JUDGMENT : Defendant Nos.3 to 49 are in appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Senior Civil Judge at Basavanabagewadi ['Trial Court' for short] in O.S.No.95/2004 dated 08.10.2010. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 3. Facts of the case: The plaintiff has filed the suit in O.S.No.95/2004 for the relief of declaration that she is the owner of the suit properties and for consequential relief of direction to the defendants to deliver possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff. The suit was originally filed for the relief of permanent injunction, alternatively declaration and consequential relief of possession was sought for. On the memo filed by the plaintiff, restricting her alternative prayer of declaration and possession and giving up her prayer for injunction, the same was allowed and accordingly the amendment in the plaint was carried out by deleting the prayer of permanent injunction. 4. The suit was filed originally against the defendant Nos.1 to 3. Defendant Nos.4 to 49 were impleaded as parties to the suit during the pendency of the suit proceedings. 5. The subject matter of the suit is the landed properties in Sy.No.32 measuring 10 acres 18 guntas, Sy.No.206/3 measuring 10 acres 25 guntas, Sy.No.470/A measuring 8 acres 5 guntas and non agricultural properties i.e., open site in VPC No.243 and 93, situated at Bhairawadagi village, Basavanabagevadi Taluk, Bijapur District. 6. The plaint averments are that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 though born to the same parents are not related to each other as they are born to different unrelated family stocks. It was averred that the father of the plaintiff Nanagouda had given defendant No.1 in adoption to his true brother Siddanagouda through his widow Ramawwa on 20.06.1945. By that time, father of the plaintiff had already begotten three daughters Siddamma, Kamalabai and Shivalingamma. Siddamma and Shivalingamma were married long back. Therefore, Kamalabai succeeded to the ancestral properties of Nanagouda inherited from his genitive father. Defendant No.1 succeeded to the properties of his adoptive father Siddanagouda and got severed from the genitive family. After the adoption of Nanagouda, to one Bhimanagouda Patil of Bhairawadagi on 24.06.1945 through his widow Smt. Neelawwa, the plaintiff was born to the said Nanagouda, adopted son of Bhimanagouda Patil, through his wife Neelamma. Defendant No.1 succeeded to the properties of his adoptive father Siddanagouda and got severed from the genitive family. After the adoption of Nanagouda, to one Bhimanagouda Patil of Bhairawadagi on 24.06.1945 through his widow Smt. Neelawwa, the plaintiff was born to the said Nanagouda, adopted son of Bhimanagouda Patil, through his wife Neelamma. Thus, the plaintiff and defendants though born to the same parents, are having distinct genealogies, estates and rights. 7. The father of the plaintiff Nanagouda, adopted son of Bhimanagouda Patil died on 16.12.1984 leaving behind plaintiff as his only successor to his estate as her mother predeceased her father, consisting of following properties: “Agricultural lands Area Assessment C.S.No. Acre Gunta Rs.Ps. Village 1. 26/2 10-18 19-23 Bhairawadagi 2. 206/3 10-25 17-10 Bhairawadagi 3. 470/A 08-05 14-95 Bhairawadagi Non Agricultural properties Area Assessment Village VPC No. Sq. ft. Rs.Ps. 243 Bhairawadagi [Open site] 93 [Open site] 65-00 Bhairawadagi” Though the plaintiff’s father was given in adoption, he continued to live in the house where he was born. The plaintiff and defendant No.1 lived in the same house until she was married, though she was born at Honnalli of Muddebihal Taluk. 8. The defendant No.1 was managing the suit properties on behalf of Nanagouda during his old age and continued to manage the suit properties even after the demise of Nanagouda. The plaintiff had not examined the record of rights of suit properties after the demise of Nanagouda, as defendant No.1 had always assured her that she is the owner and successor of suit properties and that he has got her name entered in all the record of rights etc., as he had taken her signature on blank paper for this purpose. The plaintiff used to take proceeds/properties sufficient for her needs and the excess proceeds were left to defendant No.1 out of love and affection. It is during the last week of July 2004 and first week of August 2004, the defendant No.1 started avoiding the plaintiff and started to behave differently with the plaintiff. Local people of Bhirwadgi also hinted her that the defendant No.1 had been manipulating revenue records behind her back. On 10.08.2004, the plaintiff applied for record of rights of the suit properties and noticed that the name of the defendants were entered in the revenue records. Local people of Bhirwadgi also hinted her that the defendant No.1 had been manipulating revenue records behind her back. On 10.08.2004, the plaintiff applied for record of rights of the suit properties and noticed that the name of the defendants were entered in the revenue records. It was thus contended that the defendants would likely to take advantage of the unlawful entries got entered into the record of rights by the help of revenue officials and staff and interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by the plaintiff. 9. The defendant Nos.1 to 3 appeared through their counsel and resisted the claim of the plaintiff. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 have filed their written statement and the same was adopted by the defendant No.3. Defendant Nos.4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 49 appeared through their counsel but no written statement was filed by them. Defendant Nos.4 to 11, 13, 15, 19, 23 to 26, 29 to 31, 36, 37, 40 to 49 have not appeared despite due service of summons and hence they were placed exparte. 