JUDGMENT : This appeal by the plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2006 passed in R.A.No.38/2003 by the Court of the Principal District Judge at Mysuru, allowing the appeal filed by the respondents and dismissing O.S.No.76/2000 filed by the appellant, was admitted to consider the following substantial question of law: (i) Whether the lower Appellate Court is justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court on the ground that notice under Section 80 of CPC has not been complied with? (ii) Whether the notice under Ex.P.7 is sufficient notice to the respondents as required under Section 80 of CPC? 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred according to their rankings before the trial court. 3. The brief facts giving rise to the above appeal are as under: The appellant-plaintiff instituted a suit in the Court below for declaration that the defendants-respondents are not entitled to claim a sum of Rs.82,262.16 from the plaintiff in pursuance of the communication/notice issued by the Respondent No.4 and for a further declaration that the said communication/notice is null and void and also for a declaration that the proposed public auction by the defendants are without legal effect. At prayer No.2, the plaintiff sought for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from recovering the said amount of Rs.82,262.16 from the plaintiff on the strength of the auction notice. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that he entered into a contract with the defendants for formation of approach road to Pattanahalli village at Mysuru taluk which was entrusted to him on tender basis. It was contended that despite the plaintiff being ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the defendants illegally purported to rescind the contract and consequently, the plaintiff was constrained to issue a notice dated 08.04.1986 under Section 80 CPC to the defendants calling upon them to pay a sum of Rs.1,67,740/- to the plaintiff towards the work done by the plaintiffs. It is alleged that instead of complying with the said demand made by the plaintiffs, the defendant issued demand notice calling upon the plaintiff to pay a sum of Rs.82,262.16 to the defendants which was without any legal or factual basis. It was also contended that the defendants were threatening to bring the property of the plaintiff to public auction which was not permissible in law. It was also contended that the defendants were threatening to bring the property of the plaintiff to public auction which was not permissible in law. The plaintiff has also alleged that since the defendants are neither entitled to claim the said amount of Rs.82,262.16 from the plaintiff in pursuance of their communication/notice which are illegal, null and void and the proposed auction also being illegal, the plaintiff is entitled for a declaration in this regard along with the consequential relief of perpetual injunction against the defendants. 4. It is not in dispute that the defendants remained ex-parte in the suit in the trial Court and did not choose to contest the same. On behalf of the plaintiff, he examined himself as P.W.1 and documentary evidence at Exs.P.1 to P.7 were marked on his behalf. By judgment and decree dated 03.02.2003, the trial Court came to the conclusion that having regard to the unimpeachable, unchallenged and uncontroverted pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff, the plaintiff had established that he was entitled to the reliefs sought for in the suit. The trial Court also drew adverse inference against the defendants for neither cross-examining the plaintiffs nor adducing any evidence to rebut the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the court below proceeded to pass a decree against the defendants. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the defendants preferred an appeal in R.A.No.38/2003 before the Principal District Judge, Mysuru. The said appeal having been contested by the appellant-plaintiff, the lower appellate Court proceeded to reverse the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on the sole ground that there is variance between the notice at Ex.P.7 dated 09.04.1986 issued on behalf of the plaintiff under Section 80 CPC and the case put forth by the plaintiff in his pleadings and evidence. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Hence, this appeal. 6. I have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and also the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents. 7. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties, I am of the opinion that in addition to the substantial questions of law formulated above, two more substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this appeal. 7. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties, I am of the opinion that in addition to the substantial questions of law formulated above, two more substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this appeal. Accordingly, the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration: (i) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court without noticing the provisions contained in Section 99 of the CPC? (ii) Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court on the ground that notice under Section 80 of CPC has not been complied with? (iii) Whether the notice under Ex.P.7 is sufficient notice to the respondents as required under Section 80 of CPC? (iv) Whether the lower appellate Court committed an error in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court without considering and appreciating undisputed fact that the defendants did not contest the suit, pursuant to which, based on the unimpeachable, unchallenged and uncontroverted pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff, the suit of the plaintiff deserves to be decreed in his favour? 8. Substantial question No.1: Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant invited my attention to the provisions contained in Section 99 CPC, which read as under: 99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction.-No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. 9. It is contended by the learned counsel that it is not in dispute that the defendants did not contest the matter in the trial Court. It is also not in dispute that the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff after considering the pleadings as well as the oral and documentary evidence on record. 