JUDGMENT : Pratap Krishna Lohra, J. 1. Appellant-defendant has preferred this second appeal to challenge judgment dated 20th of September, 2016, passed by Addl. District Judge No. 1, Bikaner (for short, 'learned lower appellate Court'). The learned lower appellate Court, by its judgment affirmed the judgment and decree for eviction dated 18th of May, 2007, passed by Addl. Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 2, Bikaner (for short, 'learned trial Court'). 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to this appeal, are that at the threshold one Suraj Narayan filed a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against appellant before learned trial Court. In the suit, essentially, the landlord pleaded the grounds default in payment of rent, reasonable and bona fide necessity, material alteration and denial of title by the appellant. It is also pleaded in the plaint that despite determination of tenancy by a valid notice, appellant tenant has not vacated the premises. By pleading all these grounds the landlord craved for passing a decree for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against the appellant-tenant. 3. The suit is contested by appellant by filing written statement, while refuting all the averments made in the plaint. The appellant took shelter of an oral agreement-to-sale with the earlier landlord in respect of rented premises and also pleaded for his preferential right in the suit property. Appellant, in the written statement, also refused to acknowledge plaintiff Suraj Narayan as his landlord for countering the ground of default in payment of rent. An objection about maintainability of suit on the anvil of Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was also incorporated in the return. 4. On behalf of landlord, rejoinder was filed and the averments made in the plaint are reiterated. The objections raised by the appellant in the written statement are also countered by the landlord in the additional pleadings. Factum of notice given to appellant for determination of tenancy and its non-acknowledgment by the appellant-tenant is also mentioned in the rejoinder by the landlord for proving his status as such. 5. On the basis of pleadings of rival parties, learned trial Court initially settled eight issues for determination and later on framed two more issues as Issue No. 8-A and 8-B respectively. For substantiating his case, landlord Suraj Narayan himself appeared in the witness-box and also examined one witness Khushal Singh. 5. On the basis of pleadings of rival parties, learned trial Court initially settled eight issues for determination and later on framed two more issues as Issue No. 8-A and 8-B respectively. For substantiating his case, landlord Suraj Narayan himself appeared in the witness-box and also examined one witness Khushal Singh. Besides oral evidence, four documents were also produced by the landlord, which were exhibited. Per contra, on behalf of appellant-defendant, he himself appeared in the witness-box and testified on oath, however, no documentary evidence was tendered. 6. Upon conclusion of evidence of rival parties, the learned trial Court proceeded to decide the issues settled. Issues No. 1 & 2 are decided by the learned trial Court simultaneously. As burden of proving the same was on plaintiff-landlord, the learned trial Court upon appreciation of evidence recorded its definite finding favouring cause of the landlord and consequently decided both these issues in his favour and against the appellant. Likewise, Issues No. 3 & 4 are also decided in favour of landlord. Switching on to Issues No. 5 & 6, the learned trial Court decided Issue No. 5 in favour of plaintiff-landlord and Issue No. 6 against him. Issue No. 7, pertaining to denial of title, was also decided in favour of plaintiff-landlord. Last issue, i.e., Issue No. 8, was settled on the basis of pleadings of appellant-defendant and, therefore, burden to prove the same was also casted on him. The learned trial Court made sincere endeavour to discuss evidence threadbare for adjudicating the said issue. 7. After examining the entire evidence meticulously, learned trial Court recorded its definite finding that status of appellant-defendant in the disputed premises is that of a tenant and thereby rejected his plea that he is co-owner of the property. The additional Issue No. 8-A regarding comparative hardship too is decided by the learned trial Court in favour of plaintiff-landlord and against the appellant-defendant. The other additional issue i.e. Issue No. 8-B, regarding partial eviction of the premises, is also decided by the learned trial Court in favour of plaintiff-landlord by relying on the fact that the premises in question is residential and plaintiff is having a large family, which cannot be accommodated in part of the premises. The decision on all these issues finally resulted in decreeing of the suit. 8. The decision on all these issues finally resulted in decreeing of the suit. 8. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of learned trial Court, appellant preferred an appeal before learned lower appellate Court. During pendency of the appeal, the original plaintiff-landlord expired, and therefore, his legal heirs are brought on record, who are respondents No. 1/1 to 1/5 in the instant appeal. The learned lower appellate Court examined the matter afresh in the light of evidence and materials available on record. After thrashing out the matter in its entirety, learned lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the learned trial Court rightly appreciated the evidence while deciding the crucial issue in favour of landlord and against the appellant-defendant. The learned lower appellate Court also examined the finding on each issue recorded by learned trial Court and upon objective analysis of the evidence fully concurred with the conclusions of the learned trial Court. This sort of situation entailed rejection of the first appeal. 