JUDGMENT : G.S. PATEL, J. 1. The Writ Petition was dismissed departmentally by an order dated 26th March 2019 made by the Prothonotary and Senior Master. The Notice of Motion seeks the restoration of the Writ Petition and, further, the restoration and continuance of a previous Division Bench order of 16th August 2018. We made it clear to Mr. G.C. Singh for the petitioners that we would restore the petition provided it was argued forthwith for admission and interim relief. He agreed. On that basis, we heard him, and, by this order, we proceed to dispose of the petition itself. Consequently, the Notice of Motion is made absolute, but only in terms of prayer clause (a). 2. The challenge in this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to three notices issued by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (“MCGM”) under Section 354 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (“the MMC Act”) and an opinion/report of the MCGM’s Technical Advisory Committee (“TAC”). The MCGM notices are dated 19th October 2016, 6th April 2018 and 21st May 2018 at Exhibit “K” (pages 176 to 180), Exhibit “M” (pages 213 to 223) and Exhibit “N” (page 224 to 223) respectively, and the TAC report is dated at 26th April 2017. 3. The conspectus of the petition is almost identical to nearly two dozen petitions we have heard and dealt with in the last two or three months: tenants of a building that is over 30 years old having received an evacuation notice from the MCGM, and having taken no steps by themselves or by compelling the owner to carry out essential structural repairs, then rush to court and claim (a) that the building does not need demolition or evacuation; (b) that it is structurally sound and (c) that the petitioner-tenants will continue to live there ‘at their own risk’ and will give an ‘undertaking’ to assume all liability, including to third parties. In at least nine separate judgments delivered recently we have set out the law on the subject. We begin this discussion, therefore, by noting these decisions and summarizing the principles in law that apply to such a situation. The decisions are: (a) Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition (L) No. 1755 of 2019, decided on 24th June 2019. We begin this discussion, therefore, by noting these decisions and summarizing the principles in law that apply to such a situation. The decisions are: (a) Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition (L) No. 1755 of 2019, decided on 24th June 2019. (b) Inderjit Singh Sethi and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition No. 880 of 2018, decided on 9th July 2019. (c) Ramesh Nathubhai Patel and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, Writ Petition No. 1500 of 2016, decided on 9th July 2019. (d) Kutbi Manzil Tenants Welfare Association vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition No. 2451 of 2018, decided on 16th July 2019. (e) Sundar R. Gavaskar and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition No. 602 of 2019, decided on 29th July 2019. (f) Richard Gasper Mathias and Others vs. Municipal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition No. 2108 of 2018 decided on 1st August 2019. (g) Vivek Shantaram Kokate and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition No. 931 of 2019, decided on 19th August 2019. (h) Khalil Ahmed Mohd. Ali Hamdulay and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, Writ Petition (L) No. 2147 of 2019, decided on 22nd August 2019. (i) Pandurang Vishnu Devrukhar and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, Writ Petition No. 2687 of 2018, decided on 27th August 2019 (pertaining to Municipal tenants). 4. The principles of law culled from these decisions are these: (a) It is never for a Court in exercise of its limited writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to decide whether a particular structure is or is not actually in a ruinous or dilapidated condition. Diwanchand Gupta vs. N.M. Shah and Others, AIR 1972 Bom 316 (K.K. Desai and G.N. Vaidya JJ.) Nathubhai Dhulaji vs. Municipal Corporation, AIR 1959 Bom 332 (Y.V. Dixit and V.M. Tarkunde, JJ.) (b) The rights of tenants/occupants are not harmed by demolition ordered and carried out. These rights are adequately safeguarded by Section 354(5) of the MMC Act and by the provisions of the governing Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999 which fully occupies the field regarding tenancies of built premises in Maharashtra. These rights are adequately safeguarded by Section 354(5) of the MMC Act and by the provisions of the governing Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999 which fully occupies the field regarding tenancies of built premises in Maharashtra. The Supreme Court decision in Shaha Ratansi Khimji and Sons vs. Kumbhar Sons Hotel Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 1 now makes it clear that the rights of tenants and occupants are unaffected by the required demolition. (c) Tenants have rights but also remedies to keep their structure in tenantable repair. We have referred extensively to Section 14 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. So far, we have not seen a single case where any tenant or group of tenants has invoked his or their rights under this Section. (d) Section 353B casts an obligation not only on