Gajju Singh v. Executive Engineer, Public Health and Engineering Department
2019-08-01
PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. Petitioner has preferred this writ petitions seeking following reliefs:- "1. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire record of the case and after examining the same be pleased to quash and set aside and the award dated 19.11.2003 passed by the learned Labour Court-I, Jaipur in LCR No. 294/1997 and the illegal oral retrenchment made by the respondents may be quashed and set aside and the respondents may be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with full consequential benefits and the reference may kindly be accepted with costs. 2. Any prejudicial order to the interest of the petitioner, if passed during the pendency of the writ petition, the same may kindly be taken on record and be pleased to quash and set aside. 3. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may consider just and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. 4. Cost of writ petition may be quantified in favour of the petitioner." 2. The petitioner was engaged on daily wages @ Rs. 22/- per day and worked from 21/05/1992 to 03/09/1992 in the Office of Assistant Engineer, PHED, Dudu for 78 days. The petitioner thereafter worked in the Office of Executive Engineer, PHED, Jaipur Rural from 04/08/1992 to 03/10/1992 for a period of 49 days and thereafter with Assistant Engineer, PHED, Chaksu from 06/11/1992 to 20/05/1993 for a period of 147 days. 3. The retrenchment was challenged and the reference was made to the Labour Court No. 1, Jaipur. The Labour Court has principally decided the claim of the petitioner against him on the ground that since the petitioner has not completed 240 clear days before the date of retrenchment in the previous year, therefore, he does not have any reason to get the protection of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. Mr. Sandeep Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, makes a limited submission that the calculation of 240 days has been denied only on the ground that the petitioner worked in three different units of the PHED i.e. Assistant Engineer, Dudu, Executive Engineer, Jaipur Rural and Assistant Engineer, Chaksu.
4. Mr. Sandeep Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, makes a limited submission that the calculation of 240 days has been denied only on the ground that the petitioner worked in three different units of the PHED i.e. Assistant Engineer, Dudu, Executive Engineer, Jaipur Rural and Assistant Engineer, Chaksu. He has shown Para 1 of the written statement filed by the respondents before the learned Labour Court which is reproduced as under:- **1- ;g fd LVsVesUV vkWQ Dyse dh en la[;k 1 ftl izdkj ls dFku dh xbZ gS] vLohdkj gSA izkFkhZ us vizkFkhZ la[;k 2 ds vf/ku iw.kZr;k% nSfud osru Hkkxh deZpkjh ds :i esa fnukad 21-5-92 ls dk;Z izkjEHk fd;k Fkk vkSj rRi'pkr~ og LosPNk ls miyC/k dk;ksZa ij dk;Z djrs gq, fnukad 3-9-92 rd dk;Zjr jgkA bl izdkj izkFkhZ us vizkFkhZ la[;k 2 lgk;d vfHk;Urk nwnw ds v/khu dsoy 78 fnol dk;Z fd;kA** 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has relied upon judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. : (2015) 4 SCC 458 , more particularly on Para 8 which reads as under:- "8. The workman has further stated that he has worked up to 31.12.1993 and showed that he has worked for more than 310 days both in Sub Division Nos. 8 and 6. He has produced the Muster Roll in support of his contention and further stated that the Executive Engineer of both the Sub Divisions is same. He has further stated that while terminating his service, neither notice nor notice pay in lieu of notice or retrenchment compensation was given to him. He has further produced the photocopy of the Muster Roll Ext. WX showing that he worked for 22 days during the month of September, 1993. Therefore, the total number of days worked in a calendar year, as indicated in the written statement filed by the Respondent-employer at para 2, if taken into consideration then it will be more than 240 days the workman has worked in the establishment of the Respondent-employer. The genuineness of the document is not questioned by the Respondent's counsel in the cross-examination of WW-1, therefore, the same is accepted and held that the workman has worked for more than 240 days during a calendar year preceding the date of his termination from the services.
The genuineness of the document is not questioned by the Respondent's counsel in the cross-examination of WW-1, therefore, the same is accepted and held that the workman has worked for more than 240 days during a calendar year preceding the date of his termination from the services. Undisputedly, retrenchment compensation was not given by the Respondent-employer to the Appellant contending that he is not entitled for the same, as he has not worked for 240 days, and therefore, the question of giving retrenchment compensation does not arise." 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that purport of the preceding law is the same as in the present case since in the present case the petitioner has worked in three units which come under the same employer although the units are different. Counsel further submits that it is a clear case of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus, the order impugned is bad in the eye of law. 7. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents is not in a position to refute Annexure-6 to the writ petition which is the written statement submitted by the respondents before the Labour Court and particularly Para 1 which has been quoted herein above. However, he submits that even if the facts are to be believed, then also the petitioner was working in separate units and thus was not entitled for any relief from the Labour Court. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that except violation of Section 25-F, no other provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been proved by the petitioner and even if Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to be invoked, then also since the petitioner has not worked for 240 days in any unit, therefore he is not entitled for any relief under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 8.
