JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/Shri Sachin Pratap Singh as well as learned Addl. G.A. for the State and perused the material on record. 2. This Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 11.07.2003 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.) IIIrd, Pratapgarh in Sessions Trial No. 185 of 2002, arising out of Case Crime No. 127 of 2001, under Section 302, 148, 323/149 and under Section 506 I.P.C., Police Station Baghrai, District Pratapgarh. 3. Shri Sachin Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of the instructions received by him from his client/appellant namely Ram Ashrey, who has been released from Jail on the basis of remission of sentence granted by the State Government, submits that he do not want to press the appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant also endorsed on the Memo of Appeal that he do not want to press the appeal on merits and the same be dismissed as not pressed. 4. In this regard, provisions of Section 384,385 and 386 Cr.P.C. are relevant, which are being reproduced as under: 384. Summary dismissal of appeal.-(1) If upon examining the petition of appeal and copy of the judgment received under section 382 or section 383, the Appellate Court considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it may dismiss the appeal summarily: Provided that- (a) no appeal presented under section 382 shall be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same; (b) no appeal presented under section 383 shall be dismissed except after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same, unless the Appellate Court considers that the appeal is frivolous or that the production of the accused in custody before the Court would involve such inconvenience as would be disproportionate in the circumstances of the case; (c) no appeal presented under section 383 shall be dismissed summarily until the period allowed for preferring such appeal has expired. (2) Before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may call for the record of the case. (3) Where the Appellate Court dismissing an appeal under this section is a Court of Session or of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, it shall record its reasons for doing so. (2) Before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may call for the record of the case. (3) Where the Appellate Court dismissing an appeal under this section is a Court of Session or of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, it shall record its reasons for doing so. (4) Where an appeal presented under section 383 has been dismissed summarily under this section and the Appellate Court finds that another petition of appeal duly presented under section 382 on behalf of the same appellant has not been considered by it, that Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in section 393, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, hear and dispose of such appeal in accordance with law. 385. Procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily.-(1) If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard to be given- (i) to the appellant or his pleader; (ii) to such officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf; (iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a case instituted upon complaint, to the complainant; (iv) if the appeal is under section 377 or section 378, to the accused, and shall also furnish such officer, complainant and accused with a copy of the grounds of appeal. (2) The Appellate Court shall then send for the record of the case, if such record is not already available in that Court, and hear the parties: Provided that if the appeal is only as to the extent or the legality of the sentence, the Court may dispose of the appeal without sending for the record. (3) Where the only ground for appeal from a conviction is the alleged severity of the sentence, the appellant shall not, except with the leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of any other ground. 386. (3) Where the only ground for appeal from a conviction is the alleged severity of the sentence, the appellant shall not, except with the leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of any other ground. 386. Powers of the Appellate Court.-After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may- (a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law; (b) in an appeal from a conviction- (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same; (c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence- (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a Court competent to try the offence, or (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same; (d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order; (e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper; Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement: Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal. 5. In Jeetu and Others Vs. 5. In Jeetu and Others Vs. State of Chattisgarh, MANU/SC/1056/2012 it is held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 15,20 and 21 as under :- "15. The hub of the matter, as we perceive, really pertains to the justifiability and legal propriety of the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the appeal. It is clear as day that it has recorded the proponement of the learned Counsel for the Appellants relating to non-assail of the conviction, extenuating factors for reduction of sentence and proceeded to address itself with regard to the quantum of sentence. It has not recorded its opinion as regards the correctness of the conviction. 20. At this stage, we may refer with profit to a two-Judge Bench decision in Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. and Anr., (2007) 6 SCC 528 : MANU/SC/1803/2007 wherein this Court, after referring to the pronouncements in Babu Rajirao Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 3 SCC 337 : MANU/SC/0072/1971 and Siddanna Apparao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1970) 1 SCC 547 : MANU/SC/0190/1970, opined thus: An appeal is indisputably a statutory right and an offender who has been convicted is entitled to avail the right of appeal which is provided for Under Section 374 of the Code. Right of appeal from a judgment of conviction affecting the liberty of a person keeping in view the expansive definition of Article 21 is also a fundamental right. Right of appeal, thus, can neither be interfered with or impaired, nor can it be subjected to any condition. XXX XXX XXX XXX The right to appeal from a judgment of conviction vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other provisions thereof, as mentioned hereinbefore, must be considered having regard to the fundamental right of an accused enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as also the international covenants operating in the field. 21. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid legal principles, it is luminescent that the High Court has not made any effort to satisfy its conscience and accepted the concession given by the counsel in a routine manner. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that when a convicted person prefers an appeal, he has the legitimate expectation to be dealt with by the Courts in accordance with law. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that when a convicted person prefers an appeal, he has the legitimate expectation to be dealt with by the Courts in accordance with law. He has intrinsic faith in the criminal justice dispensation system and it is the sacred duty of the adjudicatory system to remain alive to the said faith. That apart, he has embedded trust in his counsel that he shall put forth his case to the best of his ability assailing the conviction and to do full justice to the case. That apart, a counsel is expected to assist the Courts in reaching a correct conclusion. Therefore, it is the obligation of the Court to decide the appeal on merits and not accept the concession and proceed to deal with the sentence, for the said mode and method defeats the fundamental purpose of the justice delivery system. We are compelled to note here that we have come across many cases where the High Courts, after recording the non-challenge to the conviction, have proceeded to dwell upon the proportionality of the quantum of sentence. We may clearly state that the same being impermissible in law should not be taken resort to. It should be borne in mind that a convict who has been imposed substantive sentence is deprived of his liberty, the stem of life that should not ordinarily be stenosed, and hence, it is the duty of the Court to see that the cause of justice is subserved with serenity in accordance with the established principles of law." 