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2019 DIGILAW 2152 (RAJ)

Bheru Lal Parasar S/o Banshilal v. Board of Revenue, Ajmer

2019-08-08

SANGEET LODHA

body2019
JUDGMENT : SANGEET LODHA, J. 1. This petition is directed against the judgment dated 4.5.2018 passed by the Board of Revenue Rajasthan, whereby an appeal preferred by the petitioners against the judgment and decree dated 17.7.2015 of the Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA), Chittorgarh, allowing the appeal preferred by the fifth respondent, assailing the legality of the judgment and decree dated 22.5.2013 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer (SDO), Rashmi in Suit No. 26/13, has been dismissed. 2. The matter comes up on an application preferred on behalf of the fifth respondent for vacating the interim order dated 6.8.2018. However, with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the matter is finally heard at this stage. 3. The facts relevant are that the petitioners filed the suit under Section 63 (1) (iv) and 188 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’) against the defendants Salagram S/o Kashiram and Jaikishan S/o Kashiram, seeking declaration of khatedari rights, correction of entries in revenue record and permanent injunction in respect of the land comprising khasra no. 4426, 4429, 4437, 4438 and 4440, ad measuring 9 bighas, situated at village Aarni, Tehsil Rashmi, District Chittorgarh. The service was effected upon the defendants by publication of the notice in daily newspaper “Dainik Navjyoti.” The defendants did not appear before the trial court and therefore, the matter was proceeded ex-parte against them. The suit was decreed ex-parte by the SDO, Rashmi vide judgment and decree dated 22.5.2013. Aggrieved thereby, the fifth respondent, legal heir of deceased-defendants preferred an appeal before the RAA, Chittorgarh, which was allowed. The judgment and decree dated 22.5.2013 passed by the SDO, Rashmi was set aside. The RAA remitted the matter to the Tehsildar, Rashmi with the directions to record the names of the legal heirs of the khatedar after due examination. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners preferred second appeal before the Board of Revenue Rajasthan, which stands dismissed by the order impugned. Hence, this petition. 4. The judgment and decree passed by the SDO, Rashmi was set aside by the RAA observing that the suit was filed by the petitioners against the dead persons inasmuch as, Salagram had expired on 28.5.1939 and Jaikishan on 29.12.1944 and thus, the decree passed against the dead persons being nullity, cannot be sustained. 5. Hence, this petition. 4. The judgment and decree passed by the SDO, Rashmi was set aside by the RAA observing that the suit was filed by the petitioners against the dead persons inasmuch as, Salagram had expired on 28.5.1939 and Jaikishan on 29.12.1944 and thus, the decree passed against the dead persons being nullity, cannot be sustained. 5. The Board of Revenue after examination of the record found that the summon issued to the defendants was received un-served with the endorsement of the process server that the defendants used to reside at the place mentioned in the notice earlier and presently they are not residing there and thus, without making any efforts for service of notice in ordinary course, straight away, the service of the notice by way of publication in newspaper was not in accordance with law. The Board affirming the order passed by the RAA observed that the decree passed in the suit filed against the dead persons is nullity in the eyes of law. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that if the decree passed against the dead person was nullity then the Appellate Court should have remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration afresh. The order passed by the RAA remitting the matter to Tehsildar with the directions to record the names of legal heir of recorded khatedars after due examination, is absolutely unjustified. Learned counsel submitted that despite publication of the notice in the newspaper, since nobody appeared therefore, the decree passed by the trial court proceeding ex-parte was absolutely justified. 7. On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the fifth respondent submitted that the decree passed in a suit filed against the dead persons being nullity in the eyes of law, has rightly been set aside by the RAA and therefore, the order impugned passed by the Board of Revenue does not warrant any interference by this court. 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel and perused the material on record. 9. It is well settled that a judgment and decree passed against dead persons is nullity and cannot be allowed to stand. A fortiori, in the instant case, in the first instance, the suit was filed by the petitioners against the dead persons and thus, the suit itself was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. 9. It is well settled that a judgment and decree passed against dead persons is nullity and cannot be allowed to stand. A fortiori, in the instant case, in the first instance, the suit was filed by the petitioners against the dead persons and thus, the suit itself was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. On judgment and decree passed against the dead persons having been set aside being nullity, the question of the restoration of the suit against the dead persons, does not arise and thus, the RAA has committed no error in setting aside the judgment and decree passed as aforesaid. Obviously, in case of the death of the khatedar, the names of legal heirs as khatedar have to be recorded in the revenue record in accordance with law and thus, the directions issued by the RAA, directing Tehsildar to make an inquiry in this regard and record the names of the legal heirs entitled to be substituted as khatedar, also cannot be faulted with. Obviously, if aggrieved, by any order to be passed by the Tehsildar pursuant to the directions issued by the RAA, they will be at liberty to take the appropriate remedy available under the law. 10. There is yet another aspect of the matter. A bare perusal of the provisions of Order V Rule 20 CPC, makes it abundantly clear that the mode of substituted service can be resorted to only when the court is satisfied that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of way for the purpose of avoiding service or that for any other reason, the summons cannot be served in ordinary way. To put it in other words, the personal service of summons in ordinary way is a rule and the substituted service is an exception. Therefore, before passing any order for substituted service on the basis of the material on record, the court must be satisfied that the conditions stipulated in Order V Rule 20 of CPC, noticed above, exists. 11. To put it in other words, the personal service of summons in ordinary way is a rule and the substituted service is an exception. Therefore, before passing any order for substituted service on the basis of the material on record, the court must be satisfied that the conditions stipulated in Order V Rule 20 of CPC, noticed above, exists. 11. In the instant case, despite there being a report of the process server available on record, showing that the defendants are not residing at the place mentioned in the notice, instead of proceeding with the matter for service of notice in ordinary course, straight away, the trial court passed the order for substituted service upon the defendants, without there being reasonable efforts to get the defendants served in ordinary way and without recording its satisfaction that the defendants cannot be served personally in the ordinary way and thus, the order proceeding ex-parte passed was also not justified even otherwise. 12. For the aforementioned reasons, the order impugned passed by the Board of Revenue, does not warrant interference by this court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. The petition therefore, fails, it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.