ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. P.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Ashish Kr. Thakur, learned A.C. to SC (L&C). 2. In this writ application the petitioners have prayed for quashing of B.P.L.E. Case No. 1/2001-02 initiated by the respondent no. 3 under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, by which the respondent no. 3 had directed the writ petitioner and the proforma-respondents to get their title decided by the competent Civil Court. A further prayer has been made for quashment of Annexure-7 and Annexure-10 to the extent of directing the petitioner to file a civil suit for declaration of title. 3. The case of the original writ petitioner is that in the year 1928 his father Rakhal Chandra Mahto and his brother Durga Charan Mahto got the settlement of the land in question through a Registered Deed of Hukumnama registered in Jamshedpur Sub-Registry on 13.06.1928 by the then landlord of the village Bhagwatnanda Dev Goswami and Pratapnanda Dev Goswami. The land in question was initially covering a portion of the Bandh (Tank). 4. In the Survey Settlement of 1910 the land was recorded as Gair Abad Malik and the land holders name was shown as Bhagwatnanda Dev Goswami. In between 1928 and 1937 when the Survey Operation started the landlord of the village namely Bhagwatnanda Dev Goswami sold the Zamindari rights of village Mahulia to one Sri Rai Sahib Gopal Sahu in the Survey and Settlement Operation in 1937. The land in the Khatiyan was shown to be “Unabad Malik” and the landholders name was recorded as Rai Sahib Gopal Sahu. After promulgation of the Bihar Land Reforms Act the Zamindari System was abolished and Zamindari right vested in the State of Bihar in the Survey Settlement Operation in the year 1964 and in the Khatiyan it was recorded “Unabad Bihar Sarkar”. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that on account of a mistake committed by the Survey Settlement Authorities such recording in the Khatiyan came into being. The original petitioner claims that the land in question was settled before 1937 in favour of the father and uncle of the petitioner and since the uncle of the petitioner died issueless he had inherited the property being the member of a Joint Family Property governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. The original petitioner claims that the land in question was settled before 1937 in favour of the father and uncle of the petitioner and since the uncle of the petitioner died issueless he had inherited the property being the member of a Joint Family Property governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. The original petitioner claims that the land of which he was possessed of was initially a Tank but subsequently it lost its identity and was converted into a paddy field. 6. In 2001 the Circle Officer, Ghatshila issued notice under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act to the original petitioner as well as to the Proforma-Respondents to show cause as to why not the encroachment over the Government land should not be removed. The petitioner appeared before the Circle Officer who vide order dated 21.09.2001 issued notice that within three days the land has to be vacated otherwise the petitioner will be evicted from the land. 7. A writ application was preferred by the original petitioner being W.P.(C) No. 5075/2002 which was disposed of on 10.07.2007 with a direction to the petitioner to appear in the B.P.L.E., proceedings before the Circle Officer who was to pass a reasoned order after hearing the parties in accordance with law as early as possible and preferably within six months from the date of appearance of the petitioner. 8. The original petitioner claimed that the documents showing his title was presented before the Circle Officer but vide order dated 19.04.2008 the original petitioner as well as the Proforma-Respondents were directed to approach the competent Civil Court for declaration of his title and the land encroachment proceedings were stayed till any order is passed by the competent Civil Court. 9. The petitioners in this writ application is aggrieved by the order dated 19.04.2008. 10. Mr. P.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners and their predecessors are in continuous possession of the land in question since 1928 when it was settled through a Registered Deed of Hukumnama dated 13.07.1928 and therefore no proceeding could have been initiated under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act. It has been submitted that merely because there has been an error in the Survey Operation wherein the land was recorded as “Unabad Malik” the same cannot have a binding effect upon the settlee of the land. It has been submitted that merely because there has been an error in the Survey Operation wherein the land was recorded as “Unabad Malik” the same cannot have a binding effect upon the settlee of the land. It has further been submitted that the Topography of the land has changed in course of time as initially it was a Tank but subsequently it was converted into an agricultural land and the same is in continuous cultivating possession of the predecessors of the petitioners and the petitioners also. It has further been submitted that the mistake which was initially committed in the Survey Operation cannot be allowed to be perpetuated in the subsequent Survey Operations and since the title of the petitioners is beyond any doubt the status of the petitioners therefore cannot be that of encroachers and in such circumstances the land encroachment proceeding deserves to be quashed in its entirety. Learned senior counsel further submits that the mistake having been committed by the State authorities it is for the State authorities to move the competent Civil Court and it was an error on the part of the Circle Officer to direct the original petitioner and the Proforma-Respondents to move the competent Civil Court for declaration of their title over the land in question. Learned senior counsel in support of his contention has referred to the judgment in the case of “Govt. of Andhra Pradesh versus Thummala Krishna Rao and Another” reported in AIR 1982 SC 1081 . 