JUDGMENT : This is a plaintiff’s appeal. The suit of the plaintiff in O.S.No.7539/2004 filed against the present respondents arraigning them as defendants in the Court of the XVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, (CCH16), Bangalore City, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “Trial Court”) for the relief of permanent injunction came to be dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- by the judgment and decree dated 06-10-2012 of the Trial Court. It is against the said impugned judgment and decree, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 2. The summary of the case of the plaintiff in the Trial Court was that, he purchased the suit schedule property which is an immovable property bearing Survey No.28/2 in Kammagondanahalli, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk and measuring one acre, as an agricultural land under a Registered Sale Deed dated 26-02-1992 from its erstwhile owner - Sri. R. Munivenkatappa. All the revenue records were got transferred to the name of the plaintiff and that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property since the date of purchase of the suit property till now. The Government of Karnataka initiated proceedings under Section 79 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “KLR Act”). However, after hearing the plaintiff who had appeared and substantiated that he was from an agriculturist family, the Government by its order dated 10-03-2004 dropped all proceedings against the plaintiff in this regard and handed over the land back to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the receipt patta and khata have been effected to the name of the plaintiff and RTC extracts are being issued in the name of the plaintiff even to this day. It is further the case of the plaintiff that none of the defendants had any manner of right, title or interest over the suit schedule property or any portion thereof by way of registered legal document. The vendor of the plaintiff had also not executed any valid document in favour of these three Co-operative Societies/Association conveying, conferring or transferring any absolute right over the suit schedule property or any portion thereof in Survey No.28/2 in a total extent measuring 01 Acre 27 Guntas. The vendor of the plaintiff had also not executed any valid document in favour of these three Co-operative Societies/Association conveying, conferring or transferring any absolute right over the suit schedule property or any portion thereof in Survey No.28/2 in a total extent measuring 01 Acre 27 Guntas. The plaintiff further contended that the office bearers of the defendant’s Co-operative Societies/ Association and several members of the Co-operative Societies/Association claiming to have certain bogus documents from these Co-operative Societies/ Association were day-in and day-out interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff/appellant. The suit schedule property till date remains to be an agricultural land and has not been converted for the purpose of any non-agricultural use, more so, for the purpose of formation of layout of residential sites. It was further contended by the plaintiff that the defendants – Co-operative Societies /Association claiming to be having support of their members and other influential persons, taking advantage of the situation are trying to interfere with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has also stated in his plaint that there have been proceedings initiated by the plaintiff against one Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao in O.S.No.8637/1995 and there are also several other proceedings by the defendants in O.S.Nos.2566/1996, 2567/1996, 2568/1996, 2570/ 1996, 2836/1996 and 2837/1996 initiated by the plaintiff’s vendor due to certain misrepresentation and for want of proper intimation. The plaintiff’s suit in O.S.No.8637/1995 against Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao came to be dismissed for default. The plaintiff has alleged that taking advantage of the dismissal of the said suit, the defendants’ office bearers and members are attempting to trespass into the suit schedule property and interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. With this, the plaintiff has prayed for the relief of a permanent injunction against the defendants restraining the defendants – Co-operative Societies/Association, their office bearers, successors-in-interest, anybody claiming through or under them in any manner and howsoever in favour of the plaintiff from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property by the plaintiff. 3. Even though the suit summons were served, the defendant No.1 chose to remain ex-parte. While the defendant No.2 though appeared and was represented by its counsel, did not contest the matter by filing their Written Statement. 3. Even though the suit summons were served, the defendant No.1 chose to remain ex-parte. While the defendant No.2 though appeared and was represented by its counsel, did not contest the matter by filing their Written Statement. The defendant No.3 – Owners’ Association, however, appeared through its counsel and filed its Written Statement and contested the suit. 4. Defendant No.3 – M/s. Kammagondanahalli Site Owners’ Association (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “Association”) in its Written Statement denied the entire plaint averments. It contended that a suit for bare injunction was not maintainable and that the plaintiff was not the owner of the suit schedule property. It also denied that the plaintiff was in possession of the land. It further contended that the Survey No.28 was consisting of immovable property totally measuring about 4.50 Acres under the ownership of four brothers namely Sri. Munisettappa, Sri. Munivenkatappa, Sri. Gopalappa and Sri. Narayanappa of Kammagondanahalli Village. As per their family Partition Deed dated 07-08-1963, the entire property in Survey No.28 was divided into four shares among those four brothers. Survey No.28/1 fell to the share of Sri.Munisettappa, Survey No.28/2 fell to the share of Sri. Munivenkatappa, Survey No.28/3 fell to the share of Sri. Gopalappa and Survey No.28/4 fell to the share of Sri. Narayanappa. The said four brothers had executed agreements with one Sri. T. Muniyappa and formed house sites in the said property. The Fragmentation Act came into force and there was prohibition for registration of the Sale Deeds, but the sales could have been done through Societies/ Associations only. The said four brothers had executed General Power of Attorney apart from the Sale Agreements empowering the first and second defendants – Co-operative Societies to sell the sites which were formed in the said land. Thus the entire land in Survey No.28 consisting of four blocks was divided into 117 sites and all of them were sold by the original owners. It is further the contention of the defendant No.3 - Association that the sites formed in Survey No.28/2 (suit schedule property which had fallen to the share of said Sri. Munivenkatappa – deceased) were being sold by way of Registered Sale deeds during the year 1981-82 in favour of several of the members of the 3rd defendant – Association who are named in the Written Statement. Munivenkatappa – deceased) were being sold by way of Registered Sale deeds during the year 1981-82 in favour of several of the members of the 3rd defendant – Association who are named in the Written Statement. Thus, the purchasers after getting the Sale Deeds in their favour were also put in possession of their respective sites and that they had even started to put up constructions of compound walls etc. Those owners of the sites have also paid taxes, betterment charges and other revenue to the Government. They have also formed an Association in the name of the third defendant. Thus, it is the members of the said Co-operative Societies/Association who are the absolute owners in title and in physical possession of their respective sites formed in the land bearing Survey No.28/2. Thus, the plaintiff has neither any legal rights nor he is in possession of the schedule property in any manner. In fact, the third defendant – Association further contended that it was the plaintiff who had made several unsuccessful