JUDGMENT : N. Kotiswar Singh, J. 1. The present application has been filed by the Respondent No. 3 in the writ petition seeking grant of benefit under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming that he being a workman, as also held by the Labour Court, Assam, is entitled to full wages last drawn by him including any maintenance allowance admissible to him. 2. This application has been objected by the Petitioner/Management on the ground that this Court had already made an observation on 15.11.2017 in the main petition i.e. WP(C) 6956/2017, that there seems to be a conflicting observation by the Labour Court as to whether the Respondent No. 3 (Applicant) is a workman or not and accordingly, this Court was of the prima facie view and also considering the balance of convenience and irreparable loss that the petitioner may suffer, the award dated 18.09.2017 of the Labour Court be stayed. 3. Thus, it has been contended on behalf of the Petitioner/Management that if the relationship of workman and employer is not established, it will go to the root of the matter and since there was an observation by this Court that the award of the Labour Court seems to be without jurisdiction, in that event Section 17-B will not be attracted and no such benefit can be granted. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Management submits that the Applicant/Respondent No. 3 was appointed as a Hostel Superintendent by the petitioner Society on temporary basis for a period of six months on a consolidated pay of Rs. 8000/- per month w.e.f. 23.07.2017. 5. It has been stated that duties of the respondent No. 3 is mainly supervisory in nature, to maintain discipline in the hostels and keep the premises clean and in a thoroughly sanitary condition. 6. It has been submitted that because of certain misconduct on the part of the Respondent No. 3, and after holding an enquiry to that effect, by giving an opportunity to be heard to the Respondent No. 3, it was decided to terminate the service of the Respondent No. 3. This termination led to a conciliation proceeding before the Labour Inspector, Ulubari and as no settlement was arrived at between the parties, the State Govt. referred the dispute for adjudication before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Guwahati. 7. This termination led to a conciliation proceeding before the Labour Inspector, Ulubari and as no settlement was arrived at between the parties, the State Govt. referred the dispute for adjudication before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Guwahati. 7. It has been stated on behalf of the Management that one of the issues specifically raised before the Labour Court was that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and as such he was not entitled to any relief under the aforesaid Act. 8. However, according to the petitioner, the Labour Court erroneously held that the Respondent No. 3 was a workman and is not covered by exemption Clause (iv) of Section 2(s). 9. The award of the Labour Court has been challenged before this Court by the Management Petitioner by filing the petition WP(C) 6956/2017. The said issue has been also raised in this petition, contending that the applicant Respondent No. 3 is not a workman within the meaning of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and if the applicant is not a workman, the Labour Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the reference and ought to have dismissed the claim of the Respondent No. 3, in which event, no relief can be granted under Section 17-B, as only a workman is entitled to such relief during the pendency of the petition. 10. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that this Court also has made an observation on 15.11.2017 to the effect that there is prima facie material to show that conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court that the respondent No. 3 is a workman is conflicting, arbitrary as well as without jurisdiction and accordingly, stayed the award passed by the Labour Court. 11. Learned counsel for the Petitioner Management in support of his contention has relied on the decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Deepak Agro Foods Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (2008) 7 SCC 748 , wherein it has been held that when an order is passed by an authority without jurisdiction, it renders such an award void ab initio because absence of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and such defect is not curable at all. 12. State of Rajasthan and Others (2008) 7 SCC 748 , wherein it has been held that when an order is passed by an authority without jurisdiction, it renders such an award void ab initio because absence of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and such defect is not curable at all. 12. It has been submitted that since the award passed by the learned Labour Court was without jurisdiction as the respondent No. 3/applicant is not a workman, such an award is void ab initio. In such an event, the question of payment of wages in terms of section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not arise. 13. Learned counsel for the Management also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.K. Maini Vs. M/s. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. and Others (1994) 3 SCC 510 , to hold that whether an employee is a workman or not under Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act is required to be determined with reference to the principal nature of duties and functions discharged and if an employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally also does some clerical work, he should be held to be doing supervisory work and cannot be held to be a workman. 14. Accordingly, it has been submitted that since the applicant was mainly doing supervisory and managerial work, he cannot be said to be a workman, in which event, provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will not be attracted. 15. It has been accordingly, submitted that the question of payment of wages under Section 17-B during pendency of this petition does not arise. 