JUDGMENT : K. Surendra Mohan, J. The challenge against rejection of applications by the Kerala Public Service Commission ('PSC' for short) in its recruitment process has been a very frequent phenomenon in this Court. Though instructions are provided to the candidates along with the notifications issued by the PSC regarding the manner in which applications are to be filled up, submitted or uploaded on the computer, candidates often commit mistakes that entail serious consequences including rejection of their candidature causing severe heartburn and despair in the minds of such persons. Such candidates would then approach this Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for relief. These cases also relate to such rejection of applications. A Division Bench of this Court noticed that there was some confusion in the matter, in view of the decision in Kerala Public Service Commission v. Roshini (ILR 2016 (1) Ker. 99). In the said case, though the candidates were to have uploaded photographs of the size mentioned in the instructions, they uploaded stamp size photographs. For the said reason, their applications were rejected. The said action was challenged before this Court. The learned Single Judge considered the contentions of the writ petitioner as well as the PSC, found that though the photographs uploaded were not of the specified dimensions, they were sufficient to identify the candidate. Since the purpose of uploading photographs was to identify the candidate, it was found that, there was substantial compliance with the stipulations and therefore the rejection of their candidature was held to be unjustified. Though the judgment of the learned Single Judge was the subject matter of W.A. No. 399 of 2015 at the instance of the PSC, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. However, the said dictum has been found to be in conflict with the decision in Rangaswamy v. KPSC ( 1982 KLT 574 ) by the Bench. The Division Bench in its reference order further noticed that the decision in Roshini's case was at variance with the consistent dicta in a number of previous decisions. In view of the confusion noticed, the Division Bench has framed four questions for being decided by a Larger Bench. It is accordingly that, the captioned cases have been posted before us. 2. In view of the confusion noticed, the Division Bench has framed four questions for being decided by a Larger Bench. It is accordingly that, the captioned cases have been posted before us. 2. The questions referred to us by the Division Bench are the following: (i) Whether the Tribunal could pass orders in deviation of the earlier judgments, only because of Roshni's case; (ii) whether the observation in Roshni's judgment that there cannot be mechanical rejection of candidature, dilutes the findings in earlier judgments; (iii) whether the permission granted by Chairman of the PSC to participate in an interview could be construed as holding out a promise that would attract the principle of promissory estoppel; (iv) whether after the judgments in Rangaswami and in O.P. (KAT).No. 3013 of 2013, holding held that there cannot be any interference with the rejection of an application, interference is possible on the ground of permission granted by the Chairman, relying on Roshni's case. The issue arising in the Writ Appeal, also relates to rejection of application by the PSC but on some other grounds. The learned Single Judge has allowed the Writ Petition following Roshni's case. Therefore, that has also been posted along with these O.Ps. 3. We have heard Sri. P.C. Sasidharan, the learned Legal Retainer for Kerala Public Service Commission ('PSC' for short), Adv. Kaleeswaram Raj, Adv. K.T. Syam Kumar and Adv. Krishna Menon, the learned Counsel for the party respondents in these cases. 4. The rejection of applications by the Public Service Commission is usually being challenged before this Court on various grounds by the candidates aspiring for appointment to various posts irrespective of the qualifications prescribed or the categories of such posts. Notifications are issued by the Public Service Commission inviting applications for the selection, prescribing the details of the post, its scale of pay, qualification, the eligibility conditions, last date for receipt of application, the documents required to be produced along with the application, for proving identity, qualifications including age, experience, etc. The consequences of not furnishing the requisite documents in time, etc. are also stipulated. Candidates are directed to go through the detailed instructions available on the official website, the gazette notification etc. Despite all these, instances are many where the candidates are faced with serious consequences, some times on account of technical problems, sometimes due to their own inadvertence or otherwise. are also stipulated. Candidates are directed to go through the detailed instructions available on the official website, the gazette notification etc. Despite all these, instances are many where the candidates are faced with serious consequences, some times on account of technical problems, sometimes due to their own inadvertence or otherwise. Instances are many where candidates who are fully qualified lose their opportunities, on account of their own carelessness or on account of some inaction or delay on the part of some authorities. There may be circumstances beyond their control also. 5. It is the primary duty of any candidate aspiring for an employment, to go through the notification carefully and submit the application in accordance with the instructions given therein or in the notifications, where it is stated to be available. Every application to be submitted has to be in a pro-forma, which would require the candidate to furnish a declaration to the following effect: "Every thing stated above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. If any information furnished above is found to be false, or incorrect, later, my candidature could entail in rejection of my candidature." The consequence of submitting an incorrect or false application is also given in the proforma. For answering the reference, we shall examine the judgments hitherto rendered by this Court on this issue and cited by both sides. 