owners but also on occupiers of structures that are more than 30 years old to furnish a structural stability certificate. We have yet to see one so furnished unbidden, or, when demanded, one with anything meaningful in it. (e) A Writ Court exercising jurisdiction will not substitute its own view for that of technically qualified experts. Equally, the Writ Court will not prefer the view of one expert over another. (f) In order to succeed a Petitioner before the Court must be able to show that the impugned action suffers from Wednesbury unreasonableness [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 : 1947 (2) All ER 680] i.e. it is so unreasonable that no rational person could, having regard to the fact of the case, ever have reached it. There is no scope in such cases for any larger judicial review or invoking the doctrine of proportionality [State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273 , Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank vs. Coimbatore District Cooperative Bank Employees Association and Another, (2007) 4 SCC 669 ]. In other words the decision must be shown to be utterly perverse, or in excess of authority or manifestly illegal. (g) It is never sufficient merely to allege mala-fides without particulars. While direct evidence may not always be available as proof of mala-fides, they must nonetheless be established. In other words the decision must be shown to be utterly perverse, or in excess of authority or manifestly illegal. (g) It is never sufficient merely to allege mala-fides without particulars. While direct evidence may not always be available as proof of mala-fides, they must nonetheless be established. In the words of the Supreme Court, allegations of mala-fides are more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of high order of credibility [Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar, (2005) 8 SCC 760, Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. P. Chandra Mouli and Another, (2009) 13 SCC 272 ]. Courts are slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts, especially when the imputations are grave and m and they are made against one who holds an office of responsibility in the administration [E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 , Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. vs. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579 ]. Mala-fides are the last refuge of a losing litigant [Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 ]. Hence, whenever mala-fides are alleged, we will demand proof. In case after case we are told that the provisions of the MCGM Act are being abused by rapacious landlords in connivance with venal officers of the MCGM to order the demolition of the buildings that are otherwise structurally sound. We have yet to come across any such case. The argument is in generalities. Though it is an argument of mala-fides, it is always made without any particulars whatsoever and we are asked simply to conjecture that this must be so. The law in regard to allegations of mala-fides is well settled and we will draw no such general conclusion. (h) Further, it is no answer at all, as we have held in Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah, to seek an order of status-quo. We have discussed this aspect quite elaborately and have held that no such order can be passed by any Court without specific reference to the actual state of affairs at that moment [Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Another vs. Praveen Kumar Singh, (2006) 3 SCC 312 ]. There can be no order of status-quo against natural elements. It is one in one thing to direct to parties to a contract to maintain the status-quo. This may be an order against one person seeking another’s eviction. There can be no order of status-quo against natural elements. It is one in one thing to direct to parties to a contract to maintain the status-quo. This may be an order against one person seeking another’s eviction. This has no application whatsoever to a situation where the complaint is about the deterioration day by day of the physical condition of a built structure exposed to the elements. (i) We have also demonstrated in Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah that the entire trend in this Court in the recent past of obtaining undertakings from occupants allowing them to continue in occupation at their own risk is without any basis in law. The MCGM cannot contract out of a statute. An undertaking by a Petitioner to a Court does not absolve the MCGM from its statutory responsibilities or liabilities under that statute. If the undertaking is intended to function as some sort of an indemnity then we have expressed the gravest doubts about any such undertaking ever being enforceable, let alone when the person who gives the undertaking himself or herself suffers an unfortunate mishap. 