JUDGMENT : Surendra Mohan, J. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether a total stranger to the contractual relationship between the victim of an accident arising out of his employment, and his employer could be made liable to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923? 2. The above question has been referred for our decision by the Division Bench, doubting the correctness of the dictum laid down by another Division Bench of this Court in an earlier decision, Kerala State Electricity Board v. Sundaram Estate ( 1987 (1) K.L.T. 425 ). The said decision has held that even a total stranger could be made liable. 3. The factual matrix out of which the above question arises can be summarized as under: Respondents 1 and 2 are the parents of late Sri. M.K. Subhash @ Suma, a construction worker who was electrocuted. The deceased was a concrete worker under the fourth respondent. The third respondent is the owner of a commercial building at Perumpilly Bhagam, Narakkal. She is conducting a small tea shop in the building. She entrusted the fourth respondent with the construction of an additional floor above the existing ground floor of the building. The building is situate in a property having an area of one cent. The work of construction was taken up by the fourth respondent on contract basis. The deceased was his workman. On 23.10.2004 at about 6.45 p.m. while engaged in the construction work on the upper floor of the building, he lifted an iron rod which hit the 11 KV electric line that was passing overhead and was electrocuted. According to respondents 1 and 2, the deceased was 22 years old and was earning Rs.190/- per day. They claimed an amount of Rs.9,00,000/- as compensation. 4. The third respondent opposed the claim for compensation contending that she was only running a small teashop in the very same building having an area of just one cent. She had not employed the deceased, nor paid any wages to him. Therefore, according to her, she was not a necessary party to the proceedings. The fourth respondent denied that he was a contractor, as stated in the application. He was only a worker like the deceased. They were engaged by the third respondent. Therefore, he was not having employer-employee relationship with the deceased. 5. Therefore, according to her, she was not a necessary party to the proceedings. The fourth respondent denied that he was a contractor, as stated in the application. He was only a worker like the deceased. They were engaged by the third respondent. Therefore, he was not having employer-employee relationship with the deceased. 5. The third respondent filed a petition to implead the Kerala State Electricity Board as an opposite party before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner pointing out that the workman had died of electrocution from the KSEB line. The impleading petition was allowed. Though notice was received, they did not appear in the proceedings and were therefore declared ex parte. After taking evidence, the matter was considered by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. As per order dated 25.10.2011 an amount of Rs.4,42,740/- has been awarded as compensation to respondents 1 and 2. The Kerala State Electricity Board ('KSEB' for short) has been directed to pay the said amount. This appeal is filed by the KSEB aggrieved by the said order. 6. According to the Standing Counsel for the KSEB, the Board had absolutely no relationship with the deceased worker. He was employed by the fourth respondent who was a contractor under the third respondent. The KSEB had laid the 11 KV line and the same was being maintained properly. It is pointed out that admittedly the accident had occurred when the deceased lifted an iron rod which came into contact with the 11 KV line. It was not due to any default on the part of the KSEB that the accident had occurred. In the absence of any contractual relationship with the deceased, the KSEB cannot be made liable to pay the compensation amount as ordered by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. It is contended by the learned counsel that, Section 12(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) brings within its scope only persons who are having contractual relationship with the deceased. The provision does not and cannot include total strangers even if they are tortfeasors. Therefore, it is contended that the order appealed against is liable to be set aside. 7. Adv. K.N. Rajani meets the contentions of the counsel for the appellants by pointing out that the third respondent is the owner of the building and the fourth respondent is the Contractor with whom the deceased was working. Therefore, it is contended that the order appealed against is liable to be set aside. 7. Adv. K.N. Rajani meets the contentions of the counsel for the appellants by pointing out that the third respondent is the owner of the building and the fourth respondent is the Contractor with whom the deceased was working. Since the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the appellant, it is contended that, the direction in the order appealed against, to the appellant to pay the compensation was fully justified. According to the learned counsel, there are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the order appealed against. 