10. The defence in the written statement: The rights claimed by the plaintiff that she alone succeeded to the adopted family properties of Nanagouda was denied. It was contended that the suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties since all the other daughters of Nanagouda were not arrayed as parties to the proceedings. The averments made in the plaint that the defendant No.1 was given in adoption on 20.06.1945 to Siddanagouda through his wife Ramavva was admitted but he lost his rights over the properties of the genetic father was denied. However, it was averred that no suit properties of Nanagouda has been inherited by defendant No.1. Thereafter genetic father of Nanagouda giving him [Nanagouda] in adoption to Bheemanagouda Patil on 24.06.1945 was disputed. It was contended that the plaintiff’s father Nanagouda relinquished his rights over the property in Sy.Nos.470/A, 206/2 on 10.10.1984 in favour of his grand son, defendant No.2 since the defendant No.2 was taking care of Nanagouda during his lifetime. After relinquishment of rights over the suit properties by Nanagouda, defendant No.2 is in possession of the same and is fortified by the change of the mutation entries. After relinquishment of rights over the suit properties by Nanagouda, defendant No.2 is in possession of the same and is fortified by the change of the mutation entries. The plaintiff’s father Nanagouda was not the owner of the land in Sy.No.26/2. This property belongs to Sri. Ramanagouda S/o Sahebgouda Patil and the same was relinquished in the name of the defendant No.2. Thereafter, the defendant No.2 and others have partitioned the said property. It was contended that the plaintiff is living in her husband’s house since 45 years and not with the defendants. The allegation of defendant No.1 taking signature of the plaintiff on the blank papers was denied. After the partition of the suit properties among the defendants, mutation entries were effected and are in possession of the suit properties. The suit filed by the plaintiff in the year 2004 was challenged as barred by limitation and for payment of deficit Court fee. In substance, it was the defence of the defendant Nos.1 to 3 that they are the owners of the suit properties and sought for dismissal of the suit with costs. 11. Plaintiff got examined herself as PW1 as well as one witness PW2 and got marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P83. The defendants got examined DW1 to DW3 and got marked Ex.D1 to Ex.D10. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: “1. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is the owner in possession of the suit properties as she has succeeded to the same on the death of her father who died on 16.12.1984? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves further that the defendant No.1 has managed to enter his name in the records with respect to the suit properties without the notice to the plaintiff? 3. Whether the defendant Nos.1 and 2 prove that the father of plaintiff Nanagouda A/F Bhimanagouda Patil was looked after by them in his old age, therefore the father of plaintiff has relinquished his right over the suit properties in favour of defendant No.2 for the reasons claimed in para6 and 8 of written statement? 4. Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? 5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 6. Whether the suit is properly valued and court fee paid is proper and correct? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief claimed in the suit? 8. 4. Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? 5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 6. Whether the suit is properly valued and court fee paid is proper and correct? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief claimed in the suit? 8. What decree or order?” And the same were answered as under: ISSUE No.1: Partly affirmative. ISSUE No.2: In the affirmative. ISSUE No.3: In the negative ISSUE No.4: In the negative ISSUE No.5: In the negative ISSUE No.6: In the affirmative ISSUE No.7: In the affirmative ISSUE No.8: As per final order for the following reasons” 12. The Trial Court decreed the suit declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties and is entitled for the possession of the suit properties from the defendants. The defendants were directed to deliver the possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff within six months from the date of the judgment. 13. Learned counsel Sri.J.S.Shetty, representing the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that originally the prayer sought in the plaint was for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by the plaintiff and alternatively to declare that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit properties and consequentially direct the defendants to deliver the possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff. On the basis of the memo filed on 30.03.2010 by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, the prayer of injunction was given up and restricted the relief only to the alternative prayer of declaration and possession, the same came to be allowed on 27.08.2010 on the ground that the learned counsel appearing for the contesting defendant Nos.1 to 3 had no objections to allow the memo as per the submissions made on 03.04.2010. Hence, non filing of objections to the memo by the other defendant Nos.4 to 49 would have no substantial relevancy. The plaintiff was permitted to carry out the amendment in as much the prayer of the plaint is concerned and accordingly amended plaint was filed restricting the relief only for the declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit properties and consequently to direct the defendants to deliver possession of suit properties to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was permitted to carry out the amendment in as much the prayer of the plaint is concerned and accordingly amended plaint was filed restricting the relief only for the declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit properties and consequently to direct the defendants to deliver possession of suit properties to the plaintiff. It was argued that no sufficient opportunity was provided to the defendants to file objections to the memo. It was at the stage of conclusion of the arguments, the first prayer in the plaint was allowed to be deleted by accepting the memo which is wholly impermissible in law. No amendment of pleadings can be made unless the requisite application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC is filed. Certain allegations were made against the learned counsel who appeared for the defendant Nos.1 to 3 before the Trial Court contending that the learned counsel was not instructed to make such submissions before the Trial Court to allow the memo and the same ought not to have been considered by the Trial Court unless the submissions were filed by the defendants in writing to allow the memo dated 30.03.2010. Indeed, it was submitted that legal action was initiated against the learned counsel who appeared for the defendant Nos.1 to 3 before the Trial Court for not properly conducting the case in the interest of the defendants. Thus, it was submitted that the original plaint filed by the plaintiff depicts the true nature of the suit whereby no two contradictory prayers were sought by the plaintiff. It was pointed out that immediately on allowing the memo on 27.08.2010, O.S.No.95/2004 came to be disposed on 08.10.2010. The amendment carried on 27.08.2010 to the plaint changes the nature of the suit. The defendants being rustic persons confidently engaged the learned counsel to conduct the case. If any mischief is committed by the learned counsel much against the interest of the defendants who were oblivious of the proceedings before the Court, that too subsequent to the arguments of the case, would certainly cause injustice and the same requires interference by this Court, considering the pleadings and arguments of the appellants. 