JUDGMENT : R. PONGIAPPAN, J. PRAYER in S.A. No. 1145/1997: Appeal filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, against the Judgment and Decree, dated 10.10.1996, passed in A.S. No. 89 of 1993, on the file of the Subordinate Court, Pudukottai, reversing the Judgment and Decree, dated 23.09.1992 passed in O.S. No. 398 of 1987, on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif, Pudukottai. PRAYER in S.A. No. 1170/1997: Appeal filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, against the Judgment and Decree passed Cross Appeal No. 89 of 1993, dated 10.10.1996, on the file of Sub Court, Pudukottai, confirming the Judgment and Decree passed in O.S. No. 398 of 1987, dated 23.09.1992, on the file of the Principal District Munsif at Pudukkottai as regard to Suit "B" Schedule properties. 1. Both the Second Appeals are directed against the Judgment and Decree passed in A.S. No. 89 of 1993, on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Pudukkottai. 2. Originally, the plaintiff has filed a Suit before the learned District Munsif at Pudukkottai in O.S. No. 398 of 1987 and seeking the relief of declaration, declaring that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and for the relief of injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd respondents in interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. 3. The learned Principal District Munsif, Pudukkottai, by Judgment and Decree, dated 23.09.1992, declared that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of plaint "A" schedule property and he has dismissed the Suit in respect to plaint "B" schedule property. Aggrieved over the said findings, the defendants 1 and 2/respondents 1 and 2 herein filed an appeal in A.S. No. 89 of 1993, on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Pudukkottai, praying to set aside the findings arrived at by the learned trial Judge, in respect to suit "A" schedule property. Similarly, the plaintiff herein filed a cross appeal in A.S. No. 89 of 1993 to set aside the findings arrived at by the trial Court in respect to "B" schedule property. 4. By Judgment and Decree, dated 10.10.1996, the learned Subordinate Judge, Pudukkottai, allowed the appeal and set aside the findings arrived at by the trial Court in respect to "A" schedule property. However, he dismissed the cross appeal filed by the plaintiff in respect to "B" schedule property. 4. By Judgment and Decree, dated 10.10.1996, the learned Subordinate Judge, Pudukkottai, allowed the appeal and set aside the findings arrived at by the trial Court in respect to "A" schedule property. However, he dismissed the cross appeal filed by the plaintiff in respect to "B" schedule property. Feeling aggrieved over the same, the plaintiff is before this Court with these present two Second Appeals. 5. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as, as described before the trial Court. 6. The averments made in the plaint, in brief, are as follows:- (i) The suit properties described in plaint "A" schedule which then belonged to one Thombathal was when under the Management, possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff's father Rengavelalar by himself paying kist also. Natesa Velalar was a close relative to the plaintiffs family. Considering the close relationship with Natesa Velalar, there was a proposal for the marriage of the 3rd defendant with Natesa Velalar. In these circumstances, the said Thombathal had already decided to settle the whole plaint "A" schedule property, in favour of the plaintiff alone, later wanted to include the said Natesa Velalar also in the settlement deed. Accordingly, she had executed a settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff by also including the name of said Natesa Velalar on 17.04.1961. The said settlement deed had been duly stamped, executed, attested and registered. However, the possession and enjoyment of the plaint "A" schedule property continued with the plaintiff. (ii) Since Natesa Velalar had became too sick and also had developed some illicit connections with others, his marriage proposal with the 3rd defendant had been dropped. The said Natesa Velalar had bequeathed his undivided share in the plaint "A" schedule property, in favour of the plaintiff, by a Will, dated 15.01.1981. The said Will is his last will. Thus, the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the plaint "A" schedule property. Mutation are effected in respect to plaint "A" schedule property, in the name of plaintiff. After issuing patta in favour of the plaintiff, the defendants 1 and 2 appeared to have secured the inclusion of their names without any enquiry or notice. (iii) The plaint "B" schedule property belonged to one Ayyavoo @ Ayyakkannu, the father of Palaniyandi. The same was purchased by the plaintiff's father on 14.09.1918. After issuing patta in favour of the plaintiff, the defendants 1 and 2 appeared to have secured the inclusion of their names without any enquiry or notice. (iii) The plaint "B" schedule property belonged to one Ayyavoo @ Ayyakkannu, the father of Palaniyandi. The