8. Adv. Dinesh Mathew J. Murickan, who appears for the fourth respondent contends that, the accident was caused due to the negligence of the appellant. Had the 11 KV line been properly maintained, it is contended that, the accident would not have occurred. According to the learned counsel, Section 3(5) of the Act bars the filing of a civil suit for compensation. Therefore, the only remedy of respondents 1 and 2 was to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Therefore, all issues relating to the award of compensation to the claimants would have to be decided in the proceedings under the Act. The parties are not to be relegated to the Civil Court. It is contended that, the existence of a contractual relationship is not necessary to connect the appellant to the deceased. Section 13 entitles the claimants to seek and recover compensation from even strangers. Section 12 (2) brings within its ambit even strangers who are responsible for causing the death or injury. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the contention now put forward by the appellant that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to total strangers, cannot be countenanced. The learned counsel therefore seeks dismissal of the appeal. 9. In reply, the Standing Counsel for the appellant points out that, the existence of a contractual relationship is necessary for making the person responsible for the accident, liable to pay compensation. In the absence of a contractual relationship, no claim for compensation under the provisions of the Act is maintainable. Such a claim would have to be enforced by filing a civil suit. Under Section 12 of the Act, the principal employer is bound to indemnify the contractor. Under Section 3, the employer's liability is determined through a summary procedure. In the absence of a contractual relationship, no claim for compensation under the provisions of the Act is maintainable. Such a claim would have to be enforced by filing a civil suit. Under Section 12 of the Act, the principal employer is bound to indemnify the contractor. Under Section 3, the employer's liability is determined through a summary procedure. The amount of compensation is computed in accordance with Section 4 of the Act. The counsel also points out that, Section 12 (2) contemplates three categories of persons. They are firstly, the contractor, from whom the employee could recover compensation, secondly where a contractor who himself as a principal is liable to pay compensation and thirdly any person standing to him in the relation of a contractor from whom the employee could recover compensation. Since the appellant does not come within any of the three categories mentioned above, no liability to pay compensation under the provisions of the Act could be fastened on the appellant. Since the order appealed against has held the appellant liable to pay the compensation amount, it is contended that the order requires to be interfered with and set aside. 10. Heard. The facts in this case are not disputed. The dispute raised by the appellant essentially is whether the appellant, who is a total stranger to the deceased, could be made liable to pay compensation for his death under the Act. The answer to the above question would depend on a proper understanding of the provisions of the Act. 11. According to Section 3, the liability to pay compensation is cast on an employer where an injury is caused to a workman in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The liability is absolute inasmuch as it is not necessary to prove negligence on the part of the employer. At the same time, the employer has no liability to compensate a workman who was at the relevant time under the influence of drinks or drugs or who has wilfully disobeyed an order given or rule expressly framed for the safety of the workman, or in cases where the workman has wilfully removed a safety guard or other devices provided for his safety. Section 12 makes the employer liable to pay compensation not only to his workman but also to the workman employed by a contractor for the execution of his work. Section 12 makes the employer liable to pay compensation not only to his workman but also to the workman employed by a contractor for the execution of his work. The above liability however is subject to his right to be indemnified by the contractor. Section 12 is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference. “12. Contracting.- (1) Where any person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the principal) in the course of or for the purposes of his trade or business contracts with any other person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the contractor for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the trade or business of the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the execution of the work any compensation which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from the principal, this Act shall apply as if references to the principal were substituted for references to the employer except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the wages of the workman under the employer by whom he is immediately employed. (2) Where the principal is liable to pay compensation under this section, he shall be entitled to be indemnified by the contractor, or any other person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation and where a contractor who is himself a principal is liable to pay compensation or to indemnify a principal under this section he shall be entitled to be indemnified by any person standing to him in the relation of a contractor from whom the workman could have recovered compensation, and all questions as to the