JUDGMENT : 1. This is a plaintiff’s Second Appeal, whereby, he has questioned the judgment dated 02.02.2019, as rendered by the 3rd Additional District Judge, in Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2014, Smt. Prabha Rana Vs. Sri Harmit Singh, whereby, the appeal of the defendant/respondent was allowed, setting aside the decree dated 15.12.2013 rendered by Trial Court in O.S. No. 13 of 2002, Harmit Singh Vs. Prabha Rana. 2. Brief facts, as has been brought on record by the plaintiff appellant to the Second Appeal is that the plaintiff appellant is said to have instituted a Civil Suit, being Suit No. 13 of 2002, Shri Harmit Singh Vs. Prabha Rana on 15th January, 2002, seeking a decree of permanent injunction in relation to the property as described at the foot of the plaint. The relief and the description of the property as provided in the plaint is quoted hereunder :- ^^oknh fuEu izfrdkj izkIr djus dk izkFkZuk djrk gS & v& ;g fd izfrokfnuh] muds ,tsUVksa] izfrfuf/k;ksa o deZpkfj;ksa dks LFkk;h fu"ks?kkKk dh vkKfIr }kjk oknxzLr Hkwfe ls oknh dks csn[ky djus vkSj oknh ds 'kkfUriw.kZ v?;klu esa fell izdkj dk gLr{ksi djus ls fuf"k/k fd;k tkosA c& lEiw.kZ okn O;; izfrokfnuh ls oknh dks fnyok;k tkosA l& vU; dksbZ izfrdkj ftldk oknh vf/kdkjh ik;k tkosA oknh dks izfrokfnuh ds fo:) fnyok;k tkosA fooj.k oknxzLr Hkwfe Hkwfe [kljk uEcj 980 {ks=Qy 119-83 o0 eh0 fLFkr ekStk dkacyh ijxuk dsUnzh;nwu nsgjknwu uki 86 QqV x 15 QqV ftldh lhek;sa fuUu izdkj ls gSa & iwjc esa & lEifRr oknh lhek uki 86 QqV] if'pe esa & va'k esa lEifRr oknh o va'k esa lEifRr izfrokfnuh lhek uki 86 QqV] mRrj esa & jkLrk 20 QqV pkSMk lhek esa uki 15 QqV] nf{k.k esa & lEifRr tlfcUnj dkSj lhek esa uki 15 QqV^^ 3. The plaint case of the plaintiff was that the property in dispute which has an area of 119.83 sq. meter as described in the plaint, he contends to have purchased the said property by virtue of the sale deed executed in his favour on 10th November, 2000 from his predecessor owner Shyam Singh S/o Megh Singh. He submits that in and around the area of the property situated in the western part of the plot No. 5 & 4, lies the disputed passage described in map by alphabets EFGH as filed with written statement. He submits that in and around the area of the property situated in the western part of the plot No. 5 & 4, lies the disputed passage described in map by alphabets EFGH as filed with written statement. The defendant had purchased the said property, lying on the western side of the disputed passage, i.e. plot No.3, much prior in time, i.e. by virtue of the sale deed dated 19th September, 1999. The cause of action which has been taken as to be the reason for instituting the suit was that on 14th January, 2002, the defendant / respondent is said to have visited the spot and started demolishing the wall of the plaintiff and, thereby, obstructing the property i.e. the passage which was allegedly purchased by him by the sale deed dated 10th November, 2000. He contended that there was no right with the defendant to demolish the wall existing on the northern side as there was no right or title vested with the defendant/respondent. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff is recorded in the revenue record in Shrerni 1 Ka, as per the category as classified bhumidhars under Section 129 of the Zamindary Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and the property which adjoins the western portion of the disputed property was the defendant’s land which was admittedly purchased by the defendant much prior in time on 19th September, 1999, by virtue of the registered sale deed, i.e. plot No. 3 as per map annexed with the written statement. 4. On issuance of the notice, the defendant respondent has filed his written statement and denied the plaint allegation and contended that as far as the so called purchase of the property is concerned, it is absolutely contrary to the contents of the sale deed and the extent of right conferred because the said property was never sold or part of the sale deed, rather could not be sold as was a common passage to be utilized by the surrounding inhabitants of the area, but, in fact, was rather being utilized as common passage and it was this passage which was being utilized by the adjoining residents too who had their plots in and around the disputed property, i.e. the passage shown by figure EFGH. He further contended that from the passage, in question, he has access to his plot, being plot No. 1, which, he has purchased on 05.06.1994, he got his map sanctioned from the Development Authority and raised his construction. Even the sanctioned map shows disputed property as a passage. The sale deed and the sanctioned plan were placed on record by the defendant as evidence before the Court below in support of his case which could not be rebutted by the plaintiff. His contention was that in accordance with the contents of the sale deed dated 19th September, 1999 and 05.09.1994 in relation to No. No. 1 and the description of the property as given therein and even as per sanctioned map by the Development Authorities, the disputed land is shown to be a passage and the plaintiff himself has admitted that when the construction was being raised by the defendant, he has placed a gate which was used by him for his ingress and egress and, apart from that the passage, in question, there was no other passage available to him to utilize his property, i.e. plot No. 3 and 1 and he has got bhumidhari rights on the same. The defendant in the written statement has submitted that the property which has been claimed by the plaintiff, in fact, is a property which is a passage jointly used by the other residents also and it is a common passage. 