6. In Kerala Pulic Service Commission v. Varghese (ILR 1977 (1) Ker 523: 1977 KHC 367), a Division Bench of this Court held that production of a certificate of payment from the Treasury was not sufficient, since the application was to be accompanied by a challan towards payment of fee. The petitioners in that case were candidates who had applied for a departmental examination. Though the application fee was remitted, the diary in which the challans were kept, was lost and therefore they approached the Treasury for duplicate challan; since there was no provision for issuing a duplicate challan, they were given certificates of payment and they enclosed those certificates along with their applications. The learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition observing that the PSC should not be hyper technical. The learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition observing that the PSC should not be hyper technical. But the Division Bench found that when the PSC had prescribed that the application should be accompanied by the original challan and since nobody could dispute the power of PSC to prescribe such a condition, it was not for the Court to go into the issue any further. It was held that non-compliance with the requirement prescribed by PSC should result in rejection of the application. It was even held that no direction could be issued to the PSC to exercise any discretion in the matter. It was also held that it was not fair to interfere in such matters unless mala fides is shown in the conduct of the Commission or on the part of the officers rejecting the application. 7. In Rangaswami v. KPSC ( 1982 KLT 574 ), a Sub Inspector of Police in the Armed Forces submitted an application for appointment as Sub Inspector of Police in General Executive Branch. The application was to be submitted on a form affixing a stamp worth Rs.5/-. He submitted the application in the prescribed form through proper channel along with another form affixing a stamp worth Rs.5/-. By mistake the office of the Inspector General of Police forwarded only the copy of the form without the stamp. There was no dispute as to the fact that the application was submitted by the candidate in the prescribed form before the Inspector General of Police and that the mistake had occurred in the office of the IG. However, the Division Bench of this Court, following its decisions in Varghese's case (supra), and in Public Service Commission V. Saroja Nambiar (1978 KLN 305), where a candidate who had omitted to fill up one column, was denied relief, and taking note of the judgment of the Apex Court in Umasankar v. Union of India ( AIR 1980 SC 1457 ), held that when the requirement as per the notification was not complied with, the only consequence could be rejection of the application. 8. In Raghavan v. Public Service Commission ( 1985 KLT 880 ), a learned Single Judge declined interference in a case where a candidate alleged that he could not attend the interview because he did not get the interview card in time, due to postal delay. 8. In Raghavan v. Public Service Commission ( 1985 KLT 880 ), a learned Single Judge declined interference in a case where a candidate alleged that he could not attend the interview because he did not get the interview card in time, due to postal delay. The contention of the PSC was that they had taken timely action, sending the interview card, issuing press release, etc. and the rank list was already published. It was held that the rules are prescribed and the norms laid down, to eliminate arbitrariness and ensure orderliness and they are intended to be followed in every case. Interference was refused observing that authorities who are bound by rules cannot be directed to relax the same. 9. In Sasikala T.V. v. KPSC ( 2012 (2) KLT 585 ), the PSC rejected the application of a candidate on the ground that the photograph affixed did not contain the name of the candidate or date on which the photograph was taken, despite the instructions in clause 1(a) 7 of the notification. The contention of the petitioner relying on Manojkumar v. KPSC ( 1999(2) KLT 534 ) that it was only a minor defect which the PSC could permit the candidate to cure, was repelled observing that both the requirements were made for the purpose of identifying the candidate and that the judgment in Manojkumar's case (supra) did not apply. Observing that the conditions prescribed could be described as insignificant, the Division Bench affirmed the judgment in W.P.(C) No.17611 of 2011 where the learned Single Judge held that the conditions in clause 7(1)(a) of the notification were prescribed in order to prevent impersonation and to ensure fairness in the conduct of examination. 10. In Ushakumari v. State of Kerala ( 2013 (4) KLT 11 ), the candidate submitted an application for appointment to the High Court service, without affixing signature on the photograph affixed in the application. As she was allowed to appear in the examination based on an interim order, this Court found that since she was already identified and permitted to appear in the examination, the failure on her part should not be a reason for rejection of her candidature. 11. As she was allowed to appear in the examination based on an interim order, this Court found that since she was already identified and permitted to appear in the examination, the failure on her part should not be a reason for rejection of her candidature. 11. In Sreejesh Vijayan v. KPSC ( 2014 (1) KLT 1003 ), the Division Bench reiterated its view in Sasikala's case and held that no principle of law was laid down in Ushakumari v. State of Kerala (supra). The inscription of name and date of photographing was held essential requirements on the photograph affixed. 