attempts to take the possession of the suit property through rowdy elements and on several such occasions trespassed into the sites and caused damage to the compound wall and other constructions in which regard, several criminal cases in Gangammana Gudi Police Station including C.C.No.928/1997, C.C.No.925/1997, Crime No.152/2004 and Crime No.165/2004 were all filed against him. The third defendant – Association further contended that the plaintiff had already filed a suit with the similar subject matter with respect to the same property and for the same relief in O.S.No.8637/1995 before the City Civil Court at Bangalore against one Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao, who is one among the members of the third defendant – Association. The said Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao is also a purchaser of two house sites bearing Nos.88 and 90 (house Nos.1377 and 1378 formed out of Survey No.28/2 schedule property) as per the Sale Deed dated 26-08-1981. An Interlocutory Application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “CPC”) was also filed by the plaintiff in the said suit which was strongly opposed by the said Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao. The said application came to be rejected by the Court which was challenged by the plaintiff in M.F.A.No.3257/1996 before this Court. However, the said M.F.A. came to be dismissed on 04-01-2000. The said application came to be rejected by the Court which was challenged by the plaintiff in M.F.A.No.3257/1996 before this Court. However, the said M.F.A. came to be dismissed on 04-01-2000. In the meantime, the Original Suit No.8637/1995 also came to be dismissed. The said Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao and others are in physical possession of their respective sites formed in the schedule property bearing Survey No.28/2. The third defendant – Association also contended that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and is hit by res judicata. Reiterating that the plaintiff has not at all been in possession of the suit schedule property, the defendant No.3 Association prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. In the light of the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: OTHER LANGUAGE The English translation of the aforesaid issues is as below: [1] Whether the plaintiff has proved that he has been in lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of institution of the suit? [2] Whether the plaintiff has proved that the defendants are interfering in his possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property? [3] Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an order of injunction as sought in the plaint? [4] What order or decree? In support of his suit, the plaintiff got himself examined as PW-1 and got produced and marked documents from Exs.P-1 to P-13. The defendant No.3 – Association got examined four persons as DW-1 to DW-4 and produced and got marked documents from Exhibits D-1 to D-14. 6. After hearing both side, the Trial Court by its impugned judgment and decree dated 06-10-2012 answered issues No.1 to 3 in the negative and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff with costs of Rs.10,000/-. It is against the said judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. 7. Lower Court records were called for and the same are placed before this Court. 8. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. 9. Service of notice is held sufficient in respect of Respondents No.1 and 2. However they remained un-represented. 10. Respondent No.3/defendant No.3 – Association alone appeared through its counsel and contested the matter. 11. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for respondent No.3/defendant No.3 – Association. 12. 8. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. 9. Service of notice is held sufficient in respect of Respondents No.1 and 2. However they remained un-represented. 10. Respondent No.3/defendant No.3 – Association alone appeared through its counsel and contested the matter. 11. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for respondent No.3/defendant No.3 – Association. 12. Perused the materials placed before this Court including the memorandum of appeal and the impugned judgment. 13. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be henceforth referred to with the ranks they were holding before the Trial Court respectively. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in his arguments has submitted that the identity of the intruders is not known to the plaintiff except that they claim through defendants No.1, 2 and 3. Therefore, the defendants No.1 to 3 alone are made as the defendants. Hence, the suit is one for quia-timet injunction. Learned counsel further submitted that the defendants have not at all produced any Sale Deeds or RTCs to show that they are in possession of the suit schedule property. There are no documents to show that the alleged sites said to have been purchased by the members of defendant No.3 - Association are in any way related to or connected to the suit schedule property bearing Survey No.28/2. On the other hand, the documents produced by the plaintiff would go to show that he is the owner in actual possession. However, the Trial Court observing that a suit for permanent injunction cannot be maintained against a juristic person alone and that in view of denial of title for the plaintiff over the suit property by the defendants, suit for bare injunction cannot be maintained was pleased to dismiss the suit. In his support, he relied upon some of the judgments of various Courts which would be referred to at an appropriate stage. 15. Learned counsel for respondent No.3/ defendant No.3 Association in his arguments submitted that a suit for injunction against unknown persons is not maintainable, that too, particularly in the circumstance of the present case. He submitted that even for execution of a decree, there must be a person. On the merits of the case, learned counsel submitted that neither the boundary nor the measurements is established clearly by the plaintiff. He submitted that even for execution of a decree, there must be a person. On the merits of the case, learned counsel submitted that neither the boundary nor the measurements is established clearly by the plaintiff. As such, regarding the existence of the property in the alleged measurement in the possession of the plaintiff itself is not established. He also submitted that the documents produced by the plaintiff by themselves go to show that, he cannot be in possession of the property to the extent of the measurement contended by him. The plaintiff himself has stated in his plaint that the third defendant – Association has formed sites in the suit schedule property and has sold them, which in turn supports the case of the defendants. Learned counsel further submitted that when the alleged title of the plaintiff has been specifically denied, a suit for bare permanent injunction would not lie. Learned counsel also submitted that admittedly, the defendant No.3 - Association has not sold the sites to other purchasers, but, it is through the land owners and their General Power Attorney holders, they have sold the sites. As such, no individual can be called as successor-in-interest of the Co-operative Societies/ Association. In his support, he relied upon few judgments of various Courts which will be referred to at appropriate places. 16. In the light of the above, the following points arise for my consideration in this appeal :- 1] Whether in the circumstances of the case, a suit for Quiatimet injunction against unknown persons is maintainable? [2] Whether the plaintiff has proved that he is in lawful possession of the suit schedule property? [3] Whether the plaintiff proves interference in his alleged possession of the suit schedule property? [4] Whether the suit for bare permanent injunction in the present case is maintainable? [5] Whether the judgment and decree under appeal warrants any interference at the hands of this Court? 17. The plaintiff, who got himself examined as PW-1, in his Examination-in-chief in the form of Affidavit evidence has reiterated the contentions taken up by him in his plaint. In support of his contentions, he produced and got marked the original Registered Sale Deed dated 26-02-1992 shown to have been executed by one Sri.R. Munivenkatappa in his favour with respect to the suit schedule property at Ex.P-1. 