JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned State Counsel for the opposite party No. 1, Sri Sameer Kalia, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 and Sri Uttam Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 02.08.2011 and 17.03.2012, passed by the opposite party Nos. 2 and 4 (Annexure Nos. 1 and 2 to the writ petition). 3. Facts, in brief, of the present case are to the effect that initially on 14.12.1987, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Manager, Printing Press in the pay-scale of Rs. 500-900. Vide letter dated 03.01.1991, one post of Manager, Printing Press was sanctioned and it was directed that on the said post, regular selection be made and after making regular selection, the services of the petitioner shall be terminated. 4. On 31.07.1997, an order was passed in the Writ Petition No. 4138 of 1997 filed by the petitioner before this Court challenging the advertisement for holding regular selection for the post of Manager. Relevant portion of the order dated 31.07.1997 reads as under:- "In the meantime no result shall be declared nor shall any appointment be made in pursuance of the advertisement dated 4th December,1992 for which the meeting is scheduled to be held on 31.01.1997 for the post of manager printing press in the University concerned." 5. In the aforesaid writ petition, counter affidavit was filed in the year 1998 on behalf of opposite party No. 3 stating therein that the regular appointment on the post of Manager, Printing Press has been made and the petitioner has been adjusted against the post of Research Assistant in pay-scale of Rs. 500-900. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide order 06.12.2000. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred along with his post of Research Assistant in the Department of Dairy and Animal Husbandry and it was directed that the work shall be taken from the petitioner. 500-900. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide order 06.12.2000. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred along with his post of Research Assistant in the Department of Dairy and Animal Husbandry and it was directed that the work shall be taken from the petitioner. Thereafter, on a complaint dated 16.08.2010 under Section 23 of the U.P. Krishi Evam Praudyogik Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1958, with regard to the appointment/adjustment of the petitioner on the post of Research Assistant, the opposite party No. 2 issued the order dated 02.08.2011, whereby directed the opposite party No. 3 to take appropriate decision in the matter of appointment of the petitioner keeping in view the report of University and direction of the State Government. Thereafter, vide order dated 15.04.2011, the opposite party No. 1 refused to provide the revised pay-scale on the ground that the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Research Assistant is in violation of Government Orders dated 03.01.1990, 27.02.1991 and 30.08.1990. Thereafter, vide order dated 27.06.2011, a Committee was constituted by the opposite party No. 3 to inquire into the matter/appointment of the petitioner on the post of Research Assistant. 7. The Committee so constituted submitted its report dated 31.10.2011. Considering the report of the Committee dated 31.10.2011, the petitioner was asked to submit his reply, which he submitted on 06.12.2011, and he was provided personal hearing fixing 07.12.2012, on which date the petitioner was heard. Thereafter, vide order dated 17.03.2012, the services of the petitioner were terminated. 8. In view of the aforesaid factual background, the present writ petition has been filed before this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has not been given adequate opportunity to defend his case. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the service of the petitioner has been terminated, which is a major penalty and before terminating the petitioner, a full-fledged enquiry should have been done in the matter. However, no such steps were taken by the respondents, as such, the impugned order dated 17.03.2012, terminating the services of the petitioner, is violative of principles of natural justice and arbitrary in nature. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in identical circumstances, four persons, who did not possess the requisite qualification, have been retained in service and the petitioner was terminated from service. 12. The prayer is to allow the writ petition. 13. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in identical circumstances, four persons, who did not possess the requisite qualification, have been retained in service and the petitioner was terminated from service. 12. The prayer is to allow the writ petition. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents while opposing the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification, which was to be possessed by a person to be appointed on the post of Research Assistant i.e. B.Sc Krishi. In view of the said fact and after conducting the enquiry wherein, the petitioner was given the opportunity to defend his case, and considering his reply, the impugned order of termination was passed, which is just and proper in the facts of the case. 14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 15. Needless to mention here that learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed the fact that for the post of Research Assistant, the requisite qualification is B.Sc. Krishi and the petitioner did not possess the said qualification. Rather the petitioner possessed the qualification of M.A. and Ph.D. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts, the admitted position emerges out to the effect that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification to be appointed on the post of Research Assistant in the Chandrasekhar Azad Agriculture and Technology University, Kanpur and also the minimum qualification for the said post cannot be relaxed, contrary to this, no Rule has been placed before us. 17. In this regard, this Court in the case of Ajay Singh v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 AllLJ 38 : 2011 SCCOnLineAll 2201 : (2011) 87 ALR (SUM 14) 7 : 2011 Lab IC 3113, observed as under:- "11. Before going into the question as to whether the respondents were justified in making appointment of respondent No. 5 by permitting relaxation in the qualification even if this Court assume that such relaxation was permissible under 1986 Rules, the fact remains that before acting thereon, no modification, amendment or readvertisement of the post in question took place with modified qualification. This resulted ex facie denial of opportunity to such other persons who could have satisfied the relaxed qualification but failed to apply since the advertisement which was actually made did not contain such qualification. This resulted ex facie denial of opportunity to such other persons who could have satisfied the relaxed qualification but failed to apply since the advertisement which was actually made did not contain such