9. I have heard learned counsels for the parties, perused judgments of both the Courts below and scanned record of learned trial Court as well relevant documents of the learned lower appellate Court produced by rival parties. 10. At the outset, it may be observed that in the instant appeal, appellant is assailing concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below. Well it is true that, even in case of concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below, power of this Court is not loathed u/Sec. 100 CPC but then power can only be exercised when there is substantial question of law involved in the appeal. The existence of substantial question of law is sine qua non for maintainability of second appeal. In general, in a second appeal, Court is reluctant to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact, however, if the finding is perverse, contrary to evidence and material available on record, or founded on misreading or eschewing of the material evidence, then Court can certainly exercise its appellate jurisdiction after determining substantial questions of law. 11. Upon examining the matter threadbare, it has come to the fore that defence put-forth by the appellant, against grounds of eviction set out by the respondent-landlord, was absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific. 11. Upon examining the matter threadbare, it has come to the fore that defence put-forth by the appellant, against grounds of eviction set out by the respondent-landlord, was absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific. In the written statement appellant simply relied on oral agreement to sale with the original landlord and pendency of suit for specific performance of contract. During his deposition before the learned trial Court, appellant has not only admitted his initial status in the premises as tenant but also conceded that he came to know about purchase of suit property by Suraj Narayan in July, 1977. Therefore, relying on evidence and other available material, learned trial Court decided all the crucial issues in favour of landlord. In a dispute between landlord and tenant concerning relief of eviction, the Courts are required to make scrutiny of the grounds for eviction and not to decide title. If the landlord has tendered relevant material evidence to substantiate grounds for eviction and the said evidence is not countered by the tenant with any reliable/tangible evidence, then no other conclusion except decree for eviction is possible. Thus, the learned trial Court in the facts and circumstances of the case rightly passed the decree for eviction. 12. Subsequently, the learned lower appellate Court also examined the findings de novo and after thoroughly discussing the same rejected the appeal. The learned lower appellate Court recorded its concurrence with the finding of fact arrived at by learned trial Court after spelling out cogent and convincing reasons. The learned lower appellate Court also examined the findings on each issue meticulously in the light of evidence and other available material for affirming the same. Therefore, essentially, the appellant is assailing alleged infirmity in the unison finding of fact, recorded by both the courts below, in this appeal, which requires judicial review on the touchstone of parameters and yardsticks provided under Section 100 CPC. 13. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has proposed many substantial questions of law and has also urged that pertaining to the disputed property, at his behest, a suit was filed for specific performance of contract based on oral agreement, but, I am afraid this plea of the appellant cannot be sustained as there was no proper factual foundation in this behalf before the learned trial Court. The learned Senior Counsel has also urged that the learned Courts below have seriously erred in proceeding with trial in the instant matter inspite of the fact that the suit filed on behalf of appellant for specific performance of contract was prior, and therefore, the Courts below ought to have stayed the proceeding by invoking Sec. 10 CPC. The contention appears to be alluring but not of substance. During the course of arguments, it is also brought to the notice of the Court by learned Senior Counsel that the suit for specific performance of contract is pending since November 1978 and presently it is posted for plaintiffs' evidence, therefore, while refraining to make any comment on the alleged oral agreement to sale, in my view question about res subjudice requires examination in the light of lis involved in both the suits. 