same was purchased by the plaintiff's father on 14.09.1918. The Plaintiff's father Rengavelalar died in or about 1952, leaving his wife, his only son the plaintiff herein and the only daughter, the 3rd defendant herein. The father of the defendants 1 and 2 was the husband of plaintiff's paternal aunt. By this time, the defendants 1 and 2 and their father came to look after the plaintiff and his properties. (iv) While in such management, they had not chosen to effect in the revenue registry in favour of the plaintiff for the plaint "B" schedule properties. The plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 lived in the same house as one family. At the time of updating the land records, the defendants 1 and 2 attempted to claim patta for "A" schedule properties in their favour. Except few items of the land in the Neppugai Village, the defendants secretly procured the inclusion of their names in patta. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Pudukkottai, has to rectify the mistake and to give patta in his name by removing their names, till the plaintiff by getting proper order. The defendants have no manner of right or possession over the suit lands. (v) The plaintiff's mother also died intestate five years back. The 3rd defendant is the sister of the plaintiff. She did not claim any rights in the suit property and she had released her rights in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff had become the absolute owner of the "B" schedule property also. Taking advantage of wrongful inclusion of their names in the patta for some items of the suit properties, on 17.05.1987, the defendants attempted to cut the trees standing in the suit land. Hence, the Suit. 7. The averments made in the written statement filed by the defendant, in brief, are as follows:- (i) It is true that Thombathai had settled her properties in favour of the plaintiff and the deceased Natesa Velalar in equal moieties. One Mokkayee is the elder sister of Thombathal. Plaintiff is the son's son of the said Mokkayee. The deceased Natesa Velalar is the daughter's son of said Mokkayee. One Mokkayee is the elder sister of Thombathal. Plaintiff is the son's son of the said Mokkayee. The deceased Natesa Velalar is the daughter's son of said Mokkayee. The said Thombathal had settled the properties, on account of the natural love and affection, which she had for the settlees, who have been looking after her and her affairs. As a matter of fact, the deceased Natesa Velalar had been with her throughout her life bestowing his best attention to the welfare of the said Thombathal. The plaintiff Chinnappan and Natesa Velalar have been cultivating the lands in equal moieties. The said Natesa Velalar died on account of heart attack, after ailing for few days. It is false to state that Natesa Velalar had executed a Will in favour of the said Chinnappan. The alleged Will is a forged document. The alleged signature of Natesa Velalar is also a rank forgery. (ii) After the death of said Natesa Velalar, the defendants 1 and 2, as his brothers, have succeeded to his estate and have been in enjoyment of the properties by cultivating them and by paying kist etc., It is absolutely false to allege that the "A" schedule properties in full have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had manipulated to get patta in his name. The "B" schedule properties are the ancestral properties of the defendants 1 and 2. It is denied that plaintiff's father Renga Velalar had acquired the same for full and proper consideration by means of registered sale deed, dated 14.09.1918. The defendants 1 and 2 have perfected their title by adverse possession long over the statutory period. Even assuming for arguments sake, without admitting that the alleged sale deed, dated 14.09.1918 is true, the plaintiff's father as well as the plaintiff has lost all their rights over these properties by their ouster long over the statutory period. The "B" schedule properties are, and have been in possession and enjoyment of the defendants 1 and 2 in their own right, as absolute owners. It is equally false to allege that the plaintiff and defendants lived in the same roof. There is no cause of action. The Suit is not maintainable. 8. Based on the above pleadings, the learned Principal District Munsif, Pudukkottai, framed necessary issues and tried the suit. 9. It is equally false to allege that the plaintiff and defendants lived in the same roof. There is no cause of action. The Suit is not maintainable. 8. Based on the above pleadings, the learned Principal District Munsif, Pudukkottai, framed necessary issues and tried the suit. 9. Before the trial Court, during the time of trial, on the side of the plaintiff 4 witnesses have been examined as PWs. 1 to 4 and on their side 28 documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A28. On the side of the defendants, 2 witnesses have been examined as DWs. 1 and 2 and 23 documents were marked as Exs.B1 to B23. 