18. In support of his contentions, he produced and got marked the original Registered Sale Deed dated 26-02-1992 shown to have been executed by one Sri.R. Munivenkatappa in his favour with respect to the suit schedule property at Ex.P-1. 18. Ex.P-2 is the Patta and Receipts Book with an entry of one acre of land in Survey No.28/2 in the name of the plaintiff. Ex.P-3 is the mutation entry to the same effect. Ex.P-4 is also a copy of mutation entry which speaks about the dropping of proceedings against the plaintiff under Section 79-A and 79-B of the KLR Act. Exs.P-5 to P-9 are the RTCs showing the name of the plaintiff. Exs.P-10 to P-12 are the taxpaid receipts. Ex.P-13 is the certified copy of the order dated 10-03-2004 in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-Division, Bangalore in Case No.LRF(1)469:1995-96 which shows that the proceedings against the plaintiff under Section 79-A, 79-B and Section 80 of the KLR Act have been dropped. PW-1 was subjected to a detailed cross-examination, where he has admitted that on 07-08-1963 Sri. Munivenkatappa and his brothers have partitioned the land through a Registered Partition Deed. The witness has also stated that in Survey No.28/2, his vendor – Sri. Munivenkatappa had left 15 feet road on the Eastern side towards the pipeline and on the Southern side of the suit schedule property, a cart track is left which is 10 feet width. Several suggestions were also made to PW-1 in his cross-examination to elicit from him that the witness was not sure as to where his alleged property is exactly located and also to elicit from him that his alleged property has long back been sold to various vendors in the form of sites. The witness has stated that the Original suit filed by him against one Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao in O.S.No.8637/1995 came to be dismissed. The witness also admitted that several persons had gone to him claiming right over the land bearing Survey No.28/2. They had even given a Police complaint against him alleging that he had trespassed into their land to demolish the compound wall and constructions. The witness also stated that those criminal cases were registered against him several years prior to he filing the present suit. However, he has not filed any suit against those individual persons. 19. They had even given a Police complaint against him alleging that he had trespassed into their land to demolish the compound wall and constructions. The witness also stated that those criminal cases were registered against him several years prior to he filing the present suit. However, he has not filed any suit against those individual persons. 19. On behalf of the third defendant, one Smt. Mary Akkamma John who claims to be a Secretary of the third defendant Association was examined as DW-1. She in her evidence in her Examination-in-chief in the form of Affidavit evidence has reiterated the contentions taken up by defendant No.3 – Association in its Written Statement. She stated that the entire land in Survey No.28 which in total consists of four blocks was divided into 117 sites and all of them have been sold by the original owners. She also stated that the sites formed in Survey No.28/2 which had come to the share of Sri. Munivenkatappa were also sold by way of Registered Sale Deeds during the year 1981-82 in favour of some of the members of the third defendant Association. The witness has also given the names of those purchasers of sites whose names were already reflected in the Written Statement. The witness denied the alleged possession of the suit schedule property with the plaintiff, on the other hand contended that, it is the various purchasers of the sites who have been in actual possession and enjoyment of their respective sites which have been carved in Survey No.28/2. She got produced and marked an Association Registration Certificate at Ex.D-1 (however, while marking the Exhibits, four photographs have been marked as Exs.D-1 to D-4), tax extract issued by the Dasarahalli City Municipal Council at Ex.D-2, self declared tax assessment form at Ex.D-3, few tax paid receipts at Exs.D-4, D-5 and D-6, a certified copy of the General Power of Attorney at Ex.D-7; a certified copy of the deposition in Misc.238/2005 at Ex.D-8, a Possession Certificate in favour of one Smt. Jayamma to show that the site pertains to Survey No.28/2 was marked at Ex.D-9. In her brief cross-examination, nothing much favouring the plaintiff could be elicited from the plaintiff’s side. However, the witness admitted that Ex.D-7 does not pertain to the entire extent of the land in Survey No.28/2, but had confined to only few sites with house list numbers. 20. In her brief cross-examination, nothing much favouring the plaintiff could be elicited from the plaintiff’s side. However, the witness admitted that Ex.D-7 does not pertain to the entire extent of the land in Survey No.28/2, but had confined to only few sites with house list numbers. 20. One Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao who claims himself to be a Member of the defendant No.3 - Association was examined as DW-2. He, in his Examination-in-chief in the form of Affidavit evidence while supporting the contentions taken up by Defendant No.3 has specifically stated that, the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit schedule property. He stated that the alleged Sale Deed upon which the plaintiff relies upon and dated 26-02-1992 is false, forged and a concocted one. The original owners have already lost the title in the year 1981-82 having sold Survey No.28/2, as such, they had lost possession in favour of the purchasers. He has called the Sale Deed dated 26-02-1992 as an act of fraud as vendors of the plaintiff had no title and possession to execute the Sale Deed. In rest of his evidence, he has supported the defendant No.3 further by putting forth the summary of the contentions of the defendant No.3 -Association. He has stated that the entire land in Survey No.28 measuring 04 Acres 50 Guntas which was under the ownership of four brothers including Sri. Munivenkatappa, was partitioned among them and all of those brothers had executed an agreement in favour of one Sri.T Muniyappa. Accordingly, the entire land was formed into various sites and were sold. Small sites were also formed in Survey No.28/2, wherein several persons including himself have purchased sites and have been put in possession of their respective sites. He has also stated, in the year 1986, the plaintiff had instituted a suit against him which came to be dismissed. He also stated that in that case, he had an order of injunction in his favour. In his cross-examination, it was elicited that in his Sale Deed, the survey number of the land has not been mentioned. He denied the suggestion that he is not in possession of any part of the suit schedule property. 21. He also stated that in that case, he had an order of injunction in his favour. In his cross-examination, it was elicited that in his Sale Deed, the survey number of the land has not been mentioned. He denied the suggestion that he is not in possession of any part of the suit schedule property. 21. DW-3 Smt. R. Vijayalakshmi Assistant Revenue Officer of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP), Shettyhalli, Bengaluru has stated that, she does not know anything about the transactions with respect to the disputed property which had taken place prior to she assuming charge in the office which was only two months prior to her date of evidence. She has stated that she has no personal knowledge about the payment of property tax for the year 2002-03 with respect to the said land. 22. One Sri. B.L. Narasimhachar, who claims to be a former Secretary of the Bagalgunta House Building Co-operative Society (defendant No.2) was examined as DW4. The said witness also in his Examination-in-chief in the form of Affidavit evidence has supported defendant No.3 – Association by stating that the entire property in Survey No.28 of Kammagondanahalli village including its sub survey numbers, viz. Survey Nos.28/1, 28/2, 28/3 and 28/4 were formed into residential layouts with the help of one Sri.T. Muniyappa and all those sites were sold to various purchasers. The Sale Deeds were executed with the consent and in the presence of the land owners who received the consideration amounts from the purchasers of the lands. He has stated that Survey numbers were not mentioned in the Sale Deeds to avoid legal complications. Hence, the Sale Deeds described the House List numbers of those sites in them. In his cross-examination, he has given few more details as to how the House List numbers were acquired by the Association. 