12. In Antony v. KSEB ( 2014(1) KLT 702 ), the signature put by the candidate in the attendance register was found against the name of another candidate who was absent and therefore rejection of candidature was interfered with. 13. As per an unreported judgment dated 17.08.2016 in W.A. No.1435 of 2016, the Division Bench has confirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge in Prasanth K. Kanotathil v. Kerala Public Service Commission ( 2016 (4) KLT 242 ). In the said case, a candidate for appointment to the post of Draftsman Grade I in Kerala Water Authority, was not included in the rank list on the ground that he did not put his signature under his declaration in the identification certificate. After referring to various instructions given to candidates by the PSC, especially at Sl. Nos. (3), (4) and (10) of the instructions, regarding the details to be furnished in the identification certificate : that the photograph should be one taken within 6 months; the size of the photograph, the details of the features required for the photograph to be affixed, along with the warning that candidates who have not affixed the photographs as prescribed, would not be permitted; instruction No. (4) regarding the signature to be affixed on the photograph and the declaration in the identity certificate in presence of the invigilators and no.10 that answer scripts shall be invalidated in the case of those who violate the instructions, it was held that rejection of candidature was fully justified. The contention that the defect was trivial or inconsequential, was repelled. 14. In the decision in Prasanth K. Kanotathil's case (supra), a candidate was removed from the rank list for the reason that his photograph in the application did not contain his name and the date of taking the same. The contention that the defect was trivial or inconsequential, was repelled. 14. In the decision in Prasanth K. Kanotathil's case (supra), a candidate was removed from the rank list for the reason that his photograph in the application did not contain his name and the date of taking the same. He had applied for the post of Drftsman Grade I in the Kerala Water Authority. The learned Single Judge after analyzing a series of judgments where rejection of applications/candidature were considered by this Court, has summarised the principles laid down in those judgments which read as follows: “(i) The PSC is a constitutional body that is entrusted with the task of conduct of examinations and evaluation of candidates for appointment to public services under the State. It has to be borne in mind that the candidate in question has only a fundamental right to be considered for appointment to the post in question and it is the role of the PSC to evolve a procedure for laying down the mode and manner for consideration of such rights of the candidates. The decision as to whether any of the procedural requirements evaluated by the Commission are mandatory or directory, must therefore, vest with the PSC, at first instance. ii. Once the PSC puts in place a procedure for evaluating candidates based on their inter se merit; then it becomes obligatory on the part of the applicants to comply with the said procedure, and a non compliance with any such procedure could adversely affect the candidature of the applicant in question. iii. While the tenor of the instructions issued by PSC in connection with the selection procedure could be a pointer to whether the instructions are mandatory or directory in nature, the discretion with regard to waiver of any requirement must necessarily vest with the PSC, at first instance, since it is a constitutional authority having expertise in the said field. iv. While courts would generally be slow to second guess the wisdom of the PSC in categorising conditions/procedures, as mandatory or directory, it would only be in those cases where the procedural requirement breached has no demonstrable nexus with the object behind conducting an impartial assessment/evaluation of the merits of candidates, that this Court would interfere with the decision of the PSC in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, in that event, this Court would be discharging its role as the 'sentinel on the qui vive' to ensure that no injustice is meted out to any person. Such instances must necessarily be rare for, under ordinary circumstances this Court must defer to the wisdom of the PSC, itself a constitutional body, in areas that are within the area of expertise of the said body. Interference by a court with the decision of the PSC would only be in cases where there is manifest arbitrariness, discrimination, or the decision is found to be irrational, mala fide or unfair.” Finding that the rejection was on grounds more or less similar to the rejection in T.V.Sasikala's case (supra), the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition. That judgment was upheld by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 17.08.2016 in W.A. No.1582 of 2016 observing that the instructions were clear about the photograph to be affixed and after reiterating the principles in Sreejesh Vijayan's case (supra), Sasikala's case, etc., where the Division Bench had held that there was no infirmity or jurisdictional error committed by the PSC. It was also observed that this Court had been consistently taking the view that it is mandatory for the candidates to comply with all the requirements of the instructions issued to them, particularly relating to the photograph to be uploaded. 15. In the following cases, the action of PSC in granting time/for correction, production of documents. etc. was under challenge and this Court did not interfere. In Kuriakose v. State of Kerala & others ( 1984 KLT 925 ), the issue that arose for consideration was whether the advice and appointment of a candidate who had failed to produce the original documents within the time stipulated by PSC was valid or not. This Court found that when the PSC itself found that relaxation should be given, the Court would be reluctant to interfere. However, the learned Single Judge observed that the working difficulties of PSC cannot defeat the valuable rights of a citizen. Pointing out that a liberal approach was taken in Santhamma v. PSC (1982 KLT 86), in favour of the candidate and that it was not taken note of in the subsequent judgments, a necessity for reconsideration was found in that case. Pointing out that a liberal approach was taken in Santhamma v. PSC (1982 KLT 86), in favour of the candidate and that it was not taken note of in the subsequent judgments, a necessity for reconsideration was found in that case. (However, the said proposition was not agreed to in the judgment in Raghavan v. PSC ( 1985 KLT 880 ), observing that rules and norms are intended for its observance and to direct the authorities to relax rules would amount to torpedoing the Rule of Law. 16. In Manojkumar v. KPSC ( 1999 (2) KLT 534 ) also the challenge was against the action of PSC in allowing the candidates to cure certain minor defects. In Sasikala's case (supra) name and date of photographing were not written on the photograph. The defect was not found to be of a minor nature. Even the request to approach the PSC was not allowed. The same view was reiterated in Sreejesh's case(supra). 