ORDER : I.A. No. 2828 of 2018 This application has been filed for condoning the delay of 223 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. Heard the parties. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2828 of 2018 is allowed and delay of 223 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 157 of 2018 1. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants-State and the respondent-writ petitioner. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13.07.2017 rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 4970 of 2013 by virtue of which the punishment of censure, withholding of two increments with non-cumulative effect and withholding of promotion for three years, imposed upon the writ petitioner, has been quashed and set aside. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner having been selected in the Bihar Administrative Services Cadre was serving as Executive Magistrate, Koderma but was also given an additional charge of District Transport Officer, Koderma. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner having been selected in the Bihar Administrative Services Cadre was serving as Executive Magistrate, Koderma but was also given an additional charge of District Transport Officer, Koderma. On 24.12.2007 he was served with memo of charge, which the writ petitioner disputes saying that the same was served upon him only on 19.11.2008, and in the charge memo following charges were levelled against the writ petitioner which is available at Annexure-3 of the writ petition:- ^^vkjksi la0&¼d½ vkids }kjk Jh xksiky eq[kthZ] firk&Jh jkts'k eq[kthZ] eqjSuk] e/; Áns'k ds okgu la[;k&MCyw-ch-&19,Q 5566 dk fucU/ku la[;k cnydj ts-,p-&12ch 2809] iksLV&djek] ftyk&dksMjek fd;k x;k gSA ¼[k½ Jh xqjoUr flag] firk&Jh gfjgj flag] okgu la[;k&,e-ih-&19,ch 6557 eqjSuk] e/; Áns'k ds okgu dk fucU/ku la[;k cnydj ts-,p&12ch 2812] iksLV&djek] ftyk&dksMjek fd;k x;k gSA ¼x½ Jh lqjthr flag] firk&Jh ch0 ih0 flag] okgu la[;k&,e-ih-&19,ch 3201 eqjSuk] e/; Áns'k ds okgu dk fucU/ku la[;k cnydj ts-,p&12ch 2811] iksLV yksdkbZ] ftyk&dksMjek fd;k x;k gSA mDr rhuksa okguksa ds iw.kZ irk dh lR;rk dh tk¡p vkids }kjk ugha dh xbZA vkjksi la0&2& mDr rhuksa okguksa ds fy, ,d gh frfFk 18-08-06 dks ftyk ifjogu inkf/kdkjh] eqjSuk] e/; Áns'k ls vukifŸk Áek.k&i= tkjh fd, tkus dh ckr dgh xbZ gSA vkius ftyk ifjogu inkf/kdkjh] eqjSuk] e/; Áns'k ds i=ksŸkj dh Árh{kk fd, fcuk gh ek= ,d lIrkg ds ckn mDr okguksa ds fucU/ku dh ÁfØ;k lEiUu dj nh] tks vfu;fer gSA vkidks ftyk ifjogu inkf/kdkjh] eqjSuk ds i= dh Árh{kk de&ls&de 30 fnuksa rd djuh pkfg, Fkh] ijUrq fcuk vukifÙk Áek.k&i= ds gh vkius fucU/ku dh ÁfØ;k lEiUu dj nhA blls Li"V gksrk gS fd vkids }kjk vius dÙkZO;ksa ds fuoZgu esa ?kksj ykijokgh cjrh xbZ gSA vkjksi la0&3&mDr rhuksa okguksa ds fucU/ku gsrq lefiZr vkosnuksa esa vkosndksa ds i=kpkj dk iw.kZ irk Hkh vafdr ugha gSA i=kpkj dk lgh irk vafdr ugha jgus ds dkj.k vkosndksa dh [kkstchu ugha dh tk ldrh gSA vkjksi la0&4&dksMjek ftyk esa mDr okguksa ds fucU/ku gsrq mDr rhuksa vkosndksa }kjk ftyk ifjogu dk;kZy;] eqjSuk] e/; Áns'k ls fuEukafdr vukifŸk Áek.k&i= ÁLrqr fd, x,%& Ø0 Okkgu la[;k vkosnd dk uke ÁLrqr vukifÙk Áek.k&i= dk fooj.k 1- MCY;w0 ch0 &19 F/ 5566 Jh xksiky eq[kthZ] th0Vh0 jksM+ eqjSuk ¼e/; Áns'k½ Kkikad 3615@2006 fnukad&08&08&2006 2- ,e0 ih0&19 AB/ 6557 Jh xq:oUr falag Kkikad 2915@2006 fnukad&10&08&2006 3- ,e0 ih0&19 AB/ 3201 Jh lqjthr Álkn flag Kkikad 2918@2006 fnukad&10&08&2006 mDr fooj.k ds lR;kiu gsrq mik;qDr] dksMjek dh xksiuh; 'kk[kk ds i=kad 233@xks0 fnuakd&05-03-07 }kjk ftyk ifjogu inkf/kdkjh] eqjSuk ¼e/; Áns'k½ ls vuqjks/k fd;k x;k ¼Áfrfyfi layXu½ ftlds mŸkj esa MV Registering Authority, Chambal Region, Morena (M.P.) us vius i=kad 3382@iath;u@07 fnukad 15-03-07 ¼Áfrfyfi layXu½ }kjk lwfpr fd;k fd mi;qZDr okgu muds dk;kZy; esa iathd`r ugha gSaA vr,o muds dk;kZy; ls of.kZr okguksa ds NOC tkjh ugha fd, x, gSA mi;qZDr rF;ksa ls Li”V gS fd vkius dksMjek ftyk esa fucU/ku gsrq ÁkIr vkosnu i=ksa esa of.kZr okguksa dh vafdr fooj.kh dk lR;kiu djk, fcuk rFkk vkosndksa dk iw.kZ:i ls Li"V irk ÁkIr fd, fcuk of.kZr okguksa dk fucU/ku dj fn;k gS] tks vius nkf;Ro ds Áfr vkidh ykijokgh dk rks ifjpk;d gS gh] xyr okguksa ds fucU/ku esa vkidh lafyIrrk Hkh Áekf.kr gksrh gSA mik;qDr] dksMjekA 4. The Enquiry Officer was appointed and the delinquent-writ petitioner filed his written statement before the Enquiry Officer. There is no dispute that so far charges no. 1, 3 and 4 are concerned they could not be proved. So far charge no.2 is concerned, at one place it is stated by the Enquiry Officer that though there is no violation of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or the concerned Rules but the same stands partially proved. However, in the concluding paragraph it has been stated in the enquiry report that the Presenting Officer failed to prove all the four charges and it does not appear that there was any dereliction of duty shown by the delinquent but still he could have served in a better way and, therefore, the Disciplinary Authority can take a decision of its own. Considering such enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority vide its decision contained in Annexure-6 of the writ petition imposed the following punishment upon the writ petitioner: 1) Censure; (2) Withholding of two increments with non-cumulative effects; and (3) Withholding of promotion for three years. 5. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner assailed the aforesaid order by filing the writ petitioner which was allowed by the learned single Judge simply on the ground that the departmental proceeding is fraught with procedural irregularity as admittedly no show cause was served upon the petitioner nor copy of the enquiry report along with the reasoning for differing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer was served upon the writ petitioner. It has also been noticed by the learned single Judge that from perusal of the enquiry report it is evident that none of the charges has been proved except charge no.2, which has been partially proved on the basis of presumption. Thus, it has been held that in case the Disciplinary Authority has chosen to differ from the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, certain procedure of recording the reasons and granting an opportunity to the delinquent to answer the same was required to be adopted and in absence of that the impugned order becomes vulnerable. In such a situation, the order impugned has been quashed and set aside. 6. In such a situation, the order impugned has been quashed and set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants-State vehemently urged that even in case the learned single Judge was of the opinion that the aforesaid fatal defects were there in the order impugned, those were of procedural nature and, as such, even after quashing the impugned order, the matter should have been remanded to the Disciplinary Authority so that a fresh order in accordance with law following the procedure could have been passed. 7. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon a decision of Hon’ble the Apex Court rendered in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India & others Vs. A. Masilamani [ (2013) 6 SCC 530 ] in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to enable it to take a fresh decision, taking into consideration the gravity of the charges involved, as with respect to whether it may still be required to hold a de novo enquiry from the stage that it stood vitiated i.e. after issuance of the charge-sheet. 8. The aforesaid submission, prima facie, appears to be very attractive but on deeper scrutiny of the matter and the materials which are available on record, in our view, that is not tenable for the following reasons:- As has been noticed and observed above that at one place the Enquiry Officer has recorded in the enquiry report that so far charge no.2 is concerned, it stands partially proved as there appears to be partial dereliction of duty whereas in the concluding paragraph of the enquiry report he has clearly stated that the Presenting Officer has miserably failed to prove any of the four charges. However, at the same time it is stated that if the concerned officer would have been more cautious and vigilant, then better result could have been achieved. On the basis of this enquiry report, without granting any opportunity of second show cause, the Disciplinary Authority has imposed the aforesaid punishment. Apart from the observations made by the learned single Judge, it has to be considered that whether actually the Disciplinary Authority differed from the views expressed by the Enquiry Officer or it has accepted the enquiry report and then imposed the punishment. 9. Apart from the observations made by the learned single Judge, it has to be considered that whether actually the Disciplinary Authority differed from the views expressed by the Enquiry Officer or it has accepted the enquiry report and then imposed the punishment. 9. In our view, since the order impugned imposing punishment does not disclose that in fact, the Disciplinary Authority differed with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer, it cannot be presumed that there was any difference of opinion, especially when nothing was recorded to that extent and no notice was served upon the writ petitioner. Then we will have to further examine as to whether upon plain reading of the enquiry report, charges stand proved or not because the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order or resolution has nowhere stated that the punishment is being imposed on which of the charges or for all the charges. It is merely stated in the order that in view of the findings recorded in the enquiry report and on the basis of the materials available, the punishment is being imposed. Admittedly, if there is no difference of opinion then at least three charges stand disproved as has categorically been stated by the Enquiry Officer in its report. So far charge no.2 is concerned, it is regarding registering the concerned vehicles without verifying the correctness of “No Objection Certificate” issued by the earlier Registering Authority. The Enquiry Officer surprisingly has stated that there is no violation of any statutory provision because there would have been question of verification only if no “No Objection Certificate” could have been produced and as per Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in such case the concerned officer could have waited for 30 days where “No Objection Certificate” was not issued. However, still it is stated that since he had already written a letter to the concerned Registering Authority he could have waited for 30 days. But at the same time, he has also recorded that there is no violation of either the statutory provision of the concerned Section or the Rule. For better appreciation of this issue, the concerned Section 48 is being reproduced: “48. But at the same time, he has also recorded that there is no violation of either the statutory provision of the concerned Section or the Rule. For better appreciation of this issue, the concerned Section 48 is being reproduced: “48. No objection certificate.