JUDGMENT : This criminal revision petition is filed by the Petitioners/Accused 1 to 4 against the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Krishnagiri in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2009 dated 21.03.2013 confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Krishnagiri in S.C.No.86 of 2008 dated 20.08.2009. 2. Brief case of the prosecution: The petitioners/accused were residing at Jagadab Mottur Village and the Petitioner/accused A3 is the husband of deceased namely Parameswari. A1 and A2 are the father and mother of petitioner/accused A3. A4 is the younger brother of A3. The marriage between petitioner/accused No.3 and deceased Parameswari took place about 2.1/2 years prior to the date of occurrence on 02.12.2004 and both were leading their matrimonial life in the house of petitioner/accused A3 along with other petitioners/accused persons A1,A2 and A4 as Hindu Joint family. Prior to the marriage, petitioners/accused A1 to A4 had demanded to the tune of Rs.50,000/- and gold jewels to the tune of 13 sovereigns. But at the time of marriage, the parents of deceased Parameswari offered only 9 sovereigns of gold jewels. After 2 years the petitioner/accused A3 had taken away the chit amount of Rs.50,000/- remitted by the parents of deceased Parameswari and at that time she was pregnant, taken to her parents house at Jagadab Mottur Village where she gave a birth to a female child. The Petitioners/accused Nos.A1 to A4 visited her house to see child and demanded more dowry, 10 sovereigns of gold jewels, about a week prior to the occurrence. Ayyanar, the younger brother of petitioner/accused A3 who is working in the army, visited the house of parents of Parameswari convinced them to took deceased Parameswari and her child to petitioner/accused A3 house and left her there. After 3 days deceased Parameswari was driven backed to her parents house along with her child due to the torture given by petitioners/accused A1 to A4 for giving 3 sovereign gold jewels as a dowry. After 3 days deceased Parameswari was driven backed to her parents house along with her child due to the torture given by petitioners/accused A1 to A4 for giving 3 sovereign gold jewels as a dowry. Due to the above said acts of petitioners/accused A1 to A4 on 2.12.2004 at about 3 PM at Jagadab Mottur village at the fields of one Annadurai, the deceased Parameswari with intention to commit suicide by herself consumed quinalphos, an organo phosphorus insecticide poison and died, otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 years of her marriage and it is shown soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty by petitioners/accused A1 to A4 in connection with demand of dowry. Thus the petitioners/accused A1 to A4 were charged under sections 498(A) and 304(B) of IPC and also under sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. On 02.12.2004 PW1 Mangai after completing work, she came to her house and at that time her uncle namely Vetrayan told her that the deceased Parameswari consumed poison and committed suicide. PW1 went to Kaveripattinam Hospital and returned her house and saw her dead body. Then PW1 lodged a complaint Exhibit P1 before the Kaveripattinam Police. PW14 Circle Inspector of Police Kaveripattinam registered a case in Cr.No.1211 of 2004, under sections 438, 304(B) of IPC. The FIR was marked as Exhibit-P8. PW16 Deputy Superintendent of Police observed the scene of occurrence prepared a observation mahazar Exhibit P2 and rough sketch Exhibit P10 in the presence of witnesses PW6 Prabakaran and one Murugan. Then PW14 examined witnesses namely PW1 Mangai, PW2 Sivalingam, Muthuvedi PW3, Dharman Kumar PW4, Prabkaran PW6 and recorded their statements. 4. PW-13 R.D.O. Krishnagiri conducted the inquest over the deadbody before the Panchayatars and she prepared Exhibit-P5 observation mahazar and inquest report Exhibit P6 and come to the conclusion that the deceased Parameswari consumed poison due to the harassment of the accused persons demanding of dowry and sent a report Exhibit-P7. 5. PW16 Deputy Superintendent of Police examined the witnesses Poongabanam, Vetrayan, Settu PW5, Palani PW12, Subayagoam PW7. On 04.12.2004 at about 3.10 p.m. PW 16 arrested the accused persons and they were remanded to Judicial custody. The admission portion of the confession of the accused Muthuvedi is Exhibit-P3. M.O.1 and M.O.2 were seized from the nearby house of the accused in Exhibit P4 under a cover of mahazar. 6. On 04.12.2004 at about 3.10 p.m. PW 16 arrested the accused persons and they were remanded to Judicial custody. The admission portion of the confession of the accused Muthuvedi is Exhibit-P3. M.O.1 and M.O.2 were seized from the nearby house of the accused in Exhibit P4 under a cover of mahazar. 6. On 07.12.2004 PW 16 Deputy Superintendent of Police examined the witnesses PW8 Annadurai and PW9 Gundu @ Nagan and got recorded their statement. PW15 Dr.Ashokkumar issued the chemical analysis report Exhibits-P11 and P12. After completion of the investigation, the respondent police filed the final report against the accused A1 to A4 under sections 498(A), 304(B) and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 7. The learned trial Court framed charges under sections 498(A), 304(B) and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. During trial the prosecution examined PWs-1 to 16 and marked Exhibits-P1 to P12. On the side of the accused Exhibit-D1 was marked and no witnesses were examined. 8. On completion of the trial, the learned trial Court found guilty of all the accused and convicted them under Sections 498(A), 304(B) and 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year under Section 498(A) of IPC, sentenced to undergo 7 years imprisonment for the offences under Section 304(B) and sentenced to undergo 6 months imprisonment for the offences under Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 9. Aggrieved over the same, the revision petitioners/Accused A1 to A4 preferred appeal before the learned Principal District Sessions Judge, Krishnagiri, where in the learned District Judge confirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence, this Criminal Revision is filed. 