14. If any mischief is committed by the learned counsel much against the interest of the defendants who were oblivious of the proceedings before the Court, that too subsequent to the arguments of the case, would certainly cause injustice and the same requires interference by this Court, considering the pleadings and arguments of the appellants. 14. It was argued that the defendant No.1 was managing the suit properties during the lifetime of Nanagouda and on the basis of the relinquishment deed executed by Sri.Nanagouda in favour of defendant No.2, revenue entries were mutated in the year 1984, which was well within the knowledge of the plaintiff who was married and living with her matrimonial home. It is only in the year 2004, suit came to be filed by the plaintiff on frivolous grounds which is totally barred by limitation. Reference was made to Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads thus: “58. To obtain any other declaration – Three years – when the right to sue first accrues.” 15. Nextly, it was submitted that originally the suit schedule properties were described as under: “Agricultural lands Area Assessment C.S.No. Acre Gunta Rs.Ps. Village 1. 26/2 11-01 20-30 Bhairawadagi 2. 206/3 10-25 17-10 Bhairawadagi 3. 470/A 08-05 14-95 Bhairawadagi Non Agricultural properties Area Assessment Village VPC No. Sq. ft. Rs.Ps. 243 Bhairawadagi [Open site] 93 [Open site] 65-00 Bhairawadagi” Subsequently the same was amended as under: “Agricultural lands Area Assessment C.S.No. Acre Gunta Rs.Ps. Village 1. 32/2 10-18 19-23 Bhairawadagi 2. 206/3 10-25 17-10 Bhairawadagi 3. 470/A 08-05 14-95 Bhairawadagi Non Agricultural properties Area Assessment Village VPC No. Sq. ft. Rs.Ps. 243 Bhairawadagi [Open site] 93 [Open site] 65-00 Bhairawadagi” 16. It was argued that I.A.16 was filed by the defendant Nos.8 to 13 seeking permission to file written statement and the same came to be rejected without assigning valid reasons. The claim put up by the plaintiff that she alone is entitled to inherit the suit schedule properties belonging to Nanagouda dehors the admitted fact that both the plaintiff and defendant No.1 were born to the same parents is unjustifiable. The Trial Court failed to appreciate the testimony of the parties in a right perspective. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent Nos.1 to 49 are not necessary parties to the suit proceedings. The Trial Court failed to appreciate the testimony of the parties in a right perspective. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent Nos.1 to 49 are not necessary parties to the suit proceedings. Out of 10 acres 05 guntas of land in Sy.No.470/A, 2 acres of land was got converted into nonagricultural purposes, sites were developed and sold to defendant Nos.4 to 49 through registered sale deeds from 1991 to 2001. The extent of 8 acres 05 guntas of land shown in the description of the suit properties in Sy.No.470/A is not correct and no boundaries are shown; other daughters of Nanagouda are proper and necessary parties for the effective adjudication of the dispute and are not arrayed as parties. Hence, the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties as well as nonjoinder of necessary parties. Trial Court grossly erred in decreeing the suit. The material irregularity or perversity found in the order of the Trial Court necessarily warrants interference of this Court. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendants placed reliance on the following judgments: 1 Kale and Others V/s. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, reported in AIR 1976 SC 807 . 2 L.C. Hanumanthappa [since dead] represented by his LRs V/s. H.B.Shivakumar, decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.6595/2015 decided on August 26, 2015. 3. Krishnanand Govindanand V/s. M.D.Oswal Hosiery, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1162 . 4.Bikram Singh and Others V/s. Ram Baboo and Others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 2036 . 17. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted that defendant Nos.1 to 3 have no right to inherit the properties belonging to the family of Bhimanagouda Patil to whom Nanagouda was given in adoption through the widow Ramawwa on 24.06.1945. It was argued that after the death of Nanagouda, the defendant No.1 continued to manage the suit properties on behalf of the plaintiff knowing very well that she is the only heir who is entitled to inherit the properties of Nanagouda. It was argued that after the death of Nanagouda, the defendant No.1 continued to manage the suit properties on behalf of the plaintiff knowing very well that she is the only heir who is entitled to inherit the properties of Nanagouda. It was contended that the defendant No.1 had taken the signature of the plaintiff on the white blank papers and blank bond paper on the pretext that he would change the name of the plaintiff in revenue records as the successor of her father but only after coming to know the truth that the defendant No.1 manipulated the revenue records behind her back and had sold some of the properties, she was compelled to file the suit. It is only on technicalities, the defendants are challenging the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. No relinquishment deed is produced to substantiate the contention of the defendant Nos.1 to 3 that Nanagouda had relinquished his rights over the suit properties in favour of the defendant No.2 on the basis of which the mutation was effected. It was argued that no title to the property can be transferred on the basis of the revenue records and such entries in the revenue records do not create any title nor has any presumptive value on the title. The memo filed by the plaintiff for deletion of the first prayer in the plaint and to restrict the same to the alternative prayer was allowed only after hearing the parties and recording the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the defendant Nos.1 to 3 that he has no objections to allow the memo and amend the plaint accordingly. No additional written statement was required to be filed by the defendants since there was neither any change in the nature of the suit nor any such prayer was made. 