23. The above evidence of the parties would go to show that the plaintiff has not disputed that the entire property in Survey No.28 of Kammagondanahalli comprised of 04 Acres 50 Guntas and that the said property was shared by four brothers including Sri.Munivenkatappa to whose share, 01 Acre 27 guntas of land was allotted in the partition. 23. The above evidence of the parties would go to show that the plaintiff has not disputed that the entire property in Survey No.28 of Kammagondanahalli comprised of 04 Acres 50 Guntas and that the said property was shared by four brothers including Sri.Munivenkatappa to whose share, 01 Acre 27 guntas of land was allotted in the partition. It is the contention of the plaintiff that he had purchased 01 Acre of land out of it and since his purchase of the said land on 26-02-1992 vide a Registered Sale Deed at Ex.P-1, he has been in possession of the said property. It is also his contention that the Defendants - Co-operative Societies/Association claiming to be having support of their members and other persons taking advantage of the situation are trying to interfere with his possession and enjoyment of the suit property. It is also his contention that on 01-10-2004, several members claiming to be the members of the defendants – Co-operative Societies/Association have trespassed into the schedule property and interfered with his possession and enjoyment. In view of the said threat by the defendants – Co-operative Societies/Association and their members, the plaintiff apprehends his dispossession by force by those persons. 24. According to learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, it is for the said threat which he is facing, the quia timet injunction is required to be ordered in his favour. However, it is not disputed that even for the relief of quia timet injunction, in the circumstance of the case, first he is required to prove his lawful possession over the suit schedule property. 25. The concept of ‘quia timet’ injunction is not common in our land. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), ‘Quia-timet’ means “A legal doctrine that allows a person to seek equitable relief from future probable harm to a specific right or interest.” Nelson in his Book on ‘Law of Injunctions’ [(Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd. (6th Edition) at page 14] on ‘Quia timet injunctions’ has stated as below: "The words “quia timet” mean simply “since he fears”. If an applicant seeks an injunction before the act of the defendant has occurred which is alleged to involve an interference with his rights, then he is said to seek a quia timet injunction. If an applicant seeks an injunction before the act of the defendant has occurred which is alleged to involve an interference with his rights, then he is said to seek a quia timet injunction. Since, however, one of the main uses of injunctions is the prevention of prospective injuries, it is apparent that the mere futurity of unlawful acts can by no means be an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court….” It is further stated in the same page as below: “Quia timet injunctions have been issued from time to time to prevent breaches of covenants or breaches of patents, or to prevent an expected misapplication of funds by an administrator, or to prevent expected torts, such as, the wrongful removal of the support to land, and in many other similar cases. These are injunctions to restrain wrongful acts which are threatened or imminent but which have not yet been commenced. An injunction to restrain the commission of a tort is called an injunction quia timet. It is obvious that the Court will not so readily grant this type of injunction as it will grant the others, for it will require more convincing evidence from a plaintiff as to the harm he thinks he may suffer from the defendant’s action than to the harm he has suffered.” C.M. Row in his Book on ‘Law of Injunctions’ (Universal Law Publishing Co. New Delhi, Ninth Edition page.280) has called the concept of ‘quia timet’ as ‘quia timet action’, referring to the judgment of Mr. Justice Parson in the case of Fletcher Vs. Bealey (28 Ch D 688), the relevant portion of which is reproduced here below: “There are at least two necessary ingredients for a quia timet action. There must also be proof that the apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very substantial. Justice Parson in the case of Fletcher Vs. Bealey (28 Ch D 688), the relevant portion of which is reproduced here below: “There are at least two necessary ingredients for a quia timet action. There must also be proof that the apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very substantial. I should almost say it must be proved that it will be irreparable, because, if the danger is not proved to be so imminent that no one can doubt that, if the remedy is delayed the damage will be suffered, I think it must be shown, if the damage does occur at any time, it will come in such a way and under such circumstances that it will be impossible for the plaintiff to protect himself against it if relief is denied to him in a quia timet action.” C.M. Row in the aforesaid Book also refers to Woodroffe (Woodroffe on Injunctions, (1964 p.17),a portion of which reads as below: “Relief whether it be given by the issue of an injunction or appointment of receiver, is granted generally on the principle quia timet i.e., the court assists the party who seeks its aid, because he fears (quia timet) some future probable injury to his rights or interests and not because an injury has already occurred, which requires any compensation or other relief. So the remedy by temporary injunction being preventive in its nature, it is not necessary that a wrong should have been actually committed before the court will interfere, since if this were required it would, in most cases, defeat the very purpose for which the relief is sought by allowing the commission of the act which the complainant seeks to restrain. And satisfactory proof that the defendants threaten the commission of a wrong (which is within their power) is sufficient ground to justify the relief.” 26. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in his arguments relied upon a judgment of the England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) in the case of Vastint Leeds BV Vs. persons unknown (decided on 24-09-2018) reported in MANU/UKCH/0240/2018 wherein after referring to its previous several judgments including Hooper Vs. Rogers (1975)1 Ch 43 and Fletcher Vs. Bealey (1884) 28 Ch D 688, the Court derived the propositions at para31 of its judgment which are reproduced here below: “31. persons unknown (decided on 24-09-2018) reported in MANU/UKCH/0240/2018 wherein after referring to its previous several judgments including Hooper Vs. Rogers (1975)1 Ch 43 and Fletcher Vs. Bealey (1884) 28 Ch D 688, the Court derived the propositions at para31 of its judgment which are reproduced here below: “31. From this, I derive the following propositions: (1) A distinction is drawn between final mandatory and final prohibitory quia timet injunctions. Because the former oblige the defendant to do something, whilst the latter merely oblige the defendant not to interfere with the claimant’s rights, it is harder to persuade a court to grant a mandatory than a prohibitory injunction. That said, the approach to the granting of a quia timet injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is essentially the same. (2) Quia timet injunctions are granted where the breach of a claimant’s rights is threatened, but where (for some reason) the claimant’s cause of action is not complete. This may be for a number of reasons. The threatened wrong may, as here, be