ORDER : The present revision petition has been filed by the petitioner-accused Nos.1 and 2, challenging the judgment passed by LXXII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at Mayo Hall, Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No.25180/2018 dated 17.01.2019 wherein the appeal preferred by the petitioners-accused was dismissed by confirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by LVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall unit, Bengaluru in C.C.No.53439/2015 dated 18.09.2018. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners-accused and the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant. 3. Though this case is listed for orders on Interim application, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties the same is taken up for final disposal. 4. This Court heard the matter on 11.11.2019 and after hearing both the parties, the learned counsel for the petitioners-accused on the instruction of his client submitted that he is agreeable to settle the case for a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- in full and final settlement. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant submitted that she will consult her client and as such, the case has been posted today for reporting the settlement. 5. Both the counsel are present today along with their parties and they submitted that the matter has not been settled amicably between the parties, in that light, I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties in detail. 6. Before going to take up the contentions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, in nutshell the case of the complainant as contended by him before the Court below is that the complainant and accused were known to each other and in the month of July 2014, the accused approached the complainant for a hand loan of Rs.8,00,000/- agreeing to repay the same on 29/12/2014. Accordingly, the complainant paid the said amount to the accused on 28.07.2014 and the accused issued a post dated cheque bearing No.595855 dated 29.12.2014 drawn on ICICI Bank for Rs.8,00,000/- and the said cheque belongs to the firm of accused namely M/s. Panchamukhi Enterprises. When the said cheque was presented through his bankers, the same has been returned without encashing on 10.03.2015 with a share “Account Closed”. Thereafter, the complainant caused a legal notice to the accused on 26.03.2015 calling upon him to pay the cheque amount and it is contended that the said notice has served on 31.03.2015. When the said cheque was presented through his bankers, the same has been returned without encashing on 10.03.2015 with a share “Account Closed”. Thereafter, the complainant caused a legal notice to the accused on 26.03.2015 calling upon him to pay the cheque amount and it is contended that the said notice has served on 31.03.2015. Inspite of service of notice the accused did not pay the cheque amount and as such he filed a complaint. 7. The learned Magistrate took the cognizance and secured the presence of the accused. The plea of the accused was recorded. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. As such, the trial was fixed. 8. In order to prove the case of the complainant, he got examined himself as PW.1 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.6. Thereafter, the statement of the accused was recorded under Sec.313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C and the accused examined himself as DW-1 and got marked documents at Ex.D1 to D12. Thereafter, after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the trial Court convicted the accused. Being aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred an appeal and the order of the trial Court was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed. Challenging the same, the accused is before this Court. 9. The main grounds urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-accused are that both the Courts below have grossly erred for having not appreciated the fact that, in the absence of the firm, being made a party, the complaint is not maintainable under Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act (herein after it is called as “NI Act” for short). It is his further submission that the conviction of the partners of the firm without making the company/firm is bad in law and want of compliance under Section 141 of NI Act is must. In order to Substantiate his said contention, he has relied upon the decision in the case of Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd reported in (2012)5 SCC 661 . It is his further submission that there is no compliance of the provision of Section 138 of NI Act. In order to take the cognizance of the offence, the notice has to be served to the accused. But in the instant case, the notice has not been served to the accused and it has been sent to a wrong address. It is his further submission that there is no compliance of the provision of Section 138 of NI Act. In order to take the cognizance of the offence, the notice has to be served to the accused. But in the instant case, the notice has not been served to the accused and it has been sent to a wrong address. It is the specific case that the address mentioned in Ex.P3 legal notice and Ex.P4 clearly goes to show that the said notice has been sent to a wrong address. 10. It is his further submission that in the notice sent by the complainant, the house Number. has been mentioned as “2371” but actually accused is residing in house Number “2317”. It is his further submission that as per Ex.P6 though the postal authorities have given an endorsement to the effect that the said notice has been delivered to the addressee, but when the house number itself is different, under such circumstances, it cannot be held that notice sent by complainant has been served. It is his further submission that the case of the accused is that he has misused the documents which have been given by the accused to the complainant. In this behalf they have produced Ex.D1 and other documents. It clearly goes to show that it bears the signature of the complainant and thereby the accused has rebutted the prosecution on preponderance of probabilities. The trial Court and the first appellate Court ignoring the said facts have wrongly convicted the accused. On these grounds, he prays to allow the petition and to set aside the impugned judgment and acquit the accused. 11. Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant vehemently argued and submitted that the notice which has been issued as per Ex.P3 has been served on the accused to the address mentioned therein. Only a small mistake which has been committed is that instead of mentioning the house Number as 2371 it has been given as House Number 2317 but the postal authorities have given their endorsement as per Ex.P6 and as per the said report notice has been delivered to the accused on 31.03.2015. Only a small mistake which has been committed is that instead of mentioning the house Number as 2371 it has been given as House Number 2317 but the postal authorities have given their endorsement as per Ex.P6 and as per the said report notice has been delivered to the accused on 31.03.2015. If the notice has been sent to the correct address, if the postal authority have given an endorsement to the effect that the said article sent to the addressee has been delivered, under such circumstances it can be presumed that the notice is duly served to the addressee. 12. She further submitted that the trial Court in detail discussed the said facts and has come to a right conclusion and rightly convicted the accused. It is her further submission that the documents at DW.1 which have been produced by the accused clearly goes to show that the said document has been fraudulently created and concocted only to overcome the liability. It is her further submission that Exs.D3 and D4 itself clearly goes to show that they have been concocted and created for the purpose of discharging the liability. It is her further submission that if the said documents were in existence at the time of filing of the case or at the time of issuance of Ex.P1, then under such circumstances, the said documents could have been confronted to the complainant during cross-examination and the said defense would have been taken at the first instance. 13. It is her further submission that the said contention if it was there, immediately after appearance of the accused before the Court below they could have taken the said contention. In the absence of any such plea, the said document is not going to rebut the presumption raised against the accused. 14. It is her further submission that during the course of evidence of DW-1 he has clearly admitted that the signatures found on Ex.P1 belongs to him. When once he admits the signature on the cheque Ex.P1, then under such circumstances the Court is duly bond to draw presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. The said presumption indicates that the said cheque has been given to discharge debt or liability. The said presumption is rebuttable presumption by proving the contrary. But mere denial or rebuttal by the accused is not enough. The said presumption indicates that the said cheque has been given to discharge debt or liability. The said presumption is rebuttable presumption by proving the contrary. But mere denial or rebuttal by the accused is not enough. The accused had to prove by cogent and acceptable evidence that there was no debt or liability. In the absence of such material, Court below has rightly appreciated and has rightly convicted the accused. 15. It is her further submission that as per the Companies Act, the Company has been defined and it is only the legal entity and for the purpose of pursuance of things. It is her further submission that firm is a mere shorthand name of collection of persons, commercially convenient but not legally recognized. Under Section 3 of the partnership Act it is not a person, but a relationship among persons. It is her further submission that in the documents and other materials it has been clearly mentioned that the said firm is not in existence at the time when the cheque has been issued by the accused persons. 16. It is her further submission that the said firm was not in existence in the year 2008, then under such circumstances question of issuing the cheque belonging to M/s Panchamukhi Enterprises in the year 2008 does not arise at all. 17. It is her further submission that during the course of cross-examination of DW-1 he has clearly admitted that the cheque has been issued by him. Then under such circumstances existence of any partnership firm in the name of M/s Panchamukhi Enterprises as on the date of issuing cheque has to be explained by the accused. In the absence of such material, the said contention of the accused cannot be accepted. It is her further submission that when the accused has utterly failed to prove the existence of the company, then under such circumstances, the provisions of Section 141 of the Act is not attracted and as such the same contention is not having any force in the eye of law. In order to substantiate her contention she has relied upon the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras vs. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai and others reported in AIR 1977 SC 489 . 18. In order to substantiate her contention she has relied upon the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras vs. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai and others reported in AIR 1977 SC 489 . 18. It is her further submission that the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court after considering the factual matrix has rightly come to a right conclusion. It is her further submission that the documents produced at Exs.P1 to P9 clearly go to show that they were doing money lending business and the documents are created and that itself shows that the documents have been created only with an intention to deprive the complainant. The trial Court and the first appellate Court have applied their mind and they have come to a conclusion that the complainant has misused the cheque. On these grounds, she prays that the revision petition is devoid of merits and the same may be dismissed. 19. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records. 20. The first and foremost contention taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioner-accused is that the complainant has not complied the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act and no notice has been served, there is no cause of action as contemplated under the said NI Act. For the purpose of brevity I quote Section 138 of the NI Act which reads as under: “138. For the purpose of brevity I quote Section 138 of the NI Act which reads as under: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder I due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” 21. On close reading of the above said Section, it mandates that in order to attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, the cheque has to be presented to the bank within a period of three months from the date on which it is drawn or within a period of its validity whichever is earlier. 