14. The doctrine of res subjudice can be invoked by a party subject to the condition that in the later suit the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit between the same parties. Therefore, the law has prescribed very stringent requirements for invoking the doctrine of res subjudice. The provision is well orchestrated with the solemn object to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits and to avoid conflicting findings. Legislature has employed key words "the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue" in contradiction to "incidentally or collaterally in issue". Thus, when both proceedings being entirely distinct, Section 10 CPC had no applicability. The fundamental test to attract Section 10 CPC is, whether on final decision being reached in the previous suit such decision would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. My this view is fortified by a judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences vs. C. Parameshwara [ (2005) 2 SCC 256 ]. 15. In a later judgment, Apex Court, in the matter of Aspi Jal & Anr. vs. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor [ (2013) 4 SCC 333 ], reiterated the same principle. The Court further observed: "..The eviction in the third suit has been sought on the ground of non-user for six months prior to the institution of that suit. It has also been sought in the earlier two suits on the same ground of non-user but for a different period. The Court further observed: "..The eviction in the third suit has been sought on the ground of non-user for six months prior to the institution of that suit. It has also been sought in the earlier two suits on the same ground of non-user but for a different period. Though the ground of eviction in the two suits was similar, the same were based on different causes. The Plaintiffs may or may not be able to establish the ground of non-user in the earlier two suits, but if they establish the ground of non-user for a period of six months prior to the institution of the third suit that may entitle them the decree for eviction. Therefore, in our opinion, the provisions of Section 10 of the Code is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case." 16. From the facts available on record and the information divulged by learned Sr. Counsel during the course of arguments, Court has taken note of the fact that suit for specific performance of contract filed by the appellant-tenant is still pending consideration before the trial Court for recording evidence of the plaintiff. In contrast to the same, the lis involved in the present appeal has already been adjudicated by the two courts below and now it is the third stage in the form of second appeal. Therefore, besides question being alien to the doctrine of res subjudice is wholly insignificant and superfluous in the changed scenario so as to form even a question of law much less substantial question of law. 17. As observed supra and mandated by Section 100 CPC, after its amendment, scope of judicial review in second appeal is drastically circumscribed. Section 100 CPC in vogue, after amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977, provides with clarity and precision that in a second appeal memorandum of appeal must state precisely the substantial question of law involved. The requirement of law is also that substantial question of law has to be precisely stated in the memorandum of appeal. The Court, while hearing a second appeal, cannot interfere with the finding of fact if it involves re-appreciation of the evidence inasmuch as the Court while hearing second appeal is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of lower appellate Court. The Court, while hearing a second appeal, cannot interfere with the finding of fact if it involves re-appreciation of the evidence inasmuch as the Court while hearing second appeal is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of lower appellate Court. Ordinarily, in second appeal, concurrent findings of lower courts cannot be reversed except when the lower courts have patently gone wrong in casting the burden of proof and misread the evidence or not considered the basic requirements to substantiate the case. After going through the concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the courts below, I am afraid, no such situation is forthcoming in the instant appeal. The proposed substantial questions of law are also not satisfying the requirements and in fact the questions raised are either pure questions of fact or are superfluous. 18. Although Law mandates stringent requirement for entertaining second appeal, i.e., involvement of substantial question of law in an appeal but under the Code the term "substantial question of law" is not defined. The Court feels that prefix "substantial" has qualified a question of law so as to construe the same meticulously relying on legislative intent. Thus, the term "substantial question of law" can be defined as a question having subsistence, essential, truly of sound worth, exigent or considerable. In other words, it is to be understood something very special in contradistinction with purely technical, of no substance or consequence or merely academic. Likewise, a point of law, which gives rise to two opinions, may be construed as a proposition of law but by no means a substantial question of law. 19. After going through the judgments of both the courts below and the available material, I feel dissuaded to frame any substantial question of law requiring adjudication in this second appeal. The concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the courts below is based on sound appreciation of evidence favouring the cause of respondent-landlord. Therefore, no case for interference with the concurrent finding of fact is made out and the instant appeal merits rejection. The upshot of above discussion is that the instant appeal is bereft of any merit, therefore, same is hereby dismissed.