10. I heard Mr. S. Rajendrakumar for M/s. Norton & Grant, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. G. Harihara Arun Soma Sankar, learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) for the respondent and perused the entire materials available on record. 11. Hence, this Criminal Revision is filed. 10. I heard Mr. S. Rajendrakumar for M/s. Norton & Grant, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. G. Harihara Arun Soma Sankar, learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) for the respondent and perused the entire materials available on record. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that the marriage between Petitioner/Accused A3 and deceased is not an arranged one and it is a love marriage and PW1 had admitted the love affair between the deceased and Petitioner/Accused A3 in the cross examination and further she deposed that a panchayat was called for in this regard and in that panchayat the accused No.3 declared that it is enough if the girl (deceased) is married to him and he does not want any other thing, without considering the same the Courts below came to an erroneous conclusion that there was a dowry demand at the time of marriage. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that though PW2, the father of the deceased, has deposed that at the time of marriage A3 has demanded 10 sovereign jewel and 3 sovereign minor chain and same was not corroborated by PW1, the mother of the deceased and she deposed that the jewels were given by them on their own violation. The petitioners/accused were not liable to be convicted if there are material contradictions in the evidence as held in Lakshmana v. State reported in 2003 MLJ (Crl) 152. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that the PW1 for the first time in the Court deposed in his chief examination that after the birth of the child, Simla, the sister of the Petitioners/Accused A3, his sister’s husband Singaram, brother of A3 Ayyanar alone visited the house of the PW2 and demanded dowry, but the said portion of demand was not stated by the PW2 either before the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) or before the police, it is only an improvement on the part of the PW2 at the time of the chief examination and the same cannot be relied upon. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that the petitioners/accused did not visit the house of PW2 and did not demand anything from PW2. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that the petitioners/accused did not visit the house of PW2 and did not demand anything from PW2. The said factum was admitted by PW2 also during his cross–examination also. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that there is no material before the Court below to show that the deceased was subjected to harassment in relation with dowry demand soon before her death, without considering the same the Courts below erroneously shifted the burden on the petitioners/accused by invoking the presumption under section 113(B) of the Evidence Act and reliance is based upon the decisions in Prema v. Ramesh as reported in 2007 (2) MLJ Crl 691 and the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tirathkumari and another v. State of Haryana AIR 2005 SC 4429 Ayyanar and another v. State 2006(2) MLJ (Crl.) 1181 Sunil Bajaj v. State of MP 2002 SCC (Crl.) 608. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below heavily relied upon the inquest report of the PW13 Revenue Divisional Officer in order to arrive at a conclusion that the death of the deceased is a dowry death without even considering the fact that the panchayathars examined by the Revenue Divisional Officer were not examined before the Courts below. The Revenue Divisional Officer Report is not a substantive piece of evidence and it is only an Opinion. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that no local witnesses were examined to prove that indeed there was dowry demand and due to which the deceased committed suicide. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that the incident was took place at around 15.00 hours on 02.12.2004 but FIR was registered only at around 21.00 hours and hence there is enough time to falsely implicate the revision petitioners in the above case. 19. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that the incident was took place at around 15.00 hours on 02.12.2004 but FIR was registered only at around 21.00 hours and hence there is enough time to falsely implicate the revision petitioners in the above case. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Court below failed to see that the PW2 had deposed before the trial Court that the chit amount was taken by petitioners/accused A3 but the same was not corroborated by PW12, the chit agent and PW12 deposed that petitioners/accused A3 did not receive any money but PW2 had received the chit amount from him. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that the FIR Exhibit P1 alone cannot be treated as substantive piece of evidence in the absence of corroboration by the prosecution witnesses. In this case, the author of the First Information namely PW1 did not corroborate Exhibit-P1 and reliance is placed upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madusudan Singh and another v. State of Bihar as reported in 1997 SCC (Crl.) 187 and Utpaldas and another v. State of West Bengal as reported in AIR 210 SC 1894. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submits that the Courts below failed to see that there is no incriminating evidence as against petitioners/accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 and no incriminating material was put to them at the time of examination of the petitioners/accused by the Courts under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and in the said circumstances the conviction as against petitioners/accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 cannot be sustained. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused cited the following decisions in support of his submissions: (1) CDJ 2016 MHC 1756 (Chittu @ Chithra & Another v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, Erode South Police Station) (2) CDJ 2015 SC 527 (Major Singh & others v. State of Punjab) (3) 2012 (3) MLJ (Crl) 215 (Suresh and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dharmapuri) (4) 2012 (3) MLJ (Crl) 495 (SC) (Sahadevan and Another v. Stte of Tamil Nadu) 23. by Inspector of Police, Erode South Police Station) (2) CDJ 2015 SC 527 (Major Singh & others v. State of Punjab) (3) 2012 (3) MLJ (Crl) 215 (Suresh and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dharmapuri) (4) 2012 (3) MLJ (Crl) 495 (SC) (Sahadevan and Another v. Stte of Tamil Nadu) 23. The learned Government Advocate contended that the deceased is about 20 years at the time of incident and died within 3 years from the date of marriage and also subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and in-laws for dowry. Therefore the death of deceased due to the act of the accused A1 to A4 and the prosecution proved the case beyond the reasonable doubts and supported the judgment passed by the Courts below, filed the counter and sought for dismissal of appeal. 24. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners drew the attention of this Court to the findings of the learned trial judge, wherein it has been held that cruelty has been proved on account of the confession made by the petitioners/accused and submitted that the finding is illegal as the confession statement itself is inadmissible excepting to the extent of discovery of facts. It is also contended that there is no legal material to establish the ingredients of the offence under section 304(B) of IPC. 25. A perusal of the judgment would go to show that the petitioners/accused have been found guilty based upon the confession statement. The relevant finding of the trial Court would reveal thus: “On perusal of the confession statement it was clearly reveals that the deceased found died due to the harassment of petitioners/accused persons demanding of dowry only.” 26. The confession statement cannot be the basis for coming to a conclusion that there was harassment. The confession leading to recovery of material object alone would be admissible. 27. The confession statement cannot be the basis for coming to a conclusion that there was harassment. The confession leading to recovery of material object alone would be admissible. 27. The law is well settled in view of the law laid down in Kashmira Singh v State of Madhya Prades (1952 AIR 159) wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an extra judicial confession of the co-accused not a substantive evidence against the other accused and the proper approach to the confession of the co-accused is to keep the same aside first and then, to marshal the other evidences available against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and on such marshaling and on such appreciation, if the Court is able to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the said offence, the Court can look into the confession given by the co-accused as a last resort to add strength to the said conclusion. 28. To sustain the conviction under Section 304(B) of IPC, the following essential ingredients are to be established:- The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a 'normal circumstance' such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage; she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry and such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. 29. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections 304B of IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows:- "113B: Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this Section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 30. It is imperative to note that both these sections set out a common point of reference for establishing guilt of the accused person under Section 304B, which is "the woman must have been 'soon before her death' subjected to cruelty or harassment 'for or in connection with the demand of dowry'". 31. It is not disputed that Parameswari died on 02.12.2004. Further fact that she died due to quinalphos insecticide poisoning is also not disputed. Now looking into the evidence on record, we have to see whether death of Parameswari occurring within seven years of marriage is due to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry and whether there is a reasonable nexus between the alleged harassment and death. 32. PW1-Mangai, mother of the deceased, has stated that after marriage his daughter Parameswari was being ill-treated and subjected to cruelty in connection with demand of dowry and that the accused were demanding 9 sovereign of gold and that his daughter used to complain about the ill-treatment by the accused. PW1-Mangai further stated that she informed the conduct of the accused demanding dowry to the village Panchayat were accused No.3 informed the panchayatars that he is ready to take Parameswari to his house without any dowry, which was accepted by the PW1 in her cross examination. PW2- Sivalingam, father of the deceased, had also spoken about the demand of dowry and that the accused had been ill-treating his daughter in connection with demand of dowry. But in the cross examination he admits that the marriage between her daughter and accused No.3 was not arranged one and it is a love marriage and in the panchayat conducted, the accused No.3 have not demanded any dowry and even the jewels given to her daughter was put up by him voluntarily and at no point of time, the accused demanded money. Further he deposed that due to the misunderstandings both family members were not cordial to each other. 