22. On close reading of the above said Section, it mandates that in order to attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, the cheque has to be presented to the bank within a period of three months from the date on which it is drawn or within a period of its validity whichever is earlier. 22. The second condition is that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of the information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. 23. The third condition is that, the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of cheque amount to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within 15 days from the receipt of the notice. Under such circumstances, the cause of action arises. I am not having any difference of opinion regarding the proposition of law laid down by this court or by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above quoted decisions. In order to invoke the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, the ingredients as contemplated under Section 138 of the NI Act has to be satisfied. Otherwise the Court cannot take the cognizance. 24. Apart from that, in order to comply the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act it must contain that there is legally enforceable debt or liability and the cheque was drawn from the account of the accused for discharge in whole or part of any debt or other liability and the cheque though issued had been returned with insufficiency of funds, notice has to be served on accused demanding the said amount and the above said ingredients must also be satisfied in this behalf. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G.Hegde reported in (2008) 4 SCC 54 , wherein at paragraph No.12 it has been observed as under: “12. Mr. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G.Hegde reported in (2008) 4 SCC 54 , wherein at paragraph No.12 it has been observed as under: “12. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent on the other hand, submitted that the appellant has rightly been found guilty of commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Act as bouncing of the cheque issued by him carries a mandatory presumption in terms of Section 139 read with Section 118(a) of the Act.” 25. By taking into consideration the above said ratio, it is the mandate of the law that the complainant has to satisfy all the ingredients failing which the complaint is not maintainable. 26. In so far as the first ingredient is concerned in order to show that there is a legally inforceable debts and the said cheque was drawn from the account of the accused for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability is concerned both the parties have led the evidence. I have gone through the cross examination of DW-1 wherein he has clearly admitted that Ex.P1 cheque bears his signature. When once the accused admits the signature on the cheque, then under such circumstances the presumption as mandate under Section 139 of the NI Act has to be drawn that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. 27. The second aspect which has to be satisfied is that the cheque was drawn from the account of the accused and in this behalf the evidence DW-1 clearly goes to show that the said cheque belongs to him. 28. Last aspect is that there must be service of notice as contemplated under Section 138 of the NI Act and the said notice has to be served on the accused within the stipulated time. 29. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the submissions and other material produced in his behalf including the trial Court records. 30. It is the specific contention of the accused that the house in which he is residing bears its number 2317 but actually the notice Ex-P3 and the other details which has been given in the address is house Number 2371. 30. It is the specific contention of the accused that the house in which he is residing bears its number 2317 but actually the notice Ex-P3 and the other details which has been given in the address is house Number 2371. In that light, he contends that the notice has not been served and as such, the complaint is not maintainable. But as could be seen from Ex-P6 the postal endorsement which has been given, it has specifically endorsed, that the said article sent to the addressee has been delivered. When once the said documents have been produced and substantiated the fact that the notice which has been sent to the addressee as per Ex.P3 has been delivered to the accused then a presumption has to be drawn that the said notice has been served. In that light the said contention does not sustainable in law. 31. Be that as it may, the accused specifically contended that the house number is 2317 but in the notice house number has been mentioned as 2371. But the other contents have not been denied by the accused. I am conscious of the fact that in Bengaluru if a single digit is changed, under such circumstances, there will be long gap and it is very difficult for any postman to identify the house and deliver the said registered document to the addressee but when the complainant made out a case that as per Ex.P6 the notice has been duly served, then under such circumstances, the duty casts upon the accused to rebut the same by establishing either by calling the postman or the other competent personalities who are in the post office, as to, to whom and what place the said article has been delivered. In the absence of any such material produced by the accused the contention taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioners-accused does not sustainable and the said contention is liable to be rejected. 32. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners-accused is that as per Section 141 of the NI Act the firm is not made as a party to the proceedings in compliance of Section 141 of the NI Act. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant that both the accused Nos.1 and 2 are proprietors and are parties before the Court and they have contested the case. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant that both the accused Nos.1 and 2 are proprietors and are parties before the Court and they have contested the case. The documents which have been concocted and created clearly goes to show that the said firm was not in existence during the year 2008 when the said cheque has been issued. It is her further submission that the Court below has rightly taken the decision that the accused is in debt and for discharging the same the said cheque is issued. 33. It is her further submission that the firm name is only for commercial purpose and it is not legally recognized as held in the decision quoted in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Act (quoted supra). For the purpose of brevity I quote paragraph No.15 which reads as under: “15. Is the firm a person or a mere shorthand name for a collection of persons, commercially convenient but not legally recognized? Under Section 3 of the Partnership Act it is not a person, but a relationship among persons. Lindley, on partnership. 12th Edition .P.28; Sweet and Maxwell. has this: “The firm is not recognized by English lawyers as distinct from the members composing it. In taking partnership accounts and in administering partnership assets, courts have to some extent adopted the mercantile view, and actions may now, speaking generally, be brought by or against partners in the name of their firm, but speaking generally, the firm as such has no legal recognition. The law, ignoring the firm, looks to the partners composing it; any change amongst them destroys the identity of the firm; what is called the property of the firm is their property, and what are called the debts and their iabilities of the firm are their debts and liabilities. In point of law, a partner may be the debtor or the creditor of his co-partners, but he cannot be either debtor or creditor of the firm of which he is himself a member, nor can he be employed by his firm, for a man cannot be his own employer.” 34. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the said decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The said decision was delivered with reference to the Income Tax Act. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the said decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The said decision was delivered with reference to the Income Tax Act. On going through Section 141 of the NI Act, the explanation to the said Section has made it clear that the “Company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals. In that light, the said Section clearly states that the term company also includes firm. Hence, the said Section itself is very clear, then under such circumstances, the said interpretations which has been made in the above decisions are with reference to Income tax, will not come to the aid of the complainant. 35. Be that as it may, if Section 141 of NI Act is read entirely, then it makes clear that when there is the Criminal liability, for discharge of debt, a cheque has been drawn on company, it mandates to implead or the impleading the company or a firm as one of the accused is must and without impleading the firm or a company the said complaint itself is not maintainable. For the purpose of brevity I want to rely upon the decision in the case of Aneeta Hada (quoted supra) wherein at paragraph Nos. 22 to 24 and 32 it has been observed as under: 22. On a reading of the said provision, it is plain as day that if a person who commits the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, the company as well as every person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of offence is deemed to be guilty of the offence. The first proviso carves out under what circumstances the criminal liability would not be fastened. Sub Section (2) enlarges the criminal liability by incorporating the concepts of connivance, negligence and consent that engulfs many categories of officers. It is worth noting that in both the provisions, there is a “deemed” concept of criminal liability. 23. Section 139 of the Act creates a presumption in favour of the holder. The said provision has to be read in conjunction with Section 118 (a) which occurs in Chapter XIII of the Act that deals with special rules of evidence. It is worth noting that in both the provisions, there is a “deemed” concept of criminal liability. 23. Section 139 of the Act creates a presumption in favour of the holder. The said provision has to be read in conjunction with Section 118 (a) which occurs in Chapter XIII of the Act that deals with special rules of evidence. Section 140 stipulates the defence which may not be allowed in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Act. Thus, there is a deemed fiction in relation to criminal liability, presumption in favour of the holder, and denial of a defence in respect of certain aspects. 24. Section 141 uses the term “person” and refers it to a company. There is no trace of doubt that the company is a juristic person. The concept of corporate criminal liability is attracted to a corporation and company and it is so luminescent from the language employed under Section 141 of the Act. It is apposite to note that the present enactment is one where the company itself and certain categories of officers in certain circumstances are deemed to be guilty of the offence. 32. we have referred to the aforesaid authorities to highlight that the company can have criminal liability and further, if a group of persons that guide the business of the companies have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate. In this backdrop, Section 141 of the Act has to be understood. The said provision clearly stipulates that when a person which is a company commits an offence, then certain categories of persons in charge as well as the company would be deemed to be liable for the offences under Section 138. Thus, the statutory intendment is absolutely plain. As is perceptible, the provision makes the functionaries and the companies to be liable and that is by deeming fiction. A deeming fiction has its own signification.” 