18. It was argued that the cause of action for the suit arose on 10.08.2004 when the plaintiff for the first time discovered the names of defendants entered in the revenue records relating to the suit properties. Reference was made to Article 65 of the Limitation Act to contend that the said Article is applicable to the facts of the case and not Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Reference was made to Article 65 of the Limitation Act to contend that the said Article is applicable to the facts of the case and not Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was contended that by the time Nanagouda went in adoption to the family of Bheemanagouda Patil, he already begotten three daughters namely, Siddamma, Kamalabai and Shivalingamma and one son, defendant No.1 who was given in adoption to Siddangouda on 20.06.1945. It is only the plaintiff who was born to Nanagouda through his wife Neelamma, after he went in adoption on 24.06.1945 to Bheemanagouda Patil’s family. Nanagouda ceases to be member of his genitive family immediately after his adoption to Bheemanagouda Patil. It was only the wife of Nanagouda, got transplanted with him into adopted family and not the other daughters and defendant No.1 who were born prior to adoption. Hence, the daughters who were born prior to his adoption are not necessary parties to the suit. The defendants who are in possession of the suit properties are in unauthorized possession. The plaintiff alone who was born to Nanagouda subsequent to adoption to Bheemanagouda Patil would succeed to the suit properties as his legal heir and she is the absolute owner of the suit properties. Reliance was placed on the relevant paragraph of the commentary on Hindu Law by the Author Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, “Mulla Hindu Law, 21st Edition” Chapter XXIII, Page 698 which is quoted infra for ready reference: Learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: (1). Avvamma V/s. The State of Karnataka and Others, reported in ILR 2006 KAR 3018. (2). Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar and Others V/s. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund and Others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 901 . (3). Dayaram and Others V/s. Dawalatshah and Another, reported in 1971 AIR [SC] 681. (4). Balawant Singh and Another V/s. Daulat Singh [Dead] by LR’s and Others, reported in 1997 AIR [SCW] 2690. 19. Thus, it was argued that the appeal deserves to be dismissed in toto confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 20. We have considered the rival submissions of both the parties and perused the material on record. 21. The Core questions that arise for our consideration are: 1. 19. Thus, it was argued that the appeal deserves to be dismissed in toto confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 20. We have considered the rival submissions of both the parties and perused the material on record. 21. The Core questions that arise for our consideration are: 1. Whether the plaintiff alone is entitled to inherit the suit properties belonging to the adoptive family of Nanagouda, adopted son of Bheemanagouda Patil, in view of the adoption of Nanagouda made through Ramawwa, widow of Bheemanagouda Patil on 24.06.1945? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3. Whether the Trial Court was justified in allowing the memo dated 30.03.2010 filed by the plaintiff to restrict the prayer in the plaint only to the alternative prayer i.e., declaration and possession and giving up the prayer for injunction? 4. Whether the suit is bad for nonjoinder of parties? 22. PW1 in her evidence has admitted that her father Nanagouda had gone in adoption to Bhimanagouda Patil and her brother Siddanagouda – defendant No.1 was given in adoption prior to the adoption of Nangouda. She got married in the year 1964. By that time, she was aged about 12 or 13 years. 23. PW2 though filed an affidavit, in examination-in-chief failed to tender herself for cross-examination. PW1 has denied the suggestion that her father Nanagouda had filed an application before the Revenue Authorities to get the revenue entries of the suit properties mutated in the name of the second defendant. However, she has admitted that she had not filed any application before the Revenue Authorities to mutate her name in the revenue records after the demise of her father. She has also denied the suggestion of the defendant No.2 and his brothers partitioning the suit properties based on the “Varadi” made by her father relinquishing the properties in favour of second defendant. It is also denied that she has not visited Bhairawadagi after her marriage. PW1 has admitted that in the suit property, Sy.No.470/A, second defendant had developed sites and alienated the same. 24. DW1 has deposed that no suit properties of Nanagouda is inherited by his father; the adoption of Nanagouda to Bheemanagouda Patil is strange. DW1 has deposed that the rights over the suit property – Sy.No.470/A was released in favour of him by Nanagouda on 10.10.1984, since he was taking care of his grandfather Nanagouda during his lifetime. 24. DW1 has deposed that no suit properties of Nanagouda is inherited by his father; the adoption of Nanagouda to Bheemanagouda Patil is strange. DW1 has deposed that the rights over the suit property – Sy.No.470/A was released in favour of him by Nanagouda on 10.10.1984, since he was taking care of his grandfather Nanagouda during his lifetime. The said release has been registered in M.E.No.3198. On acquiring the rights over the property in Sy.No.470/A, after conversion of 2 acres of land, he had alienated the sites developed by him and the plaintiff cannot plead that the said sale of the properties to the extent of 2 acres is not binding on her. It is further deposed that the suit properties were released by the deceased Nanagouda in his favour in the year 1984 and rights over V.P.C.No.93 has been released by him in favour of his younger brother, defendant No.3 and the remaining portion of suit property No.470/A has been released in favour of his father Siddanagouda and his wife for their lifetime. In his crossexamination, DW1 has deposed that one Sri.Thalati had registered the release of rights over the suit properties by Nanagouda in favour of him in his own handwriting, in the book [register]. It is after issuance of notice and being convinced that there was no objections to transfer the suit properties in the name of DW1, the “Hakkupathra” was drawn in his name and the said document is with him. DW1 has pleaded ignorance about the suit properties, Sy.Nos.32, 206. It is not in dispute that Sy.No.470/A, VPC.Nos.243 and 93 of Bhariwadagi are the properties acquired by Nanagouda from the adopted family and indeed admitted by DW1 that these properties were not acquired by Nanagouda from his genitive family. It is denied that he had obtained the signature of the plaintiff on the white blank paper and the bond paper. The plea of the plaintiff visiting his house and collecting crops from him is also denied. It is admitted that except the revenue documents, no other documents are available with him to establish the factum that Nanagouda has released his rights in favour of him. He has deposed that the receipts for the payment of revenue relating to the suit properties are with him but the same are not produced before the Court. 