17. In Karnataka Public Service Commission v. B.M. Vijaya Shankar ( (1992) 2 SCC 206 ), certain candidates, who appeared for the civil service examination, wrote their Roll Numbers in all the pages despite the specific instruction that Roll Number should not be written except in the space provided in the first sheet. The Karnataka PSC did not evaluate those answer books. The Apex Court upheld the action of the PSC and held that it was not necessary to afford an opportunity of hearing to such candidates, pointing out the requirement of adhering to such instructions which are issued in public interest. Direction of the Tribunal to afford them opportunity of hearing was found to be uncalled for and it was held that the Rule of Hearing should be construed more strictly in cases where an examinee is competing for a Civil Service post, a category where the principles of natural justice before taking action stood excluded; the nature of the competition must be fair and one infusing confidence or else it would be against public interest and would erode the social sense of equality. 18. Adv. Kaleeswaram Raj, the learned Counsel appearing for one of the candidates, argued that the judgment in Roshni's case (supra) was inevitable in the circumstances of the case. 18. Adv. Kaleeswaram Raj, the learned Counsel appearing for one of the candidates, argued that the judgment in Roshni's case (supra) was inevitable in the circumstances of the case. According to him, a total denial of relief, without looking into the circumstances of each case would deny relief to even the innocent and meritorious candidates; even in Rangaswami's case (supra), this Court had, while declining interference, only observed that normally the Court would be loathe to interfere with the decisions of the PSC. Learned Counsel pointed out the instances where the PSC itself reconsidered the matter during the pendency of the Writ Petition in Jeejo v. State of Kerala (W.P.(C) No. 16395 of 2017). 19. Here, the question for consideration is, to what extent judicial review is permissible in such cases. In KPSC v. Roshni: (ILR 2016 (1) Ker 99: 2015(4) KLT SN 94), the photograph was taken just 15 days before the 6 months' period started. On the basis of the pleadings in that case it was found that part II of the general conditions was not available on the Website. Eventhough the PSC produced the Gazette Notification, no materials could be produced to show the availability of the general conditions on the Website. The Division Bench affirmed the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge, observing in para 21 that the learned Single Judge did not take any view contrary to the view laid down by the Division Bench judgment in Sasikala's case (supra) and Sreejesh's case (supra). While endorsing the dicta in those judgments, the Division Bench observed that the object of including the conditions as to writing the name and affixing the signature on the photograph was to ensure not only transparency, but also to exclude the possibility of any allegation as to impersonation and that in Roshni's case (supra), there was no such allegation. The KAT has followed the above observations and allowed the present Original Applications before us. Roshni's case (supra) was allowed in the peculiar circumstances of the case, which the learned Single Judge has explained in the judgment. The KAT has followed the above observations and allowed the present Original Applications before us. Roshni's case (supra) was allowed in the peculiar circumstances of the case, which the learned Single Judge has explained in the judgment. The Division Bench thereafter relied on the judgments in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and another ( AIR 1954 SC 440 ), State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari ( (1976) 1 SCC 719 ), Roshan Deen V Preeti Lal ( (2002) 1 SCC 100 ) and held that the scope of Article 226 was very wide and capable of being used to remedy injustice wherever it is found. It was further held that there cannot be a mechanical rejection of all applications, though the PSC had the right to reject the candidature for non-fulfillment of the stipulations required by the advertisement. It further held that when the matter is taken to the High Court under Article 226, the Court is entitled to look into the facts of each case and consider whether injustice has been meted out in a particular case. As the learned Single Judge had in exercise of his discretion decided in favour of the petitioner, the Division Bench found that interference with the same would erase the justice meted out to her. 20. In Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal ( (1990) 2 SCC 746 ), the appointment of a Reader in Calcutta University was under challenge. The question whether the Chancellor was required to observe the principles of Natural Justice was considered. It was found that the Chancellor was not exercising any judicial or quasi judicial function; it was purely an administrative function and he was to take a decision with reference to the records, in accordance with the statutes and ordinances, without any illegality, irrationality or arbitrariness. 21. Relying on the judgments in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Others v. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve and others ( (2001) 10 SCC 51 ) and in K. Manjusree V State of Andhra Pradesh ( (2008) 3 SCC 512 ), the learned Counsel for the PSC argued that any action contrary to the instructions already issued would amount to changing the rules of the game after the game has started. It was pointed out that any deviation if made in the case of those who approached the Court, would amount to discrimination towards candidates who have not approached the court. It was pointed out that any deviation if made in the case of those who approached the Court, would amount to discrimination towards candidates who have not approached the court. In the Maharashtra SRTC case (supra), the candidates for the post of Drivers challenged the selection alleging that the marks allotted for the interview was excessive and the circulars relied on were not relevant. In Manjusree's case the minimum qualifying marks for interview for the post of District and Sessions Judges was prescribed after the interview was over. 22. In Anurag Kumar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand ( (2016) 9 SCC 426 ), while considering whether the court could have directed appointment in excess of the posts notified in the case of Assistant Prosecuting Officers, the Apex Court held that judicial discretion could be exercised by a court only when there were two or more possible lawful solutions and that courts could not give any direction contrary to the statute or rules made thereunder in exercise of judicial discretion. 23. In Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. 2018) 2 SCC 357),while considering the claim for revaluation of answer sheets, disputing the correctness of key answers, the Apex Court has laid down the areas which are not to be transgressed by the courts. In paragraph 30 of the judgment, it was held that the court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinize the answer sheets of a candidate—it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters are best left to academics; the court should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that assumption; and in the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the authority conducting the examination rather than to the candidate. In para 31 it was held as follows: “31. On our part we may add that sympathy or compassion does not play any role in the matter of directing or not directing re-evaluation of an answer sheet. If an error is committed by the examination authority, the complete body of candidates suffers. The entire examination process does not deserve to be derailed only because some candidates are disappointed or dissatisfied or perceive some injustice having been caused to them by an erroneous question or an erroneous answer. All candidates suffer equally, though some might suffer more but that cannot be helped since mathematical precision is not always possible. The entire examination process does not deserve to be derailed only because some candidates are disappointed or dissatisfied or perceive some injustice having been caused to them by an erroneous question or an erroneous answer. All candidates suffer equally, though some might suffer more but that cannot be helped since mathematical precision is not always possible. This Court has shown one way out of an impasse — exclude the suspect or offending question.” The only action taken was that those answer books in which roll numbers had been written inside were not subjected to evaluation. 24. According to the learned Counsel for the PSC, instructions are to be adhered to strictly and therefore, it cannot be relaxed in the case of certain persons, who violate the instructions. 25. The Division Bench in Roshini's case (supra) had relied on the judgment in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal ( (2002) 1 SCC 100 ), noticing that since the Single Judge had already granted an order in favour of the candidate, it was unnecessary to interfere with it. In that case, the Apex Court found that the order of the High Court reversing the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation in favour of a workman, who got crushed in a machine and suffered injuries all over his organs, was unjust. Originally the application was closed on the submission that a settlement was arrived at. But when it was seen that there was no such settlement and since the workman submitted that fraud was played on him and that he had not engaged anybody to make such submission, the Commissioner recalled the order. The Apex Court frowned upon the judgment of the High Court and observed as follows: “Time and again this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it (vide State of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao, (1984) 2 SCC 673 ). The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The lookout of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. The lookout of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law.” 26. Adv. Kaleeswaram Raj, relying on A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen ( AIR 1957 SC 227 ) argued that interference is not warranted by this Court under Article 226, where the Tribunal has granted a relief in favour of the candidates. In that case applications filed by labourers employed in Tea Estates under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 were allowed by the authority under the Act. The High Court refused to interfere with it. In the appeal the Apex Court also refused to interfere observing: "The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Article 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires it. But we are not so satisfied. We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently found in favour of the respondents both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court, we should decline to interfere." 27. In the above O.P.(KAT) cases, the candidates were applicants for appointment as HSST. In both the cases the objection was against the size of the photograph. KAT allowed the O.A on a finding that the purpose behind fixing the size of the photograph was to identify the candidate and to see that there was no impersonation. The KAT found that there was no difficulty to identify the candidate and the defect was not so serious. 