36. It has been further observed in the said decision itself that the corporate Criminal liability and vicarious liability of a person who is in-charge of the company has to be looked. When a person which is a Company commits an offence, then certain categories of persons in charge and Company would be liable. It has been further observed in the said decision itself that the corporate Criminal liability and vicarious liability of a person who is in-charge of the company has to be looked. When a person which is a Company commits an offence, then certain categories of persons in charge and Company would be liable. It is further observed that the Criminal liability on account of dishonour of cheque primarily falls on the drawer Company and is extended to the officers of the company and as there is a specific provision extending the liability to the officers, the condition incorporated in Section 141 of the NI Act have to be strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to be vicariously made liable for an offence of which the principal accused is the Company or a firm, has a role to play in relation to the incriminating act. Further such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable. For the purpose of brevity I quote paragraphs Nos. 39 to 41, 43 and 54 of the decision in the case of Aneeta Hada (quoted supra) which read as under: 39. The word “deemed” used in Section 141 of the Act applies to the company and the persons responsible for the acts of the company. It crystallises the corporate criminal liability and vicarious liability of a person who is in charge of the company. What averments should be required to make a person vicarioiusly liable has been dealt with in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. In the said case, it has been opined that the criminal liability on account of dishonour of cheque primarily falls on the drawee (sic drawer) company and is extended to the officers of the company and as there is a specific provision extending the liability to the officers, the conditions incorporated in Section 141 are to be satisfied. 40. It has been ruled as follows: 4. … It primarily falls on the drawer company and is extended to officers of the company. The normal rule in the cases involving criminal liability is against vicarious liability, that is, no one is to be held criminally liable for an act of another. This normal rule is, however, subject to exception on account of specific provision being made in the statutes extending liability to others. The normal rule in the cases involving criminal liability is against vicarious liability, that is, no one is to be held criminally liable for an act of another. This normal rule is, however, subject to exception on account of specific provision being made in the statutes extending liability to others. Section 141 of the Act is an instance of specific provision which in case an offence under Section 138 is committed by a company, extends criminal liability for dishonour of a cheque to officers of the company. Section 141 contains conditions which have to be satisfied before the liability can be extended to officers of a company. Since the provisions creates criminal liability, the conditions have to be strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for an offence of which the principal accused is the company, had a role to play in relation to the incriminating act and further that such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable.” 41. After so stating, it has been further held that while analysing Section 141 of the Act, it will be seen that it operates in cases where an offence under Section 138 is committed by a company. In para 18 of the judgment, it has been clearly held as follows: “18. … there is almost unanimous judicial opinion that necessary averments ought to be contained in a complaint before a person can be subjected to criminal process. A liability under Section 141 of the Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a company, the principal accused being the company itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability.” 43. A contention was raised before this Court on behalf of the State of Madras that the conviction could be made on the basis of Section 10 of the 1955 Act. The three-judge Bench repelled the contention by stating thus: “3. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability.” 43. A contention was raised before this Court on behalf of the State of Madras that the conviction could be made on the basis of Section 10 of the 1955 Act. The three-judge Bench repelled the contention by stating thus: “3. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, sought conviction of the two respondents on the basis of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act under which, if the person contravening an order made under Section 3 (which covers an order under the Iron and Steel Control Order, 1956), is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It was urged that the two respondents were in charge of, and were responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company and, consequently, they must be held responsible for the sale and for thus contravening the provisions of Clause(5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order. This argument cannot be accepted, because it ignores the first condition for the applicability of Section 10 to the effect that the person contravening the order must be a company itself. In the present case, there is no finding either by the Magistrate or by the High Court that the sale in contravention of Clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order was made by the company. In fact, the company was not charged with the offence at all. The liablity of the persons in charge of the company only arises when the contravention is by the company itself. Since, in this case, there is no evidence and no finding that the company contravened Clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order, the two respondents could not be held responsible. The liablity of the persons in charge of the company only arises when the contravention is by the company itself. Since, in this case, there is no evidence and no finding that the company contravened Clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order, the two respondents could not be held responsible. The actual contravention was by Kamdar and Vallabhadas Thacker and any contravention by them would not fasten responsibility on the respondents.” The aforesaid paragraph clearly lays down that the first condition is that the company should be held to be liable; a charge has to be framed; a finding has to be recorded, and the liability of the persons in charge of the company only arises when the contravention is by the company itself. 