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Rajasthan High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 2136 (RAJ)

Deeparam Daukiya v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation

2019-08-08

DINESH MEHTA

body2019
ORDER : DINESH MEHTA, J. 1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has laid challenge to the 'No Objection Certificate' dated 11.07.2018, issued by the respondent Municipal Corporation, Jodhpur, in favour of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to erect mobile tower at the plot of respondent No. 4. 2. Though various grounds have been raised in the present writ petition, but without going into the same, learned counsel confined himself to the moot question, as to whether mandatory requirement(s) of the Order dated 06.02.2017, issued by the State Government in relation to installation of mobile tower in the State, has been complied with or not. 3. On 04.07.2019, this Court had directed the Municipal Corporation to file a categorical affidavit as to whether a notice as mandated by sub-para (3) of Para 6 of the Order dated 06.02.2017, was affixed on the designated place or not? 4. Relevant provision contained in Para 6(3) of the Order is reproduced hereinbelow:- "(3) As soon as the Nodal Officer receives the application, he shall issue a public notice for seven days in Form-4 calling upon objections of any interested person. The notice, giving details of all such applications in Form-4, shall be exhibited by the Nodal Officer on the notice board of his office and a conspicuous of place near the concerned site. The public notice shall also be published on website of the Nodal Officer and local body." 5. An affidavit dated 19.07.2019 has been filed by the Municipal Corporation, wherein it has been fairly and candidly conceded that affixation of public notice dated 15.05.2018 was not made on the conspicuous place/place of installation of the tower. 6. Mr. Rajvendra Saraswat, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that it is settled proposition of law that an act, which is required to be done in a particular manner, has to be done in such manner and the orders or guidelines, issued by the State/competent authority, have to be strictly adhered to. 7. He argued that in wake of the solitary admitted fact that the public notice was not affixed, the petitioner's writ petition deserves to be allowed and the 'No Objection Certificate' dated 11.07.2018, oppugned in the petition, deserves to be quashed. 8. Mr. Anuroop Singhi, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 7. He argued that in wake of the solitary admitted fact that the public notice was not affixed, the petitioner's writ petition deserves to be allowed and the 'No Objection Certificate' dated 11.07.2018, oppugned in the petition, deserves to be quashed. 8. Mr. Anuroop Singhi, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, argued that even if the observance of the relevant provision was not ensured, the petitioner is required to establish the prejudice, which has been caused to him, on account of failure of affixing the public notice. He submitted that all the possible objections are before this Court and the Court may examine them and decide, as to whether the 'No Objection Certificate', issued in favour of the answering respondent, is in any manner, contrary to law or otherwise bad in the eyes of law. 9. Mr. Suniel Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent Corporation supported the grant of 'No Objection Certificate' and contended that though public notice was not affixed as per sub-para (3) of Para 6 of the Order, but other requirements of law have been adhered to and the 'No Objection Certificate' in question is perfectly in harmony and sync with the law, particularly Government order dated 06.02.2017, issued in this regard. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. Indisputably, the public notice, as envisaged under sub-para (3) of Para 6 of the Order, has not been affixed on the place of installation of tower; hence, the violation or breach of the mandate of law is writ large. 12. Mr. Singhi's stance based on 'no prejudice principle', which is also known as 'useless formality theory', is untenable in the present case, because this principle can be invoked only when the Court comes to a conclusion that it will be futile to issue a writ or it would be an empty formality, having regard to the facts obtaining in the case. But here, the competent authority, sitting in his office, cannot presuppose the possible objection or concern, which an interested party can bring to his notice. If the stand of the respondents is accepted, the requirement of inviting objection would itself be rendered an empty formality. 13. My above referred view is fully fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors. If the stand of the respondents is accepted, the requirement of inviting objection would itself be rendered an empty formality. 13. My above referred view is fully fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1999) 6 SCC 237 , wherein it has been observed as below: "It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice." 14. Further in Aligarh Muslim University & Ors. Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan reported in (2000) 7 SCC 529 , relevant excerpt whereof is reproduced thus: "The 'useless formality' theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above,- there has been considerable debate of the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J., and Straughton L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, De. Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise, the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said, that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via-media rules. We do not think it necessary, in this case, to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case." 15. According to this Court, non-compliance of statutory provision or guidelines itself is a prejudice, no de facto prejudice is required to be shown. The Court cannot grant post-decisional hearing either to the petitioner or to the respondents. Once it has come to the Court's notice that affixation, as required, was not done, this Court would not turn itself into an adjudicating or appellate authority. 