16. Learned counsel for the Applicant, however, submits that the issue as what is to be done by a High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution while hearing an appeal challenging the legality, validity of an award passed by a Labour Court, has been duly considered not only by different High Courts but also by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 17. The core issue to be decided in this application is, whether this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can deny grant of interim relief to the workman as contemplated under Section 17-B of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 for payment full wages last drawn by the workman during the pendency of this petition. 18. 17. The core issue to be decided in this application is, whether this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can deny grant of interim relief to the workman as contemplated under Section 17-B of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 for payment full wages last drawn by the workman during the pendency of this petition. 18. The workman/applicant herein submits that he is entitled to full wages last drawn by him under the aforesaid section. On the other hand, the Management/writ petitioner contends that since the award of the Labour Court suffers from jurisdictional error which goes to the root of the claim as the applicant is not a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is a fit case where this Court may not grant the relief under Section 17-B of the Act. 19. To decide this issue, it may be necessary to examine the scope of the aforesaid Section 17-B, which reads as follows: Section 17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher Courts.-Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court: Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be." 20. The aforesaid Section 17-B was introduced by an Amendment Act of 46 of 1982 effective from 21.08.1984. The historical background in which the said Section was introduced and also the scope thereof had been dealt with earlier by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh Vs. Management, (1986) 2 SCC 614 . The aforesaid Section 17-B was introduced by an Amendment Act of 46 of 1982 effective from 21.08.1984. The historical background in which the said Section was introduced and also the scope thereof had been dealt with earlier by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh Vs. Management, (1986) 2 SCC 614 . 21. Referring to the objects and reasons for enactment of the said Section and also the scope of said Section, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid Section was inserted to codify a benefit which was earlier also available to a workman subject to fulfilling certain conditions so as to avoid any hardship to the workman, which could be caused due to long drawn out litigation but was left to the discretion of the Court. The aforesaid Section was specifically inserted with the objective of giving certain benefits to the workman during the pendency of proceedings before the High Court or Hon'ble Supreme Court after an award has been made in favour of the workman. Thus, it is a beneficial enactment as can be seen from the observations made in para Nos. 8, 9, 10 of the Judgment in Bharat Singh (Supra) which are quoted herein below: "8. It is common knowledge that even before Section 17-B was enacted, Courts were, in their discretion, awarding wages to workmen when they felt such a direction was necessary but that was only a discretionary remedy depending upon Court to Court. Instances are legion where workmen have been dragged by the employers in endless litigation with preliminary objections and other technical pleas to tire them out. A fight between a workman and his employer is often times an unequal fight. The legislature was thus aware that because of the long pendency of disputes in Tribunals and Courts, on account of the dilatory tactics adopted by the employer, workmen had suffered. It is against this background that the introduction of this Section has to be viewed and its effects considered. 9. The objects and reasons for enacting the Section is as follows: "When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Courts. It was felt that the delay in the implementation of the award causes hardship to the workman concerned. 9. The objects and reasons for enacting the Section is as follows: "When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Courts. It was felt that the delay in the implementation of the award causes hardship to the workman concerned. It was, therefore, proposed to provide the payment of wages last drawn by the workman concerned, under certain conditions, from the date of the award till the case is finally decided in the Supreme Court or High Courts." 10. The objects and reasons give an insight into the background why this Section was introduced. Though objects and reasons cannot be the ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes, it often times aids in finding out what really persuaded the legislature to enact a particular provision. The objects and reasons here clearly spell out that delay in the implementation of the awards is due to the contests by the employer which consequently cause hardship to the workmen. If this is the object, then would it be in keeping with this object and consistent with the progressive social philosophy of our laws to deny to the workmen the benefits of this Section simply because the award was passed, for example just a day before the Section came into force? In our view it would be not only defeating the rights of the workman but going against the spirit of the enactment. A rigid interpretation of this Section as is attempted by the learned counsel for the respondents would be rendering the workman worse off after the coming into force of this Section. This section has in effect only codified the rights of the workmen to get their wages which they could not get in time because of the long drawn out process caused by the methods employed by the Management. This Section, in other words, gives a mandate to the Courts to award wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied." 22. This Section, in other words, gives a mandate to the Courts to award wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied." 