—(1) The owner of a motor vehicle when applying for the assignment of a new registration mark under sub-section (1) of Section 47, or where the transfer of a motor vehicle is to be effected in a State other than the State of its registration, the transferor of such vehicle when reporting the transfer under sub-section (1) of Section 50, shall make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government to the registering authority by which the vehicle was registered for the issue of a certificate (hereafter in this section referred to as the no objection certificate), to the effect that the registering authority has no objection for assigning a new registration mark to the vehicle or, as the case may be, for entering the particulars of the transfer of ownership in the certificate of registration. (2) The registering authority shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), issue a receipt in such form as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the registering authority may, after making such inquiry and requiring the applicant to comply with such directions as it deems fit and within thirty days of the receipt thereof, by order in writing, communicate to the applicant that it has granted or refused to grant the no objection certificate: Provided that a registering authority shall not refuse to grant the no objection certificate unless it has recorded in writing the reasons for doing so and a copy of the same has been communicated to the applicant. (4) Where within a period of thirty days referred to in sub-section (3), the registering authority does not refuse to grant the no objection certificate or does not communicate the refusal to the applicant, the registering authority shall be deemed to have granted the no objection certificate. (4) Where within a period of thirty days referred to in sub-section (3), the registering authority does not refuse to grant the no objection certificate or does not communicate the refusal to the applicant, the registering authority shall be deemed to have granted the no objection certificate. (5) Before granting or refusing to grant the no objection certificate, the registering authority shall obtain a report in writing from the police that no case relating to the theft of the motor vehicle concerned has been reported or is pending, verify whether all the amounts due to Government including road tax in respect of that motor vehicle have been paid and take into account such other factors as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (6) The owner of the vehicle shall also inform at the earliest, in writing, the registering authority about the theft of his vehicle together with the name of the police station where the theft report was lodged, and the registering authority shall take into account such report while disposing of any application for no objection certification, registration, transfer of ownership or issue of duplicate registration certificate.” 10. From bare perusal of the aforesaid Section, it appears that learned counsel for the State as well as even the Enquiry Officer have completely misdirected themselves in appreciating this statutory provision. There is no direction in the aforesaid statutory provision to the subsequent Registering Authority regarding verification of “No Objection Certificate” issued by the earlier Registering Authority. It is only with respect to issuance of “No Objection Certificate” by the Registering Authority by which the concerned vehicle was registered earlier which is now being sought to be registered under the jurisdiction of some other State. In such a situation, Sub-section (3) provides that within 30 days of an application made by the concerned, “No Objection Certificate” should be issued and the proviso thereto says that there cannot be refusal in grant of such “No Objection Certificate” unless reasons are recorded in writing. Thus, misconstruing this provision, learned counsel for the State is submitting that since the charge is partially proved the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration by the Disciplinary Authority. 11. Thus, misconstruing this provision, learned counsel for the State is submitting that since the charge is partially proved the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration by the Disciplinary Authority. 11. It also requires to refer as to whether any misconduct has been committed by the writ petitioner as per the conduct assigned because misconduct can be said to have been committed if conduct is contrary to the action governed by rules. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut & Ors. [ (1984)1 SCC 1 ], paragraph-23 whereof reads as under: “23. It was next contended that while misconduct is enumerated in Standing Order 22, the punishment is prescribed in Standing Order 23, and the expression “misconduct” in Standing Order 23 would comprehend any misconduct irrespective of the fact whether it is enumerated in Standing Order 22 or not. The preamble of Standing Order 23 reads as under : “23. (a) Any workman who is adjudged by the manager on examination of the workman, if present, and of the facts to be guilty of misconduct is liable to be....” The submission is that the expression “misconduct” under Standing Order 23 is not qualified as the one set out in Standing Order 22 and therefore, any other act of omission or commission which would per se be misconduct would be punishable under Standing Order 23 irrespective of the fact whether it finds its enumeration in Standing Order 22. The Act makes it obligatory to frame standing orders and get them certified. Section 3(2) requires the employers in an industrial establishment while preparing draft standing orders to make provision in such draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may be applicable to the industrial establishment, and where model standing orders have been prescribed, shall be, so far as is practicable, in conformity with such model. Item 9 of the Schedule provides “suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts of omissions which constitute misconduct”. It is therefore, obligatory upon the employer to draw up with precision those acts of omission and commission which in his industrial establishment would constitute misconduct. Penalty is imposed for misconduct. The workmen must therefore, know in advance which act of omission would constitute misconduct as to be visited with penalty. It is therefore, obligatory upon the employer to draw up with precision those acts of omission and commission which in his industrial establishment would constitute misconduct. Penalty is imposed for misconduct. The workmen must therefore, know in advance which act of omission would constitute misconduct as to be visited with penalty. The statutory obligation is to prescribe with precision in the standing order all those acts of omission or commission which would constitute misconduct. In the face of the statutory provision it would be difficult to entertain the submission that some other act of omission which may be misconduct though not provided for in the standing order would be punishable under Standing Order 23. Upon a harmonious construction, the expression “misconduct” in Standing Order 23 must refer to those acts of omission or commission which constitute misconduct as enumerated in Standing Order 22 and none else. However, in this connection, Mr Shanti Bhushan drew our attention to Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd. In that case in a second round of litigation between the parties the Industrial Tribunal set aside the order of dismissal of the workmen and ordered reinstatement with full back wages. In a writ petition filed by the company under Article 226 of the Constitution, a learned Single Judge of the High Court declined to interfere with the award holding that “the reason might have been the old reason of dismissal” and that the “circumstances relied on by the Tribunal cannot be characterised as unreasonable”. The company carried the matter to the Division Bench of the High Court which accepted the appeal observing that unless contravention of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act is established, the Industrial Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 33-A. In terms it was held that unless it is established that there has been discharge for misconduct, the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of termination in an application under Section 33-A. In the appeal by certificate granted by the High Court, the workman contended that Section 33 may be contravened in varieties of ways and the only question that needs to be examined is whether there was a contravention by the employer in that it did not make any application to the Tribunal for the approval of the order of termination of service of the workman. It is in this context that while allowing the appeal of the workman this Court observed as under: [SCC para 23, pp. 611-12: SCC (L&S) pp. 25-26] Standing orders of a company only describe certain cases of misconduct and the same cannot be exhaustive of all the species of misconduct which a workman may commit. Even though a given conduct may not come within the specific terms of misconduct described in the standing orders, it may still be a misconduct in the special facts of a case, which it may not be possible to condone and for which the employer may take appropriate action. Ordinarily, the standing orders may limit the concept but not invariably so. Relying on these observations. Mr Shanti Bhushan urged that this Court has in terms held that there can be some other misconduct not enumerated in the standing order and for which the employer may take appropriate action. This observation cannot be viewed divorced from the facts of the case. What stared in the face of the Court in that case was that the employer had raised a technical objection ignoring the past history of litigation between the parties that application under Section 33-A was not maintainable. It is in this context that this Court observed that the previous action might have been the outcome of some misconduct not enumerated in the standing order. But the extracted observation cannot be elevated to a proposition of law that some misconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which may be believed by the employer to be misconduct ex post facto would expose the workman to a penalty. The law will have to move two centuries backward to accept such a construction. But it is not necessary to go so