33. All other evidences examined the prosecution were on the same line as deposed by PWs 1 and 2. The prosecution has not examined any independent witness or the Panchayatars to prove that there was demand of dowry and that the deceased was subjected to ill-treatment. 33. All other evidences examined the prosecution were on the same line as deposed by PWs 1 and 2. The prosecution has not examined any independent witness or the Panchayatars to prove that there was demand of dowry and that the deceased was subjected to ill-treatment. Ordinarily, offences against married woman are being committed within the four corners of a house and normally direct evidence regarding cruelty or harassment on the woman by her husband or relatives of the husband is not available. But when PWs.1 and 2 and other witnesses has specifically stated that the demand of dowry by the accused was informed to the Panchayatars and that Panchayat was taken to the village, the alleged ill-treatment or cruelty of by her husband or relatives could have been proved by examination of the Panchayatars. The fact that deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry is not proved by the prosecution. 34. The subsequent conduct of PWs 1 and 3 raises doubt about their presence at the time of occurrence and the prosecution version. As pointed out earlier, in the cases of dowry death prosecution is obliged to show that "soon before the occurrence" deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment. In the absence of proof that deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment "soon before her death", the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained. 35. To attract conviction under Section 304B of IPC, the prosecution should adduce evidence to show that "soon before her death", the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment. There must always be proximate and live link between the effects of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. In the case of Hira Lal & Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80 , in paragraph (9) it was observed as under:- "9. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B of IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B of IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B of IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before" used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods "soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession". The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence." 36. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence." 36. Same principle was also expressed in State of A.P. vs. Raj Gopal Asawa & Anr., (2004) 4 SCC 470 ; Balwant Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 724 , Kaliyaperumal & Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 9 SCC 157 ; Kamesh Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388 ; Harjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 1 SCC 463 ; Biswajit Halder @ Babu Halder & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 1 SCC 202 and Narayanamurthy vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 512 . 37. The prosecution in my estimate, has failed to prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. The factum of unnatural death and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304(B) and 498(A) of the Code against them. 38. In all, tested on the overall scrutiny of the evidence as a whole, in my comprehension, the conviction of the accused persons on the basis of the materials on record would not be out of risk. To reiterate, the prosecution has failed to prove the crucial ingredient of cruelty and harassment by direct and cogent evidence thereby disentitling itself to the benefit of the statutory presumption available under Section 113B of the Act. 39. pplying these principles to the instant case, I find that there is no evidence as to the demand of dowry or cruelty and that deceased Parameswari was subjected to dowry harassment "soon before her death". Except the demand of jewel, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of dowry demand. Assuming that there was demand of dowry, in my view, it can only be attributed to the husband/Accused No.3 who in all probability could have demanded the same for his use. But even on this point, there is no acceptable evidence. Except the demand of jewel, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of dowry demand. Assuming that there was demand of dowry, in my view, it can only be attributed to the husband/Accused No.3 who in all probability could have demanded the same for his use. But even on this point, there is no acceptable evidence. In the absence of any evidence that the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowry "soon before her death" by the petitioners, the conviction of the petitioners/accused 1 to 4 under Section 304B of IPC cannot be sustained. The Courts below have not analyzed the evidence in the light of the essential ingredients of sections 498(A), 304(B) and 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and the conviction of the revision petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 4 is liable to be set aside. 40. In the result: (a) this Criminal Revision Case is allowed and the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2009 dated 21.03.2013 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Krishnagiri, confirming the judgment in S.C.No.86 of 2008 dated 20.08.2009 passed by the learned Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Krishnagiri, are set aside; (b) the petitioners/accused are acquitted from all the charges; (c) the bail bond if any executed by the petitioners/accused are cancelled and the fine amount, if any paid by the petitioners/accused shall be refunded to them.