16. A gainful reference to a few judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme court can be made here. 17. In S.L. Kapoor Vs Jagmohan and Ors. Once it has come to the Court's notice that affixation, as required, was not done, this Court would not turn itself into an adjudicating or appellate authority. 16. A gainful reference to a few judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme court can be made here. 17. In S.L. Kapoor Vs Jagmohan and Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 379 wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed as below: "In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal." 18. The aforementioned view has further been reiterated in M.C. Mehta (supra). Relevant para is being reproduced hereinbelow: "It is true that in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40, it has been held that breach of principles of natural justice is in itself sufficient to grant relief and that no further de facto prejudice need be shown. It is also true that the said principles have been followed by this Court in several cases but we might point out that this Court has not laid down any absolute rule. This is clear from the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR 746. It is also true that the said principles have been followed by this Court in several cases but we might point out that this Court has not laid down any absolute rule. This is clear from the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR 746. After stating (p. 395) that 'principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed' and that 'non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to a man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary', Chinnappa Reddy J also laid down an important qualification (p. 395) as follows: As we said earlier, where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs." 19. Further in State Bank of Patiala & Ors. Vs. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 , Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as below: "(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : Procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed.-Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice in established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. If no prejudice in established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity inspite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is sell- evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To report, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle slated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle." 20. The 'No Objection Certificate' dated 11.07.2018, issued without following the procedure prescribed by law, is liable to be quashed; hence it is quashed. The writ petition is allowed. 21. It will be required of the respondents to affix a public notice, as required under sub-para (3) of Para 6 of the Order, in accordance with law. 22. In view of the peculiar facts of the present case, it will be required of the respondent No. 1 to send a notice to the petitioner No. 1, at his residential address, so also on his e-mail ID, viz., deepakgehlot@sbi.co.in. 23. Needless to observe that the petitioners shall be free to submit their objections, whereafter the respondent No. 3 shall pass appropriate order in accordance with law, while objectively considering the concern shown by the interested persons. 24. It goes without saying that the tower in question, shall be made functional/operational only after grant of a valid 'No Objection Certificate'. 25. Needless to observe that the petitioners shall be free to submit their objections, whereafter the respondent No. 3 shall pass appropriate order in accordance with law, while objectively considering the concern shown by the interested persons. 24. It goes without saying that the tower in question, shall be made functional/operational only after grant of a valid 'No Objection Certificate'. 25. Having heard rival contentions, as a parting remark, this Court is constrained to observe that the Order of the State Government dated 06.02.2017, particularly sub-para (3) of Para 6 thereof, does not provide sufficient opportunity to the stake holders or aggrieved persons to submit their objections. The requirement, as envisaged under sub-para (3) of Para 6 of the Order that a public notice in Form-4 shall be published on official website of the concerned Nodal Officer, local body and affixation on the conspicuous place near the concerned site are not sufficient to evoke or invite public attention. A common man or citizen is not expected to scroll through the official website of the local body, simply with a view to conduct a fishing inquiry on regular basis to ascertain as to whether a mobile tower is being installed in an area around him. 26. As against it, the draft Rajasthan Telecom Infrastructure Policy, 2015 encompassed a rather apt provision in sub-para (5) of Para 10 of the policy, which reads thus: "(5) During scrutiny of application Competent Authority shall issue a public notice for seven days in Form-3 calling upon objections of any interested person. The notice shall be exhibited by the Competent Authority on the notice board of his office and office of Local Body, as the case may be, and shall also be published in a State level newspaper on the cost of the applicant." 27. One fails to understand why requirement of publication in the newspaper has been obliterated in the Order of 2017. It would be appropriate that the State amends the order in such a way that it mandates publication of the notice in prescribed form in the daily newspaper, having circulation, at least in the local area of the local body, in which the mobile tower is being installed. 28. A copy of this order be sent to the Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development and Housing of the State Government.