25. It is admitted that except the revenue documents, no other documents are available with him to establish the factum that Nanagouda has released his rights in favour of him. He has deposed that the receipts for the payment of revenue relating to the suit properties are with him but the same are not produced before the Court. 25. DW 1 in his cross-examination has admitted the adoption of his father Siddanagouda to Siddanagouda S/o Somanagouda on 20.06.1945 and his grandfather Nanagouda adopted to Bheemanagouda However, it is deposed that Nanagouda had relinquished his rights over the suit properties in his favour. No document is produced to establish the relinquishment of rights, by Nanagouda. Ex.D1 to Ex.D10 – relates to the mutation entries in the revenue records but the said varadi register has not been produced. As regards Sy.No.32, 206/3 and 470/A, it is deposed that Sy.No.470/A was relinquished in favour of him (DW2) out of 10 acres 5 guntas, 2 acres of land was converted into nonagricultural purposes in the year 1991 The sites formed in the said 2 acres of land were sold to respondent Nos.4 to 49 from 1991 to 2001 through separate registered sale deeds. 26. DW2 is an agriculturist of the same Village Bhairwadagi and has deposed that late Nanagouda has released the rights over the properties in favour of defendant No.2 about 25 to 26 years back and since then defendant No.2 is managing the said properties. The defendant No.2, in one of the said properties after getting the conversion order, developed sites and had sold the same for about 5 to 8 years. Nothing relevant is elicited in the cross-examination expect that he was not present at the office of the Tahasildar at the time of relinquishment of the properties by Nanagouda in favour of defendant No.2. 27. The defendant No.3 is also an agriculturist whose lands are situated adjacent to the defendant No.2. The said witness has deposed that the defendant No.2 has developed plots in one of the properties acquired by him from Nanagouda after conversion and the said plots [sites] are sold by him for about 5 to 8 years. 27. The defendant No.3 is also an agriculturist whose lands are situated adjacent to the defendant No.2. The said witness has deposed that the defendant No.2 has developed plots in one of the properties acquired by him from Nanagouda after conversion and the said plots [sites] are sold by him for about 5 to 8 years. This witness has also deposed in similar terms as that of the defendant No.3, as regards the releasing of property rights by Nanagouda in favour of defendant No.2 and the said defendant No.2 developing plots [sites] in one of the said properties acquired by him from Nanagouda. No cross-examination is made as regards this witness. 28. It is not in dispute that Somanagouda had seven children namely, Ninganagouda, Siddanagouda, Naganagouda, Kallaveerappagouda, Channappagouda, Sahebgouda and Basanagouda. Nanagouda S/o Somanagouda was married to Neelamma and from the said wedlock, Siddamma, Siddanagouda, Kamalabai, Shivalingamma and Kashibai [plaintiff] were born. Siddanagouda – defendant No.1 was given in adoption to Siddanagouda S/o Somanagouda and a registered adoption deed was executed on 20.06.1945. Subsequent to the adoption of defendant No.1 to Siddanagouda through his widow Ramawwa, Nanagouda was given in adoption by his genitive father Somanagouda to Bheemanagouda Patil. Kashibai – plaintiff was born to Nanagouda and Neelamma subsequent to the adoption of Nanagouda to Bheemanagouda effected through registered adoption deed dated 24.06.1945. 29. Plaintiff was born to Nanagouda and Neelamma on 01.06.1950 and the same is established as per Ex.P10 – the transfer certificate issued by the head of the institution – Government Primary School, Bhairawadagi, Taluk: Bhairawadagi, District Bijapur. 30. The question whether the plaintiff Kashibai born subsequent to adoption of her father to Bheemanagouda Patil is alone entitled to inherit the properties of the adoptive family of Bheemanagouda Patil requires to be addressed on the evidence of the parties discussed as aforesaid. It is well settled law that on the adoption of D1 (Siddanagouda) on 20.06.1945, his relationship got severed with his genitive family of Nanagouda including the right of inheritance. Subsequent to the adoption of Nanagouda on 24.06.1945, his relationship with the genitive family got severed and he inherited the properties of Bheemanagouda Patil, as the adopted son. It is not in dispute that the parties to the proceedings are governed by the Hindu Law. Subsequent to the adoption of Nanagouda on 24.06.1945, his relationship with the genitive family got severed and he inherited the properties of Bheemanagouda Patil, as the adopted son. It is not in dispute that the parties to the proceedings are governed by the Hindu Law. Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law [21st Edition” Chapter XXIII, Page 698, summarized on this point would be apt to refer to, and the same is quoted here under: “Where a married person is given in adoption and such person has a son at the date of adoption, the son does not, like his father, lose the gotra and right of inheritance in the family of his birth, and does not acquire the gotra and right of inheritance in the family into which his father is adopted.” 31. In AIR 1951 PEPSU 99 in the case of Lekh Ram & Others V/s. M.T. Kishno, it has been held as under: “An adoption under the Mitakshara law has the effect of transplanting the adopted boy from his natural family into the family of his adoptive father and by such adoption, the adoptee acquires the rights and privileges of a natural son in the family of the adoptor. He ceases to be a coparcener in the family of his birth from time of his adoption and becomes one with his adoptive family immediately. This is, however, not so with regard to the sons of the adoptee in existence before the adoption. The transplantation is restricted and confined to the adoptee and his wife because she is half of his body (Ardhangi) and does not extend to his sons born before he was taken in adoption. Such sons do not acquire the status of coparceners in the family in which their father is adopted and they do not like their father, lose their gotra and right of inheritance in the family of their birth and do not acquire the gotra and right of inheritance in the family in which their father has been adopted.” 