far because in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. Employees’ Union this Court in terms held that the object underlying the Act was to introduce uniformity of terms and conditions of employment in respect of workmen belonging to the same category and discharging the same or similar work under an industrial establishment, and that these terms and conditions of industrial employment should be well-established and should be known to the employees before they accept the employment. If such is the object, no vague undefined notion about any act, may be innocuous, which from the employer’s point of view may be misconduct but not provided for in the standing order for which a penalty can be imposed, cannot (sic can) be incorporated in the standing orders. From certainty of conditions of employment, we would have to return to the days of hire and fire which reverse movement is hardly justified. In this connection, we may also refer to Western India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen in which this Court held that any condition of service if inconsistent with certified standing orders, the same would not prevail and the certified standing orders would have precedence over all such agreements. There is really one interesting observation in this which deserves noticing. Says the Court: [SCC para 10, p. 334: SCC (L&S) p. 536] In the sunny days of the market economy theory people sincerely believed that the economic law of demand and supply in the labour market would settle a mutually beneficial bargain between the employer and the workman. Such a bargain, they took it for granted, would secure fair terms and conditions of employment to the workman. This law they venerated as natural law. They had an abiding faith in the unity of this law. But the experience of the working of this law over a long period has belied their faith. Lastly we may refer to Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Ltd. v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. This Court repelled the contention that the Act must prescribe the minimum which has to be prescribed in an industrial establishment, but it does not exclude the extension otherwise. Relying upon the earlier decision of this Court in Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh the Court held that everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is none the less a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Mr Shanti Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in Standing Order 22 can be punished under Standing Order 23 must be rejected.” Further in the case of A.L. Kalra Vs. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. [ (1984) 3 SCC 316 ], at paragraph-22 it has been held as under: “22. Rule 4 bears the heading “General”. Rule 5 bears the heading “Misconduct”. The draftsmen of the 1975 Rules made a clear distinction about what would constitute misconduct. A general expectation of a certain decent behaviour in respect of employees keeping in view Corporation culture may be a moral or ethical expectation. Failure to keep to such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule 5. Any attempt to telescope Rule 4 into Rule 5 must be looked upon with apprehension because Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. It is not necessary to dilate on this point in view of a recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut where this Court held that “everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short, it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty”. In short, it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty”. Rule 4 styled as “General” specifies a norm of behaviour but does not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule 5, it is nowhere stated that anything violative of Rule 4 would be per se a misconduct in any of the sub-clauses of Rule 5 which specifies misconduct. It would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It may as well be mentioned that Rule 25 which prescribes penalties specifically provides that any of the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him. Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct.” The above view has been reiterated again by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [ (2012)5 SCC 242 ]. 12. This Court has examined the nature of allegation and to judge as to whether the charge which has partially been proved can be said to be misconduct, the answer of this Court will be in negative for the reason that the Enquiry Officer, in its report, has come with the finding that no violation of applicable provision of M.V. Act is there, even then he has recorded that the charge has partially been proved. The question herein is that where there is no violation of statutory provision of the M.V. Act, merely for the reason of not waiting for the period of 30 days seeking information from the earlier Registering Authority, it cannot be construed to be misconduct since sub-section (3) to Section 48 of the M.V. Act contains power to be exercised by the earlier Registering Authority and as such for any failure of the provision of Section 48 of the M.V. Act, the Registering Authority of the other State cannot be construed to have committed any misconduct and hence the charge which has been found partially to be proved, since is not a misconduct, therefore, even if the case is remitted for fresh consideration no purpose would be served rather it would lead to futile exercise. 