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Padam Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2000) 1 SCC 621 in para-2 of its judgment has held as under: ".......It is the duty of an appellate court to look into the evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can be relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by the appellate court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by the appellate court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. It must be remembered that the appellate court, like the trial court, has to be satisfied affirmatively that the prosecution case is substantially true and the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt as the presumption of innocence with which the accused starts, continues right through until he is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court. The judicial approach in dealing with the case where an accused is charged of murder under Section 302 has to be cautious, circumspect and careful and the High Court, therefore, has to consider the matter carefully and examine all relevant and material circumstances, before upholding the conviction." 7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bani Singh and others Vs. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720 held that "the plain language of Sections 385-386 does not contemplate dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution simpliciter. On the contrary, the Code envisages disposal of the appeal on merits after perusal and scrutiny of the record. The law clearly expects the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on merits, not merely by perusing the reasoning of the trial court in the judgment, but by cross-checking the reasoning with the evidence on record with a view to satisfying itself that the reasoning and findings recorded by the trial court are consistent with the material on record. The law, therefore, does not envisage the dismissal of the appeal for default or non-prosecution but only contemplates disposal on merits after perusal of the record. Therefore, with respect, we find it difficult to agree with the suggestion in Ram Naresh Yadav case, (1987) AIR SC 1500 : 1987 Cri LJ 1856] that if the appellant or his pleader is not present, the proper course would be to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution." 8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rishi Nandan Pandit and others Vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 644 has held that "9. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rishi Nandan Pandit and others Vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 644 has held that "9. As a matter of legal position the court is not precluded from perusing the records and come to its own conclusion unaided by any legal practitioner to project the points favourable to the accused, when the counsel engaged by them does not turn up to argue. But the three-Judge Bench of this Court indicated in Bani Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 848] that it is a matter of prudence that the court may, in an appropriate case, appoint a counsel at the State's expense to argue for the cause of the accused. Of course it is for the court to determine, on a consideration of the conspectus of the case, whether it does or does not require such legal assistance. There can be appeals which could be disposed of unassisted by counsel to put forth the favourable features for the accused. But if the sentence imposed by the judgment impugned in the appeal is of a substantial range it is advisable to seek the assistance of a legal talent." 9. A reading of Sections 384,385 and 386 of the Code as well as the above legal position clearly demonstrate that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default or as not pressed, if the same has been admitted for consideration. The Court has to decide the appeal on merits and pass final orders. The consideration of the appeal on merits at the stage of final hearing and to arrive at a decision on merits so as to pass final orders will not be possible unless the reasoning and findings recorded in the judgment under appeal are tested in the light of the record of the case. After the records are before the Court and the appeal is set down for hearing, it is essential that the appellate court should peruse such record, hear the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and hear the public prosecutor, if he appears and after complying with these requirements, the appellate court has full power to pass any of the orders mentioned in the section, but the disposal must be after the appellate court has considered the appeal on merits. It is clear that the criminal appeal, if not dismissed summarily and has been admitted for hearing, must be considered and disposed of on merits irrespective of the fact whether the appellant or his counsel or the public prosecutor is present or not or even if the appeal has been "not pressed". 10. Keeping this in view, we are obliged to peruse the record of case and to scrutinize whether the reasoning of the trial court are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record for the purpose of satisfying ourself that the reasonings and findings recorded by the trial court are consistent with the material on record. After this exercise we have to arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon and whether the cumulative effect of such evidence results in proving the charges framed against the accused persons as beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore we proceed to dispose of this appeal on merits, irrespective of the fact that the same has been not pressed by Ld. Counsel for the appellant, in view of the grounds taken in memorandum of appeal. 11. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal unfolds from the record that, a written report was presented by informant namely Mohd. Asgar Ansari, the son of Mohd. Suleman to S.H.O. Police Station Baghrai, Pratapgarh on 07.12.2001 at about 11:30 am alleging that he along with his father Suleman, aged about 70 years, were irrigating their agricultural field, wherein the crop of 'wheat' was standing. It is further stated that at about 11:00 am., Ram Asrey, Meghai and Khairati all sons of Bachoolal Pasi and Pappu and Subhane son of Khairati Pasi came to his house armed with 'lathi, danda' and 'country-made pistol'. His brother Mohd. Azam and mother Khalikulnisa did not open the gate, on which the accused persons started abusing them. They saw him and his father in the field and rushed towards them and assaulted them with the intention to murder. He and his father Suleman attempted to run away, but after running for a short distance, the accused persons overpowered his father and assaulted him with 'lathi, danda'. Accused-appellant, Ram Asrey fired at the head of his father with a country-made pistol. He succeeded in running away and also sustained injuries by the assault of the accused persons and some-how managed to escape. Accused-appellant, Ram Asrey fired at the head of his father with a country-made pistol. He succeeded in running away and also sustained injuries by the assault of the accused persons and some-how managed to escape. His father could not run due to his old age and his dead body is lying in the field of Bhagan Pasi. The incident was witnessed by his brother Mohd. Azam and his mother Smt. Khalikulnisa and many other persons of the village. 