9. It is contended by the learned counsel that it is not in dispute that the defendants did not contest the matter in the trial Court. It is also not in dispute that the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff after considering the pleadings as well as the oral and documentary evidence on record. It is, therefore, contended that even if the statutory notice at Ex.P.7 issued by the plaintiff under Section 80 CPC suffers from any error, defect or irregularity as held by the lower appellate Court, the lower appellate Court was precluded from reversing the judgment of the trial Court so long as the said error, defect or irregularity did not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that an error, defect or irregularity, if any, in the contents of the statutory notice at Ex.P.7 which did not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court, will not be fatal to the case of the plaintiff so as to enable the appellate Court to dismiss the suit in the light of specific bar contained in Section 99 CPC. It is therefore, contended that even if there are any discrepancies between the plaint averments and the contents of the notice at Ex.P.7, the same will not vitiate the suit and plaintiff cannot be non-suited on this ground alone by the lower appellate Court since the said discrepancies were in the nature of errors, defects or irregularities which did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court or the merits of the case. 10. Per contra, learned Additional Government Advocate supports the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 11. 10. Per contra, learned Additional Government Advocate supports the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant places reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of KIRAN SINGH AND OTHERS vs. CHAMAN PARWAN AND OTHERS, ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ) wherein it is held as under: The policy underlying sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. (underlining by me) 12. He also relied upon the decisions of this Court reported in CHOMA NAIKA vs. RAMA NAIKA, (ILR 1988 KAR 1902). 10. In challenging the correctness of the aforesaid view adopted by the learned Civil Judge, Mr. Ram Bhat, who appears in support of the appeal invites my attention to Section 99 C.P.C. and has also in this connection relied on a few decisions that have a bearing on this point. Section 99 C.P.C. reads : "99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction. - No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder (or non-joinder) of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court." It may be seen from the aforesaid provision that a decree is immune from attack before a Court of appeal unless by reason of an error, irregularity or defect from which the said decree is said to suffer had resulted in affecting the merits of the case or of the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words if by the omission committed by the trial Court the finding on the merits of the dispute between the parties is not affected or the jurisdiction of the Court itself remains untramelled, a Court of Appeal should not interfere with such a decree merely on the off-chance of the decree suffering from some error, defect, or irregularity. The object of the legislature made evident from Section 99 C.P.C. clearly is to save the Judgment and decree, of Courts from attacks based on mere technicalities not affecting either jurisdiction of the Courts or merits of the case. Bearing in mind imprimatur of the law as enjoined by Section 99 of the C.P.C. it would be apposite to consider the point raised herein. 11. The learned Munsiff on a consideration of the evidence led by both sides has come to the conclusion that the defendant was not a debtor under law as his income exceeded the statutory limit. The only omission with which he could be charged is of not recording an independent finding on this issue at the very beginning and before he had launched on a consideration of all the other issues. No doubt the lapse on the part of the Munsiff is glaring one it may in one sense be said to be unforgivable but then looked at from the context of its impact on the proceedings as a whole and vis-a-vis the predicament of the litigant who had received a Judgment after an arduous trial only to be sent back to the trial Court to relieve the ordeal once-again, it appears to be manifestly unjust to call upon litigants to go-through the mill once-again particularly when nobody had made a grievance of it, even as the case was under progress before the learned Munsiff. It was undoubtedly open to the defendant to have immediately taken exception to the procedure followed by the Munsiff, in which event it could have been corrected by that Court itself. Instead, he has laid by all these years and after the matter reached the Civil Judge, had raised this objection and got away with it. 12. It seems to me to allow this kind of free-wheeling in the conduct of litigation is to pay a premium to hyper technicalities on which the law frowns and indeed scorns as well. Instead, he has laid by all these years and after the matter reached the Civil Judge, had raised this objection and got away with it. 12. It seems to me to allow this kind of free-wheeling in the conduct of litigation is to pay a premium to hyper technicalities on which the law frowns and indeed scorns as well. But, then, it is not necessary to decide this matter merely on apriori grounds since the view I take is also supported by a decision of the Supreme Court and two other decisions of our Court. In KIRAN SINGH v. CHAMAN PASWAN, it has been pointed out that where a case has been tried by a Court on merits and Judgment rendered it is not liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice and that the policy of the legislature has always been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an Appellate Court unless there is prejudice on merits. 13. I have given my careful consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 14. A plain reading of Section 99 of CPC and the law laid down in KIRAN SINGH’s case and CHOMA NAIKA’s case supra will clearly indicate that mere error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit will not enable the appellate Court to reverse the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The two exceptions to this rule are as hereunder: (a) The error, defect or irregularity should affect the merits of the suit; (b) The said error, defect or irregularity should affect the jurisdiction of the Court. 15. It is therefore clear that so long as the error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit do not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court, any finding rendered by a trial Court or any judgment and decree passed by a trial court shall not be reversed by appellate Court merely on account of any such error, defect or irregularity. It is needless to state that the object of this provision is to prevent well reasoned and well considered judgments passed by the trial Court from being interfered by the appellate Court on account of technicalities or hyper-technicalities so long as the said technicalities or hyper-technicalities do not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the trial Court to pass a judgment and decree. 