32. In the case of Vahannappa Ningappa Boli and others V/s Mahalingappa Mahadevappa Boli and others, reported in ILR 2011 Kar 582, this Court has held as under: “13. Adoption has the effect of transferring the adopted boy from his natural family into the adoptive family. In the case of Vahannappa Ningappa Boli and others V/s Mahalingappa Mahadevappa Boli and others, reported in ILR 2011 Kar 582, this Court has held as under: “13. Adoption has the effect of transferring the adopted boy from his natural family into the adoptive family. It confers upon the adoptee the same rights and privileges in the family of the adoptor as the legitimate son An adopted son acquires the rights of a son in the adoptive family. However, he loses all the rights of son in his natural family including the right of claiming any share in the estate of his natural father or natural relations or any share in the coparcenary property of his natural family. The wife passes with her husband into the adoptive family because according to the Shastras, husband and wife form one body. It is settled that when a married Hindu is given in adoption and at the time of his adoption, his wife is pregnant, and a son is born to him, the son on his birth passes into the adoptive family and is entitled to inherit in that family, the reason given being that such a son is born into the adoptive family and therefore, he is treated as a member of that family (see AIR 1981 Bombay 13). An adopted son ceases to be a member of his genitive family on adoption and becomes the member of the adoptive family. The question is where a married person is given in adoption, whether his sons born prior to the date of adoption have a share in the property of their genitive family.” 33. In the case of Vittal Rao and Another V/s. Mallappa and another, in RSA.No.7379/2011 [DD 26.11.2012], this Court has observed that an adoption under the Mitakshara law has the effect of transplanting the adopted boy from his natural family into the family of his adoptive father. He ceases to be a coparcener in the family of his birth from the time of adoption and becomes one with his adoptive family immediately. This is however not so with regard to the sons of the adoptee born before the adoption. His preadoption son continues to be the grand son of his grand father and his right to partition in that branch is in no way affected. This is however not so with regard to the sons of the adoptee born before the adoption. His preadoption son continues to be the grand son of his grand father and his right to partition in that branch is in no way affected. Even if a married person having children is taken in adoption, such children are not transplanted to the adopted family of their genitive father. In other words, the adopted son ceases to be a coparcener in the family of his birth from the time of his adoption and becomes one with his adoptive family immediately. However, children born before the adoption are not transplanted to the adopted family of his father. The transplantation is restricted and confined to the adoptee and his wife (Ardhangi) and does not extend to the children born before such adoption. Such children born prior to adoption do not loose their gotra and right of inheritance in the family of their birth and no gotra and right of inheritance in the family to which their father has been adopted, is acquired. 34. The defendant No.1 ceases to be a member of Nanagouda’s family immediately after his adoption on 20.06.1945 to Siddanagouda S/o Somanagouda. On the adoption of Nanagouda to Bheemanagouda on 24.06.1945, Neelamma his wife gets transplanted into the adopted family of Bheemanagouda, not the children born prior to such adoption. Siddamma, Kamalabai, Shivalingamma and Siddanagouda are not transplanted to the adopted family of Bheemanagouda. Kashibai – plaintiff who was born after adoption of Nanagouda alone is entitled to the right of inheritance in the adopted family of Bheemanagouda Patil. 35. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant that Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the facts of the present case cannot be countenanced for the reason that the plaintiff has not merely claimed a declaration that she is the owner of the suit properties, but also the relief for possession of the suit properties from the defendant No.2. It is obvious that such a suit where the possession is claimed as a consequence of declaration would be governed by Article 65 and not by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is obvious that such a suit where the possession is claimed as a consequence of declaration would be governed by Article 65 and not by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 58 of the Limitation Act contemplates three years as the period of limitation to obtain any other declaration when the right to sue first accrues whereas Article 65 of the Limitation Act postulates 12 years as the period of Limitation for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on the title from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 36. It is appropriate to extract the relevant passage from the judgment of State of Maharashtra V/s. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar [Dead] by LRs, decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 07.03.2000, which reads as under: “Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes limitation of three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues to obtain a declaration. Under Article 65, the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title is 12 years from the date when possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The contention urged on behalf of the State Government was that Article 58 of the Limitation Act was applicable as the plaintiff had sought declaration about the invalidity of the order dated 26th May, 1976 and sale deed dated 23rd August, 1976 and that the period of limitation of three years had to be computed from 26th May, 1976 and, therefore, the suit filed on 22nd August, 1988 was hopelessly barred by time. This contention was rejected by the High Court as also by the trial court. The contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff and which has been accepted is that the suit is basically for possession of the property based upon title and the sale deed dated 23rd August, 1976 and the order dated 26th May, 1976 being void ab initio and without jurisdiction, a plea about its invalidity can be raised in any proceedings and it is not necessary to claim any declaration and thus Article 65 which deals with suit for possession based on title would be applicable from the date, the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The High Court held that in view of the order and the sale deed being null and void and without jurisdiction, the same have no existence in the eyes of law and the plea about invalidity of these documents can be raised in any proceedings and no separate declaration is necessary to be sought. It held that the suit for possession would be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was further held that a suit is within time even from the date when the possession of the suit property was taken on the execution of the sale deed on 23rd August, 1976. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji's case (supra), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj and Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi [ (1991) 3 SCC 136 ] this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, nonexistent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.” 37. In Mechineni Chokka Rao and Others V/s. Sattu Sattamma, reported in 2006 [1] ALD 116, it is held as under: “7. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.” 37. In Mechineni Chokka Rao and Others V/s. Sattu Sattamma, reported in 2006 [1] ALD 116, it is held as under: “7. Having regard to the rival contentions, Articles 58 and 65 of the Act are apt to be considered at the outset and they read as under: “Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 58. To obtain any other declaration. Three years When the right to sue first accrues. Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Twelve years. When the possession of becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Explanation:- For the purposes of this article- (a) where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainder man, reversioner or devisee, as the case may be, falls into possession; xxxxx xxxxx 8. xxxx 9. xxxx 10. xxxx Indubitably the relief of declaration can be sought for in respect of an immovable property or movable property, or in respect of an instrument, or in respect of a decree, or in respect of an adoption. Thus, various types of declaratory reliefs can be sought for pertaining to those categories. Therefore, the relief of declaration alone appears to be not the criterion for prescribing the period of limitation but the subjectmatter of the suit in respect of which the declaration is sought for, appears to be germane for consideration.” 38. In the light of aforesaid, this court is of the considered opinion that in the suit filed claiming declaration of title to the immovable property with consequential relief of possession, Article 65 of the Limitation Act would apply. Article 58 being in the nature of residuary provision among the declaration suits, applies only to a case where declaration simplicitor is sought in any further relief. 39. The evidence on record clearly indicates that the defendant No.2 is claiming rights over the suit properties mainly relying upon the relinquishment said to have been made by the deceased Nanagouda in his favour on 10.06.1984. 39. The evidence on record clearly indicates that the defendant No.2 is claiming rights over the suit properties mainly relying upon the relinquishment said to have been made by the deceased Nanagouda in his favour on 10.06.1984. Neither any document is placed on record to establish the same though he admitted that such a document is in his possession nor relinquishment made by Nanagouda in favour of defendant No.2 is proved. It is a well settled law that no title can be conferred on the basis of the revenue records. It is significant to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar supra, at para 12, it is held as under: “12. A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/ or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. The courts below, were, therefore, required to appreciate the evidence keeping in view the correct legal principles in mind.” 40. It is thus clear that ‘Varadi’ is not a document evidencing the transfer of immovable property, it is trite to be legal must be in accordance with the Provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1982. In the absence of registered document of transfer of immovable property, varadi per se cannot be construed as transfer of immovable property, the nature of the varadi, the identity of the persons who gave the report and recorded are relevant material particulars and in the absence of the same, no credential value can be given to such entries. 41. It is the case of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 that the revenue records got changed in the name of defendant No.2 after Nanagouda made a Varadi before the Revenue Authorities on 10.12.1984. On the contrary, it is the contention of the plaintiff that she was under a bonafide belief that the suit properties were standing in her name subsequent to the death of her father on 16.12.1984, as the defendant No.1 had taken her signature on blank white paper and blank bond paper to mutate her name in the revenue records. The plaintiff (PW1) has deposed that only in the year 2004, she came to know about the revenue records relating to the suit properties standing in the name of the defendant No.2. The plaintiff (PW1) has deposed that only in the year 2004, she came to know about the revenue records relating to the suit properties standing in the name of the defendant No.2. No suggestion is made to the said witness (PW1) as regards the possession of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 having become adverse to the plaintiff from 10.12.1984, immediately after the mutation effected in the revenue records. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence let in by the defendant Nos.1 to 3 to controvert the stand of the plaintiff, it cannot be held that the suit is barred by limitation. Merely taking a defence in the written statement would not be suffice unless it is proved. Further, no positive material is elicited in the crossexamination to disbelieve the testimony of PW1 who denies the same. No such material evidence is forthcoming. In such circumstances, the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff requires to be considered to reckon the period of limitation. Hence, the finding of the Trial Court on this issue cannot be held to be unjustifiable. 