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Bharat Singh (supra) clearly mentioned that benefit under Section 17-B can be granted only when the 3 (three) necessary ingredients are fulfilled, namely: (i) The Labour Court should have directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) The employer should have preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or the Supreme Court, (iii) That the workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. The Supreme Court clarified that it is only when the aforesaid three conditions are fulfilled that the Section becomes operative as observed in para Nos. 6, 7 which are reproduced herein below: "6. Before we deal with the rival contentions, it would be useful to read Section 17-B with which we are concerned: 17-B Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court: Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be. The three necessary ingredients for the application of this Section are (i) the Labour Court should have directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the employer should have preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or in the Supreme Court, (iii) that the workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. 7. The three necessary ingredients for the application of this Section are (i) the Labour Court should have directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the employer should have preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or in the Supreme Court, (iii) that the workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. 7. The question now before us is whether a workman would be denied the benefit of this Section, even if all the above three conditions are satisfied, if the award was passed prior to August 21, 1984? We may, even at this stage, say that in cases where the award had become final prior to August 21, 1984, Section 17-B cannot be pressed into service to reopen the same. It is only when the award is challenged and the challenge is pending, that the Section becomes operative." 23. Subsequently, thereafter, related issues arose in various High Courts questioning the constitutional validity of Section 17-B and also the issue raised before this Court as to whether the aforesaid provision under Section 17-B can restrict the power of High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution to pass any order in invariance with the aforesaid Section 17-B. 24. The Bombay High Court in ElPro International Ltd. Vs. K.B. Joshi, Lab IC at P.P. 1472-1473 had upheld the constitutional validity of Section 17-B and also made the observation that Section 17-B does not encroach upon or override the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court of India under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India. The powers of the High Courts and the Supreme Courts under the aforesaid Articles are paramount and Section 17-B nowhere lays down that in extreme case where it is demonstrated that the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise, a nullity or grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court or the Supreme Court is deterred from exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India as held in para No. 8 in the aforesaid decision, as reproduced herein below: "8. So far as the challenge to Section 17B of the Act based on the ground that it either interferes or encroaches upon the Constitutional powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court is concerned, from the bare reading of this Section it is clear that it does not even remotely refer to the powers of the Courts under Articles 136 or 226, much less of restricting the said powers. This section only guarantees to the workman the payment of wages by the employer during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court, and that too subject to the conditions laid down by the said section and the proviso, irrespective of the result of the proceedings. It also imposes an obligation upon the workman concerned to file an affidavit before the Court stating that he has not been employed in any establishment during the pendency of the proceedings. It also absolves the employer of his obligation to pay such wages, if he is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the workman had been otherwise employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration. As already observed Section 17B operates within a limited sphere. It's operation is subject to conditions laid down by the Section itself. Section nowhere lays down that in extreme cases where it is demonstrated that the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity, or grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court or the Supreme Court is debarred from exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. Therefore it is not possible for us to accept the contention that Section 17B is void as it encroaches upon or overrides the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court of India under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India. The powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution are paramount and Section 17B does not interfere nor restrict the said Constitutional powers." 25. Similarly, in Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. The powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution are paramount and Section 17B does not interfere nor restrict the said Constitutional powers." 25. Similarly, in Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1985) 88 Punj LR 74, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the challenge to this Section as violative of Article 226 of Constitution of India by holding that it does not in any way interfere or restrict the same and it merely guarantees the workers the payment of wages by the employer during the course of proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, subject to the safeguards provided for, irrespective of the result of the proceedings. 26. The aforesaid cases of Elpro International Ltd. and Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank Vs. Kirti Kumar T. Patel, (1999) 2 SCC 106 . 