right to and the amount of any such indemnity shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a workman from recovering compensation from the contractor instead of the principal. (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a workman from recovering compensation from the contractor instead of the principal. (4) This section shall not apply in any case where the accident occurred elsewhere that on, in or about the premises on which the principal has undertaken or usually undertakes, as the case may be, to execute the work or which are otherwise under his control or management.” [Emphasis supplied] The above provision applies where an employer, 'in the course of or for the purposes of his trade or business' has contracted with any other person for the execution of 'the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the trade or business of the principal,' and makes him liable to pay compensation where the workman is injured by an accident in the course of such work. The liability to pay compensation is fastened on the employer in the same manner as his liability in relation to his own employee. Sub section (2) of Section 12 specifies the categories of persons from whom the employer is entitled to be indemnified for the compensation paid by him. They are the following: (i) Contractor (ii) Any other person from whom the employee could recover compensation, and (iii) Any person standing to him in the relation of a contractor from whom the employee could have recovered compensation. In view of the fact that, two out of the above mentioned three categories concern persons who are having contractual relations with the employer, it is contended that any other person from whom the employee could recover compensation can also be only a person with whom the employer has a contractual relationship. The contention therefore is that, the words "any other person” cannot be construed as including a total stranger to the employer even if he is the person who is responsible for causing the injury. Reliance is placed on Section 13 of the Act also to contend that, the said Section makes provision for indemnifying the employer for the acts of strangers. Such proceedings would have to be initiated separately as a civil suit, it is contended. Section 13 of the Act reads as under: “13. Reliance is placed on Section 13 of the Act also to contend that, the said Section makes provision for indemnifying the employer for the acts of strangers. Such proceedings would have to be initiated separately as a civil suit, it is contended. Section 13 of the Act reads as under: “13. Remedies of employer against stranger.- Where a workman has recovered compensation in respect of any injury caused under circumstances creating a legal liability of some person other than the person by whom the compensation was paid to pay damages in respect thereof, the person by whom the compensation was paid and any person who has been called on to pay an indemnity under section 12 shall be entitled to be indemnified by the person so liable to pay damages as aforesaid.” 12. In the above context, it is necessary to take note of the fact that Section 12(2) as originally enacted did not include a provision to make any other person liable to pay compensation other than the employer. The above aspect has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in K.S.E. Board v. Sundaram Estate ( 1987 (1) K.L.T. 425 ), on which reliance has been placed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to make the appellant liable for the compensation. The scope of Section 12 has been explained by Dr. Kochu Thommen, J (as he then was) in paragraph 5 of the said judgment after extracting the section itself, as follows: “5...... The liability of the principal to pay compensation to the Contractor's workman arises where he had, in the course of for the purpose of his trade or business, engaged a contractor for the execution of his work, which is ordinarily part of his trade or business, and a workman employed by the contractor for the execution of such work was injured by an accident which occurred in the principal's premises. An absolute liability is cast on the principal in such circumstances as if the workman was his immediate employee. Sub-s. (2) of the Section, however, entitles the principal to be indemnified by the contractor. These two sub-sections thus simultaneously impose a liability and confer a corresponding right upon the principal. Such right and liability have to be worked out by recourse to the machinery provided under sub-s. (2) and not by any proceeding outside the Act. Sub-s. (2) of the Section, however, entitles the principal to be indemnified by the contractor. These two sub-sections thus simultaneously impose a liability and confer a corresponding right upon the principal. Such right and liability have to be worked out by recourse to the machinery provided under sub-s. (2) and not by any proceeding outside the Act. This means that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction to settle such questions. The scope of sub-section (2) was considerably widened by the insertion of the words, which we have indicted in bracket, by S.9 of Act 15 of 1933. As a result of this amendment, the principal is entitled to be indemnified not only by the contractor, as was the pre-amendment position, but also by “any other person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation.” Furthermore, it is provided by the amended provision that: “Where a contractor who is