JUDGMENT : Sangeeta Chandra, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. This petition has been filed challenging the order dated 27.02.2008 passed by the opposite party no.2-Joint Director Education, Faizabad, as contained in Annexure No.1 to the petition. 3. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who is the Adhyaksh, Ayodhya Prasad Bachchoo Lal Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Bangaon, Tehsil Tarabganj, District Gonda, which runs the School that such order could not have been passed. It is wholly without jurisdiction as there is no such power for reviewing the earlier order given to the Joint Director, under U.P. Junior High School regarding (Payment of Salary to Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978. 4. The facts of the case as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that Ayodhya Prasad Bachchoo Lal Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Bangaon, Tehsil Tarabganj, District Gonda, is an Institution imparting education upto Intermediate and the petitioner is the Adhyaksh of the Institution, and the opposite party no.5 namely Jagdish Prasad, is the Manager of the Committee of Management. Since the Institution in question is under Grant-in-Aid upto Class VIIIth, the provisions of U.P. Junior High School (Payment of Salary to Teachers and Other Employees), Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred as Act of 1978) are applicable to the Institution. A recommendation was made by the District Basic Shiksha Adhikari on 17.10.2007 to the Joint Director, the opposite party no.2 regarding several problems is making payment of salary to the Teachers and other employees of the Institution and requested for appointment of Authorized Controller. The Joint Director, Education, Devi Patan Mandal, Faizabad, passed the order on 19.01.2008 appointing Finance Accounts Officer, in the office of the BSA, Gonda, as Authorized Controller for the Institution. The Authorized Controller was functioning in accordance with the directions issued by the High Court from time to time in several writ petitions and had complied with such orders. All of a sudden, the opposite party no.2 has passed an order on 27.02.2008 revoking his earlier order passed under Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1978 and reinstated the Management. 5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no provision of review of order by the Education Authorities in the Basic Education Manual and, therefore the opposite party no.2 could have passed the order reviewing his earlier order. 5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no provision of review of order by the Education Authorities in the Basic Education Manual and, therefore the opposite party no.2 could have passed the order reviewing his earlier order. 6. This Court has perused the Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1978 which has been referred to in the impugned order and also in the earlier order dated 19.01.2008. It is being quoted hereinbelow:- "6. Enforcement of provision and directions. - (1) Where on the basis of an inspection of an institution or its records or otherwise, the Education Officer is satisfied that the management has committed default in complying with any direction given under Section 4 or with the provisions of Section 3 or Section 5, he may through the Inspector, recommend to the Regional Deputy Director, Education, that action be taken against the institution under sub-section (2). (2) On receipt of a recommendation under sub-section (1), the Regional Deputy Director, Education, may call upon the management to comply with the said direction or provision or to show cause within a week why the management should not be superseded. (3) Where the management fails to comply as aforesaid or to show cause, or the Regional Deputy Director, Education, considers the cause shown to be insufficient he may by order supersede the management, for such period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order, and authorise any person (hereinafter referred to as the Authorised Controller), to take over the management of the institution for the said period: Provided that the Regional Deputy Director, Education, may where he considers it necessary or expedient so to do - (i) extend the said period from time to time, so however, that the period so extended does not exceed five years in the aggregate; or (ii) revoke the order at any time : Provided further that nothing in clause (ii) of the preceding provision shall bar the passing of a fresh order under this section." 7. It is apparent from a perusal of the Section itself that under the First Proviso Sub Clause (ii), the Authority who has passed the order can also revoke his order at any time. It is apparent from a perusal of the Section itself that under the First Proviso Sub Clause (ii), the Authority who has passed the order can also revoke his order at any time. But after revoking, the Second Proviso further provides that nothing in Clause (ii) of the preceding Proviso shall bar the passing of a fresh order under the Section. 8. It is apparent that on cause being shown to be sufficient by the Management that it has complied with a directions issued by the Education Officer earlier and with the provisions of the Act, the officer has been conferred the power of revoking his earlier order. Therefore, the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, cannot be said to be appropriate. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by a Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Janta Shiksha Prasar Samiti and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2008 26 LCD 433. The facts in the aforecited case were that an Authorized Controller had been appointed in the Institution and elections were conducted by him on 24.01.1997. The elections were granted approval by the Sub Divisional Officer by order dated 09.08.2001 while exercising the power under Section 25 (1) of the Societies Registration Act. Later on, the SDM passed another order on 03.04.2002, recalling his earlier order dated 09.08.2001. The contention before the Court was that Sub Divisional Officer while exercising his jurisdiction under Section 25 (1) of the Act of the Societies Registration Act could not have recalled his earlier order which would amount to exercising the power of review which he was inherently lacking. 10. This Court referred to several judgments rendered by this Court in similar matters, and then observed in Paragraph no.8 as follows:- "From the aforesaid decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the inherent power which an authority can possess is with relation to either a specific provision for the same or application of the principles as are available under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the absence of such a provision an order could be recalled by the authority only upon a proved ground of fraud or misrepresentation. It cannot be disputed that in case an order has been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the authority concerned would be within its power to recall such order. In the absence of such a provision an order could be recalled by the authority only upon a proved ground of fraud or misrepresentation. It cannot be disputed that in case an order has been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the authority concerned would be within its power to recall such order. However, in case no such ground exists an order cannot be recalled by reviewing it by the authority in the absence of a specific power under a statute. Admittedly, the Societies Registration Act does not provide for any such inherent power in the Sub-Divisional Officer while exercising his jurisdiction under Section 25 (1) of the Act. Such inherent power has not been given by any express provision either in the Act or in the Rules. Therefore, in the absence of any provision under the statute permitting exercise of inherent power it cannot be assumed by the Sub-Divisional Officer." 11. It is apparent from a perusal of Section 6 (3) of the Act, 1978, that the power to revoke an order passed under Section 6 (3) of the Act has been specifically granted to the Education Officer, which can be exercised by him on sufficient cause being shown by the elected Committee of Management. The aforecited case is hence not applicable. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.