12. On the basis of this written information (Exhibit-ka-1), an FIR (Exhibit-ka-2) was registered at Police Station Kunda, District Pratapgarh at 11:30 am against Ram Asrey, Meghai, Khairati, Pappu and Subhane, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. at Case Crime No. 127 of 2001. The Investigation of the case was entrusted to S.I., Balram Mishra. An entry of this FIR was made in the G.D. No.-14 dated 07.12.2001 at 11:30 am, which is available on record as Exhibit-ka-3. 13. The Investigating Officer, P.W.-4/S.I. Balram Mishra arrived at the spot and prepared the Inquest Report of deceased Suleman (Exhibit-ka-4) and necessary papers for the purpose of the postmortem i.e. Letter to C.M.O, Seal sample, Report R.I., Challan Lash and Photo Lash (Exhibit-ka-5 to ka-9). 14. The postmortem on the dead body of deceased Suleman was conducted on 08.12.2001 at about 1:30 pm by Doctor Ravi Srivastava, the then Medical Officer, District Hospital, Pratapgarh and he also prepared the postmortem-report (Exhibit-ka-13). He found the body of the deceased as thin-build, eyes and mouth were closed, rigor mortis was present in both upper and lower limbs. 15. He also found following antemortem injuries on the body of deceased:- Injury No.1/A fire arm wound of entry of Size 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm over the forehead direct downwards literally. Margins inverted over the forehead just above the middle of left eyebrow, tattooing and blackening present. pellets recovered from the wound. Injury No.2/A fire arm wound of exit of size 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm over left side of face just adjacent to tragus of left tear, margins inverted. Injury No.3/An abraided contusion of size 4.0 cm. 0.5 cm. over the right side of forehead 2.0 cm. above the middle of right eyebrow. Injury No.4/An abraided contusion of size 3.0 cm x 1.0 cm over the left arm,8.0 cm. above the left elbow joint. Humerous bone (left fractured). Injury No.3/An abraided contusion of size 4.0 cm. 0.5 cm. over the right side of forehead 2.0 cm. above the middle of right eyebrow. Injury No.4/An abraided contusion of size 3.0 cm x 1.0 cm over the left arm,8.0 cm. above the left elbow joint. Humerous bone (left fractured). Injury No.5/An abraided contusion of size 4 cm x 1.0 cm. over the back of left forearm just below the left elbow joint. Injury No.6/An abraided contusion of size 4.0 cm x 1.0 cm. over the right forearm just above the right wrist joint. Both radius and ulna bone fractured. Injury No.7/Abrasion of size 6 cm x 1.0 cm. over the posterior aspect of right shoulder 6 cm. below the tip of right shoulder. 16. The stomach contains two ounses of digested unidentified food particles, while small intestine was containing faecal matter and gases, the time of death was determined about one day before and the cause of death was stated as death due to 'Coma', as a result of fire arm injury. 17. The medical examination of the injuries of injured Mohd. Asgar Ansari was done by Doctor C.P. Sharma on 07.12.2001 at about 3:40 pm at PHC (Primary Health Center), Baghrai, Pratapgarh and he found following injuries on the person of the injured:- Injury No.1/Abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm. on right forearm 14 cm. above from right chest. Injury No.2/Contusion 6.0 cm. x 2.0 cm. on right shoulder. Injury No.3/Contusion 4.0 cm. x 2.0 cm. on right knee. Injury No.4/Complaint of pain on left big toe of the leg. 18. All injuries were stated to be simple, while Injury No.1 was caused by friction and rest of the injuries were stated to have been caused by blunt object. Duration of all injuries were noted as fresh. 19. The Investigating Officer also recorded the statement of the informant as well as of Mohd. Asgar Ansari and prepared the Site Plan (Exhibit-ka-10) on the pointing of him. He also collected the simple as well as blood stained soil from the spot and sealed them in a container separately and prepared an 'Fard' (Exhibit-ka-11). He also recorded the statement of eye witness Mohd. Azam and the statement of another eye witnesses Smt. Khalikulnisa on 06.01.2002 and submitted the Charge-sheet (Exhibit-ka-12) against the accused persons, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. 20. He also recorded the statement of eye witness Mohd. Azam and the statement of another eye witnesses Smt. Khalikulnisa on 06.01.2002 and submitted the Charge-sheet (Exhibit-ka-12) against the accused persons, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. 20. The case being triable by the Court of Sessions was committed to the Sessions Court and charges against the appellant under Sections 148,302,307,323 read with Section 149,504 and 506 of I.P.C. were framed against the appellant. The appellant denied the charges and claimed trial. 21. During trial, the prosecution placed reliance on following documentary evidence:- 1. Tehrir FIR, (Exhibit-ka-1). 2. Chick FIR, (Exhibit-ka-2). 3. G.D. Quaymi, (Exhibit-ka-3). 4. Inquest Report, (Exhibit-ka-4). 5. Letter to C.M.O., (Exhibit-ka-5). 6. Sample soil, (Exhibit-ka-6). 7. Letter to R.I., (Exhibit-ka-7). 8. Challan R.I., (Exhibit-ka-8). 9. Photo lash, (Exhibit-ka-9). 10. Site Plan, (Exhibit-ka-10). 11. Fard blood stained and sample soil, (Exhibit-ka-11). 12. Charge-sheet, (Exhibit-ka-12). 13. Postmortem report, (Exhibit-ka-13). 14. Injury Report of informant, Asgar Ali, (Exhibit-ka-14). 22. In addition to the above documentary evidence, the prosecution also testified following witnesses in order to prove its case before the Court below:- P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam (Eye witness) P.W.-2/Mohd. Asgar Ansari (Informant/injured eye witness) P.W.-3/Head Constable, (Durgvijay Singh, who recorded the First Information Report.) P.W.-4/S.I. Balram Mishra (Investigating Officer) P.W.-5/Doctor Ravi Srivastava, (Doctor, who did the postmortem.) P.W.-6/Doctor C.P. Sharma, (Doctor, who examined the injured Mohd. Asgar Ansari.) 23. After the completion of the evidence of the prosecution, the statement of the accused persons including the appellant was recorded. The appellant, Ram Ashrey in his statement, recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution evidence and stated that deceased Suleman and his sons had murdered Bachoolal. These peoples are 'Gunda elements' and also informer of the police. The deceased Suleman had been killed by some unknown persons at unknown place, but to pressurize the appellant for compromise, this false case has been instituted against him. 24. Learned Trial Court after appreciating and analyzing the evidence of the prosecution came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced the appellant, Ram Ashrey under Sections 302,323/149,506 and 148 I.P.C. and acquitted the appellant of the charges under Section 307 and 504 of I.P.C. 25. 24. Learned Trial Court after appreciating and analyzing the evidence of the prosecution came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced the appellant, Ram Ashrey under Sections 302,323/149,506 and 148 I.P.C. and acquitted the appellant of the charges under Section 307 and 504 of I.P.C. 25. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction and sentence the appellant Ram Ashrey had filed this appeal challenging the judgment and order of the Trial Court on various grounds mentioned in the Memo of Appeal. A perusal of the memo of appeal would reveal that appellant, Ram Ashrey challenged the impugned judgment and order on the grounds that the same has been passed against weight of evidence available on record and the Court has admitted the evidence, which was otherwise not admissible. There was no evidence against the appellant on record and the judgment and order of the Trial Court was based on assumption, presumption, conjectures and surmises as well as the version of the prosecution has not been corroborated by the medical evidence and the whole case of the prosecution is highly improbable and also that the Trial Court has ignored material contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 26. Since learned counsel for the appellant has not pressed the appeal and learned Addl. G.A. has supported the judgment and order of the Trial Court on the ground that there is no illegality in the finding and reasoning recorded by the Court, keeping in view the law mentioned herein-before, we have carefully perused the record of Sessions Trial No. 185/2000 "State Vs. Meghai and others", arising out of Case Crime No. 127/2001, Police Station Baghrai, District Pratapgarh in the background of the grounds of appeal taken by the appellant. This Court is conscious of the fact that being the Ist Appellate Court, it is the duty of this Court to go through the evidence on record and assess and analyze the evidence of prosecution to gauge as to whether the cumulative affect of such evidence results in proof beyond reasonable doubt and as to whether the Trial Court has erred in either marshalling of facts or in appreciation of evidence or in application of law. 27. Section 134 of Evidence Act do not require any particular number of witnesses to prove any fact. 27. Section 134 of Evidence Act do not require any particular number of witnesses to prove any fact. Plurality of witnesses in a criminal trial is not the legislative intent, it is not the quantity but quality which matters. Therefore, if the testimony of a witness is found reliable on the touch stone of credibility, accused can be convicted on the basis of testimony of even single witness. This principle was highlighted in Vadivelu Thevar V/s state of Madras, (1957) AIR SC 614, wherein it is held by Hon’ble Apex Court that "The contention that in a murder case, the Court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much broadly stated." "The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general Rule recognized in Section 134 quoted above. The Section has enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted." Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. "It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstance of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution." "Generally speaking oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely (1) wholly reliable (2) wholly unreliable (3) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first category of proof, the Court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the Court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The Court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony." 28. Vadivelu Thevar case (supra) was referred to with approval in Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P., (1994) AIR SC 1251. It was held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act'). But, if there are doubts and suspicion about the testimony of such a witness the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses.Therefore, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality which is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth around it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise. 29. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth around it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise. 29. In Lallu Manjhi vs. State of Jharkhand, (2003) AIR SC 854 Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Para 10, that "The Law of Evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the Court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable, nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon testimony of a single witness." 30. In Sucha singh v/s State of Punjab, (2003) AIR SC 3617, Hon’ble Apex Court after considering Masalti and others vs. State of U.P., MANU/SC/0074/1964, State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (1973) AIR SC 2407 and Lehna v. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 76 , opined as under:- "Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence.' (See Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1957) AIR SC 366. Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh and another, (1956) AIR SC 460. The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because18witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justicewould come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1972) 3 SCC 751 ) and Ugar Ahir and others v. State of Bihar, (1965) AIR SC 277. An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1954) AIR SC 15 and Balaka Singh and others v. state of punjab, (1975) AIR SC 1962. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and another, (1981) AIR SC 1390, normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi and others v. State of Bihar etc., (2002) 4 JT 186 (SC)." 31. In State of Gujarat vs J.P. Varu, (2016) CriLJ 4185 (SC) it has been propounded by the Supreme Court that, " Para 13 the burden of proof in criminal law is beyond all reasonable doubt. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi and others v. State of Bihar etc., (2002) 4 JT 186 (SC)." 31. In State of Gujarat vs J.P. Varu, (2016) CriLJ 4185 (SC) it has been propounded by the Supreme Court that, " Para 13 the burden of proof in criminal law is beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and it is also the rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted." 32. In Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju alias Batya v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) AIR SC 3150, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Para 17 "Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take place of proof and there is a large difference between something that 'may be' proved and 'will be proved'. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the Court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between 'may be' true and 'must be' true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between 'may be' true and 'must be' true, the Court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The Court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense." 33. In view of above legal position it is established that the golden rule which runs through the web of criminal jurisprudence is that every accused person is presumed to be innocent till the prosecution through reliable and acceptable evidence proves its case beyond all reasonable doubt. In other words, in criminal trial, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. However, it is not each and every doubt which can be termed as reasonable and benefit of only that doubt can be claimed by the accused persons, which is reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case and which grow out of the evidence, itself. It is also settled that if the evidence of any witness is having a ring of truth around it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, the Court will not hesitate in reposing confidence in such a witness. 34. Now we proceed to appreciate the evidence available on record in the background of above mentioned settled principles of appreciation of evidence. 35. P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam, who is the son of the deceased in his statement recorded before the Court below has supported the version of the prosecution as contained in the First Information Report and stated that accused -appellant, Ram Ashrey, Meghai and Khairati are real brothers and accused Pappu and Subhane are the sons of Khairati. All of them are the residents of his village. He stated that before the instant incident, there was a quarrel between the accused persons and his family members, pertaining to some loss to crops by a cowed of accused persons. In that incident, accused person Meghai and his father Bachoolal and some other persons assaulted them and in their self defence, the lady members of the house pelted stones on them, as a result of which, the father of Meghai namely Bachoolal died. Accused persons are inimical to them since then. In that incident, accused person Meghai and his father Bachoolal and some other persons assaulted them and in their self defence, the lady members of the house pelted stones on them, as a result of which, the father of Meghai namely Bachoolal died. Accused persons are inimical to them since then. He further stated that on the fateful day at about 11:00 am, he and his mother was at their home and his father Mohd. Suleman and his younger brother Mohd. Asgar Ansari were irrigating their field. Accused-appellant, Ram Ashrey along with other co-accused persons came to his house and started abusing. He and his mother closed the door, where on the appellant started abusing and ran towards the direction, whether his father and brother were irrigating their field. They raised an alarm, but accused persons captured his father, who was attempted to ran away and accused persons Meghai, Khairati, Pappu and Subhane started assaulting his brother and his father with 'lathi, danda'. His brother ran away and he also sustained some injuries, while his father, who was old could not run away and fell down. Appellant, Ram Ashrey fired at his father from country-made pistol on his head, whereby his father died at the spot instantly. He further stated to be a witness of the inquest of his father's dead body. A lengthy cross-examination has been done with this witness, but he remained consistent on the material points throughout cross-examination. 