JUDGMENT : Rajesh Bindal, J. 1. The order passed by the learned court below, whereby application for interim injunction filed by the respondent was accepted, has been impugned by filing the present appeal before this Court. 2. Brief facts, as are available on record, are that suit was filed by the respondent alleging trade mark violation by the present appellant. It was claimed that ‘HARVARD’ is a world famous trade mark being used by the respondent for 370 years. The same is registered in many countries. Primarily it is used for the purpose of education. To keep the flag of the trade mark, the respondent is maintaining the quality of education. The trade mark is worth billions of dollars. The suit was filed after the respondent came to know in April, 2013 about misuse of its name by the present appellant while running a college under the name, ‘Harvard College of Education’. Prior to the filing of the suit, a cease and desist notice was also issued, however, same was not responded to by the appellant. 3. The learned trial Court, after considering the averments made by both the parties and finding a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff-respondent herein, accepted the application for interim relief and restrained the present appellant from using the word ‘HARVARD’ for the College of Education till pendency of the suit. It is the aforesaid order which is under challenge before this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that respondent may be using the word ‘HARVARD’ for the educational institutions being run by it in USA or in other different country, however, that is simply a name, whereas the intention and meaning of the word used by the appellant is not as is sought to be projected by the respondent. A definite stand was taken by the appellant in the written statement filed that ‘HARVARD’ is a combination of two native words from Hindi and Urdu i.e. ‘HAR’ and ‘VARD’. The word ‘Har’ is sanctimonious amongst Sikhs and Hindus. It was prefixed to the names of some of the 10 Sikh Holy Gurus. It is also used in the most sacred seat and place of Sikhism, i.e. Shree Harminder Saheb which is popularly known as GoldenTemple, Amritsar. The word ‘VARD’ carries two meanings i.e. ‘daily round of prayer and another ‘rose’. It was prefixed to the names of some of the 10 Sikh Holy Gurus. It is also used in the most sacred seat and place of Sikhism, i.e. Shree Harminder Saheb which is popularly known as GoldenTemple, Amritsar. The word ‘VARD’ carries two meanings i.e. ‘daily round of prayer and another ‘rose’. The word ‘HARVARD’ used by the appellant, hence, is combination of aforesaid two words. It has nothing to do with the word being used by the respondent. A combination of two words can always have a different meaning. Comparison of the name being used by the respondent with its own name, is totally misconceived. The pleadings and the stand taken by the appellant at the time of arguments was not appreciated at all by the learned trial Court. The impugned order is totally non-speaking. It was further submitted that the appellant had opened its College with the aforesaid name duly approved by the authorities, much prior to registration of the trade mark of the respondent in India. 5. In support of the arguments reliance was placed upon the judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Hoffimann-La Roche and Co. vs. Geoffrey Manners and Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 2062 ; M/s. S. M. Dyechem Ltd vs. M/s Cadbury (India) Ltd, AIR 2000 SC 2114 and a judgment of Delhi High Court in case titled Kala Niketan, Karol Bagh vs. Kala Niketan, G-10 South Extension, AIR 1983 Del 161 . 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the name of the respondent as trade mark is registered as ‘HARVARD’, which is in capital letters only. The appellant is also using it similarly. The trade mark ‘HARVARD’ was registered in India in Class 09 under No. 1303894, as from 20th August, 2004, and in Class 41 under No. 1301756 as from 11th August, 2004, claiming user since 1982. The said registrations are valid and subsisting as on today. What the appellant is using is identical and not deceptive. Though the appellant is a Society under the name and style ‘Brilliant Education Society’, still it thought of using the name of ‘HARVARD’ for its College. 7. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant claims that it is running many educational institutions, however, name ‘HARVARD’ has been used only recently when a College of education was opened. Though the appellant is a Society under the name and style ‘Brilliant Education Society’, still it thought of using the name of ‘HARVARD’ for its College. 7. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant claims that it is running many educational institutions, however, name ‘HARVARD’ has been used only recently when a College of education was opened. The advertisements are being displayed on facebook and website inviting students for admission, which is misleading and is bringing bad name to the reputation of the respondent, which is a renowned name in education. It was further submitted that at the stage of consideration of appeal for interim relief, the Court had to consider the prima facie case and not to record a definite finding against the parties, as the same can prejudice the case of either of the parties. All the arguments raised, which were relevant for purposes of consideration of application for interim relief, were dealt with by the learned Court below. He further submitted that the suit is already more than five years old. The issues have been framed. The affidavits of evidence have already been filed by the respondent. The witnesses produced by the respondent have also been partly cross-examined. The respondent will conclude its entire evidence without any delay. Thereafter the onus is on the appellants to conclude their evidence as early as possible so that the trial is concluded. 8. In response, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants had opened a B.Ed College with all the permissions way back in the year 2003 whereas the trade mark of the respondent was registered in India much thereafter. There is no complaint or material produced on record by the respondent that any person has been deceived with the use of word ‘HARVARD’ by the appellants with the name of its College. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book. 10. The claim made by the respondent before the court below as well as before this Court is that ‘HARVARD’ is a well known and famous trade mark being used by it for the last 380 years. It is a well known name throughout the world in the field of education. It has its presence even in India and is well known. It is a well known name throughout the world in the field of education. It has its presence even in India and is well known. The students treat it a matter of honour in case they are able to get admission in any of the Harvard Schools/Education Institutions for studies. The Harvard alumni club is functioning in India for the last more than 25 years. A student at the very first blush will be mislead by hearing the name ‘HARVARD’ and link the same with the well known name ‘HARVARD’ in the field of education. The appellant has not claimed that it is a registered trade mark in the name of Harvard. The first in market test has always enjoyed pre-eminence. Different meanings were sought to be given by the appellants by dividing the word ‘HARVARD’ into two different words and claiming the same to be a combination thereof, in pronunciation, however, the word remains same and so are the spellings. By hearing the word and spellings used, one can easily take that it may be the same as HARVARD, which is a well known name in education. 11. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants are distinguishable. 12. In the case of S. M. Dyechem (supra), the Court found that dissimilarities in two words were striking to the naked eye. 13. In the facts of the case, the learned trial Court below had found that the respondent had been able to make out a prima facie case, hence, rightly granted injunction in its favour. The order does not call for any interference by this Court. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. It is clarified that nothing said above shall be considered as expression of opinion on merits of controversy. The matter shall be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led by the parties. 14. Before parting with the case, I deem it proper to direct the court below to conclude the trial of the case as early as possible as the same is more than five year old.