42. It is depicted from the records that a memo was filed on 30.03.2010 by the plaintiff’s counsel seeking to give up the prayer of injunction and to restrict to the alternative prayer of declaration and possession, the matter was adjourned to 03.04.2010 for filing of objections by the defendants. On 03.04.2010, learned counsel for the defendants submitted no objection for allowing the memo. Thereafter, the matter was listed on several occasions. On 27.08.2010, the memo filed by the plaintiff came to be allowed, the plaintiff was permitted to carry out amendment in the prayer column of the plaint. On 28.08.2010, amended plaint was filed by the plaintiff’s counsel. The judgment was pronounced on 03.10.2010. It is true that the memo was filed by the plaintiffs’ counsel at the fag end of the proceedings that too during the stage of arguments but the said memo was allowed, after providing an opportunity to the defendants to file objections if any. We are conscious that the pleadings before the Trial Court are the basis upon which the issues are framed and adjudicated upon. Amendment of the pleadings are required to be carried out following the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. We are conscious that the pleadings before the Trial Court are the basis upon which the issues are framed and adjudicated upon. Amendment of the pleadings are required to be carried out following the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Order VI Rule XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 postulates the procedure for amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. It is imperative for the Court to apply its mind on several factors while exercising the discretionary power in allowing or disallowing such an application for amendment of pleadings. In the present case, after the arguments of the plaintiff were concluded, memo was filed by the plaintiff’s counsel to restrict the prayer only to the alternative prayer of seeking a declaration and possession and not to the main prayer of seeking injunction. This permission granted by the Trial court to amend the prayer as sought for, in the absence of no objections made by the contesting respondents, would not be considered to be illegal as the prayer is restricted to alternative prayer [giving up the main prayer] by the defendants. The issues framed do not get altered. The prayer now restricted was already pleaded by the plaintiff as an alternative prayer. Written statement filed by the defendants to the plaint covers the pleadings. However, on the application of mind, if the Court comes to a conclusion exercising its discretionary power that the prayer can be restricted as sought for by the plaintiff, no fault can be found in allowing such prayer. In the circumstances, filing of additional written statement would only be an empty formality. Hence, it cannot be held that any injustice has been caused to the defendants in allowing the memo as aforesaid. 43. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case of Bikram Singh supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court while allowing the application for amendment, left it open to the different defendants to submit written statement to the amended plaint but in the present case, it is giving up or not pressing the main relief and restricting to the other alternative prayer sought for. Hence, the said judgment is not applicable in the present context. 44. Hence, the said judgment is not applicable in the present context. 44. In the case of Kale supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the compromise between the parties and mutation effected on the ground of compromise dealt with the scope of family arrangement and held that the High Court erred in entertaining the appeal when the matter is already settled in accordance with the family arrangement. However, in the present set of facts, no such family arrangement/compromise between the parties is pleaded nor adjudicated. The entire case of the defendant No.2 rests on the relinquishment said to have been made by Nanagouda in his favour, but the same not having proved, the said judgment would not come to the assistance of the defendants. 45. In the case of N.C. Hanumanthappa supra, a new relief of declaration was sought by the plaintiff by way of an amendment to the plaint after the period of limitation. A new relief sought by way of an amendment introducing completely new cause of action based on the fresh facts was held to be time barred. As discussed aforesaid, no such new relief is claimed based on the fresh facts by the plaintiff herein. 46. In the case of Krishnanand Govindanand supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the statement made by the learned counsel of a party across the bar whether could be treated as admission of the party, having regard to the requirements of Section 18 of the Evidence Act, held that on the facts of that case, the statement of counsel conceding the ground of eviction and seeking some time for the respondent to vacate the premises cannot be termed a compromise and such statement of the counsel cannot be accepted as admission relating to the eviction of the respondent-tenant therein from the suit premises under Clause [d] of Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Hence, the said judgment is also not applicable in the present fact situation. 47. As regards the fourth question, in view of the discussions made in the preceding paragraphs that Siddamma, Kamalabai and Shivalingamma though were born to the same couple, Nanagouda and Neelamma, they were not transplanted to the family of Bheemanagouda after adoption of Nanagouda on 24.06.1945. The right of inheritance of these children would remain with the genitive family properties of Nanagouda but not of adoptive family properties. The right of inheritance of these children would remain with the genitive family properties of Nanagouda but not of adoptive family properties. Hence, in the suit filed by the plaintiff, seeking the relief’s against the defendant Nos.1 to 49 relating to the suit properties belonging to Bheemanagouda Patil, adopted father of Nanagouda, the daughters born to Nanagouda namely, Siddamma, Kamalabai and Shivalingamma are not necessary parties. 48. For the reasons aforesaid, no perversity or illegality is found in the impugned order and the same deserves to be confirmed. 49. Hence, the following: ORDER 1. Appeal stands dismissed. 2. Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No.95/2004 stands confirmed. The defendants are directed to deliver the possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff within eight months from the date of this judgment 3. Parties shall bear their respective costs. 4. Draw decree accordingly.