5. For completeness of reference, we also now set out the provisions of Sections 354 and 353-B of the MMC Act: 354. (1) If it shall at any time appear to the Commissioner that any structure (including under this expression any building, wall or other structure and anything affixed to or projecting from any building, wall or other structure) is in a ruinous condition, or likely to fall, or in any way dangerous to any person occupying, resorting to or passing by such structure or any other structure or place in the neighbourhood thereof, the Commissioner may, by written notice, require the owner or occupier of such structure to pull down, secure or repair such structure Subject to the provisions of section 342, of danger therefrom. (2) The Commissioner may also if he thinks fit, require the said owner or occupier, by the said notice, either forthwith or before proceeding to pull down, secure or repair the said structure, to set up a proper and sufficient hoard or fence for the protection of passers-by and other persons, with a convenient platform and hand-rail, if there be room enough for the same and the Commissioner shall think the same desirable, to serve as a footway for passengers outside of such hoard or fence. (3) It is shall appear to the Commissioner that any building is dangerous and needs to be pulled down under sub-section (1), the Commissioner shall call upon the owner, before issuing notice thereunder, to furnish a statement in writing signed by the owner stating therein the names of the occupiers of the building known to him or from his record, the area in occupation and location of premises in occupation, possession of each of the respective occupiers or tenants, as the case may be. (4) If he fails to furnish the statement as required by sub-section (3) within the stipulated period, then the Commissioner shall make a list of the occupants of the said building and carpet area of the premises in their respective occupation and possession along with the details of location. (5) The action taken under this section shall not affect the inter se rights of the owners or tenants or occupiers, including right of re-occupation in any manner. Explanation - For the purposes of this section “the tenant” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (15) of section 7 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.” “353B. Structural Stability Certificate: (1) Every owner or occupier of a building in respect of which a period of thirty years, from the date of:- (i) issue of its completion certificate by the Corporation. (ii) issue of permission to occupy a building under section 353A. (iii) its physical occupation of at least 50 per cent, of its built-up area, whichever is earlier, has expired, shall cause such building to be examined by a Structural Engineer registered with the Corporation for the purposes of certifying that the building is fit for human habitation (such certificate hereinafter referred to as “the Structural Stability Certificate”). The Structural Stability Certificate issued by such Structural Engineer shall be submitted to the Commissioner. (2) The Structural Stability Certificate shall be submitted within one year from the expiry of a period of thirty years referred to in sub-section (1) and every ten years thereafter or such earlier period as the Commissioner may determine having regard to the condition of the building and the corrective repairs carried out by the owner or occupier. (2) The Structural Stability Certificate shall be submitted within one year from the expiry of a period of thirty years referred to in sub-section (1) and every ten years thereafter or such earlier period as the Commissioner may determine having regard to the condition of the building and the corrective repairs carried out by the owner or occupier. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Commissioner may, at any time, after having recorded the reasons, in writing, direct the owner or occupier of a building, to cause such building to be examined by such Structural Engineer and to submit to the Commissioner, the Structural Stability Certificate, as required under sub-section (1), within the period not exceeding thirty days as specified by the Commissioner, in such direction. (4) If the Structural Engineer recommends any corrective repairs for securing the structural stability of the building, such corrective repairs shall be carried out by the owner or occupier of a building to the satisfaction of the Commissioner. (5) Any owner or occupier, as the case may be, who fails to carry out corrective repairs for securing structural stability, within a period of six months from the date of report of the Structural Engineer, shall be punished with the fine as provided in section 471. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (5), the Commissioner may, after giving the owner or occupier, a notice in writing, require him to carry out, within the period specified in the notice, corrective repairs for securing structural stability of a building. If the owner or occupier fails to carry out such corrective repairs within the period specified in the notice, the Commissioner may carry out the same and the expenses incurred by the Commissioner on such repairs shall, on demand if not paid within thirty days, be recovered from the owner or occupier as arrears of property tax. (7) If there is any dispute about the amount of expenses for which demand is made under sub-section (6), an appeal may be preferred to the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, but no such appeal shall be entertained by the said Chief Judge, unless:- (i) it is preferred within twenty-one days from the date of receipt of notice of such demand. (ii) the amount for which demand is made is deposited with the Corporation and a true copy of the receipt showing that the amount has been so deposited accompanies the appeal. (8) In case the appeal is decided in favour of the appellant and the amount of expenses deposited with the Corporation is more than the amount payable by the appellant, the Commissioner shall adjust the excess amount with interest at 6.25 per cent, per annum from the date on which the amount is so deposited by the appellant, towards the property tax payable by the owner in respect of such building thereafter.” 