JUDGMENT A.K. Mishra, J. - Heard Mr. G. N. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, learned counsel for opposite party no.1. 2. In this Lis under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 prayer is made to quash the order dated 06.08.2015 passed by learned S.D.J.M., Panposh in 1CC Case No.312 of 2015 taking cognizance under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 against the present petitioners and proforma opposite parties. 3. The case of the petitioners is that on the allegation that the cheque issued by the present petitioners and proforma opposite parties which was dishonoured, the opposite party, as complainant, had filed 1CC Case No.85 of 2012 in the court of S.D.J.M., Angul in which cognizance was taken under section 138 of the N.I. Act vide order dated 23.7.2012 and processes were issued against the present petitioner no.2 - Mr. Pradyot Pattnaik as Director of the Company. The said cognizance order was challenged before this court by the accused petitioner in CRLMC No.239 of 2013 and this court, vide order dated 11.03.2015 quashed the said order taking cognizance as the company was not arraigned as an accused there. Thereafter the opposite party, as complainant, filed 1CC Case No.312 of 2015 in the court of S.D.J.M., Panposh, Rourkela against the Company and other Directors including Director Pradyot Pattnaik, against whom complaint was filed at Angul but quashed by this court. The Company and Directors are petitioners and proforma opposite parties in this case. CRLMC No.5015 of 2015. 4. Learned S.D.J.M., Panposh condoned the delay in filing the complaint vide order dated 12.5.2015. Thereafter, on 06.08.2015 took cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act and issued processes against 5 accused persons including the company. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged the following points to quash the said cognizance order, such as; (i) Once the cognizance on the self same matter taken in 1CC Case No.85 of 2012 has been quashed by this court in CRLMC No.239 of 2013 on 11.3.2015, the petitioners have no cause of action to file second complaint and continuance of that proceeding would amount to double jeopardy. (ii) Delay of almost four years in presenting the complaint has been condoned without giving notice to the accused - petitioners; and (iii) No notice on dishonor of cheque was given to the Company even though notice was issued to present petitioner no.2, a Director only. 6. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following decisions:- 1. Ramakanta Sahoo and Others vs. State of Orissa and another reported in (2016) 2 OLR 959 . 2. Gold Quest International Private Limited vs. The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in (2014) 59 OCR (SC) 593 . 7. Learned counsel for the complainant - opposite party, per contra, submits that when the order dated 23.7.2012 in 1CC No.85 of 2012 of learned S.D.J.M., Angul taking cognizance was quashed as the company was not arraigned as an accused, as per decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada vs. M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. reported in, AIR 2012 Supreme Court 2795 , the accused persons cannot be said to have acquitted after trial to attract double jeopardy as provided under section 300 Cr.P.C., 1973 8. He further submits that the second complaint even on same facts is maintainable as per decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (passed in Criminal Appeal No.857 of 2018, arising from SLP(Crl.) No.387 of 2018). 9. With regards to delay condonation, it is submitted that the said order condoning delay is not challenged in this case, as such has attained finality and there is no provision to give notice to the other side because the court is to satisfy on sufficient cause. 10. On the last plank, it is submitted that notice to the Company has been issued and they had replied through their Director and the plea of non-issuance of statutory notice about dishonor of cheque is not available to quash the proceeding. 11. The copy of complaint filed, reveals that the accused persons and complainant were dealing in supply of electrical goods and accused persons had delivered 3 nos. of cheques drawn on Indian Bank, Main Road, Rourkela Branch on 31.10.2011 for amounting Rs. 15 lakhs, another 15 lakhs and 5 lakhs towards part payment of the articles supplied. Complainant presented those cheques on 27.3.2012. of cheques drawn on Indian Bank, Main Road, Rourkela Branch on 31.10.2011 for amounting Rs. 15 lakhs, another 15 lakhs and 5 lakhs towards part payment of the articles supplied. Complainant presented those cheques on 27.3.2012. The Bank returned the cheques stating that payment was stopped by the drawer. On 03.04.2012 the complainant issued and served notice to the accused persons. Accused persons replied the same notice through their advocate on 16.4.2012. Those cheques were signed by accused Pradyot Pattnaik, one of the Directors of the Company. Thereafter the complaint was filed before learned S.D.J.M., Angul. Due to inadvertence the company was not impleaded as an accused. After quashing of the proceeding for such defect vide order dated 11.3.2015 passed in CRLMC No.239 of 2013, the present complaint was filed. In fact the copy of order dated 11.3.2015 in CRLMC No.239 of 2013 reveals that the order dated 23.7.2012 passed by learned S.D.J.M., Angul in 1CC No.85 of 2012 taking cognizance under section 138 of N.I. Act was quashed as the company was not arraigned as an accused. (a). In Aneeta Hada case (supra) their Lordships have held that Section 141 of the Act is concerned with the offences by the company. It makes the other persons vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. The vicarious liability