5. Similarly, the gate of the owner of the adjoining plot No. 2, i.e. Ravindra Singh Rawat, too opens over the disputed passage and thus the exclusive claim raised by the plaintiff is absolutely untenable and beyond the rights which was vested in him by his sale deed. Hence, the defendant, in support of his contention has further submitted that the so called theory of cause of action being accrued to the plaintiff on 14th January, 2002, on account of the plea raised that the defendant respondent had demolished the wall is also not tenable because neither any construction nor any act of demolition was ever committed by the defendant/respondent, as his gate was already opening on the disputed passage used for his ingress and egress. 6. In support of his contention, the defendant has placed on record, paper No. 10-Ga, i.e. khatuni pertaining to 1391 to 1399 fasli and the khasra, paper No. 11-Ga, pertaining to 1399 fasli. 6. In support of his contention, the defendant has placed on record, paper No. 10-Ga, i.e. khatuni pertaining to 1391 to 1399 fasli and the khasra, paper No. 11-Ga, pertaining to 1399 fasli. Besides this, he has also placed on record, the photograph of the plot, in question, i.e. paper No. 29-G and 30-Ga and also the manner in which the title has flowed to the defendant by the sale deed dated 10th September, 1999 and 05.06.1994 from his predecessors because by the document on record, as paper No. 73- G, i.e. sale deeds dated 22nd February, 1982 and sale deed, paper No. 98-Ga dated 02.02.1982, 19.03.1999 and 19.12.1999, was copy of sale which all show the existence of the property in dispute as to be the passage, which was being commonly utilized by the people at large residing in the vicinity. Besides this, paper No. 120 was also placed by him before the Court below, which was sanctioned map, sanctioned in favour of the defendant on 15th September, 2010 to substantiate his case about the existence of the passage which is being claimed by the defendant as to be his personal property. 7. Besides this, the defendant/respondent in additional plea taken in the written statement as filed on 4th March, 2002, had given a detailed pleading as to how the passage has come into existence and, in support thereto, he has placed on record the various sale deeds ever since 1979 and a specific plea was taken that the principal owner, i.e. Megh Singh S/o Surbha Singh, Shyam Singh S/o Megh Singh had divided a big chunk of their land into the plots and thus have sold it to various persons, including the plaintiff and the defendant. In the said area, they have left the disputed land as to be a passage available to all the purchasers who have purchased the plots from the predecessors owners. 8. In the said area, they have left the disputed land as to be a passage available to all the purchasers who have purchased the plots from the predecessors owners. 8. A reference in the written statement was also made to the sale of plot No. 3, which was sold to Bachan Singh Rawat by the common seller Megh Singh and Shayam Singh by the sale deed dated 2nd February, 1982, which is being placed as evidence on record as paper No. 98-Ga, which too shows that the property in dispute claimed by the plaintiff to be exclusive owner and, as a matter of fact, the said sale deed too shows the existence of the aforesaid passage on the eastern side of aforesaid plot No. 3, purchased by Bachan Singh and even gate of Bachan Singh opens on the disputed passage. Later on, Bachan Singh has sold property to Mahabir Singh Malik by sale deed dated 6th August, 1990, which yet again records the land in dispute lying on the eastern side as to be a common passage. 9. Not only this, the defendant had also placed reliance on sale deed dated 19th December, 1999, sold by the common sellers to the plaintiff’s wife Jasvinder Kaur on 9th December, 1999. In the said sale deed, plot No. 4, which was sold to the wife of the plaintiff and the map which is annexed with the sale deed and was its part, it too shows that the property in dispute was a common passage. It is after the aforesaid purchase, it seems that the plaintiff has started raising the claim over the passage as to be his personal property alleging it to have been purchased by the sale deed dated 10th November, 2000. One of the plot No. 6, which was purchased by one Mr. Vipin Mohan Rawat, which also lies in the same vicinity and the plot which was principally belonging to Megh Singh and Shayam Singh have purchased the Plot No. 6 by the sale deed dated 4th February, 1982, the description of property in the said sale deed, which also shows the existence of the passage. Vipin Mohan Rawat, which also lies in the same vicinity and the plot which was principally