6. In Sundar R Gavaskar, noted above, we set out the background for the introduction of Section 353-B in these words: 10. On a bare perusal of the same, it is clear that the legislature stepped in case a Structural Stability Certificate was required of such buildings which are benchmarked in this Section. There are buildings in respect of which period of thirty years from the date of issuance of completion certificate by the Corporation or issuance of permission to occupy a building under Section 353A or its physical occupation of at least 50% of its built-up area, whichever is earlier, has expired. Such building has to be examined by a Structural Engineer registered with the Corporation for the purpose of certifying that the building is fit for human habitation. The Structural Stability Certificate issued by such Structural Engineer shall be submitted to the Commissioner. 11. That has to be submitted within a period of one year from the expiry of a period of thirty years referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 353B and every ten years thereafter or such earlier period as the Commissioner may determine having regard to the condition of the building and importantly the corrective repairs carried out by the owner or occupier. There is non-obstante clause in sub-section (3) which empowers the Commissioner to record reasons in writing and to direct the owner or occupier of a building, to cause such building to be examined by a Structural Engineer and to submit a the Structural Stability Certificate as required under sub-section (1), within the period not exceeding thirty days as specified by the Commissioner, in such direction. It is a failure to carry out the repairs which are styled as corrective repairs and recommended by the Structural Engineer, which repairs have to be carried out by the owner or occupier of the building to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, which results in that being termed as an offence and sub-section (5) is clear in that behalf. By sub-sections (6), (7) and (8), there is a provision by which failure of such corrective repairs by the owner or occupier, despite notice from the Commissioner, enables the Commissioner to carry out the same and recover the expenses for the purpose thereof from the owner or occupier. 12. Now, this provision was inserted by Maharashtra Act, VI of 2009 with a specific purpose and object. The Statement of Object and Reasons leading to this Act reads as under: “1. While sudden collapse of “Laxmi Chhaya” Building in Borivali, Mumbai, and consequent loss of life, was being discussed in the State Legislature, the Government has assured that, to avoid recurrence of such incidents, the necessary amendments in the Municipal laws in operation in the State will be carried out. 2. The Government considers it expedient to amend the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 and the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965, so as to make it obligatory on every owner or occupier of a building to submit a certificate from the Structural Engineer that the building is fit for human habitation. It is also proposed to provide that, if the Structural Engineer recommends certain corrective measures, it shall be obligatory on the owner or occupier of the building to carry out such repairs to the satisfaction of the Commissioner or the Chief Officer, as the case may be. It is also proposed to provide that the failure to carry out the directions by the Commissioner or the Chief Officer shall be punishable with fine. It is also proposed to empower the Commissioner or the Chief Officer, as the case may be, to undertake repairs, if the corrective repairs are not undertaken by the owner or occupier of a building and that the cost of such repairs shall be recoverable as an arrears of property tax. 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.” 7. 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.” 7. There is an extant MMC policy, evolved as a result of an interim decision of 23rd June 2014 of this Court [Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, Writ Petition No. 1080 of 2015] in regard to such notices. Under Section 354, on the basis that the building is ruinous, dilapidated and dangerous, owners and occupants are called upon to bring down the structure in question. Occupants have 30 days in which to produce their own structural report contesting the view that the building is ruinous. Sometimes they do, and sometimes they do not. When they do, it is almost invariably a report saying the building can be repaired. Owners usually have reports supporting the demolition and saying the building cannot be repaired. The policy now demands that with conflicting reports, the matter is to be referred to a specially constituted Technical Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of the Director (ES & P) of the MCGM. The rival consultants are given notice and are heard. The TAC is to make a site visit or visual inspection. After considering all material, it is then to make its independent technical assessment. There are different categories into which a building may be placed. A C-1 categorization is that the building is ruinous and cannot be repaired. A C-2B categorization is assigned when the building can be repaired without requiring to be evacuated. A C-2/A category means the building requires repairs (not demolition), but those repairs can only be done on evacuation. The interim order mentioned above held the field until final disposal of the Petition on 28th February 2018 [(2018) 5 AIR Bom R 460 : 2018 SCC Online Bom 816]. 