entirely anticipatory. On the other hand, as in Hooper V. Rogers, the cause of action may be substantially complete. In Hopper V. Rogers, an act constituting nuisance or an unlawful interference with the claimant’s land had been committed, but damage not yet sustained by the claimant but was only in prospect for the future. (3) When considering whether to grant a quia timet injunction, the court follows a two-stage test: (a) First, is there a strong probability that, unless restrained by injunction, the defendant will act in breach of the claimant’s rights? (b) Secondly, if the defendant did an act in contravention of the claimant’s rights, would the harm resulting be so grave and irreparable that, notwithstanding the grant of an immediate interlocutory injunction (at the time of actual infringement of the claimant’s rights) to restrain further occurrence of the acts complained of, a remedy of damages would be inadequate? (4) There will be multiple factors relevant to an assessment of each of these two stages, and there is some overlap between what is material to each. (4) There will be multiple factors relevant to an assessment of each of these two stages, and there is some overlap between what is material to each. Beginning with the first stage – the strong possibility that there will be an infringement of the claimant’s rights – and without seeking to be comprehensive, the following factors are relevant: (a) If the anticipated infringement of the claimant’s rights is entirely anticipatory – as here – it will be relevant to ask what other steps the claimant might take to ensure that the infringement does not occur. Here, for example, Vastint has taken considerable steps to prevent trespass; and yet, still, the threat exists. (b) The attitude of the defendant or anticipated defendant in the case of an anticipated infringement is significant. As Spry notes “one of the most important indications of the defendant’s intentions is ordinarily found in his own statements and actions”. (c) Of course, where acts that may lead to an infringement have already been committed, it may be that the defendant’s intentions are less significant than the natural and probable consequences of his or her act. (d) The time-frame between the application for relief and the threatened infringement may be relevant. The courts often use the language of imminence, meaning that the remedy sought must not be premature. (5) Turning to the second stage, it is necessary to ask the counterfactual question: assuming no quia timet injunction, but an infringement of the claimant’s rights, how effective will a more-or-less immediate interim injunction plus damages in due course be as a remedy for that infringement? Essentially, the question is how easily the harm of the infringement can be undone by an ex post rather than an ex ante intervention, but the following other factors are material: (a) The gravity of the anticipated harm. It seems to me that if the some of the consequences of an infringement are potentially very serious and incapable of ex post remedy, albeit only one of many types of harm capable of occurring, the seriousness of those irremediable harms is a factor that must be borne in mind. (b) The distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions.” 27. Our Hon’ble Apex Court too discussed the concept of ‘quia timet action’ in the case of Kuldip Singh Vs. Subhash Chander Jain and others reported in (2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 50. (b) The distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions.” 27. Our Hon’ble Apex Court too discussed the concept of ‘quia timet action’ in the case of Kuldip Singh Vs. Subhash Chander Jain and others reported in (2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 50. In the said case which was pertaining to Tort Law and an alleged nuisance by running of a bhatti (baking oven) in the locality, the Hon’ble Apex Court had an occasion to discuss the concept of ‘quia timet action’ in such cases for precautionary justice. In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed at para-6 as below: “A quia timet action is a bill in equity. It is an action preventive in nature and a specie of precautionary justice intended to prevent apprehended wrong or anticipated mischief and not to undo a wrong or mischief when it has already been done. In such an action the court, if convinced, may interfere by appointment of receiver or by directing security to be furnished or by issuing an injunction or any other remedial process.” A reading of the above commentary and the judgments on the concept of ‘quia timet’ injunctions, or ‘quia timet actions’ (as it is also called) would go to show that, it is an order of injunction granted by the Court to prevent an action that has been threatened but has not yet violated the plaintiff’s rights. As the Latin word ‘quia timet’ means “because he fears”, the Court will not generally interfere unless there is a clear proof of fear posed by the defendant which would invariably result in some harm or damage to the plaintiff, which should not be normally possible to be compensated by damages. The quia timet injunction or quia timet action will be put into action in the field of Tort Law. However, the concept of ‘trespass’ also appears to be not an alien to quia timet action. 28. In my view, either Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “S.R. Act”) or Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC does not exclude the application of quia timet injunction in the appropriate cases. It is for the reason that Section 38(3) of the S.R.Act says that a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff, when the defendant ‘invades or threatens to invade’ the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of the property. 29. It is for the reason that Section 38(3) of the S.R.Act says that a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff, when the defendant ‘invades or threatens to invade’ the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of the property. 29. Similarly, under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of CPC, a Court can grant Temporary Injunction, where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that, the defendant ‘threatens to’ dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. 30. In the instant case, the plaintiff in his plaint has stated that there is a threat by the defendants – Co-operative Societies/Association and their members who may forcibly dispossess him from his alleged possession of the suit schedule property. Though he has stated that few days prior to the filing of the suit, i.e.on 01-10-2004, several members claiming to be the members of the defendants – Co-operative Societies/ Association had trespassed into the suit schedule property, still, he has apprehended repetition of a similar act by them. As such, if other ingredients/requirements are fulfilled by the plaintiff, he cannot be denied the relief of quia timet injunction as prayed. 31. The next point for consideration would be, Whether his alleged lawful possession of the suit schedule property is proved by the plaintiff? The plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit schedule property from its vendor Sri. R. Munivenkatappa under a Registered Sale Deed dated 26-02-1992 which he has got produced and marked at Ex.P-1. In order to show that he is in possession of the said property as on the date of filing of the suit, he has produced and got marked Exhibits P-2 to P-12. As already observed above, these documents are Patta and Receipt book, extract of mutation register, RTCs and tax paid receipts. The mutation extracts at Exs.P-3 and P-4 show that the entry has been transferred in the name of the plaintiff with respect to a land measuring one acre in Kammagondanahalli village. The RTCs at Exs.P-5, P-6 and P-7 show that one acre of the said land stands in the name of the plaintiff and remaining 27 guntas in the name of the vendor Sri.R. Munivenkatappa. The RTCs at Exs.P-5, P-6 and P-7 show that one acre of the said land stands in the name of the plaintiff and remaining 27 guntas in the name of the vendor Sri.R. Munivenkatappa. However in Exs.P-8 and P9, the name of vendor, Sri.R. Munivenkatappa is not appearing, but in its place, his alleged children’s name who are seven in number appear and it is shown therein that each of them is in possession of four guntas of land. 32. Admittedly, the land in Survey No.28/2 of Kammagondanahalli village in its total extent measures only 01 Acre 27 Guntas. Had really one acre is sold and possession is delivered to the plaintiff through Sale Deed Ex.P1, then, the residue must be only 27 guntas. Since Ex.P8 shows that the children of the vendor of the plaintiff are in possession of 28 guntas (seven brothers X 4 guntas), then it becomes doubtful whether the plaintiff was in possession of entire one acre of land or whether the entry showing 28 guntas in the names of the children of said vendor – Sri.R. Munivenkatappa is not correct. Since it is the plaintiff’s case that he is in lawful possession of the entire suit schedule property of one acre, it is for him to establish the fact in his favour. 