belonging to Megh Singh and Shayam Singh have purchased the Plot No. 6 by the sale deed dated 4th February, 1982, the description of property in the said sale deed, which also shows the existence of the passage. Even so much so that when the map was sanctioned in relation to the Plot No. 2, purchased by the Ravindra Singh Rawat on 21st December, 1989, the plot, in question, was inspected by the authorities of the M.D.D.A. and the said map, which was sanctioned shown the existence of 15 feet wide passage on the eastern side of plot No. 2. Thus, from the aforesaid pleadings the defendant contended that invariably all the sale deeds which are on record and maps sanctioned by the Development Authority supports her contention that the plot in dispute is a common passage over which she has got an easementary rights and which cannot be obstructed by any act of interference by the plaintiff without any exclusive right vested in him and thus, as a matter of fact, there was no cause of action for him to institute the suit. 10. The defendant/respondent has also made a reference to earlier set of proceedings while taking a plea of bar of Section 10 of the C.P.C. to the effect that the there was another and earlier Suit, being Suit No. 321 of 2010, Smt. Prabha Rana Vs. Jasvir Singh, which was decided by the Civil Judge, Junior Division on 19th December, 2001, and while dismissing the said suit, yet again, it recorded that the disputed passage is the only passage available to the purchaser of the various plots in the vicinity, which have been detailed above. 11. Jasvir Singh, which was decided by the Civil Judge, Junior Division on 19th December, 2001, and while dismissing the said suit, yet again, it recorded that the disputed passage is the only passage available to the purchaser of the various plots in the vicinity, which have been detailed above. 11. After the exchange of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues, which are quoted hereunder :- ^^4- mHk; i{kksa ds ijLir fojks/kh vfHkopuksa ds vk/kkj ij fnuakd 30-11-3011 dks fuUufyf[kr fook|d fojfpr fd, x, % 1& D;k oknh] fookfnr lEifRr dk LokHkh o dkfct gS \ 2& D;k fookfnr lEifRr ,d jkLrk gS \ ;fn gkW rks izHkko A 3& D;k izfroknh }kjk oknh dh fookfnr lEifRRk esa nhokn rksMdj oknxzLr Hkwfe ls oknh dks csn[ky dj voS/k :i ls dCTkk djus dh dksf'k'k dh x;h gS \ 4& D;k oknh }kjk okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS vkSj U;k;'kqYd vi;kZIr vnk fd;k x;k gS \ 5 & D;k orZeku okn /kkjk 10 lh-ih-lh- ds izko/kkuksa ls ckf/kr gS \ 6& oknh] ;fn gka rks fdl vuqrks”k dks ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS \^^ 12. The plaintiff, in support of his contention, has produced himself in the witness box as PW1 and the defendant as recorded his oral testimony as DW1 and has also recorded the statement of Mr. B.S. Rana, as DW2. The learned Trial Curt primarily while dealing with issue no. 2. had derived its conclusion without reading the evidences produced by the defendant in its correct prospective on records, the Trial Court proceeded on the grounds that since the so called claimed passage by the defendant since is not recorded in the public records as a public passage, it cannot be treated as a passage. For considering the same, the Trial Court has placed reliance on paper No. 10-Ga and 11-Ga which are the khasras produced by the plaintiff which showed that the property stands recorded with Shyam Singh. This findings which has been recorded by the Trial Court in its judgment dated 5th December, 2013, while decreeing the suit, it is absolutely perverse and misreading of the evidence for the reason that under the revenue law khasra is only a document which shows the possession of the property and not a title or its nature of user. This findings which has been recorded by the Trial Court in its judgment dated 5th December, 2013, while decreeing the suit, it is absolutely perverse and misreading of the evidence for the reason that under the revenue law khasra is only a document which shows the possession of the property and not a title or its nature of user. May be that the khatuni filed on record showed that the property belong to Shyam Singh but the interpretation of khatuni, it will not show the existence or non existence of the passage, which has been already settled to the purchasers of various plots sold by the predecessors owners to the different persons and the existence of passage which also stands settled by the various maps sanctioned by the Development Authority in favour of various purchasers of the plot. 13. The finding recorded by the Trial Court pertaining to the fact that the disputed passage has not been recorded as a public passage in the revenue record is absolutely perverse and without any material basis and application of mind for the reason being that admittedly according to the map which was produced by the defendant along with written statement and if that map is read along with the various maps which stood sanctioned by Development Authority, it is the plotting which has been done by the previous owners and it was a private plotting and thus, the passage, which has been shown in the aforesaid plots, it will never constitute to be a passage which has been statutorily