8. The entire policy was evidently set up precisely to allay fears that rapacious landlords in connivance with venal municipal officers were issuing Section 354 pull-down notices almost indiscriminately without any regard to the facts. This was meant as a fail-safe, or as another level of check and balance. The TAC is not a quasi-judicial authority. 8. The entire policy was evidently set up precisely to allay fears that rapacious landlords in connivance with venal municipal officers were issuing Section 354 pull-down notices almost indiscriminately without any regard to the facts. This was meant as a fail-safe, or as another level of check and balance. The TAC is not a quasi-judicial authority. It was not ever intended that the independent assessment of the TAC, arrived at after an open consideration of rival contentions, would itself be susceptible to interference on facts - i.e. that a writ court in exercise of its discretionary and jurisprudentially constrained jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would substitute its own opinion as to whether the building is or was actually ruinous or not. The purpose of the setting up the TAC mechanism was to give occupants an opportunity of putting forward before technical experts discharging a statutory duty the occupants’ rival contentions. A writ court will, therefore, only assess the decision-making process; if there is demonstrated perversity; or if the decision of the TAC suffers from Wednesbury unreasonableness. A mere expression of desirability or possibility is insufficient in law to successfully invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, or to support the issue of a high prerogative writ remedy in the form of a certiorari or a mandamus. 9. In Khalil Ahmed Mohd. Ali Hamdulay, noted earlier, we held: 24. We are constrained to note that these reports, made like this in respect of buildings that are otherwise said to be ruinous, themselves present a danger. We find in matter after matter that consultants are signing of on such reports but without assuming any liability whatsoever. We are now making it clear that if any Petitioner wants, in the face of such facts, an order allowing a building to be repaired rather than brought down and reconstructed, we will demand a personal undertaking from the structural consultant accepting full responsibility including for loss of life and property should anything untoward happened. We do not demand this undertaking from Petitioners. We have already set out in previous decisions how such undertakings have no basis in law and serve no purpose. But if the professional consultant makes such a report then he must be prepared to defend it and he must be prepared to stand by it. We will hold such persons to the contents of their assertions. We have already set out in previous decisions how such undertakings have no basis in law and serve no purpose. But if the professional consultant makes such a report then he must be prepared to defend it and he must be prepared to stand by it. We will hold such persons to the contents of their assertions. We will not make an order only on the basis of assertions to which a consultant is unprepared to give a personal undertaking. 10. In the same decision, in regard to TAC reports, and a reference to the TAC, which is again and again now invoked as though it is an invariable statutory right, we held: 27. Mr. Vanoo’s submission that we must await the TAC report is also without merit. As we have noted, the entire edifice of a reference to the TAC is in the event of an ambiguity or a conflict. That conflict must be not merely some stray sentence from a conclusion but from the report viewed as a whole. We find that, in fact, the petitioners’ consultant’s report is not only on a limited inspection and without complete access, but his conclusion is entirely unsupported by his own observations and test results. A reference to the TAC is not a legal entitlement or a legal right. It is to resolve a patent and apparent factual, technical inconsistency. Where there is no inconsistency, therefore and it can be demonstrated or seen that there is none, no question arises of awaiting any TAC report. What Mr. Vanoo’s submission really means is that every occupant now gets ‘to take his chances’ over and over again: first by assailing the Section 354/353-B notices, and then later by assailing the TAC report on exactly the same, solitary ground that some consultant says the building can be repaired. This means nothing to us. It is bereft of logic. The test is not whether