himself a principal is liable to pay compensation or to indemnify a principal under this section he shall be entitled to be indemnified by any person standing to him in the relation of a contractor from whom the workman could have recovered compensation.......” These two sets of words inserted by the amendment refer to: (1) the right of the principal to be indemnified by “any other person”; and (2) the right of the contractor to be indemnified by a person “standing to him in the relation of a contractor”. Two categories of indemnifiers are thus added by the amendment. In either of these two cases, the indemnifier is a person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation. In the case of the indemnifier falling under the second category, it is not disputed that he is a sub-contractor who stands in the position of a contractor vis-a-vis the principal's contractor. He is the immediate employer of the workman engaged in the execution of work which he has undertaken to execute under sub-contract with the contractor. In the case of the indemnifier falling under the second category, it is not disputed that he is a sub-contractor who stands in the position of a contractor vis-a-vis the principal's contractor. He is the immediate employer of the workman engaged in the execution of work which he has undertaken to execute under sub-contract with the contractor. Sub-section (2) postulates, in regard to the second category that where the principal's contractor is liable to pay compensation or to indemnify the principal, as provided under the sub-section, such contractor can in turn seek indemnity from his own contractor, who in relation to the principal, stands as a sub-contractor, and who, being the immediate employer of the workman, is in terms of Section 3, liable to pay compensation for the injury caused. So far there is no dispute. But the question is whether “any other person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation” would include a total stranger.” 13. The above decision has gone on to take note of the fact that the amendments to Section 12 of the Act was felt necessary in view of two earlier decisions, Mt. Machuni Bibi v. Jardine Menzies & co. (AIR 1928 Cal. 399) and Dhanjibhoy v. Gunpa Khandu (A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 338). In the Calcutta case, the court had considered whether the sub-contractor of a contractor had any liability to indemnify the contractor for the liability of the principal employer to pay compensation to the injured workman. The court held that, the liability to pay compensation for the injury was on the principal employer and that the said person had a right to be indemnified by the contractor. Since the Act did not contain a provision for the contractor to be indemnified by the sub-contractor, no indemnification could be obtained under the Act. The said decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in Dhanjibhoy v. Gunpa Khandu (supra). The Bombay High Court held that the indemnity provided under Section 12(2) was restricted to one indemnity, between the principal and the original contractor. In view of the above decisions, the provision was amended, as rightly held by the Division Bench in K.S.E. Board v. Sundaram Estate (supra). Paragraph 8 of the said judgment, summarizes the position as follows: “8. Almost immediately after these two decisions, the Act was amended so as to bring within the scope of S.12(2) any other person or sub-contractor. In view of the above decisions, the provision was amended, as rightly held by the Division Bench in K.S.E. Board v. Sundaram Estate (supra). Paragraph 8 of the said judgment, summarizes the position as follows: “8. Almost immediately after these two decisions, the Act was amended so as to bring within the scope of S.12(2) any other person or sub-contractor. The report of the Labour Commission, on the basis of which S.12 (2) was amended in 1933, says: “The provisions of the Act in respect of proceedings against contractors have been shown to be defective in one respect. There is little evidence to show that the defect has much practical effect, but it would be an improvement if sub.s.12(2) were amended so as to enable a principal to recover compensation from any person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation. Sub. s.(2) of S.12 of the Act provides that where a principal is liable to pay compensation under the section he is entitled to be indemnified by the contractor. A recent decision of the Calcutta High Court has made it apparent that no indemnification can be obtained under the Act from a sub-contractor in respect of compensation awarded against the principal for injuries sustained by a subcontractor's workman. The amendment seeks to remove this defect.” See K.D. Srivastava's Commentaries on Workmen's compensation Act, 1923;4th Edn. The decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to in the report is Mt. Machuni Bibi v. Jardine Mensies & Co. A.I.R. 1928 Cal.399(2).” 