10. Having considered all the materials placed before him, the learned Principal District Munsif, Pudukkottai, concluded that in respect to "A" schedule property, the plaintiff is the absolute owner and in respect to "B" schedule property, the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. 11. In the appeal filed by the defendants, the findings arrived at by the trial Court was interfered and held that in respect to the plaint "A" schedule property, the plaintiff has not proved his title. Ultimately, the findings arrived at by the trial Court in respect to "A" schedule property was set aside. Aggrieved over the same, the plaintiff is before this Court with this Second Appeal i.e. S.A. No. 1145 of 1997. Similarly, the Cross Appeal filed by the plaintiff in respect to the suit "B" schedule property has also been dismissed by the First Appellate Court. Aggrieved over the same, the plaintiff has filed the Second Appeal in S.A. No. 1170/1997. 12. Since both the Second Appeals are arosed from the same Judgment and the parties to the appeals are one and the same, it is appropriate to deliver a common judgment for both the appeals. 13. At the time of admission, this Court has formulated the following substantial questions of law, for consideration:- “1. Whether the decision of the lower appellate court in reversing the well founded Judgment and Decree of the trial Court as regards A schedule property in the absence of clinching material evidence is correct? 2. Whether the decision of the lower appellate Court in disregarding the evidentiary value of Ex.A2 is proper and correct? 3. Whether the decision of the lower appellate court in reversing the well founded Judgment and Decree of the trial Court as regards A schedule property in the absence of clinching material evidence is correct? 2. Whether the decision of the lower appellate Court in disregarding the evidentiary value of Ex.A2 is proper and correct? 3. Whether the Courts below were right in rejecting Ex.A3, dated 14.09.1918, on the footing that it is sham and nominal in the absence of any supporting title deeds or material proof for the same? Substantial Questions of Law Nos. 1 to 3: 14. In respect to the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants, the admitted facts are that the suit schedule property originally belongs to one Thombathal. Through her husband Chinnaian, the said Thombathal is not having any issue. However, the said Thombathal had a sister in the name of Mokkayee, who is the paternal grandmother of the plaintiff Chinnappan. The father of the plaintiff Rengavelalar had one sister in the name of Cauvery Ammal. Through her husband Ayyavu the said Kavery Ammal blessed with three male children viz. Palaniandi Velalar, Natesa Velalar and Muniandi Velalar in which, Palaniandi Velalar and Muniyandi Velalarr are arrayed as 1st and 2nd defendants in the suit. Further, the sister of the plaintiff, Kuttayammal was arrayed as the 3rd defendant in the suit. 15. It is the case of the plaintiff that since the Thombathal is not having any issue, she executed a settlement deed in favour of Natesa Velalar and in the name of plaintiff, in respect of "A" schedule property (Ex.A1). Since the said Natesa Velalar, who is the brother of defendants 1 and 2 was in the care and custody of the plaintiff, he executed a Will, dated 15.01.1981 in which, he bequeathed the half share of "A" schedule property in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, vide Ex.A1 settlement deed and Ex.A2 Will, the plaintiff become entitled to the entire "A" schedule property. 16. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that the deceased Natesa Velalar is a drunkard and using his position, the plaintiff obtained his signature and thereafter fabricated Ex.A2 Will. In otherwise, in respect to execution of Ex.A1 settlement, there was no denial on the side of the 1st and 2nd respondents. 17. 16. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that the deceased Natesa Velalar is a drunkard and using his position, the plaintiff obtained his signature and thereafter fabricated Ex.A2 Will. In otherwise, in respect to execution of Ex.A1 settlement, there was no denial on the side of the 1st and 2nd respondents. 17. The learned counsel, who appearing on behalf of the plaintiff would contend that to prove Ex.A2 Will one of the attestor Veerappan S/o Malayavelar was examined as PW-2. His evidence is very clear in respect to execution of the Will. In the said situation, while at the time of disposing the first appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge has held that the execution of the Will is not proved. On the other hand, the learned trial Judge, after comparing the signatures of the testator with the other admitted documents and found that the Will was executed only by the said Natesa Velalar. 18. So, it is necessary to find out whether the findings arrived at by the first appellate Court in respect to the proving of Will is having the valid reason or not. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff relied on the Judgment of this Court in Chandramohan vs. Pushpa, 2011 (7) MLJ 160 and made a submission that the first appellate court without comparing the admitted signature of the testator found in other documents mainly believing the evidence given by PW-2 and held that since the testator Natesa Velalar is a drunkard and by using his position there may be a chance for fabricating the Will and resultantly held that the Will was not proved. It is absolutely not within the ambit of Law. Now on seeing the Judgment relied on by the appellant, this Court has held as follows:- “The 1st Appellate Court has not even chosen to place reliance on any contemporaneous admitted signature of the defendant or admitted anti litem motem signature of the defendant, but only on the post of litem motem signatures of the defendant in the vakalat and deposition and that itself is ex facie and prima facie untenable.” 19. Only by following the said Judgment, the learned trial Judge, while at the time of disposing the Suit, has held that the signatures found in Ex.A2 with Ex.B,1 alleged to be the signatures of Natesa Velalar is one and the same and ultimately concluded the Suit as the Will was proved. 20. In this aspect, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants would contend that in general, the Will has to be proved under the provisions of Indian Evidence Act. In fact, it is the duty of the propounder to remove the suspicious circumstances arising in and around execution of the Will. He relied on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Guro vs. Atma Singh, 1992 (2) SCC 507 wherein our Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:- “With regard to proof of a will, the law is well-settled that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement prescribed in the case of a will by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the will could be accepted as genuine. Such suspicious circumstances may be a shaky signature, a feeble mind and unfair and unjust disposal of property or the propounder himself taking a leader part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicion before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator.” 21. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicion before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator.” 21. Further, he has relied on one another Judgment of our Hon'ble Apex Court in Gurdial Kaur and Others vs. Kartar Kaur and Others, 1998 (4) SCC 384 , wherein it has been held as follows:- “The law is well settled that the conscience of the Court must be satisfied that the will in question was not only executed and attested in the manner required under the Succession Act, 1925 but it should also be found that the said will was the product of the free volition of the executant who had voluntarily executed the same after knowing and understanding the contents of the will. Therefore, whenever there is any suspicious circumstance, the obligation is cast on the propounder of the will to dispel suspicious circumstance. As in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal below did not accept the valid execution of the will by indicating reasons and coming to a specific finding that suspicion had not been dispelled to the satisfaction of the Court and such finding of the Court of Appeal below has also has been upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment, we do not find any reason to interfere with such decision. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.” 22. So, on culling out the two judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents would reveal the fact that the duty is cast upon the propounder to remove all suspicious circumstances arising in execution of the Will. In this aspect, before comparing the signature found in Ex.A2 with Ex.B1, it is necessary to see the evidence given by PW-2, who is the attestors in the Will. First of all, PW-1 himself admitted as at the time of executing the Will the testator Natesa velalar is suffering from some illness. In otherwise, PW-2 has stated in his cross-examination that the testator is having the habit to consume liquor in the morning itself. Further, if he has not consumed the liquor regularly, his fingers are went upto to severing stage. In otherwise, PW-2 has stated in his cross-examination that the testator is having the habit to consume liquor in the morning itself. Further, if he has not consumed the liquor regularly, his fingers are went upto to severing stage. In otherwise, he specifically stated on the day of........the testator Natesa Velalar and the beneficiary, who is the plaintiff Chinnappan, are in their house without going anywhere. 23. Now, applying the said evidence with the recitals found in the Will, it is clear that the Will was executed on the Second Day of Tamil month.......Only on the date of.....Second, the festival........was celebrated by Tamilians. Therefore, according to the recitals found in the Will, it is apparent that the same was executed on the day of celebrating.......In this regard, the evidence given by PW-2 is entirely different, he has stated, on the day of.....both the testators and the beneficiary are in their house. In otherwise, as per the chief examination of PW-2, the Will was executed in a Village Kandarvakottai, not in a Village in which, the said Natesa Velalar was residing. The said circumstances will create a suspicious circumstances over execution of the Will. 24. In otherwise, even though the trial Court is having the power to compare the signature of testator with the admitted signature, however, it is not safe to find out the correct truth, by seeing the signature through naked eye. Alternatively, it is very easy for the beneficiary to file an application for sending the disputed signature to handwriting expert, for comparison. 