the building can be repaired, but whether it is safe for continued human habitation; and whether it is shown that despite being safe, on account of perversity, demonstrated and proved mala-fides or Wednesbury unreasonableness, the authorities have ordered it to be brought down. We reiterate our approach: we will now demand that such consultants affirm and stand by their opinions and reports and that they accept responsibility for what they say in their reports. We reiterate our approach: we will now demand that such consultants affirm and stand by their opinions and reports and that they accept responsibility for what they say in their reports. We do so because it is now our belief that the conclusions in many such reports are worthless and are given despite an easily discerned inconsistency between the conclusion and the observations and test results. If a consultant is, therefore, so emphatic that no demolition is necessary, his opinion must be that the building is not ruinous, i.e. that it is entirely safe for human habitation, and that he accepts full responsibility for this. Nothing short of this will now do. This Court will not, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, risk the lives and property of occupants year after year. Our task demands that we first look to the safety of occupants and of third parties, not that we give utmost precedence to the contractual or property rights or claims of a handful. The wider public interest will always outweigh narrow private concerns. 11. In the general context of dilapidated buildings, though with reference to the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1949, which contains provisions parallel to Section 354 of the MMC Act, and in regard to a demolition notice issued by the Kalyan Dombivli Municipal Corporation (which has no policy of a TAC), we recently had occasion to reject a submission that a report by a ‘renowned’ institute had to be accepted only for that reason, i.e. its reputation, without regard to its contents [Suresh Khureja and Others vs. Kalyan Dombivli Municipal Corporation and Others, Writ Petition No. 11302 of 2013 decided on 27th August 2019]. 12. What remains is to set the petitioners’ case against this established position in law, i.e. whether the petitioners are able to make out a case of mala-fides, perversity, manifest illegality or Wednesbury unreasonableness sufficient to warrant our interference in exercise of our limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Two overriding factors must guide our judgment. First, that in our writ jurisdiction, we will not go into disputed questions of fact. Second, as has been settled half a century ago, it is not for a Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to determine whether a building is actually ruinous or not. 13. Two overriding factors must guide our judgment. First, that in our writ jurisdiction, we will not go into disputed questions of fact. Second, as has been settled half a century ago, it is not for a Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to determine whether a building is actually ruinous or not. 13. The 18 petitioners are tenants of various residential tenements in a building called Pushpa Park at Daftary Road, Near S.K. Patil Hospital, Malad (E), Mumbai 400097. This is a very old building - it was built around 1964. There are 25 tenements in Pushpa Park, more or less equally divided between its ground and two upper floors. There is an additional room on the terraces. Each floor has a common toilet. Respondent No. 4, Ashif Rehmat Khan, is the legal representative of the original owner. He occupies the terrace room. The Petitioners occupy the remaining rooms. 14. Paragraph 5 of the petition straightaway proceeds to make allegations of mala-fides against Khan and Respondents Nos. 1 to 3, viz. the MCGM, the Assistant Municipal Commissioner and the Assistant Engineer. As usual, apart from using prejudicial language (“false and frivolous complaint” and “behest and instigation”) the petition has no particulars at all. 15. What is not disputed, however, is that the building is indeed very old, that it has not been maintained or repaired, and that some six years ago, on 1st July 2013, the MCGM issued a notice under Section 353-B of the MMC Act demanding a structural stability certificate. This was served on one tenant and on Khan. A reminder followed on 1st April 2014. 16. Nobody complied. 17. As we have seen, Section 353-B does not limit itself to owners. 18. The petitioners claim that they ‘awaiting’ a legal opinion when a third notice dated 2nd June 2014 followed, also under Section 353-B of the MMC Act. 19. Predictably, the petitioners claim in paragraph 8 that all these notices were again at Khan’s ‘behest and instigation’. They provide no particulars. 20. Khan took a structural report from one Creative Consultants in mid-2014. The Creative Consultants’ report is of 30th May 2014 and we bear in mind that all this now goes back a good five years. That report says the building is utterly dilapidated and ruinous. It puts the building in the C-1 category. 21. They provide no particulars. 20. Khan took a structural report from one Creative Consultants in mid-2014. The Creative Consultants’ report is of 30th May 2014 and we bear in mind that all this now goes back a good five years. That report says the building is utterly dilapidated and ruinous. It puts the building in the C-1 category. 