16. There is considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the discrepancy between the contents of Ex.P.7 and the plaint averments are merely errors, defects or irregularities in the proceedings in the suit which did not affect the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court. 17. The trial Court having decreed the suit after having considered the entire matter on merits and the material on record, the lower appellate Court committed a serious error of law in reversing the well reasoned and well considered judgment and decree passed by the trial Court merely on the simple hyper-technical ground that there was variance and discrepancy in the contents of Ex.P.7 and the plaint averments. It is therefore clear that in the light of the provisions contained in Section 99 of CPC, the lower appellate Court was not justified in reversing the well reasoned and well considered judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff, thereby dismissing the suit filed by him on this ground. Accordingly, I answer substantial question No.1 in favour of the appellant. 18. Substantial questions of law 2 and 3: Both these substantial questions of law are inter-linked/inter-connected and they are taken up together. 19. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Court below has failed to appreciate that as per the undisputed chronology of events, while Ex.P.7, the statutory notice under Section 80 CPC was issued on 08.04.1986 by the plaintiff, the subsequent notice/correspondence issued by the defendants to the plaintiff were issued during the subsequent period from 16.06.1987 to 07.01.1991. It is therefore contended that at the time of issuing the notice at Ex.P.7, the question of referring to the subsequent notice and correspondence at Exs.P.3 to P.6 did not arise since they were later in point of time. It is therefore contended that at the time of issuing the notice at Ex.P.7, the question of referring to the subsequent notice and correspondence at Exs.P.3 to P.6 did not arise since they were later in point of time. It is also contended that the cause of action for the suit was a continuous one and Exs.P.3 to P.7 being intimately connected and interwined with each other forming a long chain in the sequence of events, all these documents are inseparable from one another constituting the cause of action for the plaintiff to file a suit. It is, therefore, contended that the lower appellate Court committed an error in misreading/misinterpreting Ex.P.7 in isolation without appreciating that the cumulative effect of Exs.P.3 to P.7 should be taken into consideration for the purpose of ascertaining whether the suit of the plaintiff was maintainable or not and failure on the part of the lower appellate Court to appreciate this has resulted in erroneous conclusion. 20. I find sufficient force in the submission made by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant. A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court will clearly indicate that despite having referred to Exs.P.3 to P.6 in Para No.12 of the impugned judgment, the trial Court committed a serious error of law in failing to take into account Exs.P.3 to P.7 cumulatively. Instead, the Court below read and construed Ex.P.7 in isolation and came to a conclusion that there is discrepancy between Ex.P.7 and plaint averments in order to hold that the said notice was invalid and the suit was liable to be dismissed. As stated above, Exs.P.3 to P.6 having come into existence subsequent to Ex.P.7, the question of there being omissions or discrepancies in Ex.P.7 and Exs.P.3 to P.6 does not arise. Further, the entire set of correspondence between the plaintiff and defendants at Exs.P.3 to 7 being continuous and intimately connected/interwined with one another, it cannot be said that merely because Exs.P.3 to P.6 are not referred to in Ex.P.7, the suit of the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed for want of valid notice under Section 80 CPC. The reasoning of the Court below in misinterpreting the said documents at Exs.P.3 to P.7 is clearly fallacious and contrary to law as well as the undisputed material on record. The reasoning of the Court below in misinterpreting the said documents at Exs.P.3 to P.7 is clearly fallacious and contrary to law as well as the undisputed material on record. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court misdirected itself in misreading and misconstruing Exs.P.3 to P.7 thereby coming to the conclusion that the suit is not maintainable for want of valid notice under Section 80 CPC. Accordingly, substantial questions of law 2 and 3 stated above are answered in favour of the appellant herein. 21. Substantial question of law No.4 In so far as the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the lower appellate Court committed an error in upholding the contention urged on behalf of the respondents that the suit is bad for issuance of invalid notice at Ex.P.7 is concerned, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, in the absence of a written statement, cross-examination of the plaintiff and without there being any evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants, the lower appellate Court was clearly in error in coming to the conclusion that the notice was invalid without appreciating that there was neither pleadings nor evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents to substantiate their contention. This contention urged by the appellant qua the validity and correctness of Ex.P.7 was clearly a mixed question of fact and law which was not permissible to be raised before the lower appellate Court in appeal in the absence of pleadings and evidence in this regard before the trial Court itself. It is, therefore, clear that on this ground also, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is liable to be set aside and this substantial question of law is also answered in favour of the appellant as stated herein before. 22. Accordingly, I pass the following order: (i) The appeal is hereby allowed; (ii) The impugned judgment and decree dated 28.07.2006 passed in R.A.No.38/2003 by the Court of the Principal District Judge at Mysuru is hereby set aside; (iii) The matter is remitted back to the lower appellate Court to consider the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made herein before. Both parties undertake to appear before the lower appellate Court on 16.12.2019 without further notice from the Court. Both parties undertake to appear before the lower appellate Court on 16.12.2019 without further notice from the Court. (iv) The lower appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible and in any event, not later than the period of two months from 16.12.2019. No costs. L.C.R. to be re-transmitted to the lower appellate Court forthwith.