54. In this context, we may usefully refer to Section 263 of Francis Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation where it is sated as follows: “A principle of statutory interpretation embodies the policy of the law, which is in turn based on public policy. … The Court presumes, unless the contrary intention appears, that the legislator intended to conform to this legal policy. A principle of Statutory interpretation can therefore be described as a principle of legal policy formulated as a guide to legislative intention.” 37. It is the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant that the said cheque has been issued in their individual capacity and not on behalf of the company. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the records. In the first instance the complaint itself reads that the accused issued post dated cheque bearing No. 595855 dated 29.12.2014 drawn on ICICI Bank for Rs.8,00,000/- and the said cheque belongs to the firm of accused namely M/s. Panchamukhi Enterprises. When complainant has made out a specific case that the said cheque belongs to the firm, then under such circumstances, it does not lie in his mouth that cheque has been issued in their individual capacity. The said pleading amounts to admission of complaint, it binds on him. 38. Be that as it may, if Ex.P1-cheque if it is looked into the name of the firm has been clearly mentioned in it as “M/s Panchamukhi Enterprises” and both the partners of the said firm have signed the said cheque. The said pleading amounts to admission of complaint, it binds on him. 38. Be that as it may, if Ex.P1-cheque if it is looked into the name of the firm has been clearly mentioned in it as “M/s Panchamukhi Enterprises” and both the partners of the said firm have signed the said cheque. When he has issued the cheque, admittedly in the name of the firm and it has also been printed on the cheque as by M/s Panchamukhi Enterprises and it has been also separately mentioned as the partners. It makes it clear that the said cheque has been issued by the firm. Then under such circumstances, the contention taken up by the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant is not having any force the same is liable to be rejected. I have carefully gone through the judgments of both the Courts. The Courts below without looking into the said legal aspect have erroneously come to a different conclusion on the basis of the documents produced. It is the contention that the said documents have been concocted and created. Admittedly as per the case of complainant itself the cheque has been issued in the year 2008 and it contains the name of the firm then under such circumstances, it cannot be held that the accused has concocted the said documents to over come the liability. 39. In that light as mandated under Section 141 of the NI Act, without making the firm as a party to the proceedings the vicarious liability cannot be fixed on the petitioners- accused. This aspect has not been properly considered by the Court below and have been swayed away by the contention of the complainant. Keeping in view the anatomy of the above said provision of law and analyzing the Section 141 of the NI Act and in view of the larger bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada (quoted supra) it is aptly applicable to the present facts of the case. In that light without making the Company a party, the complaint is not maintainable. In that light without making the Company a party, the complaint is not maintainable. No doubt the other contentions which have been taken up by the accused has not rebutted the presumption drawn as contemplated under Section 139 of the Act is concerned it can be safely held that though the primary aspect has been proved to show that there exists a liability, the accused has admitted the signature on the cheque and then the burden shifts on to the accused to rebut the said presumption. But however, when the basic ingredients have not been established to take the cognizance of the case and they have not been proved as contemplated under the law, then under such circumstances not rebutting the presumption will not come to the aid of the complainant so as to take advantage. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court has not applied their mind to Section 141 of the NI Act and has erroneously come to the wrong conclusion. 40. I am conscious of the fact that a Revisional Court is having a limited jurisdiction but I am also conscious of the fact that if there is jurisdictional error or error of law, then under such circumstances, this Court can exercise its power as contemplated under the law and set aside the said orders. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bir singh vs. Mukesh Kumar reported in (2019) 4 SCC 197 at paragraph No.13 it has been observed as under: “13. The short question before us is whether the High Court was right in reversing the concurrent factual findings of the trial Court and of the appellate Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The questions of law which rise in this appeal are, (i) whether a Revisional Court can, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, interfere with an order of conviction in the absence of any jurisdictional error or error of law and (ii) whether the payee of a cheque is disentitled to the benefit of the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, of a cheque duly drawn, having been issued in discharge of a debt or other liability, only because he is in a fiduciary relationship with the person who has drawn the cheque.” 41. Keeping in view the above said facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner-accused has made out a case to interfere with the judgment of trial Court. In that light, petition is allowed and the judgment of LXXII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at Mayo Hall, Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No.25180/2018 dated 17.01.2019 is set aside and consequently the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by LVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall unit, Bengaluru in C.C.No.53439/2015 dated 18.09.2018 is also set aside and the petitioners-accused have been acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The amount in deposit made by the accused is ordered to be refunded to them on proper identification and acknowledgment. In view of the disposal of the main petition, I.A No.2/2019 does not survive for consideration.