14. It was argued in the said case on behalf of the appellant, who was none other than the KSE Board (the appellant herein), that a total stranger was outside the ambit of Section 12, notwithstanding Section 13. The said argument has been considered and rejected by the Court. Paragraph 10 of the judgment reads as under: “10. This argument, in our view, does not take into account the object of the amendment which, as stated in the report of the Labor Commission, was to remedy the evil that was pointed out for the first time by the Calcuttta High Court in Mt. Machuni Bibi v. Jardine Mensies &Co., A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 399(2). This argument, in our view, does not take into account the object of the amendment which, as stated in the report of the Labor Commission, was to remedy the evil that was pointed out for the first time by the Calcuttta High Court in Mt. Machuni Bibi v. Jardine Mensies &Co., A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 399(2). That evil was the gap in the law which did not provide for the enforcement of the statutory right created under Section 13 as against a person other than the principal or his contractor, and it was remedied by the insertion of the words which we have bracketed. Any person, be he a sub-contractor, or a person having no contractual relationship with the workman, but liable to him in damages, is roped in for the purpose of enforcing the indemnity against him. The sub-contractor is specifically referred to in the amended provision as the “person standing to him (the contractor) in the relation of a contractor.” If he is, in terms of Section 3, a person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation, he is a person against whom indemnity can be enforced. Likewise, if a person, being a total stranger having no contractual relationship, is responsible for the accident by which injury was caused to the workman, or he is a contractor to a sub-contractor and therefore the immediate employer, he is described in the amended provision as “any other person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation”. Sub-section (2) of Section 12, as amended, thus ropes in all persons contemplated under Section 13 to be proceeded against for indemnification, and indemnification can be had against them by recourse to the machinery provided under sub-section (2) of Section 12. This means that all questions as to the right and the amount of any such indemnity will, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. This, in our view, is the result of the amendment.” 15. The object of the amendment, according to the Division Bench, was to avoid litigation in connection with the injury sustained by the workman. All questions arising are therefore brought within the ambit of the Act by the amendment. It is to the advantage of the workman that, all persons standing to him in contractual relationship or responsible to him as tort feasors are dealt with and their respective liabilities settled under the Act. All questions arising are therefore brought within the ambit of the Act by the amendment. It is to the advantage of the workman that, all persons standing to him in contractual relationship or responsible to him as tort feasors are dealt with and their respective liabilities settled under the Act. The indemnity provided under Section 13 is an incentive to the person liable under Section 12 to pay compensation or indemnity promptly and to settle the issue without a prolonged and expensive civil litigation. We are in respectful agreement with the said dictum. 16. The contention strenuously put forward by the counsel for the appellant is that, the proceedings under the Act is a summary one aimed at providing compensation to the workman in a quick and cheap manner. Therefore, the said remedy cannot be stretched to include even claims against strangers. However, what is necessary to be noticed is that, that was the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Mt. Machuni Bibi v. Jardine Menzies & co. (supra) and by the Bombay High Court in Dhanjibhoy v. Gunpa Khandu (supra). However, the gap in the legislation that was exposed by the said decisions was remedied by legislative intervention and amendment of the provision itself. Accordingly, provision has now been made for indemnifying even persons who do not have any contractual relationship with the employee. The resultant position therefore is that every person responsible for the accident could be made liable under the provisions of the Act. In the present case, the workman was electrocuted when an iron rod that he lifted, came into contact with an 11 KV line of the KSEB. The appellant would therefore fall within the expression “any other person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation” incorporated by amendment in sub section (2) of Section 12 of the Act. 17. On behalf of the appellant, reliance has been placed on the decision in Koodalingam v. Supdt. Engineer (1994 KHC 362). In the said case, the question that arose was whether the Public Works Department could be made liable for the injury sustained by a workman. The project was undertaken by the PWD called Kuttiadi Irrigation Project. The work involved construction of a canal. While engaged in the work of removal of earth from the work site, there was a landslide resulting in a workman being buried alive. His wife claimed compensation. The project was undertaken by the PWD called Kuttiadi Irrigation Project. The work involved construction of a canal. While engaged in the work of removal of earth from the work site, there was a landslide resulting in a workman being buried alive. His wife claimed compensation. The court held that, for Section 12 to apply, the work had to be ordinarily part of the trade or business. It was contended in the said case that there was an agreement between the principal and the contractor regarding their liability for payment of compensation under the Act. The object of enacting Section 12 has been summarized by the Division Bench, in