36. P.W.-2/Mohd. Asgar Ansari is also an eye witness of the incident and an injured in the incident as well as the informant of the case. He narrated the incident in the manner, written in the FIR and corroborated the testimony of P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam. He attributed the role of assault by 'lathi, danda' to all the accused persons and also that appellant, Ram Ashrey was having a country-made pistol with him, whereby he fired at his father in his head, whereby his father died at the spot. This witness also stated to have sustained injuries by the assault made by the appellant and other accused persons by 'lathi, danda' and also fixed the spot as the field of Bhagan Pasi. He proved the FIR of incident as Exhibit-ka-1 and also that he was medically examined by the Doctor in police custody and was also a witness to the inquest of his father's dead body. He proved the FIR of incident as Exhibit-ka-1 and also that he was medically examined by the Doctor in police custody and was also a witness to the inquest of his father's dead body. He also stated that on his pointing the Investigating Officer prepared the Site Plan. This witness was also subjected to lengthy cross-examination, but he also remained consistent in material particulars. 37. P.W.-3/Head Constable, Durgvijay Singh is a formal witness, who has proved to have lodged the First Information Report as Exhibit-ka-1 at 11:30 am and also the Chick FIR as Exhibit-ka-2 as well as the entry of the G.D. made by him in his hand writing as Exhibit-ka-3. 38. P.W.-4/Investigating Officer of the case namely S.I. Balram Mishra, who has stated to have recorded the statement of the witnesses, prepared the necessary papers for the postmortem of the body of the deceased Suleman as Exhibit-ka-5 to ka-9. He further stated to have prepared the Inquest Report as Exhibit-ka-4 and also prepared the Site Plan, Exhibit-ka-10 and Fard of seizing blood stained as well as sample soil as Exhibit-ka-1 and also to have submitted the Charge-sheet, Exhibit-ka-12. 39. P.W.-5/Dr. Ravi Srivastava is the person, who has done the postmortem on dead body of deceased Suleman and prepared the Postmortem report in his hand writing and signature and proved the same as Ex-ka-13. The postmortem report as narrated by him has been discussed here in before. He further opined that the death of the deceased Suleman had occurred on 07.12.2001 at about 11:00 am due to fire arm injury. 40. The proved facts, which have also not been disputed by the accused persons are that the father of appellant Ram Ashrey namely Bachoolal was allegedly murdered by the deceased and his sons and at the time of the incident, a criminal case pertaining to that incident was pending against the deceased and his sons. The fact that deceased and his sons were charged for the murder of Bachoolal is also admitted to the prosecution witnesses, however, with a different version of the incident and it is claimed by them that Bachoolal along with others came to their house for the purpose of assaulting them and the ladies of the house pelted stones on them in their Self defence and in that incident Bachoolal got injured and died. However, the crux of the matter is that prior to the instant incident, the deceased and his sons were charged for the murder of Bachoolal and a criminal case was pending pertaining to that incident in the Court. It has also been admitted by the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that his father Bachoolal was done to death by deceased and his sons and they were pressurizing him to make a compromise in the matter and on the basis of it, the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case. Therefore, it is established on record that both parties were highly inimical towards each other and this bitterness may provide sufficient motive to the appellant to commit the crime in order to take revenge of the death of his father Bachoolal and this may also be the basis of false implication. Therefore the duty of this Court is to analyze the evidence on record keeping in mind the above possibilities. 41. So far as the ground, which has been taken in the memo of appeal, pertaining to the fact that all the witnesses of fact were related to the deceased, as P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam and P.W.-2/Mohd. Asgar Ansari were the sons of deceased Suleman, the law is well-settled on this point that the evidence of a related witness, who is also a natural witness could not be discarded only on the basis of his relation with the deceased on the point of admissibility of the evidence of related witness, following case laws are relevant:- 42. In Gangabhavani vs. Rayapati Venkat Reddy and Ors., MANU/SC/0897/2013 Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :- "11. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of closely related witnesses is required to be carefully scrutinised and appreciated before any conclusion is made to rest upon it, regarding the convict/accused in a given case. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that the witnesses are related to each other or to the deceased. In case the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, it can, and certainly should, be relied upon.(Vide: Bhagaloo Lodh and Anr. v. State of U.P., (2011) AIR SC 2292 : MANU/SC/0700/2011; and Dhari and Ors. v. State of U.P., (2013) AIR SC 308 : MANU/SC/0848/2012). 12. In case the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, it can, and certainly should, be relied upon.(Vide: Bhagaloo Lodh and Anr. v. State of U.P., (2011) AIR SC 2292 : MANU/SC/0700/2011; and Dhari and Ors. v. State of U.P., (2013) AIR SC 308 : MANU/SC/0848/2012). 12. In State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr., (1981) AIR SC 1390 : MANU/SC/0254/1981, this Court held: "5A. As mentioned above the High Court has declined to rely on the evidence of P.W. 1 on two grounds: (1) she was a "highly interested" witness because she "is the wife of the deceased"......For, in the circumstances of the case, she was the only and most natural witness; she was the only person present in the hut with the deceased at the time of the occurrence, and the only person who saw the occurrence. True it is she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot be called an 'interested' witness. She is related to the deceased. 'Related' is not equivalent to 'interested. A witness may be called 'interested' only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be 'interested'. In the instant case P.W. 1 had no interest in protecting the real culprit, and falsely implicating the Respondents."(Emphasis added) (See also: Chakali Maddilety and Ors. v. State of A.P., (2010) AIR SC 3473 : MANU/SC/0609/2010). 13. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) AIR SC 5039 : MANU/SC/0865/2004, while dealing with the case this Court held: "7....Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere 'chance witnesses'. The expression 'chance witness' is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere 'chance witnesses'. The expression 'chance witness' is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter explaining their presence." 14. In view of the above, it can safely be held that natural witnesses may not be labelled as interested witnesses. Interested witnesses are those who want to derive some benefit out of the litigation/case. In case the circumstances reveal that a witness was present on the scene of the occurrence and had witnessed the crime, his deposition cannot be discarded merely on the ground of being closely related to the victim/deceased." 43. In Bhagaloo Lodh and Ors. vs. State of U.P., MANU/SC/0700/2011 it was held as under :- "14. Evidence of a close relation can be relied upon provided it is trustworthy. Such evidence is required to be carefully scrutinised and appreciated before resting of conclusion to convict the accused in a given case. But where the Sessions Court properly appreciated evidence and meticulously analysed the same and the High Court re-appreciated the said evidence properly to reach the same conclusion, it is difficult for the superior court to take a view contrary to the same, unless there are reasons to disbelieve such witnesses. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that the witnesses are inter-related to each other or to the deceased. (Vide: M.C. Ali and Anr. v. State of Kerala, (2010) AIR SC 1639 : MANU/SC/0247/2010; Myladimmal Surendran and Ors. v. State of Kerala, (2010) AIR SC 3281 : MANU/SC/0670/2010; Shyam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 16 SCC 531 : MANU/SC/7112/2007; Prithi v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536 : MANU/SC/0532/2010; Surendra Pal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2010) 9 SCC 399 : MANU/SC/0713/2010; and Himanshu @ Chintu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36 : MANU/SC/0006/2011). In view of the law laid hereinabove, no fault can be found with the evidence recorded by the courts below accepting the evidence of closely related witnesses." 44. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2010) 9 SCC 399 : MANU/SC/0713/2010; and Himanshu @ Chintu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36 : MANU/SC/0006/2011). In view of the law laid hereinabove, no fault can be found with the evidence recorded by the courts below accepting the evidence of closely related witnesses." 44. It is therefore settled that merely because witnesses are close relatives of victim, their testimonies cannot be discarded. Relationship with one of the parties is not a factor that affects credibility of witness, more so, a relative would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegation against an innocent person. However, in such a case Court has to adopt a careful approach and analyze the evidence to find out, whether it is cogent and credible. 45. The above reports would show that the ratio, which has been propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the evidence of a witness, who is related to the deceased, his testimony could not be discarded only on the basis of his relationship with the deceased, rather his evidence is to be scrutinized with care and caution, keeping in view in mind that he is relative of the deceased. It is also to be seen whether the witnesses, who are being termed as related witnesses were also natural witnesses or not. 46. In Sucha Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0527/2003 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "15. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, (1954) 1 SCR 145 : MANU/SC/0031/1953 it has been laid down as under:- "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely, Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts." 16. The above decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, (1974) CriLJ 331 : MANU/SC/0107/1973 in which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (1957) CriLJ 1000 : MANU/SC/0039/1957 was also relied upon. 17. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness. should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed: "We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. It the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, (1952) CriLJ 547 : MANU/SC/0036/1951. we find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, it not in the judgements of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel." 18. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133 : MANU/SC/0074/1964 this Court observed: (p,209-210 para 14): "but it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ....... The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct." 19. To the same effect is the is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (1973) CriLJ 1589 : MANU/SC/0193/1973 and Lehna v. State of Haryana, (1973) CriLJ 1589 : MANU/SC/0193/1973. Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that, it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1957) CriLJ 550 : MANU/SC/0032/1957). The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1957) CriLJ 550 : MANU/SC/0032/1957). Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. (See Gurucharan Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, (1956) CriLJ 827 : MANU/SC/0122/1955). The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1972) CriLJ 1302 : MANU/SC/0254/1972) and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, (1965) AIR SC 277 : MANU/SC/0333/1964). An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1972) CriLJ 1302 : MANU/SC/0254/1972) and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, (1965) AIR SC 277 : MANU/SC/0333/1964). An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1954) AIR SC 15 : MANU/SC/0093/1952 and Balake Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab., (1975) CriLJ 1734 : MANU/SC/0087/1975). As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr., (1981) CriLJ 1012 : MANU/SC/0254/1981, normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc., (2002) CriLJ 2645 : MANU/SC/0327/2002. Accusations have been clearly established against accused-appellants in the case at hand. The Courts below have categorically indicated the distinguishing features in evidence so far as acquitted and convicted accused are concerned. 20. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Ors., (1999) CriLJ 2588 : MANU/SC/0189/1999 the over-insistence on witnesses having no relating with the victims often results in criminal justice going away. When any incident happens in a dwelling house or nearby the most natural witnesses would be the inmates of that house. It would be unpragmatic to ignore such natural witnesses and insist on outsiders who would not have even seen any thing. When any incident happens in a dwelling house or nearby the most natural witnesses would be the inmates of that house. It would be unpragmatic to ignore such natural witnesses and insist on outsiders who would not have even seen any thing. If the Court has discerned from the evidence or even from the investigation records that some other independent person has witnessed any event connecting the incident in question then there is justification for making adverse comments against non-examination of such person as prosecution witness. Otherwise, merely on surmises the Court should not castigate a prosecution for not examining other persons of the locality as prosecution witnesses. Prosecution can be expected to examine only those who have witnessed the events and not those who have not seen it though the neighbourhood may be replete with other residents also." 47. Coming to the facts of this case, the story as unfolds from the FIR and the statement of the two witnesses namely P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam and P.W.-2/Mohd. Asgar Ansari is that the appellant along with other accused persons went to the house of deceased Suleman, where P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam and his mother Khalikulnisa were present. Accused persons threatened them to open the door and when they did not open the door, they hurled filthy abuses and then noticed the deceased Suleman and P.W.