27. In the aforesaid case of Dena Bank (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the aforesaid decisions about the power of the High Court and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution vis-à-vis Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act held that conferment of such power under Section 17-B cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution, as held in Para 23 thereof which is reproduced herein below: "23. As regards the powers of the High Court and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution it may be stated that Section 17-B, by conferring a right on the workman to be paid the amount of full wages last drawn by him during the pendency of the proceedings involving challenge to the award of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal in the High Court or the Supreme Court which amount is not refundable or recoverable in the event of the award being set aside, does not in any way preclude the High Court or the Supreme Court to pass a order directing payment of a higher amount to the workman if such higher amount is considered necessary in the interest of justice. Such a direction would be dehors the provisions contained in Section 17-B and while giving the direction the Court may also give directions regarding refund or recovery of the excess amount in the event of the award being set aside. But we are unable to agree with the view of the Bombay High Court in Elpro International Ltd. (supra) that in exercise of the power under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted under Section 17-B. The conferment of such a right under Section 17-B cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution." 28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dena Bank (supra) though, did not specifically lay down as to under what specific circumstances the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 could pass any order contrary to Section 17-B. However, from a reading of the aforesaid decision and the since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had also made a reference to the observation by the Bombay High Court in the case of Elpro International Ltd. (supra) that in extreme cases if it is demonstrated that the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity or grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court is not deterred from exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India. In other words, if the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullify or grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court in exercise of Article 226 could pass any appropriate order contrary to or notwithstanding Section 17-B. 29. This Court would also like to make the observation that since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held in Dena Bank (supra) that conferment of right under Section 17-B cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India, such an exercise has to be made only after observing the well established principles in this regard. 30. 30. It is now well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court conferred under Article 226 cannot be restricted by any statute or enactment but the exercise of this power is governed by well settled principles in this regard of which, this Court may not dwell any more in detail except to say that it is also well settled that wherever specific statutory provisions are provided, Courts normally do not pass any order contrary to the same, as also observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, (2010) 4 SCC 393 , wherein it was observed as follows: 14. Generally, no court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor can the court direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or directions which are contrary to what has been injected by law. (Vide State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla (1994) 1 SCC 175 , State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309 , Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 453 , University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra (1997) 10 SCC 264 and Karnataka SRTC v. Ashrafulla Khan (2002) 2 SCC 560 .) 15. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr. AIR 1963 SC 996 held as under: (AIR p. 1002, para 12) "12. ... An order which this Court can make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws." (emphasis supplied) 31. Similarly, it was also held in Pitta Naveen Kumar Vs. Raja Narasiah Zangiti, (2006) 10 SCC 261 that a tribunal could not have directed an authority to do something which is contrary to the rules. The relevant portion is extracted as follows: "53. The question, however, remains as to whether the State could reduce the cut-off marks. If the cut-off mark specified by the State is arbitrary, Article 14 would be attracted. The Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to pass an interim order directing reduction in the cut-off mark. The relevant portion is extracted as follows: "53. The question, however, remains as to whether the State could reduce the cut-off marks. If the cut-off mark specified by the State is arbitrary, Article 14 would be attracted. The Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to pass an interim order directing reduction in the cut-off mark. The cut-off mark at 66% was fixed having regard to the ratio of the candidates eligible for sitting at the written examination at 1:50. An interim order as is well-known is issued for a limited purpose. By reason thereof, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant a final relief. 54. Moreover, the Tribunal could not have directed the Commission to do something which was contrary to rules. An interim order is subject to variation or modification. An interim order would ordinarily not survive when the main matter is dismissed. The Commission also did not intend to abide by the said directions. It wanted the State to pass an appropriate order. It was, pursuant to or in furtherance of the said desire of the Commission as also the direction of the Tribunal as contained in its interim order dated 6.1.2005, GOMs 200 was issued. The said Government Order was, thus, not issued by the State of its own. There was no independent application of mind. The statutory requirements for passing an government order independent of the interim directions issued by the Tribunal were wholly absent." 