28. The instructions regarding uploading of photographs are provided in the home page of the website, which the candidates are supposed to read carefully, before submitting their applications. Those instructions provide for the size of the photographs as : Height: 200 pixel; width: 150 pixel; jpg format file size: less than 30kb. But both applicants uploaded stamp size photographs. The above details are provided in the PSC's bulletin also. Those instructions provide for the size of the photographs as : Height: 200 pixel; width: 150 pixel; jpg format file size: less than 30kb. But both applicants uploaded stamp size photographs. The above details are provided in the PSC's bulletin also. Innumerable candidates have uploaded photographs of the correct size. 29. Any candidate applying for a job should be careful in submitting their applications in compliance with the instructions. The ability to do so is also a means to assess the sense of responsibility of the candidate who seeks to be appointed in his service. The assessment starts from the application of the candidate. The candidates are expected to have the minimum responsibility to submit the application in tune with the instructions, except in circumstances where technical problems beyond their control create difficulties, despite taking sufficient care and caution. 30. A scanning of majority of the judgments cited by both sides would show that the consistent stand of this Court has been to the effect that applications shall be submitted as instructed. Roshni's case (supra) can only be considered as one rendered in the peculiar facts of the said case, where it was found that the date of photographing was just a few days prior to the six months' period. Apart from that in that case it was demonstrated that the website did not provide for part II of the notification, in which the instructions for uploading of photographs were alleged to have been published. The Division Bench found that no material was produced in the Writ Appeal also so as to reverse the finding of the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the dictum in the said case has to be confined to the peculiar factual situation of that case. 31. The contention that the judgment has diluted the dicta of the earlier decisions cannot be accepted. As long as the instructions were made known to the candidates properly, without any ambiguity and with due clarity, it was incumbent on the candidates to have abided by such instructions strictly. In the case of defects committed despite clear instructions and not because of any technical errors in the server of PSC or the like, which is beyond the control of the candidates, there cannot be any relaxation of the instructions. In the case of defects committed despite clear instructions and not because of any technical errors in the server of PSC or the like, which is beyond the control of the candidates, there cannot be any relaxation of the instructions. The instructions cannot also be modified to suit the convenience of parties on the ground that the intention of stipulating the instruction could be achieved even otherwise, as in the case of the candidates who had approached the KAT, where it is held that it was possible to identify the candidate even with the given photograph though it does not conform to the size prescribed. When all candidates, except a very few have produced the photographs of the prescribed size, it cannot be said that photographs uploaded without the due care and caution, that is expected of the candidates, who are eagerly waiting for employment, are liable to be accepted. Such cases do not justify any indulgence on the ground that the candidate could be identified and that the purpose of affixing a photograph with the prescribed size was achieved. 32. The other question that arise is, once a candidate is permitted to appear for the examination, by the Chairman, whether the PSC is bound by the principle of promissory estoppel from rejecting his candidature, later. In order to attract the principle of promissory estoppel, one should have suffered some detriment acting upon a promise and altering his position. In this case, the candidates had approached the Chairman just before the date of the examination and the Chairman had permitted some of the candidates to appear for the examination. Such permission cannot be construed as a promise to regularise their candidature. It cannot also be said that such appearance of the candidates in the examination, has resulted in any prejudice to them or that it was detrimental to them. Such permission or the appearance in the examination also cannot cure the defects in the applications submitted by the candidates. In such circumstances, this Court would not direct the PSC to rank them, diluting the rigor of the instructions. 33. Such permission or the appearance in the examination also cannot cure the defects in the applications submitted by the candidates. In such circumstances, this Court would not direct the PSC to rank them, diluting the rigor of the instructions. 33. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘Promissory estoppel’ is an estoppel that arises when a promise is made by the promisor with the intention to induce an action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of promisee, and where it does induce such action or forbearance, such promise would be binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of such promise. 34. As long as the Chairman or PSC does not find that rejection of application was not proper and takes a decision to accept the candidature, it cannot be said that Article 226 could be invoked against the rejection merely on the ground that the Chairman had granted permission to a candidate to appear for the examination. In other words as long as there is no provision in the rules or regulations issued by the PSC providing that, once a candidate is allowed to appear for the examination by the Chairman, he/she would be treated as regular, no relief could be granted to the candidate, as claimed. 