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2019 DIGILAW 2045 (ALL)

Reeta Singh v. State of U. P.

2019-09-02

SIDDHARTHA VARMA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Siddhartha Varma, J. 1. The petitioner's Fair Price Shop situate in Village - Tanda Kalan, Block - Chahaniyan, Tehsil - Sakaldiha, District-Chandauli, was suspended on 4.4.2019. Thereafter on 16.4.2019, the petitioner denied the charges and filed her reply. On 4.6.2019, the licence to run the Fair Price Shop was cancelled. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 2. The petitioner has submitted that initially when the order of suspension was passed there was enquiry contemplated in it and subsequently thereafter no fresh charges were issued and no enquiry as is contemplated under the Government Orders dated 29.7.2004 and 16.10.2014 was undergone. 3. Learned Standing Counsel, in reply, however, submitted that prior to the issuing of the suspension order, notices were issued and the charges were known to the petitioner. He submits that these charges were issued on 18.2.2019 and 12.3.2019. 4. Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that when the petitioner was appointed as a Fair Price Shop Dealer it was a contract between the State and the Fair Price Shop Dealer and as per the paragraph No. 15 of the agreement, the contract would be terminated at any time without giving any reason. Learned Standing Counsel pointed out to Clause 15 of the agreement between the Government and the Fair Price Shop Licencee which is being reproduced here as under: ^^ftyk eftLVªsV@ftyk iwfrZ vf/kdkjh ¼vkiwfrZ½] mi&ftykf/kdkjh rFkk xzke lHkk dks bl] vuqcU/k&i= dks fdlh le; fcuk dkj.k crk, gq, lekIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA^^ 5. Learned Standing Counsel only pointed out to the instructions which had been received by him and did not file any counter-affidavit. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 6 who was the complainant in the case stated that since the charges which were made against the petitioner were clear from the charge-sheet itself, no further enquiry was required. 7. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel and Sri Dhirendra Kumar Srivastava appearing for the respondent No. 6, this Court is of the definite view that the order impugned cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 8. A perusal of the impugned order dated 4.6.2019 definitely shows that no independent enquiry was ever conducted after the suspension order dated 4.4.2019 was passed. 8. A perusal of the impugned order dated 4.6.2019 definitely shows that no independent enquiry was ever conducted after the suspension order dated 4.4.2019 was passed. The enquiry which is on the record appears to be put on the basis of the charges and the replies which were there on the record before the suspension order was passed. A perusal of the order dated 4.6.2019 also shows that the enquiry conducted on 2.1.2019 by the Supply Inspector was only depended upon by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Tehsil - Sakaldiha. 9. Having found that the enquiry was not done in compliance of the order dated 29.7.2004 and 16.10.2014, this Court is of the view that no useful purpose would be served by relegating the petitioner to file an appeal when no enquiry whatsoever was undergone. There was definitely a gross-violation of principles of natural justice. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel that as per the Clause 15 of the agreement the contract could have been terminated without any show cause notice is also not tenable. Had there been no stigma or allegation against the petitioner and contract had been terminated simplicitor then no enquiry was required. However, when a stigma was being cast upon the petitioner and charges were being levelled then it becomes imperative that the petitioner should have been heard in a proper enquiry. 10. Under such circumstances, the order dated 4.6.2019 and the order dated 4.4.2019 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and, thus, the same are quashed. 11. The writ petition is allowed. 12. The petitioner's Fair Price Shop Licence would be restored and the shop which the petitioner was running would also be restored to her.