21. While first claiming innocence about the law (that the petitioners were ‘under the impression’ that Khan would ‘look after the building’ paragraph 9), the petitioners then say they commissioned one Dada Veer Consultants to make a structural report. This report was sent to the MCGM on 5th June 2015. It is undated but refers to an inspection and tests conducted on 28th March 2015. Dada Veer Consultants put the building in the C/2B category, opining that it could be repaired and did not need evacuation. 22. The petitioners then sought MCGM permission to carry out repairs by their letter of 20th June 2015. In view of the interim orders of this court, referred to above, and since there were conflicting structural reports, the matter was referred to the MCGM’s TAC. Later, the petitioners filed a civil suit No. 2048 of 2015 in the City Civil Court at Dindoshi. That suit, and the petitioners’ notice of motion for interim relief, is pending. On 8th July 2016, the petitioners were given an intimation of disconnection of their power and water supply. The petitioners sent a reply through their advocates. 23. Then the petitioners appointed one Aarti Constructions to start repairs according to the Dada Veer Consultants’ report. There is no mention of the petitioners obtaining any permission for this work. 24. On 19th October 2016, the MCGM issued a Section 354 notice calling for the evacuation and demolition of the building. The petitioners allege that there is no basis to this notice. 25. The Petitioners then appointed a second set of consultants, one United Engineers and Consultants. This classified the building as C-3, as needing only minor repairs. A copy of this report was sent on to the MCGM. 26. On 6th April 2018, the MCGM issued yet another Section 354 notice saying there was no question of the TAC ‘reviewing’ its earlier decision. The petitioners say the TAC ought to have considered the fresh structural report. 27. A copy of this report was sent on to the MCGM. 26. On 6th April 2018, the MCGM issued yet another Section 354 notice saying there was no question of the TAC ‘reviewing’ its earlier decision. The petitioners say the TAC ought to have considered the fresh structural report. 27. A demolition and evacuation notice reminder dated 21st May 2018 followed, once again calling on the petitioners to vacate and to pull down the structure. 28. Factually, this is the entirety of the petition’s conspectus. 29. The petition was filed on 30th July 2018. It was mentioned on 16th August 2018, when a Division Bench of this Court made the following order: 1. Not on board. Taken on board. 2. The learned Counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation seeks time to take instructions. In view of this request, we direct that for a period of one week from today, the building subject matter of this Petition shall not be demolished, subject to condition of the Petitioners fling an undertaking in this Court stating that they will continue to occupy their respective premises at their own risk and that in the event of fall of the said building or any part thereof, they will be solely responsible for any loss or damage caused to the third parties. Such undertakings shall be filed on or before 23rd August 2018. 3. As copy of this order cannot be provided immediately, we direct the learned Counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation to communicate this order to the appropriate officer. 30. Obviously, there was no Affidavit in Reply at that time, and the entire petition projected a one-side picture. We note that the undertaking required by the Division Bench was filed on 20th August 2018. We find, in fact, that this undertaking does not accord in the least with what the court required. The petitioners have not assumed any third-party risk. They have only said that should something untoward happen: “then they will not going to blame the Respondents i.e. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay for any reason whatsoever.” This is worse than useless. Even the regular undertaking assuming third-party responsibility and liability are, we have found and declared, to be without foundation in law and cannot derogate from the responsibility and liability of the statutory Municipal authority. This undertaking does not even go that far. It is very guarded. 31. Even the regular undertaking assuming third-party responsibility and liability are, we have found and declared, to be without foundation in law and cannot derogate from the responsibility and liability of the statutory Municipal authority. This undertaking does not even go that far. It is very guarded. 31. There is an Affidavit in Reply dated 26th August 2019 of one Sunil H. Bharambe, Assistant Engineer (B & F), P/N Ward, from pages 499 to 503. It makes for telling reading. It mentions briefly the facts we have noted earlier. But it annexes at page 504 the first TAC report of 14th July 2015. This is at page 504, and it shows that the petitioners’ consultants, Creative Consultants, were represented. The report is unequivocal in the conclusion that both sets of reports are sub-standard. The MCGM staff inspected the site and found that chajjas, beams and columns were in a very bad condition. Reinforcement was corroded and exposed. The TAC concluded that the building was ruinous and beyond repairs. 