gets attracted when the condition precedent under Section 141 namely, offence by company stands satisfied. It necessarily follows that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative only then the other categories of offenders can be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. (b). It necessarily follows that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative only then the other categories of offenders can be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. (b). In the Om Prakash Singh case (supra) their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court, placing reliance upon Udai Shankar Awasthy vs. The State of U.P. reported in, (2013) 2 SCC 435 case have stated that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the Court, or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, the second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit. (c). The decision in Ramakanta Sahoo case (supra) is not relevant as it is considered as to whether dismissal of a complaint under section 256(1) Cr.P.C., 1973 was amount to acquittal to file second complaint but at paragraph 11 of the said decision it is held that second complaint can be entertained in exceptional circumstances, such as i) Where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record; or ii) On a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint; or iii) It was manifestly absurd or unjust; or iv) Where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. 12. In view of the above Law, it is clear that quashing of cognizance order by this Court in CRLMC No.239 of 2013 vide order dated 11.3.2015 cannot be treated as a bar under section 300 Cr.P.C , 1973for filing second complaint. 13. Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions Yogendra Pratap Singh vs. Savitri Pandey & Anr. reported in (2014) 59 OCR (SC) 577 and Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. reported in (2014) 59 OCR (Sc) 289 held that second complaint could have been filed where the cheque was drawn. 13. Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions Yogendra Pratap Singh vs. Savitri Pandey & Anr. reported in (2014) 59 OCR (SC) 577 and Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. reported in (2014) 59 OCR (Sc) 289 held that second complaint could have been filed where the cheque was drawn. In the case at hand it comes within the jurisdiction of S.D.J.M., Panposh. So the filing of second complaint before learned S.D.J.M., Panposh cannot be said illegal. 14. The delay in filing second complaint was condoned by the learned S.D.J.M., Panposh vide his order dated 12.5.2015. The said order is not challenged. The satisfaction of the Magistrate that complainant had sufficient cause to prefer complaint in delay was in conformity with the Section 142 (b) Proviso of the N.I. Act. 15. The petitioners have stated in their petition under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 at paragraph 6 that the statutory demand notice was issued to the petitioner No.2 (a Director) only and such a notice cannot be treated to be a notice under the Company. 16. Company is a juristic person. The notice under proviso (b) of section 138 of the N.I. Act requires the same to be given in writing to the drawer of the cheque. The liability of a company is provided under section 141 of the N.I. Act. So whether the notice was properly served or not and the extent of liability of Directors can only be seen during trial. At this stage before this court, there is no unimpeachable evidence in that regard. 17. In the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A. R. Radha Krishna vs. Dasari Deepthi & Ors. (Criminal Appeal Nos.403-405 of 2019, Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.9626-28 of 2017) it is held that "in a case pertaining to an offence under Section 138 and Section 141 of the Act, the law requires that the complaint must contain a specific averment that the Director was in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the company's business at the time when the offence was committed. The High Court, in deciding a quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 must consider whether the averment made in the complaint is sufficient or if some unimpeachable evidence has been brought on record which leads to the conclusion that the Director could never have been in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. 18. While the role of a Director in a company is ultimately a question of fact, and no fixed formula can be fixed for the same, the High Court must exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 when it is convinced from the material on record that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court. [See Gunamala Sales Private Limited vs. Anu Mehta and Ors., (2015) 1 SCC 103 ]" 19. Regards being had to the above facts, I am of the considered opinion that the order dated 12.5.2015 in the matter of condonation of delay being not specifically challenged, has attained finality. The quashing of first complaint vide order dated 11.3.2015 in CRLMC No.239 of 2013 is not a bar to maintain second complaint. There is no unimpeachable material available before this court at present as to whether notice was properly issued to the Company and whether the Directors of the Company could never have been in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant point of time. The said facts can be considered at the time of trial. 20. Hence no illegality or infirmity in the cognizance order dated 06.08.2015 of the learned S.D.J.M., Panposh in ICC Case No.312 of 2015 is found. In that view of the matter there is no justification to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 to quash the proceeding. Accordingly the CRLMC stands dismissed.