position to his prejudice or such as to bring about a situation when it would be inequitable to give him such a relief." 14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion of Courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The Court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff. The High Court has failed to consider the motive with which Varghese instituted the suit. It was instituted because Kuruvila could not get the estate and Mathew was not prepared to part with it. The sheet anchor of the suit by Varghese is the agreement for sale Exhibit A-l. Since Chettiar had waived his rights thereunder, Varghese as an assignee could not get a better right to enforce that agreement. He is, therefore, not entitled to a decree for specific performance. 60. Learned counsel for the defendant has in support of his contention that inaction for a long period of time on the part of the plaintiff in bringing the suit and substantial rise in prices of properties, would be a relevant factor to refuse specific performance has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, AIR 1997 SC 1751 . In the said case, notice through counsel was issued by the plaintiff, two and a half years after performance fell due and during this time no action was taken by the plaintiff. In the aforesaid context, it has been held in K.S. Vidyanadam (supra) by their lordship's thus: 13. In the case before us, it is not mere delay. In the said case, notice through counsel was issued by the plaintiff, two and a half years after performance fell due and during this time no action was taken by the plaintiff. In the aforesaid context, it has been held in K.S. Vidyanadam (supra) by their lordship's thus: 13. In the case before us, it is not mere delay. It is a case of total inaction on the part of the plaintiff for 2½ years in clear violation of the terms of agreement which required him to pay the balance, purchase the stamp papers and then ask for execution of sale-deed within six months. Further, the delay is coupled with substantial rise in prices -- according to the defendants, three times -- between the date of agreement and the date of suit notice. The delay has brought about a situation where it would be inequitable to give the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff.* 14. Shri Sivasubramaniam then relied upon the decision in Jiwan Lal (Dr.) v. Brij Mohan Mehra [ (1972) 2 SCC 757 : (1973) 2 SCR 230 ] to show that the delay of two years is not a ground to deny specific performance. But a perusal of the judgment shows that there were good reasons for the plaintiff to wait in that case because of the pendency of an appeal against the order of requisition of the suit property. We may reiterate that the true principle is the one stated by the Constitution Bench in Chand Rani [ (1993) 1 SCC 519 ]. Even where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiffs must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property.** *(Emphasis by Court) **(Emphasis Supplied) 61. The principles that emerge from the above decisions are well-settled but at the same time there is no straight-jacket formula that may serve as a ready reckoner to answer the issue whether discretion to exercise specific performance has been rightly exercised. The principles that emerge from the above decisions are well-settled but at the same time there is no straight-jacket formula that may serve as a ready reckoner to answer the issue whether discretion to exercise specific performance has been rightly exercised. Moreover, when the Court is seized of the matter not as a Court of fact but one hearing an appeal from an appellate decree, it is not an open question for the Court to decide whether on facts and evidence on record, the law has been correctly applied regarding exercise of discretion to grant specific performance; or for that matter to refuse it. This Court is limited in its appraisal of the issue to see whether the discretion under Section 20 has been perversely exercised. This is particularly true of the consideration about rise in prices of land subject-matter of the suit as a relevant factor in guiding the discretion under Section 20. There the difference in scale of appraisal or the freedom to decide on all facts and evidence have been noticed by their Lordship's of the Supreme Court in V. Pechimuthu (supra). 62. Turning to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that proceeding on the premise that the defendant was asked by the plaintiff to appear before the Sub-Registrar's Office on 2.2.1981 that was the limiting date to perform his part of the contract and that the defendant despite being aware of the demand avoided performing his obligations under the suit agreement, there is no plausible explanation forthcoming in evidence as to why the suit that should have been filed shortly after 2.2.1981, came to be filed as late as on 10.8.1983, with a delay of two years and six months. During this period of time, the defendant executed a sale-deed conveying the suit property in favour of the purchasers on 3.8.1983. It is indeed reflective of conduct certainly not bona fide on the plaintiff's part that he brought this suit within seven days of the aforesaid sale-deed being executed by the defendant in favour of the purchasers. The plaintiff waited from 2.2.1981 when the defendant did not appear to execute a sale-deed and get it registered before the Sub-Registrar for all the time of two years and six months, but moved to bring the suit within a week of the sale-deed last mentioned, being executed in favour of the purchasers. The plaintiff waited from 2.2.1981 when the defendant did not appear to execute a sale-deed and get it registered before the Sub-Registrar for all the time of two years and six months, but moved to bring the suit within a week of the sale-deed last mentioned, being executed in favour of the purchasers. This conduct of the plaintiff in the considered opinion of this Court is such that no other view of the matter can be taken but one that dis-entitles the plaintiff to relief of specific performance. The fact that by his utter inaction to bring a suit during all the long period of time of two years and six months and doing that when rights in favour of the purchasers were created under a sale-deed executed for valuable consideration by the defendant, most certainly makes equity work against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant; more strongly, in favour of the purchasers who are also parties to the suit, and, of course, this appeal. The equity works more strongly so far as the purchasers are concerned as they have contested the suit. 63. In this view of the matter this Court finds that the Lower Appellate Court went so wrong in granting specific performance that its view about the exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act is clearly perverse. Substantial question No. (3) is, thus, answered in the negative in so far as it relates to Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act; with regard to Sections 10 and 16 it is answered in the affirmative. 64. It requires mention that the added substantial question of law that was framed by this Court during the course of hearing on 11.3.2019 was based on a decision of the Supreme Court in B. Vijaya Bharathi v. P. Savitri and others, (2018) 11 SCC 761 , where Sri K.M. Garg, learned counsel for the appellant relying on the remarks in paragraph 70 of the report, had pressed that the said question be framed. Now, that this Court has concluded that relief of specific performance is not to be granted, there is no good reason to go into the aforesaid substantial question of law and decide the same. The said substantial question of law is, therefore, not required to be answered. Now, that this Court has concluded that relief of specific performance is not to be granted, there is no good reason to go into the aforesaid substantial question of law and decide the same. The said substantial question of law is, therefore, not required to be answered. The plaintiff has asked for the alternative relief of earnest money advanced, that is to say, Rs. 1800/- with interest @ 2% per mensem. There is no relief claimed by way of compensation, in terms of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act. 65. In the present case, breach of contract has been found established, as also readiness and willingness on the plaintiff's part. It is another matter that for reasons assigned, it has been held that the relief of specific performance is one that is ruled out. In this view of the matter, the decree of specific performance is liable to be set aside and substituted by a decree for refund of the earnest money together with interest @ 14% per annum, past and pendente lite; future interest would be payable @ 6% per annum in accordance with the provisions of Section 34 C.P.C. Looking to the circumstances that parties have met with partial success, it is a case where costs should go easy. 66. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and substituted by a decree in terms that the defendant shall refund to the plaintiff the earnest money of Rs. 1800/-, together with interest @ 14% per annum past and pendente lite; and future interest @ 6% per annum. Parties shall bear their own cost throughout. 67. Let a decree be drawn up, accordingly.