33. The defendant No.3 - Association not only has denied the alleged possession of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff, but also has denied the very title of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. As already observed above, it is their specific case that the entire land in Survey No.28 with all its sub Survey numbers i.e. 28/1, 28/2, 28/3 and 28/4 were formed into a layout comprising 117 sites and all those sites were sold to different persons by the respective land owners including the alleged vendor of the plaintiff, through their General Power of Attorney holder and through the media of the respondents No.1 and 2 /defendants No.1 and 2 Co-operative Societies. It is also the case of the defendant No.3 – Association and the evidence of DW-1, DW-2 and DW-4 that when the land owners’ Power of Attorney holder by name Sri.T. Muniyappa had formed the house sites in the land at Sy.No.28/2, since Fragmentation Act came into force and since there was a prohibition for registration of those sites, they were sold through Societies, since the sale could have been done through Societies only. Thus, the defendants No.1 and 2 – Co-operative Societies have helped the land owners in selling the sites to various purchasers. But the sale was between land owners and the purchasers and the consideration also has been passed over by the purchasers to the respective land owners. Even though DW-1, DW-2 and DW-4 have reiterated the same in their respective evidence, but they have not produced any Sale Deeds of any of the purchasers to show that all the sites purchased by the alleged members of the Society were the sites carved in land at Survey No.28 and that more particularly in the disputed land in Survey No.28/2 of Kammagondanahalli village. When Exhibits ‘D’ series which have been marked from Exs.D-1 to D-14 are verified, it is noticed that in none of the documents at Exs.D-6 to D-10 which are tax assessment and tax paid receipts, any where the Survey number of the land is mentioned. Though Ex.D-11 a General Power of Attorney shown to have been executed by the alleged vendor to the plaintiff, i.e. Sri.R.Munivenkatappa in favour of defendant No.2 – Co-operative Society, empowering the attorney to deal with five sites with their respective House List numbers mentioned in Survey No.28/2, but it is not specifically mentioned whether the said Power of Attorney is with respect to the entire extent of 01 acre 27 guntas of the land in the said Survey number. However, the total measurement of all those five sites put together would come to 20,480 sq.ft. The said extent is equivalent to 18.80 guntas of land provided if one gunta is considered as 1,089 sq.ft. The said General Power of Attorney at Ex.D-11 is dated 26-08-1981 and the RTC extract at Ex.P8 which has already been discussed above goes to show that 28 guntas of land in the year 2004-05 is shown to have been standing in the names of the children of Sri.R. Munivenkatappa the alleged vendor of the plaintiff. The said General Power of Attorney at Ex.D-11 is dated 26-08-1981 and the RTC extract at Ex.P8 which has already been discussed above goes to show that 28 guntas of land in the year 2004-05 is shown to have been standing in the names of the children of Sri.R. Munivenkatappa the alleged vendor of the plaintiff. The sites shown in Ex.D11 are said to have been sold to various members of the defendants – Co-operative Societies. Thus, the said 18.80 guntas of land when added to the land shown to have been standing in the names of the children of the vendor Munivenkatappa as per Ex.P8 which is 28 guntas, then it comes to 01 Acre 6.8 guntas. If out of the total extent of land in Survey No.28/2 (i.e. 01 acre 27 guntas), the land measuring 01 acre 6.8 guntas is deducted, then at no stretch of imagination the plaintiff can be in possession of one acre of land in the said survey number. As such, even though the plaintiff claims his title upon the suit schedule property to an extent of one acre, but the denial of the plaintiff’s title by the defendants does not appear to be a denial for the namesake, but it creates a strong cloud of suspicion upon the title and possession of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff. 34. The defendants have produced the Possession Certificate dated 22-02-1984 shown to have been issued by defendant No.1 – Co-operative Society in favour of one of the purchasers of the site through it. The said Possession Certificate shows that a site measuring 60’x40’ carved in Survey Nos.28/1, 28/2, 28/3 and 28/4 is shown to have been given possession to one Smt. Jayamma W/o. Ramaiah. Though the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff contends that the said Possession Certificate since not being a document of title cannot be looked into, but the un-objected document would go to establish the handing over of possession of a site in favour of an allottee of the first defendant – Co-operative Society. The said document clearly mentions that the sites bearing Nos.71 and 72 have been carved out in the land bearing Survey No.28. Therefore, in addition to what is mentioned above, about 01 acre and 6.8 guntas of land was being used for formation of sites in Survey No.28/2. The said document clearly mentions that the sites bearing Nos.71 and 72 have been carved out in the land bearing Survey No.28. Therefore, in addition to what is mentioned above, about 01 acre and 6.8 guntas of land was being used for formation of sites in Survey No.28/2. The site in Ex.D13 also becomes an addition to it and also supports the contention of the defendant No.3 – Association that the entire land in Survey No.28 was formed into sites and they were sold to different persons. Though Ex.D-13 may not be an independent proof to conclude so, but it prevents the plaintiff’s case from reaching the requirement of preponderance of probabilities in his favour. 35. The plaintiff as PW-1 himself has stated in his Examination-in-chief that he had instituted a suit against one Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao in O.S.No.8637/1995 and the said suit came to be dismissed for default. 36. PW-1 himself has also stated that, several other proceedings in O.S.Nos.2566/1996, 2567/1996, 2568/1996, 2570/1996, 2836/1996 and 2837/1996 have been initiated by his vendor which means even according to him, there are several litigation with respect to the suit schedule property wherein he is a party. Therefore, even before filing of the present suit, there were already many suits in which he was a party with respect to the suit property. As such, the plaintiff himself was expected to know that there are serious disputes not only with his alleged possession of the property, but also his alleged title upon it. 37. The said Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao against whom the plaintiff admittedly had filed a suit in O.S.No.8637/1995 was himself examined as DW-2. The said witness in his evidence has clearly stated that the vendor of the plaintiff Sri.R. Munivenkatappa as a owner of Survey No.28/2 had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No.2 – Co-operative Society on 26-08-1981 (Ex.D-11) in which two sites, i.e. House List Nos.1377 and 1378 were purchased by him. As observed above, Ex.D-11 mentions about some of the sites including these two sites i.e. House List Nos.1377 and 1378. 