JUDGMENT : Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J. 1. The writ petitioner was a permanent employee of M/s. Gluconate Health Limited, a Company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Company"). 2. With effect from October 1, 1963 the petitioner was appointed as the Laboratory Assistant of the factory of the Company. With effect from July 10, 1979 the petitioner was transferred from the factory to the Head Office of the Company where he worked till June 12, 1994. However, with effect from June 13, 1994 the Company transferred the petitioner from the Head Office to the factory. 3. The petitioner challenged his said transfer to the factory by filing the writ petition, W.P. 694 of 1997 before this Court. On July 8, 1997 when the said writ petition, W.P. 694 of 1997 was taken up for hearing, a learned Single Judge of this Court found that in the meantime, the petitioner had accepted his transfer from the Head Office to the factory of the Company. Thus, by an order dated July 8, 1997 the learned Single Judge did not interfere with the order of transfer of the petitioner to the factory of the Company. The learned Single Judge, however, disposed of the said writ petition by holding that in terms of the impugned order of transfer, the petitioner would be entitled to all existing benefits as he was enjoying on the date of issuance of the transfer order. 4. According to the petitioner, while posted at the Head office of the Company he was receiving tiffin allowance and over time allowance, but after being transferred to the factory the Company stopped to pay him tiffin allowance and over time allowance. He, thus, filed a contempt application, being C.C. No. 319 of 1997 against the Managing Director of the Company alleging willful violation of the said order dated July 8, 1997. In this writ petition the petitioner has not disclosed any copy of the said contempt application. By an order dated March 27, 1998, the learned Single Judge held that in the contempt application the petitioner complained of the fact that he had been enjoying certain benefits in the Head Office which were not made available to him while serving at the factory. By an order dated March 27, 1998, the learned Single Judge held that in the contempt application the petitioner complained of the fact that he had been enjoying certain benefits in the Head Office which were not made available to him while serving at the factory. By the said order it was further held that the benefits, which the petitioner alleged not to have been paid were available to the employees of the Company who were posted at the Head Office in general and were not the benefits which were personal to the petitioner. According to the learned Single Judge, since the petitioner had been transferred to the factory the said benefits which were not extended to all employees posted in the factory cannot be made available to the petitioner in terms of the said order dated July 8, 1997. With the said findings, by the order dated March 27, 1998, the learned Single Judge rejected the contempt application, being C.C. 319 of 1997. 5. On February 29, 2004, the petitioner took early voluntary retirement from the service of the company. From the averments made in the petition and the documents disclosed by the petitioner, it appears that after passing of the said order dated March 27, 1998 till date of his retirement the petitioner did not raise any grievance with regard to non-payment of his benefits either on account of tiffin allowance or over time allowance. In fact, the petitioner has not disputed the assertion made by the Company that along obtaining with the benefits of Early Voluntary Retirement Scheme he received all his retiral benefits from the Company. 6. In the year 2011, the petitioner, however, filed an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, "the Act of 1947") before the First Labour Court, Kolkata claiming tiffin allowance and over time allowance from June 1994 to December, 2003 alleging the same had not been paid by the Company. By an order dated October 31, 2017, the learned Single Judge, First Labour Court, Kolkata rejected the said application filed by the petitioner under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947. 7. It is the said order dated October 31, 2017 passed by the learned Judge, First Labour Court, Kolkata, which has been assailed by the petitioner in this writ application. 7. It is the said order dated October 31, 2017 passed by the learned Judge, First Labour Court, Kolkata, which has been assailed by the petitioner in this writ application. By the impugned order, it has been held that it is well settled principle of law that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947 is restricted to interpretation of the awards or settlements on which workman's right rests and, as such, the application of the petitioner-workman to decide his entitlement to receive tiffin allowance and over time allowance is outside the scope of industry under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947. The learned Labour Court also repelled the contention of the petitioner that the said order dated March 27, 1998 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the said contempt application, C.C. 319 of 1997, had already determined the right of the petitioner to claim either tiffin allowance or over time allowance during the period of his service attached to the factory of the Company. 8. Mr. Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing in support of the writ petition submitted that the petitioner's claim on account of tiffin allowance and over time allowance can be traced in the Office Order dated June 9, 1997 issued by the Company. In this regard, he referred to Clauses 6 and 7 of the said Office Order dated June 9, 1997, being Annexure-"P/2" to the writ petition. He further referred to the order dated August 5, 2016 passed by the Division Bench in FMA 3508 of 2013 filed by the present petitioner against the Company. By the said order the Division Bench of this Court, to which myself was also a party, held that the petitioner being initially posted at the factory and subsequently transferred to the Head Office with effect from July, 2002 to January, 2004 he is entitled to get compensatory allowance, as claimed in the writ petition and directed learned Labour Court for calculation of amount of compensatory allowance to be received by the present petitioner (the appellant in the said appeal), as compensatory allowance, as filed under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947. Urging these facts, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner pressed for setting aside of the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court. 9. However, Mr. Urging these facts, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner pressed for setting aside of the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court. 9. However, Mr. Amitava Chaudhuri, learned counsel appearing for the Company, strenuously contended that the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court is not vitiated by any illegality calling for any interference by this Court. He contended that the petitioner's claim for tiffin allowance and overtime allowance during the period of his service at the factory of the company is not founded on any award of settlement and as such, the Labour Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C (2) of the Act of 1947 did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the petitioner. Thus, the impugned order dated August 31, 2017 passed by the Labour Court is not vitiated by any illegality. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the company relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak & Anr. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 235 . 10. Mr. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the State respondents, also adopted the submissions made by Mr. Chaudhuri, learned counsel appearing for the Company and supported the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court, Kolkata. 11. I have considered the materials on record as well as the arguments advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties in the present case, the petitioner could not dispute the fact urge by the respondent company that immediately after his superannuation he received all his retiral benefits from the respondent company. Further, the order dated August 31, 2017 challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition has been passed by the learned Tribunal in an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947. From a bare reading of Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947, it is evident that under the said provision the Industrial Tribunal cannot adjudicate any dispute of entitlement or basis of the claim of a workman and it can only interpret the award of settlement on which the workman has based its claim. Even in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak & Anr. Even in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak & Anr. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 235 , (supra) the Supreme Court held a Labour Court can pass an order under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947 only when the entitlement of the workman has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and, thereafter, for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation, that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33C(2) of the Act as like of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. In the said decision, the Supreme Court further held that the power of the Labour Court under Section 32C(2) of the Act of 1947 extends to interpretation of the award or the settlement on which the workman's right rests. Therefore, in the absence of any settlement or award conferring a right upon the petitioner to receive tiffin allowance or overtime allowance, during the period of his service at the factory of the respondent I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated October 31, 2017 passed by the Tribunal. 12. For the reasons as aforesaid, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court. Accordingly, the writ petition being W.P. 5129(W) of 2018 stands dismissed. 13. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.