created under the local laws or would be accordingly recorded in any revenue records. Hence, the inference drawn by the Trial Court that there was no material to show that it was a public passage recorded in the revenue records or any authentic government record is absolutely contrary and based on the misreading of the evidence. The said judgment was put to challenge in Appeal by the defendant respondent, which was registered as Appeal No. 5 of 2014 and the same has been decided by the impugned judgment dated 02.02.2019, whereby the appeal of defendant /respondent was allowed. Hence, the present second appeal invoking Section 100 of the C.P.C. 14. The said judgment was put to challenge in Appeal by the defendant respondent, which was registered as Appeal No. 5 of 2014 and the same has been decided by the impugned judgment dated 02.02.2019, whereby the appeal of defendant /respondent was allowed. Hence, the present second appeal invoking Section 100 of the C.P.C. 14. The learned Appellate Court, while dealing with the rival contentions has recorded a specific finding that the sale deed of the defendant respondent, which was executed much prior in time by the common seller, i.e. on 19th April, 1999, had showed the existence of the aforesaid passage on the eastern boundary of the land purchased by him and which constituted to be the part of the map appended with the sale deed as a passage demarcated for common use. It had also considered that though in the earlier suit No. 327 of 2001, which stood decided in the said suit too, it has recorded a finding that the disputed plot was a passage utilized by the owners of the five plots jointly and the defendant’s gate opens on the said passage. It had also considered that though in the earlier suit No. 327 of 2001, which stood decided in the said suit too, it has recorded a finding that the disputed plot was a passage utilized by the owners of the five plots jointly and the defendant’s gate opens on the said passage. Though Section 10 of the CPC may not apply for the reason as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that since he was not a party to the Suit No. 327 of 2001, the principle of Section 10 may not apply but legally, the finding which has been recorded in the aforesaid judgment while dismissing the suit on 19th December, 2001, has recorded the following findings :- ^^okfnuh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dh vksj ls ,d i{kh; fu"ks?kkKk gsrq rdZ fd;k x;k fd la;qDr jkLrk tks okn i= layXu ekufp= 3d@13 esa yky jax ls nf'kZr gS] oknh gsrq ,d ,dek= jkLrk gS vkSj ;fn oknh dk jkLrk izfroknhx.k us cUn dj fn;k rks oknh dk vkokxeu dk jkLrk ugha jgsxkA lquk o i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;kA okfnuh }kjk izLrqr 'kiFki= 7 x] layXu fodz;&i= ofj”B iqfyl v?kh{kd dks fn;k x;s i= dh izfr izLrqr dh gS] ftuds vk/kkj ij fookfnr lEifRRk dks ;fnu fu;r fnukad rd lqjf{kr u j[kk x;k rks okfnuh ds nkos dk mnsn; foQy gks tk,xkA vr% ekSds ij yky jax ls iznf'kZr 3d@13 esa jkLrs ds lEcU/k esa i{kdkj fu;r fnukad rd ;FkkfLFkfr dk;e j[ksaxsaA okLrs vkifRr o dkmUVj 6 x o okLrs lekr 4 x gsrq izfroknhx.k dks uksfVl fnukad 7&1&2002 ds fy, tkjh gksA okfnuh vkns'k 39 fu;e 3 lh-ih-lh- dk ikyu rqjUr djsaA flfoy tt ¼twfu;j fMohTku½ nsgjknwu^^ 15. The Appellate Court on the exchange of the pleadings, while exercising his power under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and considering the rival contention, apart from dealing with the issue framed by the Trial Court as referred in para 5 of the impugned appellate judgment had also formulated the questions of determination in para 9 of the said judgment in the following manner : ^^i{kdkjksa dh vksj ls izLrqr fd;s x;s mi;qZDr rdksZ ds vkyksd esa vihy ds Lrj ij fuEu vo/kk;Z fcnq fopkj.kh fn[kkbZ nsrs gS& 1- D;k fookfnr Hkw[k.M latqDr miHkksxokyk jkLrk gS \ 2- D;k fopkj.k U;k;ky; us oknfcUnq la[;k 1] 2] 3 o 6 dk =qfViw.kZ djrs gq, oknh ds okn dks vkKfIr dj =qfV dkfjr fd;k gSAa^^ 16. Primarily, the learned Appellate Court has framed two major issues of concern and the first issue would concern towards as to whether the property in dispute was a passage which was commonly utilized by the other owners of the plots. The Appellate Court has recorded a finding that on perusal of the khasra No. 979 M and 980 M, which was the property sold to the plaintiff and the defendants by the respective sale deeds, which finds place on record as paper No. 20-C1 and 100-C1, stands settled that on the eastern side there was a passage which is shown in the revenue records and not even that even the aforesaid khasra numbers have shown the existence of the passage in the sale deeds of the plot purchased by the wife of the plaintiff on 09.12.1999, which was on record as paper 21-C1 and 101-C1, wherein, it showed that on the western side of the aforesaid plot purchased by the wife, there was 15 feet wide passage. 17. 