32. This Court would also like to refer to a decision of the Jharkhand High Court rendered in Employer in relation to the Management of Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Ors. 2002 (1) JL JR 134 in which the Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court also dealt with the similar issue and referred to the aforesaid decisions of the Bombay High Court as well as Boyce Mfg. Co. Vs. Pro Lab: (1992) 2 Lab LJ 201 passed by the Madras High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court and made the following observations as follows: "10. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed and the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Godrej and Boyce (supra). Similarly in Dena Bank (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court asserted once again the fact that basic power still originates from Article 226 of the Constitution. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed and the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Godrej and Boyce (supra). Similarly in Dena Bank (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court asserted once again the fact that basic power still originates from Article 226 of the Constitution. On a consideration of all the relevant aspects of the matter, therefore, our view is that Section 17-B of the Act does not take away the unfettered power and plenary jurisdiction of the High Court conferred upon it under Article 226 of the Constitution and that Section 17-B of the Act has to be read with Article 226 of the Constitution. We are of the view, therefore, that whenever a writ petitioner challenges an award passed by a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal and raised contentions concerning the very basic jurisdictional aspects of the Award or brings to the notice of the Court some patent error of law apparent on the face of the award and thus satisfies the Court, prima facie, with reference to the merits of the aforesaid contentions (duly supported by the material on record) that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal erred in passing the Award (award can thus be termed as a perversity or nulity in the eye of law) merely because Section 17-B is there on the Statute Book, there is no mandatory requirement that even in such cases where the High Court, prima facie, is satisfied about such illegality in the Award, it must pass an order directing the writ petitioner to pay wages last drawn to the respondent during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court. We have thus no hesitation in saying that there can be cases where despite Section 17-B being there on the Statute Book the High Court can decline to grant relief paying wages last drawn to a person. At the same time we must hasten to add that cases where the High Court may decline to pass an order under Section 17-B of the Act, have to be rarest of the rare, Granting relief under Section 17-B of the Act and passing order directing payment of wages drawn, is generally the rule; refusing to grant relief under Section 17-B an exception, as it would be in the rarest of the rare cases. The cases may be only those where an award is challenged on the basic issue of jurisdictional error or errors apparent on the face of the Award. One instance of jurisdictional error can be about the absence of the relationship of workman and the employer between the parties. If the writ petitioner challenging the Award before the High Court genuinely, bona fide, seriously and gravely raised the question of absence of this relationship and the High Court is satisfied, prima facie in full measure with reference to such contention of the writ petitioner, which have to be duly supported by the material on record and the High Court comes to a prima facie conclusion that indeed very serious and grave doubts do exit with respect to the question of such relationship between the parties, it can refuse to pass an order under Section 17-B of the Act, thus declining to issue a direction to the writ petitioner to pay wages last drawn to the respondent. Since the satisfaction of the High Court on this score has to be prima facie very clear, it goes without saying that while declining to grant relief under Section 17-B of the Act, we are required to act with utmost circumspection." 33. Thus, the Jharkhand High Court took the view that it is only in the rarest of the rarest case that the High Court can decline to pass an order under Section 17-B of the Act. Grant of relief under Section 17-B of the Act should generally be the rule and refusing the relief under Section 17-B, the exception. 34. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, what this Court would hold is that such benefit under Section 17-B can be denied if any of the three conditions mentioned in Bharat Singh's Case (Supra) is not fulfilled or if there be perversity or patent illegality and without jurisdiction with reference to the aforesaid three ingredients. 35. 34. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, what this Court would hold is that such benefit under Section 17-B can be denied if any of the three conditions mentioned in Bharat Singh's Case (Supra) is not fulfilled or if there be perversity or patent illegality and without jurisdiction with reference to the aforesaid three ingredients. 35. This Court also having considered the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as different High Courts would hold the view that though Section 17-B cannot be construed to restrict or effect the plenary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, such an exercise of power under Article 226 to deny relief under Section 17-B has to be under extreme conditions only, which has been referred by the Jharkhand High Court as the rarest of the rarest case, where the finding by the Labour Court is palpable, erroneous and perverse. But these deficiencies must have reference to only the three essential ingredients highlighted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Singh (Supra) that- (i) The Labour Court should have directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) The employer should have preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or the Supreme Court, (iii) That the workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. 