11. Mr. Ashish Kr. Thakur, learned A.C. to SC (L&C) appearing for the respondent-state has submitted that the order impugned is not adverse to the cause of the petitioners. He has further submitted that the land encroachment proceeding has been virtually kept sine die till an order is obtained from the competent Civil Court with respect to the declaration of title and in such fact situation therefore the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved person which would therefore entitle this writ application to be dismissed. 12. The impugned order dated 19.04.2008 has been visited taking into consideration the background facts of the case as enumerated above. 12. The impugned order dated 19.04.2008 has been visited taking into consideration the background facts of the case as enumerated above. It appears from the impugned order that various documents pertaining to the land were perused and it was rightly held that at the time of the Survey Settlement the father of the original petitioner should have taken steps for inserting his name in the Khatiyan. The Circle Officer has also concluded that such correction/insertion is beyond the purview of the Circle Officer while coming to a conclusion that the original petitioner should take steps for declaration of title before the competent Civil Court. The plea of the petitioners therefore raises a serious dispute with respect to the title regarding the land in question and the competency to decide as to whether the petitioner has encroached upon the said land was indeed beyond the jurisdiction and powers of the Circle Officer. When there is a genuine dispute of title a summary proceeding for alleged encroachment cannot be resorted to. In such context reference may be made to the case of “Govt. of Andhra Pradesh versus Thummala Krishna Rao and Another” supra; “7. It seems to us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by Section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is “the property of the Government”. In regard to property described in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 2, there can be no doubt, difficulty or dispute as to the title of the Government and, therefore, in respect of such property, the Government would be free to take recourse to the summary remedy of eviction provided for in Section 6. A person who occupies a part of a public road, street, bridge, the bed of the sea and the like, is in unauthorised occupation of property which is declared by Section 2 to be the property of the Government and, therefore, it is in public interest to evict him expeditiously, which can only be done by resorting to the summary remedy provided by the Act. But Section 6(1) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land “for which he is liable to pay assessment under Section 3”. But Section 6(1) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land “for which he is liable to pay assessment under Section 3”. Section 3, in turn, refers to unauthorised occupation of any land “which is the property of the Government”. If there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by Section 6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. In the instant case, there is unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plots of land were the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad and whether the Osmania University, for whose benefit the plots are alleged to have been acquired, had lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation. The suit filed by the University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter alia, since Nawab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on the property more than 12 years before the date of the suit and the University was not in possession of the property at any time within that period. Having failed in the suit, the University activated the Government to evict the Nawab and his transferees summarily, which seems to us impermissible. The respondents have a bona fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted save by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents. 8. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by Section 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of “a very recent origin”, cannot be stretched too far. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents. 8. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by Section 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of “a very recent origin”, cannot be stretched too far. That was also the view taken by the learned Single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Meharunnissa Begum v. State of A.P. (1970) 1 Andh LT 88 which was affirmed by a Division Bench (1971) 1 Andh LT 292: (AIR 1971 Andh Pra 382). It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 9. The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddin from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddin from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. Maybe, that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but, until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily.” 13. Considering the aforesaid therefore the Circle Officer had rightly passed the order dated 19.04.2008 and the said order does not in any way affect the petitioner so far as the alleged encroachment as initially claimed is concerned. When there appears to be a serious dispute of title either of the parties may approach the Civil Court for settling the issue once and for all. The observations made by the Circle Officer therefore keeping the land encroachment proceeding in abeyance till an order is passed by the competent Civil Court cannot be inferred to be without jurisdiction or illegal. 14. In view of the aforesaid, therefore, I do not find any reason to cause interference in the order dated 19.04.2008 passed by the Circle Officer, Ghatshila in B.P.L.E. Case No. 1/2001-02 and this application accordingly stands disposed of with a liberty to either of the parties to approach the competent Civil Court for declaration of title. Application disposed of.