25. In fact, the trial Court, when at the time of disposing the suit, has held that the signature found in the Will and the signature of Natesa Velalar found in Ex.B1 are one and the same. In fact, in the alleged Ex.B1, sale deed, Natesa Velalar was signed as a witness and not signed as an executor. Now, on comparing the said signature with the signature found in Ex.A1 Will, apparently both the signatures are found with some difference. So, in the said circumstances, sending those documents for chemical examination is the best option for the plaintiff for proving the Will, but the same was not done. Now, on comparing the said signature with the signature found in Ex.A1 Will, apparently both the signatures are found with some difference. So, in the said circumstances, sending those documents for chemical examination is the best option for the plaintiff for proving the Will, but the same was not done. Therefore, considering the habit of testator and also considering the evidence given by PW-2, in respect to the day on which the Will was executed, I am of the opinion that the Will was not proved in accordance with law required under Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act. 26. In respect to "B" schedule property, it is the case of the plaintiff that originally the said property belongs to one Ayyavu Velalar. The said Ayyavu Velalar, through Ex.A3 sale deed, sold out the same, in favour of plaintiff's father. Since at the time of sale, the plaintiff is aged about 8 or 9 years, the defendants 1 and 2, who are the close relatives of the plaintiff, managed the property and paid Government dues. The further case of the plaintiff is that since the adangal extract and the tax receipts pertains to the said land is in the name of plaintiff, the same will prove that the plaintiff alone is the absolute owner to the said property. 27. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that the defendants perfected the title by means of adverse possession. In this aspect, the first appellate Court, while at the time disposing the appeal held that the documents produced on the side of the defendants will reveal the fact that "B" schedule property is in continuous possession of the defendants for more than a statutory period and otherwise, the documents produced by the plaintiff does not prove the same. Only by observing as above, the First Appellate Court has held that the plaintiff has not proved his possession and thereby, the counter claim filed by the plaintiff is not having any merits. 28. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that for considering the claim of adverse possession, the conditions which are required to be necessary has to be proved by a person, who claim the adverse possession. But, in this case, the defendants have not proved the factum of adverse possession. 28. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that for considering the claim of adverse possession, the conditions which are required to be necessary has to be proved by a person, who claim the adverse possession. But, in this case, the defendants have not proved the factum of adverse possession. In this regard, the findings arrived at by the first appellate Court is not correct. In this connection, he relied on the Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Chatti Konati Rao and Others vs. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010 (14) SCC 316 , wherein our Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:- 13. What facts are required to prove adverse possession have succinctly been enunciated by this Court in the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Government of India and Others, (2004) 10 SCC 779 . It has also been observed that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour and since such a person is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish necessary facts to establish his adverse possession. Paragraph 11 of the judgment which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows: “11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario” that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. S.M. Karim vs. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , Parsinni vs. Sukhi, (1993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N. Venkatarayappa vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 567 . It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. S.M. Karim vs. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , Parsinni vs. Sukhi, (1993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N. Venkatarayappa vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 567 . Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma vs. Raj Kumari Sharma.” 29. Applying the said principle with the case in our hand, in this case, the defendants have claimed that by succession, the said "B" schedule property was enjoyed by them. The first defendant, when he was examined as DW-1, has specifically stated that as he does not know about the execution of Ex.A3 through which his father sold out the "B" schedule property, in favour of plaintiff's father. 30. In this occasion, it is necessary to see all the exhibits produced on either side. First of all, the sale deed, dated 14.09.1980 stands in the name of plaintiff's father was marked as Ex.A3, only through which, the plaintiff claimed that his father purchased the "B" schedule property from the father of defendants 1 and 2. In fact, Ex.A3 is the registered sale deed only through which, Ayyan Velalar sold out the "B" schedule property, in favour of Renga velalar, who is the father of plaintiff. The said document is the 30 years old document and under Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act, the same can be presumed as true one. In fact, Ex.A3 is the registered sale deed only through which, Ayyan Velalar sold out the "B" schedule property, in favour of Renga velalar, who is the father of plaintiff. The said document is the 30 years old document and under Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act, the same can be presumed as true one. However, as per Exs.B4 to B6 patta passbook, the "B" schedule property is in the name of 1st and 2nd defendants. Further, Exs.A7 to A23 kist receipts proved the fact that the 1st and 2nd defendants alone paid the kist to the "B" schedule property from the year of 1977. 31. In this occasion, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff would contend that through Exs.A4 to A28, the plaintiff had paid kist to the Government. It is the further case of the plaintiff that even-though the said "B" schedule property was purchased by the plaintiff's father, since at the time of purchase, the plaintiff is 9 to 10 years only, the defendants 1 and 2, being the close relatives, managed the property. Only in the said situation, the kist receipts are issued in the name of plaintiff as well as in the name of defendants. He specifically stated that Exs.A9 to A11 and A13 are the copy of Adangal extracts, which would prove that in the year of 1986-87, the plaintiff alone is in the possession of "B" schedule property. In this regard, he relied on the Judgment of this Court in G. Selvamani vs. District Revenue Officers-cum-Revisional Authority, 1998 (1) LW 101 wherein this Court has held as follows:- “The best evidence to establish the cultivation is the adangal extract. When the second respondent had been cultivating the land for nearly 12 years prior to the filing of the application before the Record of Tenancy Officer, he has failed to produce any adangal extract to establish his cultivation. In the absence of any adangal extract, the certificate issued by the Village Administrative Officer cannot be accepted, since it can be procured at any time.” 32. Now, on go through Exs.A9 to A14 it appears for the years referred by the counsel, the adangal extracts stands in the name of Thombathal and Natesa Velalar. So, it cannot be said after the purchase made by the father of the plaintiff, the defendant alone is in the possession. Now, on go through Exs.A9 to A14 it appears for the years referred by the counsel, the adangal extracts stands in the name of Thombathal and Natesa Velalar. So, it cannot be said after the purchase made by the father of the plaintiff, the defendant alone is in the possession. On the other hand, the document marked on the side of the defendants has also not sufficient to prove the fact that the defendants 1 and 2 alone are in the possession of the "B" schedule property. It is the settled position that the revenue records does not confer any rights to a person in whose name the property stands. In fact, the validity of the tax receipt is not upto the level of Ex.A3. The lower appellate Court, without considering the said aspect in proper perspective, came to the conclusion that "B" schedule property belongs to the defendants. In otherwise, the findings arrived at by the trial Court in respect to "B" schedule property is not correct. The Substantial Questions of Law Nos. 1 to 3 are answered as above. 33. In fine, for the forgoing reasons, S.A. No. 1170 of 1997 is allowed and the Judgment and Decree, dated 10.10.1996, passed in Cross Appeal of A.S. No. 89 of 1993, on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Pudukottai, are set aside by holding that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of "B" schedule property. In this regard, he is entitled the relief of declaration and injunction as prayed for with costs. Insofar as S.A. No. 1145 of 1997 is concerned, this appeal is dismissed, as regards Suit "A" schedule property. However, there shall be no order as to costs.