-2/Asgar Ali, who were working in a nearby field and all of them rushed towards them and in the process caught Suleman, while the P.W.-2/Mohd. Asgar Ansari, after receiving some injuries from the appellant and his companions, managed to escape. Thereafter, deceased Suleman was assaulted by the appellants and instant appellant namely Ram Ashrey took out a country-made pistol and fired at the head of Suleman, whereby he died on the spot. 48. It is clear from the aforesaid factual matrix that P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam, who was with his mother Khalikulnisa at the house of the deceased as well as P.W.-2/Asgar Ansari, who was with the deceased in the field and was irrigating the wheat crop are natural witnesses, it is otherwise that they are also related to the deceased. Their presence at the spot is natural, as the incident is of the house and agriculture field of the deceased. 49. Their presence at the spot is natural, as the incident is of the house and agriculture field of the deceased. 49. Though, it has come in the FIR as well as in the testimony of both eye witnesses that other villagers were also present in the nearby fields, who have witnessed the incident and on the basis of this, a ground has also been taken by the appellant that the independent witnesses have not been produced by the prosecution and, therefore, the testimony of the interested witnesses is doubtful. Perusal of record in the backdrop of this argument would show that the parties were having bitter enmity in between them. Informants' side was charged for the murder of the father of appellant namely Bachoolal, therefore, it was not easy for any person to earn enmity of the accused persons and to stand as a witness against them. Secondly, the informant/P.W.-2/Asgar Ansari in his statement at Page No. 9 has stated that the villagers, who were working in the nearby fields did not came to the spot due to the fear of the country-made pistol, possessed by the appellant and when the accused persons fled from the spot, then villagers, working in nearby fields, came to the spot. P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam in his statement at Page No. 3 has also stated that the appellant fired at head of the deceased Suleman, as a result of which, he died instantly on the spot and the incident was witnessed by him, his brother and his mother along with other villagers, who were working in the nearby fields. It has been categorically mentioned by him in his statement that the accused persons are of bad characters and nobody in the village is ready to give evidence against them. The statement of this witness appears acceptable and truthful in the light of the fact that in village or even in urban areas where the presence of police is conspicuous, nobody wants to get himself involved in the enmity of two parties, which are having very bitter relations, going to the extent that father of the appellant was allegedly eliminated by the deceased and his sons and as a revenge, the deceased was allegedly eliminated by the appellant and his companions. In this background, if other independent witnesses have not come forward to depose against appellant, it is not a circumstance, which may adversely affect the case of the prosecution. 50. In Appabhai and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0028/1988. The Supreme Court held as under :- "Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability if any, suggested by the accused." 51. We have carefully perused the evidence of P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam and P.W.-2/Mohd. Asgar Ansari. P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam is a natural eye witness. He in his statement has narrated the incident by mentioning minute details. This witness has been cross-examined at length by the appellant and barring some minor contradictions, pertaining to the manner of assault and as to who hit first by 'lathi, danda', there is no material contradictions in his testimony, which may adversely affect the prosecution. P.W.-2/Asgar Ali is the witness, who was with deceased Suleman at the time of incident and was irrigating the agriculture field and he has also sustained injuries in the incident. The law is well-settled, so far as the evidentiary value of an injured witness is concerned, that the testimony of an injured witness, if his presence on the spot is established, is on a higher pedestal than others because he is the person who has actually received injuries in the incident. In the instant case, the First Information Report has also been lodged by this witness namely P.W.-2/Asgar Ali, within half an hour of the incident. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the FIR is prompt and rules out the possibility of any fabrication and concoction. In the instant case, the First Information Report has also been lodged by this witness namely P.W.-2/Asgar Ali, within half an hour of the incident. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the FIR is prompt and rules out the possibility of any fabrication and concoction. This witness has also received injuries in the incident and keeping in view his whole testimony, the same inspires confidence of this Court. His presence on the spot along with other witness was natural and nothing has been culled out from his cross examination, which may cause any doubt on the sanctity of the evidence of this witness. Despite being the son of deceased, his testimony is well-balanced and is consistant on material particulars and despite lengthy cross-examination, the appellant has failed to impeach his testimony. Therefore, this Court is having no doubt in categorizing the testimony of this witness as truthful, reliable and acceptable. 52. The circumstance of P.W.-2/Asgar Ali not attempting to save the life of his father Suleman is also of no consequence, it is established on record that, he first tried to defend himself, as appellant was having a country-made pistol in his hand, so the conduct of this witness to run away from the spot is not a circumstance, which may affect the testimony of this witness. The witnesses of heinous crimes behave in a different ways and there is no straight-jacket formula, which may apply to all the witnesses to behave in a particular manner. 53. In Appabhai and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0028/1988. The Supreme Court held as under :- "The Court, however, must bear in mind that witnesses to a serious crime may not react in a normal manner. Nor do they react uniformly. The horror stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of egregious nature may react differently. Their, course of conduct may not be of ordinary type in the normal circumstances. The Court, therefore, cannot reject their evidence merely because they have behaved or reacted in an unusual manner." 54. In Rana Pratap and Ors. v. State of Haryana, 1988 3 SCC 327. Chinnappa Reddy J. speaking for this Court succinctly set out what might be the behaviour of different persons witnessing the same incident. The learned Judge observed; (at p. 330). "Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. In Rana Pratap and Ors. v. State of Haryana, 1988 3 SCC 327. Chinnappa Reddy J. speaking for this Court succinctly set out what might be the behaviour of different persons witnessing the same incident. The learned Judge observed; (at p. 330). "Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way. 11. These may be some of the reactions. There may be still more. Even a man of prowess may become pusillanimous by witnessing a serious crime. In this case, the courts below, in our opinion, have taken into consideration of all those respects and rightly did not insist upon the evidence from other independent witnesses. The prosecution case cannot be doubted or discarded for not examining strangers at the bus stand who might have also witnessed the crime. We, therefore, reject the first contention urged for the appellants." 55. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Devendra Singh, MANU/SC/0343/2004 while discussing the issue of behavior of witness commented as under :- "Human behavior varies from person to person. Different people behave and react differently in different situations. Human behavior depends upon the facts and circumstances of each given case. How a person would react and behave in a particular situation can never be predicted. Every person who witnesses a serious crime reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Some may remain tight-lipped overawed either on account of the antecedents of the assailant or threats given by him. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Some may remain tight-lipped overawed either on account of the antecedents of the assailant or threats given by him. Each one reacts in his special way even in similar circumstances, leave alone, the varying nature depending upon variety of circumstances. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way. (See Rana Partap and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (1983) CriLJ 1272 : MANU/SC/0137/1983)." 56. In Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0527/2003 the Supreme Court held So far as inaction of witnesses in not coming to rescue of deceased is concerned, it has to be noted that both of the witnesses were unarmed and bare handed and the accused persons were armed with deadly weapons. How a person would react in a situation like this cannot be encompassed by any rigid formula. It would depend on many factors, like whether witnesses are unarmed and the assailants are armed with deadly weapons. In a given case instinct of self-preservation can be the dominant instinct. That being the position, their inaction in not coming forward to rescue the deceased cannot be a ground for discarding their evidence. 57. Therefore, keeping in view the above factual matrix as well as the law propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if P.W.-2/Asgar Ali ran away from the spot to save his life is not a circumstance, which may adversely affect or impeach his testimony. 58. The spot has been fixed in the instant case by the testimony of P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam and P.W.-2/Asgar Ansari. The Investigating Officer namely S.I. Balram Mishra (P.W.-4) arrived at the spot and also prepared the inquest and necessary papers and have found the dead body of the deceased in the agricultural field of Chedi son of Bhagan Pasi and the testimonies of the both witnesses of fact is also to the tune that the deceased fell down in the agricultural field of Bhagan Pasi. The Investigating Officer has also prepared Site Plan, which is Exhibit-ka-10 and has also collected the blood stained as well as simple soil from the spot, and as per the report of the Forensic Lab, human blood has been found in the blood stained soil. No significant or material illegality in the investigation has been highlighted which may render the investigation as tainted. After carefully perusing the statement of the Investigating Officer, P.W.-4 S.I. Balram Mishra, we are satisfied that there is no illegality in the investigation process. 59. The medical evidence has been produced in the form of P.W.-5/Dr. Ravi Srivastava, who has conducted the postmortem on the dead body of Suleman as well as P.W.-6/Dr. C.P. Sharma, who has prepared the injury report of P.W.-2/Asgar Ansari. The evidence of both medical witnesses is in the line of eye witnesses and in fact corroborating the testimony of P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam and P.W.-2/Asgar Ansari. P.W.-5/ Dr. Ravi Srivastava in his statement has categorically opined and corroborated the time of death of deceased Suleman as 11:00 am on 07.12.2001 and also that the Injury No.1 to the deceased might have been caused by fire arm and other injuries found on the person of the deceased as may be caused by blunt object. In cross-examination, nothing has been culled out, which may adversely affect, the otherwise reliable testimony of this witness. This witness has also opined that the death of the deceased has been caused due to the 'Coma' occurred as a result of ante-mortem fire arm injury. 60. P.W.-6/Dr. C.P. Sharma has also proved the injuries found by him on the person of P.W.-2/Asgar Ansari and he also proved the injury report as Exhibit-ka-14 and opined that barring one injury, which may be caused by friction, the other injuries to the injured may be caused by 'lathi' and the duration of the injuries were fresh. 61. The cumulative effect of the above discussed evidence is that the eye witness account of the incident has been corroborated by the medical witnesses. Keeping in view the above evidence of the prosecution available on record, we are satisfied and is of the considered view that the FIR in this case has been lodged promptly. Nothing has been placed on record, which may reflect that the FIR is either ante-timed or delayed. In our opinion, the FIR is prompt and inspires the confidence of this Court. Nothing has been placed on record, which may reflect that the FIR is either ante-timed or delayed. In our opinion, the FIR is prompt and inspires the confidence of this Court. The testimony of both factual witnesses namely P.W.-1/Mohd. Azam and P.W.-2/Asgar Ansari, despite being related to the deceased, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is truthful, reliable and can be safely acted upon as they are also natural witnesses of the crime and their testimony could not be disbelieved only on the allegation that they are related to the deceased. The time, place and day of incident has been fixed by the factual witnesses as well as by the medical witness and Investigating Officer. There is no material contradictions or embellishments in the testimony of eye witnesses. Though, the motive is not relevant in this case, as it is a case based on the direct evidence of witnesses and the crime has been proved by cogent and acceptable, truthful eye witnesses, but keeping in view the evidence available on record the motive was certainly available to the appellant i.e. to take the revenge of murder of his father allegedly caused by the deceased Suleman and his sons.There is no irregularity or illegality in the investigation. Therefore, in the considered opinion of us, the cumulative affect of the evidence produced by the prosecution on record is that the prosecution has been successful in proving the charges against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts. 62. Learned Addl. G.A. for the State has placed before this Court a letter dated 18.07.2019 of the Senior Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Prayagraj along with Government Order dated 11.02.2019, whereby the appellant, Ram Ashrey has been released from Jail on 14.02.2019 after the remission of his sentence has been made by the State Government. A copy of the letter of Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini Prayagraj as well as a copy of Government Order dated 11.02.2019 has been taken on record. 63. The aforesaid Government Order dated 11.02.2019 further reveals that the appellant has completed period of imprisonment, without remission, 17 years and 09 days and imprisonment of 22 years 02 months and 14 days with remission till 26.01.2019 and his remaining period of imprisonment/sentence has been remitted and the appellant has been released on furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 50,000/-. 64. 50,000/-. 64. In view of above discussion and the evidence available on record, the impugned judgment and order dated 11.07.2003 can not be termed as either perverse or against the evidence available on record, therefore, the conviction and sentence of the appellant is liable to be upheld and, therefore, it is affirmed. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. 65. Appellant, Ram Ashrey has been released on remission of the sentence, he need not surrender. 66. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for information. 67. The Trial Court record be also sent back along with a copy of this judgment, if not required in any other connected appeal.