36. Since the aforesaid provision under Section 17-B has been specifically enacted by the legislature keeping into consideration the welfare of the workman, any order passed to deny the benefit under Section 17-B would amount to nullifying the effect of beneficial provision like 17-B. As such, Court ought to be extremely slow in exercising the plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to pass any order denying relief and if done, it must be done only with reference to the aforesaid three ingredients and not otherwise. 37. In this context, it may be also noted that in Paragraph 23 of the decision in Dena Bank (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically stated that "But, we are unable to agree with the view of the Bombay High Court in Elpro International Ltd. that in exercise of the power under Article 226 and 136 of the Constitution, an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted under Section 17-B." 38. This Court would accordingly, clarify that such an exercise to deny benefit under Section 17-B can be made only in extreme case where the nullity of the award is so apparent on the face of it, which would not require any detail examination of the validity of the award, but only with reference to the aforesaid three conditions. 39. The Court has to examine the existence of the 3 (three) conditions required for grant of relief under Section 17-B, as also mentioned by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Bharat Singh (supra), i.e., (i) whether such an award was passed by the Labour Court or not and whether the Labour Court had directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) whether the employer had preferred any proceedings against the award in the High Court or the Supreme Court, (iii) whether the workman had been employed in any establishment during such period. If the aforesaid 3 (three) conditions are fulfilled, this Court is of the view that denial of the relief under Section 17-B would not be permissible as, otherwise, it would amount to nullifying a positive beneficial enactment. 40. As regard the perversity or error in jurisdiction or any such illegality which goes to the root, such deficiency must be also referable to the aforesaid 3 (three) conditions only. For example, if there is no finding by the Labour Court that the applicant is not a workman, in that event, an applicant merely by claiming himself to be a workman cannot avail the benefit under Section 17-B. However, if there is a finding by the Labour Court that the applicant is a workman, in such an event, this Court is of the view that the relief provided under Section 17-B cannot be denied merely on the ground that the finding by the Labour Court that the applicant is a workman is erroneous. This Court holds this view for the reason that if the Court has to ascertain the validity or legality of the finding arrived at by the Labour Court as to whether the applicant is a workman or not, at the stage of consideration of grant of relief under Section 17-B, it would virtually amount to deciding the case on merit finally, which is not contemplated under the law. The relief under Section 17-B is to be granted during the pendency of any such proceedings before the Court and if the Court has to decide the issue as to whether an applicant is a workman or not at that stage, as if it is a final adjudication about the status of the claimant, in spite of such decision arrived at by the Labour Court, it would virtually nullify the aforesaid beneficial provision under Section 17-B. The High Court may ultimately at the final adjudication come to the conclusion that the claimant is not a workman, but that final decision is not relevant for the purpose of grant of relief under Section 17-B. It has been accordingly, held in Dena Bank (Supra) that it is in the nature of subsistence allowances during the pendency of the proceedings. 41. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, this Court will examine the issue at hand. The fact remains that in the present case, in the award of the Labour Court which has been challenged in this petition, there is a specific finding that the applicant is a workman. The Labour Court gave the finding that the Management of the PWES did not entrust any managerial work to Sri Saikia, the applicant. It is also on record and not denied by the petitioner that the applicant was appointed as a Hostel Superintendent with a monthly salary of Rs. 8,000/- (Rupees Eight thousand only) which is less than Rs. 1000/- (Rupees One thousand only) per month so as to attract Clause (iv) under Section 2(s). The petitioner repeatedly has asserted before this Court as well as before the Labour Court that the applicant was appointed as a Hostel Superintendent and his duties was supervisory in nature, maintaining discipline in Hostels as mentioned in para Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the writ petition. As far as definition of 'workman' under Section 2(s) is concerned, it does not include a person as workman who is employed mainly in managerial and administrative capacity and or who being supervisory capacity or draws salary exceeding Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) per month or whose nature of duties and functions is mainly of a managerial nature. Since the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner's main work is supervisory nature but since the applicant has monthly salary of less than Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) per month or whose nature of duties and functions is mainly of a managerial nature. Since the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner's main work is supervisory nature but since the applicant has monthly salary of less than Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only), the case of the applicant cannot be covered under Section 2(s)(iv). Since the Labour Court also has given a finding that the Management of PWES did not entrust any managerial work to the applicant, his case cannot be covered under Section 2(s)(iii). The petitioner may contend that the aforesaid finding arrived by the Labour Court is erroneous. It may be correct. It may ultimately be found to be correct upon proper analysis of evidence and materials on record, which can be done at a time of final hearing of the petition, which exercise in the opinion of this Court cannot be undertaken at this stage while exercising the power to grant relief under Section 17-B during the pendency of the proceedings. 42. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decisions in Deepak Agro Foods (supra) to hold that if a Tribunal lacks jurisdiction and the order is passed without jurisdiction, it is null and void. It has been contended that since applicant was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the award of the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction. This is an issue as mentioned above, which can be decided at the time of final hearing and not at this stage, while considering the plea for grant of relief under Section 17-B. 43. Similarly, reliance of the petitioner on the decision in S.K. Maini (supra) that at the time of deciding as to whether the applicant is a workman or not and the test to be determined is not the designation but the main duties discharged by the person concerned, and not some works intermittently done by such an employees, is also not appropriate at this stage. 44. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the work of the applicant was mainly supervisory nature even if he was assigned some clerical works. 44. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the work of the applicant was mainly supervisory nature even if he was assigned some clerical works. This is also an issue which has to be decided by the Court after referring to the evidence and materials on record and not at this stage for the purpose of consideration of relief under Section 17-B. 45. In the present case, it is not the case of the petitioner that the Labour Court did not direct reinstate of the workman. It is also not the case that the employer did not prefer any proceedings against the award in the High Court. It is also not the case that the workman is employed in any other establishment. Thus, it cannot be said that three ingredients are absent in the present case. 46. It is the case that applicant is not a "workman" and hence, the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to pass the award. But, it is on record that the Labour Court did give a finding that the applicant was a "workman" based on appreciation of evidences on record. In the cross examination of the management witness Sri Ramchandra Kumar Chamuah, the witness says that "at the beginning workman Sri Jayanta Saikia was the only Supervisor to look after all the student hostels. No financial power was entrusted to workman Jayanta Saikia. He had only the Supervisory power of the workers....". Therefore, whether such a conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court on the basis of certain evidences is correct or erroneous cannot be examined at this stage while considering the grant of relief under Section 17-B. Sufficiency or otherwise of evidence and correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court about the status of the applicant as "workman" can be examined later at the time of final adjudication. 47. This Court would also make the observation that while dealing with such beneficial enactment as under Section 17-B, if two prima facie views are possible, one indicating illegality in the award, and the other indicating otherwise, the prima facie view sustaining the award ought to be preferred, as otherwise, the beneficial legislation would be negated. 48. This Court would also observe that in such cases, the prima facie case must be decided without undertaking any elaborate exercise to adjudge the validly of the award. 48. This Court would also observe that in such cases, the prima facie case must be decided without undertaking any elaborate exercise to adjudge the validly of the award. As a corollary, the prima facie view that the award is a nullify to deny relief under Section 17-B must be "self evident", without much endeavor on the part of the Court to discern the same. Any exercise to weigh the evidences to consider the sufficiency or adequacy must be left to be done at a later stage and not at the stage while deciding the issues of grant of relief under Section 17-B. 49. Accordingly, this Court holds that no extreme or extraordinary case has been made out by the petitioner to deny the relief sought by the applicant under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, this Court would direct the petitioner/Management to grant the Applicant/Respondent No. 3 in the writ petition full wages last drawn by him along with the admissible allowances, if any, at the time of termination from his service. 50. Before parting with this order, this Court would like to make an observation that learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that this Court had passed an interim order on 15.11.2017 staying the award passed by the Labour Court and as such, no relief can be granted under Section 17-B to the applicant during the subsistence of the stay order. However, it may be noted that the foresaid interim order was passed ex-parte without hearing the applicant/Respondent No. 3 and it was merely an interim order, which could be modified, varied by this Court, subsequently. Though no specific application has been filed by the respondent No. 3 the applicant herein, for vacating the stay order, this Court is of the view that since this Interlocutory Application has been filed seeking grant of relief under Section 17-B, and also for passing appropriate orders, this Court can mould the relief sought in this Interlocutory Application by modifying the said interim order passed on 15.11.2017 also, so that the Applicant can be granted the relief sought for under Section 17-B. (See B.C. Chaturvedy Vs. Union of India, 1995 (6) SCC 479 for moulding the relief). 51. Union of India, 1995 (6) SCC 479 for moulding the relief). 51. In the result, the earlier ex-parte interim order passed by this Court on 15.11.2017 staying the award dated 18.09.2017 by the learned Labour Court, Assam in Reference Case No. 3/2017 is modified by holding that the impugned award will be subject to the final decision of this Court. This Court has done so for the reason that the applicant has been able to make out a case for grant of relief under Section 17-B and the objection raised by the petitioner is found to be without merit and as such the stay order passed by this Court without hearing the Applicant/workman ought not to be allowed to come in the way of the grant of a statutory relief. 52. For the reasons discussed above, this Interlocutory Application is, accordingly, allowed.