38. DW-1 the Secretary of defendant No.3 – Association has also given her evidence on those similar lines. It is against the said Sri. H.V. Murthy Rao, the plaintiff had instituted a suit in O.S.No.8637/1995 and the said suit came to be dismissed. 38. DW-1 the Secretary of defendant No.3 – Association has also given her evidence on those similar lines. It is against the said Sri. H.V. Murthy Rao, the plaintiff had instituted a suit in O.S.No.8637/1995 and the said suit came to be dismissed. The certified copy of the order sheet in the said O.S.No.8637/1995 maintained by the Lower Court which is at Ex.D14 shows that the said suit was filed for the relief of permanent injunction, which came to be dismissed for default on 21-01-2002. However, there is no material placed before this Court that, till date, the plaintiff therein had taken any steps to get the said order recalled and the original suit restored. Merely because no Survey Number of the land is said to have been mentioned in those Sale Deeds by themselves cannot be considered that those sites have no connection with the suit schedule property. As already observed above, the defendant No.3 – Association in its Written Statement as well in the evidence of DW1, DW-2 and DW-4 have stated as to why the Survey Number of the land was not shown in the Sale Deeds. As such, the contention of DW-2 Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao that himself and many other members of the third defendant Association have been in actual possession of several of the sites carved in Survey No.28 of Kammagondanahalli village cannot be ruled out. This also intensifies the doubt regarding the alleged possession of the plaintiff with respect to the suit schedule property by him. 39. The defendant No.3 – Association in its Written Statement has not only given the details of the purchasers of some of the sites in the layout formed in Survey No.28/2, but also has stated that several of those purchasers had lodged criminal complaints against the plaintiff herein in the Gagammana Gudi Police Station. The third defendant - Association has also given those case numbers including the offences which were alleged against the plaintiff. Those offences included the offences punishable under Sections 420, 427, 447, 448, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,1860. 40. PW-1 – plaintiff in his cross-examination had admitted filing of those criminal cases against him. He has further stated that all those cases were filed against him prior to filing of this suit. He has also stated that he has not filed any suits against those individual persons. 40. PW-1 – plaintiff in his cross-examination had admitted filing of those criminal cases against him. He has further stated that all those cases were filed against him prior to filing of this suit. He has also stated that he has not filed any suits against those individual persons. This clearly goes to show that much before the plaintiff filing the present suit, he was clearly aware that there are several persons who are not only denying his alleged title over the property but also claiming possession of the said property with themselves. Apart from claiming the possession of the property, they even had gone to the extent of accusing the plaintiff of committing the offences like mischief, causing damage, criminal trespass, house trespass and criminal intimidation. Thus, the plaintiff was fully aware that several individuals are claiming their title over portions of schedule property which they claim to be the sites under their ownership and had initiated legal action against him. This prevents the Court from arriving at a conclusion that the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the suit schedule property. 41. The plaintiff relied upon the registered Sale Deed at Ex.P-1 as the basic document conferring title with respect to suit schedule property upon him. According to plaintiff, out of 01 acre 27 guntas of land belonging to his vendor - Sri. R. Munivenkatappa, land to an extent of one acre was sold to him, as such, the remaining land of 27 guntas continue to be with his vendor as on the date of the plaintiff purchasing one acre of land under Ex.P-1. 42. The schedule in Ex.P-1 mentions that on the Northern boundary of the suit schedule property, there exists the land of one Sri. Munisettappa, pipeline and his remaining land. The said words “my remaining land“ do not clarify as to whether it is of vendor’s or purchaser’s. However the plaintiff in his plaint in the schedule of the property has described the said Northern boundary as the property of Munisettappa, pipe line and portion of property belonging to the plaintiff. The words “belonging to the plaintiff” would rule out the vendor having any remaining portion of 27 guntas with him after selling the alleged one acre of land to the plaintiff. The words “belonging to the plaintiff” would rule out the vendor having any remaining portion of 27 guntas with him after selling the alleged one acre of land to the plaintiff. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for third respondent / third defendant - Association, had Munivenkatappa sold one acre of land to the plaintiff and retained 27 guntas with him (which was also a part of Sy.No.28/2) then, at any one of the boundary, the said remaining land of vendor had to be necessarily mentioned. Whereas the plaintiff in his plaint clarifying that the said remaining portion of the land which was found on the Northern side of the suit schedule property being his (plaintiff’s) property, it has to be inferred that there is no mention about the remaining land in Survey No.28/2 in Ex.P1. This not only gives room for suspicion about Ex.P1, but also supports the contention of the defendants that, by the time Ex.P-1 came to be executed, there was no land with any of the original land owners in Sy.No.28 including the vendor of the plaintiff, since the entire land in Survey No.28 including its sub Survey number, i.e. 28/2 was already formed into a layout, consisting of sites and sold to various people. This also thickens the cloud of suspicion not just upon the title of the plaintiff but also upon his alleged possession of the suit schedule property. 43. Lastly, according to the plaintiff, after he purchased the suit schedule property under Ex.P1, the proceeding was initiated against him for alleged violation of Section 79-A, 79-B and Section 80 of the KLR Act, in which regard, a case was instituted against him which was heard and decided in LRF (1)469:1995-96 in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-Division, Bangalore. A certified copy of the order passed in the said proceedings on 10-03-2004 has been produced by the plaintiff himself and got it marked at Ex.P-13. A perusal of the said order would go to show that the authority has considered the alleged purchase of the land by the plaintiff in Survey No.28/2 and measuring to an extent of one acre not under the Sale Deed dated 26-02-1992 (Ex.P1) but it is under a Sale Deed dated 08-04-1992. No explanation has been forwarded by the plaintiff for such a discrepancy. No explanation has been forwarded by the plaintiff for such a discrepancy. This also further intensifies the doubt with respect to the alleged title as well the possession of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff. 44. Learned counsels from both side relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs. and others reported in (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 594 = AIR 2008 SC 2033 . They drew the attention of this Court to paragraph 14 of the judgment which reads as below: “We may, however, clarify that a prayer for declaration will be necessary only if the denial of title by the defendant or challenge to the plaintiff’s title raises a cloud on the title of the plaintiff to the property. A cloud is said to raise over a person’s title, when some apparent defect in his title to a property, or when some prima facie right of a third party over it, is made out or shown. An action for declaration, is the remedy to remove the cloud on the title to the property. On the other hand, where the plaintiff has clear title supported by documents, if a trespasser without any claim to title or an interloper without any apparent title, merely denies the plaintiff’s title, it does not amount to raising a cloud over the title of the plaintiff and it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to sue for declaration and a suit for injunction may be sufficient. Where the plaintiff, believing that the defendant is only a trespasser or a wrongful claimant without title, files a mere suit for injunction, and in such a suit, the defendant discloses in his defence the details of the right or title claimed by him, which raise a serious dispute or cloud over the plaintiff’s title, then there is a need for the plaintiff, to amend the plaint and convert the suit into one for declaration. Alternatively, he may withdraw the suit for bare injunction, with permission of the court to file a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. He may file the suit for declaration with consequential relief, even after the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue of possession and not any issue of title.” 