8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds that admittedly the learned Labour Court has gone wrong in assessing 240 days in last preceding years before the retrenchment as the respondents in their reply have admitted before the Labour Court that the petitioner had discharged services from 21/05/1992 to 03/09/1992 in the Office of Assistant Engineer, PHED, Dudu for 78 days and thereafter in the Office of Executive Engineer, PHED, Jaipur Rural from 04/08/1992 to 03/10/1992 for a period of 49 days and lastly with Assistant Engineer, PHED, Chaksu from 06/11/1992 to 20/05/1993 for a period of 147 days. Thus, this Court finds that in view of the preceding law as cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (supra), even if the petitioner has worked in three different units, since the employer is the same, the petitioner is entitled for 240 days to be computed in his favour. 9. The question before this Court now is that the petitioner was retrenched way back in the year 1993 and already a period of more than 26 years have elapsed and the petitioner is having the age of 53 years and therefore, if the matter is remanded back, the petitioner may be entitled for relief arising out of 240 continuous days and violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but such adjudication will take long time. This Court is also aware of the law laid down by the Apex Court in its various judgments relating to compensation for violation of Section 25-F or any other provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 10. In Incharge Officer & Anr. Vs. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126 , the Apex Court held in Para 2 and 7 of its judgment as under:- "2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in recent years has been uniform on the above question. 7.
Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the ID Act")? The course of the decisions of this Court in recent years has been uniform on the above question. 7. We think that if the principles stated in Jagbir Singh and the decisions of this Court referred to therein are kept in mind, it will be found that the High Court erred in granting relief of reinstatement to the respondent. The respondent was engaged as a daily wager in 1978 and his engagement continued for about 7 years intermittently up to 6.9.1985 i.e. about 25 years back. In a case such as the present one, it appears to us that relief of reinstatement cannot be justified and instead monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. In our considered opinion, the compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh) in lieu of reinstatement shall be appropriate, just and equitable. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made within 6 weeks from today failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum". 11. Similarly view has been taken by the Apex Court in its recent judgment rendered in Deputy Executive Engineer Vs. Kuberbhai Kanjibhai, (2019) 4 SCC 307 -holding as under:- "8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal in part and modify the impugned order to the extent indicated infra. 9. In our opinion, the case at hand is covered by the two decisions of this Court rendered in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District Development Officer and Anr. Vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia (2018) 12 SCC 298. 10. It is apposite to reproduce what this Court has held in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra): "33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc.
While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation [see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ]. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a dailywage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily-wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated.
while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied." 11. Here is also a case where the respondent was held to have worked as daily wager or muster role employee hardly for a few years in R & B of the State; Secondly, he had no right to claim regularization; Thirdly, he had no right to continue as daily wager; and lastly, the dispute was raised by the respondent (workman) before the Labour Court almost after 15 years of his alleged termination. 12. It is for these reasons, we are of the view that the case of the respondent would squarely fall in the category of cases discussed by this Court in Para 34 of the judgment rendered in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra). 13. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that it would be just, proper and reasonable to award lump sum monetary compensation to the respondent in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits by taking recourse to the powers under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the law laid down by this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited's case (supra). 14. Having regard to the totality of the facts taken note of supra, we consider it just and reasonable to award a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs. One lakh) to the respondent in lieu of his right to claim reinstatement and back wages in full and final satisfaction of this dispute. 15. Let the payment of Rs. 1,00,000/- be made by the appellant(State) to the respondent within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed in part. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside.
15. Let the payment of Rs. 1,00,000/- be made by the appellant(State) to the respondent within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed in part. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The Award dated 09.05.2007 of the Labour Court in LCS No. 120 of 1994 is accordingly modified to the extent indicated above." 12. Thus, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court, referred to above, this Court deems it appropriate to allow the present writ petition by holding that the petitioner completed 240 days in continuity before his retrenchment and thus, on seeing apparent violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, while closing the controversy in question, this Court awards him a sum of Rs. One Lac as compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The compliance of this order be made by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order in their office.