17. The Appellate court considered the statement of the plaintiff recorded as PW1, wherein, in his cross examination, the plaintiff appellant has admitted the fact that in the Amin’s report, which was placed on record as paper No. 53-C2 and the map annexed thereto is the same land which is the land in dispute which shows the existence of the passage and the following statement was recorded : ^^oknh us ih0MCyw0&1 ds :i esa viuh izfrijh{kk esa ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd vehu fjiksVZ dkxt la[;k 53lh2 uD'ks esa yky jax ls of.kZr Hkwfe ogh Hkwfe gS tk dkxt la[;k 18,1@14 esa ihys jax ls iznf'kZr gS vkSj ;g dguk lgh gS fd ;g ogh Hkwfe gS tks jkLrs ds :i esa iz;ksx dh tk jgh gSA^^ 18. The learned Appellate Court while scrutinizing the judgment of the earlier suit which was on record as exhibit paper No. 62 C1, had concluded that in almost all the plots which existed in khasra No. 979 M and 980 M described as plot no. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, have shown the existence of the passage as demarcated by the red colour, hence, so far as the existence of the passage is concerned, the same stood decided by the earlier judgment rendered by the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division). Not only this, the appellate Court has also scrutinized the various maps, which were sanctioned by the MDDA and in particularly considered the Map paper No. 121-C which too supported the contention of the defendant respondent of the existence of passage and, consequently, the Appellate Court has allowed the appeal by the impugned judgment 02.02.2019 and had dismissed the suit while setting aside the judgment and decree dated 5th December, 2013, as rendered by the suit preferred by the plaintiff appellant, held that disputed property is a common passage used by all the adjoining plot holders. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has made reference to the judgment reported in (2017) 2 SCC 415 , Laliteshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. S.P. Srivastava, which was dealing with the ambit of power which the first appellate Court, while exercising power under Section 97 CPC could determine and appraise the evidence. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has made reference to the judgment reported in (2017) 2 SCC 415 , Laliteshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. S.P. Srivastava, which was dealing with the ambit of power which the first appellate Court, while exercising power under Section 97 CPC could determine and appraise the evidence. However, the fact which has been involved in the said case being entirely distinct and different and it was based upon a dispute pertaining to the devolvement of the property as amongst the parties to the dispute belonging to the same clan of family and since it was a suit involved a declaration of title between the co-owners, it was altogether based upon a different facts and consideration. So far as the reference is made with regard to the power of 1st Appellate Court being the final court of facts, the ratio as propounded therein in para 13 is quoted hereunder :- “13. An appellate court is the final court of facts. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect the court’s application of mind and record its findings supported by reasons. The law relating to powers and duties of the first appellate court is well fortified by the legal provisions and judicial pronouncements. Considering the nature and scope of duty of the first appellate court, in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, it was held as under: (SCC pp. 394-96, paras 12-15) “12. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) ‘15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.’ The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar v. Sangram, wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 13. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) ‘3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.’ 14. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa, while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2) ‘2. A court of first appeal can re-appreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.’ 15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-31, paras 3-5) ‘3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram, SCC p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.’” 20. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.’” 20. Admittedly, the judgment of the first appellate court is a judgment of reversal of the findings of fact recorded by the learned Trial Court and thus, this Court is of the view that it was a judgment well within the ambit of the provisions contained under Order 41 Rule 31 (d) of the CPC, as there was a vivid and rationale consideration and application of evidence produced and relied by the parties before the first appellate court. 21. Considering the records, which has been placed before this Court and after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant at length, none of the substantial questions of law as framed by the appellant calls for determination by this Court while exercising its powers under Section 100 of the C.P.C. because these substantial questions of law are nothing but calling for an appraisal of evidence and re-appreciation of the facts which already stood concluded by the Appellate Courts. 22. Hence, this Court does not find any merit in the Appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. 23. However, there would be no order as to costs.