45. Alternatively, he may withdraw the suit for bare injunction, with permission of the court to file a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. He may file the suit for declaration with consequential relief, even after the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue of possession and not any issue of title.” 45. In the instant case, as observed above, when the alleged intruders/trespassers whom the plaintiff describes so, have themselves claimed as the purchasers of the respective sites and have instituted several criminal cases also against the plaintiff himself, alleging trespass by him in their alleged possession of the property and also for alleged damages to their property said to have been caused by the plaintiff herein and even the suit filed by him against one Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao who claims to be the purchaser of two sites through the same vendor – Sri. R. Munivenkatappa is dismissed, then, obviously not only the possession of the suit property with the plaintiff is doubtful but also his title over the suit property itself is under a thick cloud. When his alleged possession of suit schedule property itself is doubtful and many persons have filed criminal cases against him alleging trespass, the plaintiff is not able to prove his alleged lawful possession and the interference in the suit schedule property. Therefore, as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anathula Sudhakar’s case (supra), the plaintiff ought to have perfected his title by seeking a declaration and ought not to have confined his suit only for the relief of permanent injunction. 46. In that regard, the Trial Court has properly appreciated the materials placed before it and has arrived at a proper conclusion which does not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court. 47. The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff was that, the Trial Court has also committed an error in holding that a suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable against unknown persons. The plaintiff has arraigned two Co-operative Societies as defendant Nos.1 and 2 and one Owners’ Association as defendant No.3. 47. The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff was that, the Trial Court has also committed an error in holding that a suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable against unknown persons. The plaintiff has arraigned two Co-operative Societies as defendant Nos.1 and 2 and one Owners’ Association as defendant No.3. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 have not contested the matter, whereas defendant No.3 Association has contested the matter and stated that the entire land in Survey No.28/2 has long back prior to the plaintiff’s alleged purchase of the land been already formed into a layout with 117 sites therein and all of them were sold to different purchasers through defendant Nos.1 and 2 – Co-operative Societies. However, all those sales were by the original owners of the land through their General Power of Attorney holder directly to the purchasers of the sites, only for the limited purpose of getting those sites registered since they were formed in agricultural land, the name of the Society was used as a facilitator. Therefore, none of the alleged intruders can be called as successors-in-interest of the defendant – Societies. They have been the individual purchasers from the original owners of the land, still, the plaintiff has not arraigned any one of those individuals in the suit. 48. When the plaintiff has failed to show that any of the alleged intruders were successors-in-interest of defendant Nos.1 and 2 – Co-operative Societies, on the other hand, when it was within the knowledge of the plaintiff himself much prior to he instituting the present suit that, there were several Original Suits in which he was a party including the suit in O.S.No.8637/1995 which the plaintiff himself had instituted against DW2 Sri.H.V. Murthy Rao, then, it was to the full and complete knowledge of the plaintiff as to who are all the alleged intruders said to have been interfering in his alleged possession of the suit property. 49. Added to this, as admitted by the plaintiff (PW-1) himself, there were several criminal cases filed against him. The defendant No.3 – Association has also given the details of several of the criminal cases that were filed against the plaintiff in its Written Statement. 49. Added to this, as admitted by the plaintiff (PW-1) himself, there were several criminal cases filed against him. The defendant No.3 – Association has also given the details of several of the criminal cases that were filed against the plaintiff in its Written Statement. As such, those criminal cases which were much prior to the institution of the present suit were to the knowledge of the plaintiff and he was very well aware as to who those persons are. If according to the plaintiff, it is not himself who is the trespasser in their alleged property, but it was those complainants themselves who were the intruders in his alleged possession of the property, then necessarily, he ought to have arraigned them as defendants in the suit rather than claiming the relief of permanent injunction against unknown persons. 50. Though learned counsel for the appellant/ plaintiff in his arguments submitted that, every day new persons are coming and interfering in the alleged possession of the suit property by the plaintiff, but there is no corresponding pleading in that regard. In his plaint, the plaintiff has only stated that several of the people claiming to be the members of the defendants – Co-operative Societies/Association have trespassed into the schedule property and interfered with his possession and enjoyment. Therefore, he has only stated that it is those people claiming to be the members of the defendants – Co-operative Societies/Association, who have interfered in his possession. Even according to the defendants, there were only 117 sites that were carved out of a total extent of 04 Acres 50 Guntas of land in Survey No.28 of Kammagondanahalli village. As such, getting the details of those alleged owners of the sites who alone could have interfered claiming that they are the owners of the sites, was not a difficult task to the plaintiff. As such, when there is all the way for the plaintiff to identify the alleged intruders and when some of them by themselves have instituted civil and criminal litigations against the plaintiff, the act of plaintiff not making any one of them as party but seeking a blanket order of injunction against one and all is not acceptable in the instant case. Thus, on the said point also, the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief. 51. Thus, on the said point also, the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief. 51. Since the Trial Court has arrived at the same finding in its impugned judgment, I do not find any reasons to interfere in it. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER [i] The appeal is dismissed; [ii] The judgment and decree dated 06-10-2012 passed by the learned XVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, (CCH-16) Bangalore City, in O.S.No.7539/ 2004, is hereby confirmed; Registry to transmit a copy of this judgment along with the Lower Court records to the concerned Trial Court, without delay.