the following words: “The avowed object with which S.12 was enacted as part of the Act as seen from the Report of the Select Committee is to enable the workmen or the dependants of the workmen to proceed against the contractor or against the principal or both and to make the contractor liable to indemnify the principal in all cases in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. The Report of the Select Committee has eliminated the provision which in the Bill as introduced exempted the Government and local authorities from liability imposed by this clause. The Committee has observed that these authorities are liable just in the same manner as private individuals. If these were the avowed objects with which S.12 of the Act was incorporated in an enactment which itself is a beneficial legislation intended to confer benefits on the workmen, we are of the view that the provisions in S.12(1) would apply notwithstanding the agreement or contract entered into between the principal and contractor regrading their liability for payment of compensation under the Act. So long as the Section has not been made specifically subject to any contract to the contrary, the Section would have application in all cases where the conditions specified in the Section are satisfied. The fact that no non obstante provision is used in the Section may not be a sufficient reason to exclude the application of the Section to cases where the conditions are satisfied. At best agreements or contracts entered into between the principal and contractor can govern only their inter se rights and liabilities and cannot affect the right of the workmen or their dependents to get compensation either from the principal or from the contractor at their option. At best agreements or contracts entered into between the principal and contractor can govern only their inter se rights and liabilities and cannot affect the right of the workmen or their dependents to get compensation either from the principal or from the contractor at their option. Right to get indemnified from the contractor specifically conferred on the principal under S.12(2) of the Act sufficiently safeguards the interest of the principal who has entrusted the work to the contractor stipulating a term in the agreement entered into between them regarding the liability under the Act. Accordingly, we would reject the contention of the learned Government Pleader." However, the question that arises in this case for determination has not been specifically considered in the said decision. In Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. Ltd. v. Hameed (2000 KHC 854), the deceased workman while engaged in tying a stay wire for the erected pillar sustained injuries in an accidental fall and died. The contention was that the accident was caused solely due to the negligence of the workman who had not used a safety belt, hook and ladder that were provided for his safety. In the said case also, it was held that, the principal employer was liable to compensate the worker with a corresponding right to be indemnified by the contractor. 18. Another decision on which reliance is placed is Travancore Devaswom Board v. Purushothaman (1989 KHC 135). The Travancore Devaswom Board challenged an order passed under the Workmen's Compensation Act contending that it had no liability to pay compensation for the death of one Mahendran, who was the son of the applicant. It was alleged that both the applicant and his son were engaged by the Devaswom Board for conducting the 'Nerchavedi' in the Achencoil Temple under its management. On 21.1.1981 the 'vedikutti' exploded, as a consequence of which Mahendran died. The Division Bench held that, since Nerchavedi was not part of the ceremonies of the temple to constitute an ordinary part of the business of the Devaswom Board, it had no obligation to pay the compensation. Accordingly, the Travancore Devaswom Board was absolved of its liability to pay compensation. 19. However, it is necessary to notice that in none of these cases the issue as to whether a total stranger could be made liable under the Act had come up for consideration. Accordingly, the Travancore Devaswom Board was absolved of its liability to pay compensation. 19. However, it is necessary to notice that in none of these cases the issue as to whether a total stranger could be made liable under the Act had come up for consideration. Therefore, the said decisions have no relevance in so far as the present question is concerned. We further notice that, it was at the instance of none other than the present appellant that the very same issue was considered by the Division Bench in K.S.E. Board v. Sundaram Estate (supra). The very same contentions that were rejected by the Division Bench are put forward in the present appeal also. For the said reason also, we find no merit in these contentions. Apart from the contentions referred to above, no other contention with respect to the quantum of compensation awarded has been urged before us. 20. In the light of the above discussion, the reference is answered, holding that the words, “any other erson” from whom the workman could have recovered compensation, occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act would take within its fold even a total stranger to the business or activity in which the workman was employed, where he was responsible for the accident that caused the injury. The order appealed against is therefore confirmed. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.