35. The principle of promissory estoppel has come up for consideration in innumerable judgments before the Apex Court. (see Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd, AIR 1968 SC 718 , Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, (1970) 1 SCC 582 ; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 ; Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11 ; Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd, (1985) 4 SCC 369 ; Indian Express Newspapers (Bom) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 ; Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala, 1986 Supp SCC 728; Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 31 ; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 86 ; Asstt. CCT v. Dharmendra Trading Co., (1988) 3 SCC 570 ; Amrit Banaspati Co. CCT v. Dharmendra Trading Co., (1988) 3 SCC 570 ; Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1992) 2 SCC 411 and Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993) 3 SCC 499, State of H.P. v. Ganesh Wood Products, (1995) 6 SCC 363 , Kasinka Trading v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 274 , Shrijee Sales Corpn. v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 398 , Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. U.P. SEB, (1997) 7 SCC 251 , Ashok Kumar Maheshwari v. State of U.P., (1998)2 SCC 502 , Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188 , State of Orissa v. Mangalam Timber Products Ltd, (2004)1 SCC 139 , State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd: (2004)6 SCC 465 , Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO: (2005) 1 SCC 625 , M.P. Mathur xxxx:(2006)13 SCC 706, Kusumam Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Kerala SEB, (2008) 13 SCC 213 , Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1 .) 36. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co's case (supra), it was held that the true principle of promissory estoppel would apply where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise with the intention to create legal relations or to effect a legal relationship that may arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. In Godfrey Philips India Ltd., the Apex Court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when equity so requires; if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. In Godfrey Philips India Ltd., the Apex Court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when equity so requires; if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. In Amrit Banaspati case it was held that the basic purpose of promissory estoppel is to promote justice founded on fairness and relieve a promisee of any injustice perpetrated due to the act of the promisor going back on his promise. But it was also held that it cannot be enforced in a court of law if the promise which furnishes the cause of action or the agreement, express or implied, giving rise to a binding contract, is statutorily prohibited or is against public policy. In the judgment in Kasinka Trading, the Apex Court explained the doctrine as follows: “11. The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is well established in the administrative law of the country. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing as well as intending that the representation, assurance or the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise, assurance or representation should be binding on the party making it and that party should not be permitted to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken place or are intended to take place between the parties. 12. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. 12. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel the Government or the public authority ‘to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make’. There is preponderance of judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation.” 37. In Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. U.P. SEB ( (1997) 7 SCC 251 ), it was held that even Government is competent to resile from a promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved, provided, no one is put in an adverse situation which cannot be rectified and even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be within the competence of the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, provided, of course, it is possible for the promisee to restore the status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. 38. It is settled law that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, where, the promisee, acting on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. 39. In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary that the promise which is sought to be enforced must be shown to be an unequivocal promise to the other party intended to create a legal relationship and that it was acted upon assuchby the party to whom the same was made. 40. In Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India ( (2012) 11 SCC 1 ), it was held that for invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary for the promisee to show that by acting on promise made by the other party, he altered his position. The alteration of position by the promisee is a sine qua non for the applicability of the doctrine. However, it is not necessary for him to prove any damage, detriment or prejudice because of alteration of such promise. It was held as follows in para 182.: “182.5. In no case, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be pressed into aid to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. No promise can be enforced which is statutorily prohibited or is against public policy.” The permission granted by the Chairman alone cannot be a ground for invoking Article 226 in order to compel the PSC to accept the application of the candidates. The permission does not amount to an uniequivocal promise and by writing the examination after getting the permission it cannot be said that the candidates have altered their position. The permission does not amount to an uniequivocal promise and by writing the examination after getting the permission it cannot be said that the candidates have altered their position. The entire process of selection is governed by rules, regulations, instructions, etc., which are applicable to all the candidates equally. There is no promise to be enforced and if at all the Chairman has made any promise, this Court will not be justified in enforcing any such promise Therefore, there is no question of any applicability of the principle of promissory estoppel in these cases. 