32. There is no Affidavit in Rejoinder. 33. This now demands that we return to an assessment of this petition within the framework of the law. The TAC report is not unreasonable, irrational or perverse merely because the petitioners’ consultants thinks or opines differently. There is no principle that a landlord’s structural consultants’ reports are always ‘procured’ and ‘unreliable’ while those of the petitioner-tenants’ consultants are invariably true, reliable and correct. If a landlord can obtain a self-serving report, so too can a tenant. This is no ground for interference. 34. There is also no basis in law for the submission that just because the petitioners have obtained a later report (from United Engineers) that the TAC is bound to constantly re-hear and reconsider. 35. We note that this question of structural repairs has been going on for six years. The building is of 1964. It has had no repairs, and any the petitioners attempted were without authorisation. 36. But we will afford the petitioners the additional indulgence of looking a little more closely at their two reports. The Dada Veer Consultants report is from page 67. There were no structural drawings. At page 72, it was noted that the overall condition of all structural members was not satisfactory. This is reiterated at page 81. 36. But we will afford the petitioners the additional indulgence of looking a little more closely at their two reports. The Dada Veer Consultants report is from page 67. There were no structural drawings. At page 72, it was noted that the overall condition of all structural members was not satisfactory. This is reiterated at page 81. At page 83, the consultants note they could not assess recently painted fats, areas behind heavy or fixed furniture and locked fats. So how much they did assess is unknown. Annexed to this report are the results of tests, and this section is the most damaging to the petitioners’ cause. For instance, the Ultrasonic Pulse Velocity test standards are that a reading of below 3 km/sec indicates doubtful concrete. Every single reading Dada Veer Consultants’ experts took is below 3 km/sec (page 96). Two are as low as 1.88 and 1.903. Throughout, the report is that the state of the concrete is doubtful across the entire structure. Then there are photographs by these consultants that show extreme distress to structural members like beams and columns (pages 102 to 105). In fact, the report bears out the TAC conclusion, far from being contrary to it: the petitioners’ own consultants’ report shows damage to structural members and corrosion and exposure of reinforcement. 37. The conflict, therefore, is not between the Dada Veer Consultants’ report and the TAC conclusion, but internal to the Dada Veer Consultants’ report. The contradiction is within the report itself and Mr. Singh for the petitioners was unable to explain to us how those consultants could, in the face of their own examination, have concluded that building was C-2B. 38. It gets worse. The report says that with all this extensive work, the maximum that can be expected is another five to seven years. But that is not all. For this work, the reconstruction cost, without the cost of land, foundation or excavation work or internal finishing works is estimated as ridiculously high as Rs. 2250/- per sq. ft. an overstatement by at least 200-300%. Lastly, we note their own observation at page 81: Overall condition of the RCC Frame structure is not satisfactory specially internal structures, and common passage, sign of deterioration are observed at various places, internal repairing programme immediately to prevent further deterioration. 39. 2250/- per sq. ft. an overstatement by at least 200-300%. Lastly, we note their own observation at page 81: Overall condition of the RCC Frame structure is not satisfactory specially internal structures, and common passage, sign of deterioration are observed at various places, internal repairing programme immediately to prevent further deterioration. 39. We have noted this because it is now for the petitioners to demonstrate with this as the basis of their own case how the TAC report of the MCGM notices can be faulted as unreasonable, perverse or illegal. 40. We are not really required to examine the later report of United Engineers (at page 181), because, as we have found, the petitioners claim to have carried out some unspecified repairs but have not said what repairs, and admittedly they had no permission to do these. They did not have any court permission as required by Section 14 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. They did not have the NOC of the owner, Khan. Further, we find from page 188 that this consultant did not, in fact, carry out the full spectrum of tests, but did only four out of as many as 12 tests. Again, it is not for us in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine the correctness of these results, but it seems to us from pages 189 and 190 that this consultant looked at only two columns and one beam in the entire structure. Ex facie, this cannot assist the petitioners, apart from there being no legal basis or foundation to the challenge. 41. Thus, we find no merit whatsoever in this petition. It is dismissed. No costs.