13. So far the decision of Hon’ble the Apex Court rendered in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) is concerned, the facts were totally different in the said decision as would be evident from paragraph-6 thereof. The point of attack in that case was that witnesses were examined in the departmental proceeding in violation of the statutory rules applicable therein and also in violation of the principles of natural justice as the delinquent was not accorded adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The Appellate Authority also failed to consider whether the procedure followed by the Enquiry Officer, as well as that followed by the Disciplinary Authority, satisfied the requirements of Regulation 46(2)(a) of 1960 Regulations which was applicable in that case. The present case is entirely different in which the Enquiry Officer has also stated at one place that all the four charges could not be proved at all and same is the correct statement because nothing is there either on the record or in the enquiry report to show that there was some statutory violation or some deliberate act by the delinquent which served adverse to the interest of the State. In paragraph-19 of the aforesaid decision, Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order.” 14. It would be apt from reading of the aforesaid passage of the judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court cited by the appellants-State that the formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the materials available on record, which is absolutely lacking in the present case as there is no application of mind at all either with respect to agreeing or disagreeing with the views expressed by the Enquiry Officer. On that, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the matter should be remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for taking a fresh decision. 15. The reason why we do not find it necessary to remand the matter to the Disciplinary Authority is that the charges could not be proved in the enquiry and it does not appear that the Disciplinary Authority has differed with the views expressed by the Enquiry Officer. In such a situation, remand will be a futile exercise and merely would amount to dragging the matter for a longer period as several years have already lapsed, the departmental proceeding having been initiated in the year 2008 and the punishment order having been passed in the year 2011 and finally, it has been set aside by the learned Single Judge in the year 2017. Another reason as to why we would not remand the matter to the Disciplinary Authority would be that the first punishment which was imposed is censure was effective only for one year at that point of time and the same has already lost its effect. The second punishment is of withholding two increments with non-cumulative effect and now having passed so many years thereafter this has also lost its effect. The second punishment is of withholding two increments with non-cumulative effect and now having passed so many years thereafter this has also lost its effect. So far as third punishment is concerned i.e. withholding promotion for three years, this not being major or minor punishment as envisaged in the relevant Rule 49 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 cannot be imposed and imposition of such punishment was without jurisdiction as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (supra) wherein at paragraphs-21 & 22 it has been held as follows: “11. Admittedly, the punishment imposed upon the appellant is not provided for under Rule 4 of the 1991 Rules. Integrity of a person can be withheld for sufficient reasons at the time of filling up the annual confidential report. However, if the statutory rules so prescribe, it can also be withheld as a punishment. The order passed by the disciplinary authority withholding the integrity certificate as a punishment for delinquency is without jurisdiction, not being provided under the 1991 Rules, since the same could not be termed as punishment under the Rules. The Rules do not empower the disciplinary authority to impose “any other” major or minor punishment. It is a settled proposition of law that punishment not prescribed under the Rules as a result of disciplinary proceedings cannot be awarded. xxx xxx xxx 22. In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal this Court has held that a person cannot be tried for an alleged offence unless the legislature has made it punishable by law and it falls within the offence as defined under Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Penal Code, 1860, Section 2(n) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The same analogy can be drawn in the instant case though the matter is not criminal in nature.” Even otherwise also this period has gone. 16. Having held and observed as above, we see no reason to remand the matter for fresh consideration as learned counsel for the appellants could not persuade us by making logical submission that one prudent person can come to a different conclusion in the matter. 17. In the result, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. I.A. No. 2829 of 2018 18. 17. In the result, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. I.A. No. 2829 of 2018 18. Consequent to final order passed in the appeal, this application also stands disposed of.