41. The next issue referred is whether interference is possible on the ground of permission granted by Chairman, relying on Roshni's case (supra), even after the judgments in Rangaswami 's case and in O.P(KAT) 3013/2013. 42. When it is found that the permission granted by the Chairman is inconsequential, the question of interference on that ground does not arise. W. A. 2421 of 2016 43. In the above writ appeal, the PSC challenges the judgment of a learned Single Judge by which the rejection of application of a candidate has been set aside. The writ petitioner had submitted an application for appointment to the post of Sub Engineer, Electrical in the Kerala State Electricity Board. His application was rejected as per Ext.P2 letter in the writ petition for the reason that, on his photograph affixed to his application, he had written his date of birth. As per the instructions issued by the PSC, it was the date on which the photograph was taken that ought to have been written on his photograph. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that, the defect on the basis of which his application was rejected, was not so material as to be a cause for the rejection of his candidature especially in view of the fact that there was no dispute regarding his identity. 44. The PSC contested the writ petition by filing a counter affidavit. According to the counter affidavit, the instructions given to the candidates on the Home Page of the Website of PSC clearly stated that the photographs uploaded should be of colour/black and white taken after 31.12.2010 and that the name of the candidate and the date of taking photograph should be printed at the bottom. According to the counter affidavit, the instructions given to the candidates on the Home Page of the Website of PSC clearly stated that the photographs uploaded should be of colour/black and white taken after 31.12.2010 and that the name of the candidate and the date of taking photograph should be printed at the bottom. Since the writ petitioner had not complied with the above mandatory requirement, his application was defective and could not be considered. 45. A reply affidavit was filed by the writ petitioner to the counter affidavit contending that, the notification of the PSC published online did not stipulate that the photograph should have been taken on or after 31.12.2010 and that the general conditions referred to in Ext.P4 notification was not available at the online site for the petitioner to peruse. The writ petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 399 of 2015 (KPSC v. Roshini K.S.) to point out that, in the context of another notification bearing No. 489 of 2011 of the same date, this Court found that the general conditions in Part II of the notification were not made available on the Website for the candidates to peruse. In view of the above, it was submitted that non-compliance with the said condition should not be made fatal to the candidature of the writ petitioner. The said contention has been accepted by the learned Single Judge and the writ petition has been allowed. It is aggrieved by the said judgment that this writ appeal is filed. 46. The counsel appearing for the respective parties have advanced identical contentions as in the other cases considered by us hereinabove, in this appeal also. We have already held that the stipulations insisted upon by the PSC prescribing the manner in which the applications are to be submitted by the candidates have to be strictly complied with. Any lapse on the part of the candidate in complying with the conditions shall entail the consequence of rejection if his/her application. Any dilution of the stipulations by this Court treating one or the other condition as having been substantially complied with would only be counter productive. Since the vast majority of candidates succeed in submitting flawless applications on the basis of the instructions of the PSC, indulgence to the few who are unable to do so would not be justified. Any dilution of the stipulations by this Court treating one or the other condition as having been substantially complied with would only be counter productive. Since the vast majority of candidates succeed in submitting flawless applications on the basis of the instructions of the PSC, indulgence to the few who are unable to do so would not be justified. Such indulgence would create unnecessary hurdles in the process of selection undertaken by the PSC. 47. In the present case, the writ petitioner had written his date of birth on his photograph submitted along with his application. His case is that, he was not aware of the requirement of furnishing the date on which the photograph was taken, on his photograph. The said contention of the writ petitioner cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt. This is for the reason that, he has no answer as to why he had written a date on his photograph, in the first place. Unless he had been aware that he was expected to put some date on his photograph, he would not have written his date of birth on his photograph. Therefore, the statement that he was not aware of the stipulation regarding the mentioning of the date on which the photograph was taken on his photograph lacks credence. In the absence of any explanation as to why he had written his date of birth on his photograph, his contention cannot be accepted. Therefore, the judgment appealed against cannot be sustained. In the result, the reference is answered as indicated above. O.P.(KAT) Nos. 143 and 153 of 2016 are accordingly allowed setting aside the impugned orders of the KAT. W.A. No. 2421 of 2016 is allowed setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 22154 of 2015.