qualification. This also makes appointment of respondent No. 5 pursuant to the relaxed qualification illegal being violative of Articles 15 and 16 of Constitution of India having resulted in denial of equal opportunity of employment to others. Even cases where there is some change in the qualification etc. under the Rules etc. after an advertisement is made, it has consistently been the view of the Court that in such a case afresh advertisement or modified advertisement, as a rule, must be published so as to give opportunity to the people at large who satisfy the altered, modified or changed qualification to apply. This is consistent with the constitutional requirement of giving equal opportunity of employment to all. 12. In State of M.R v. Shyama Pardi, (1996) 7 SCC 118 : ( AIR 1996 SC 2219 ) the Apex Court held that an appointment made in the absence of requisite qualification prescribed under Rules is void ab initio and neither it confers any right upon the person concerned to hold the post or continue if he/she has been appointed though did not possess requisite qualification nor any direction for payment of salary can be issued in such cases. 13. A similar controversy arose in the case of Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P., (2006) 1 JT 331 SC : ( AIR 2006 SC 3492 ) and the Apex Court held that an appointment lacking requisite qualification would be a nullity. A question also raised before the Apex Court that if subsequently the candidate has attained the requisite qualification whether that would validate the appointment but it was replied by the Apex Court that the validity of an appointment has to be considered at the time of appointment and if the appointment was made by ignoring the requisite qualification or if it is found that the candidate did not possess requisite qualification at that time of appointment, the appointment would be void ab initio. 17. Learned Standing Counsel or Sri R.L. Verma, Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 5 also could not place any pro vision to show that the Rules pertaining to recruitment under 1986 Rules could have been relaxed by the Director General. 17. Learned Standing Counsel or Sri R.L. Verma, Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 5 also could not place any pro vision to show that the Rules pertaining to recruitment under 1986 Rules could have been relaxed by the Director General. Rule 25 of 1986 Rules confers power of relaxation relating to Rules regulating conditions of service and reads as under: "25. Relaxation in the conditions of service. Where the State Government is satisfied that the operation of any Rule regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed to the service causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, not withstanding anything contained in the Rules applicable to the case, by order, dispense with or relax the requirements of that Rule to such extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner." 18. The distinction between Rules, pertaining to recruitment and condition of service came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, (1992) Supp1 SCC 272 : ( AIR 1991 SC 284 ) where the Rule permitted relaxation of conditions of service and it was held that the Rule did not permit relaxation of recruitment Rules. It was reiterated in Syed Khalid Rizvi v. Union of India, (1993) Supp3 SCC 575 wherein it was held:-- "Conditions of recruitment and conditions of service are distinct and the latter is precedent by an appointment according to Rules. Former cannot be relaxed." 19. In Keshav Chandra Joshi (supra) the Apex Court also says that Rules permitting relaxation of provisions regulating conditions of service cannot be invoked to suggest relaxation of Rules regulating recruitment. The Rules relating to age, qualification, other eligibility process of selection etc. that is all the steps anterior to appointment constitute Rules regulating recruitment. Under 1986 Rules, firstly the Rules relating to recruitment cannot be relaxed and secondly even Rule 25 of 1986 Rules which permits relaxation of Rules regulating conditions of service authorises the State Government or Director General to do so hence such relaxation by Director General is impermissible." 18. We also like to refer the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 . The relevant paras are reproduced hereunder:- "Appointment/employment without advertisement 35. We also like to refer the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 . The relevant paras are reproduced hereunder:- "Appointment/employment without advertisement 35. At one time this Court had been of the view that calling the names from employment exchange would curb to certain extent the menace of nepotism and corruption in public employment. But, later on, it came to the conclusion that some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. Even if the names of candidates are requisitioned from employment exchange, in addition thereto it is mandatory on the part of the employer to invite applications from all eligible candidates from the open market by advertising the vacancies in newspapers having wide circulation or by announcement in radio and television as merely calling the names from the employment exchange does not meet the requirement of the said article of the Constitution. (Vide Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Admn., (1992) 4 SCC 99 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 805 : (1992) 21 ATC 386 : AIR 1992 SC 789 . , State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 825 : (1992) 21 ATC 403 : AIR 1992 SC 2130 ] , Excise Supdt. v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, (1996) 6 SCC 216 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1420. , Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh, (1998) 2 SCC 332 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 541 : AIR 1998 SC 331 ] , Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto, (2005) 4 SCC 209 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 501 : AIR 2005 SC 2103 . , National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 493 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1152 : AIR 2006 SC 2319 ] , Telecom District Manager v. Keshab Deb, (2008) 8 SCC 402 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 709. , State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 1019] and State of M.P. v. Mohd. Abrahim, (2009) 15 SCC 214 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 508].) 36. , State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 1019] and State of M.P. v. Mohd. Abrahim, (2009) 15 SCC 214 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 508].) 36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the employment exchange or putting a note on the notice-board, etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal appointment mandatory compliance with the said constitutional requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment be made by an open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit. Order bad in inception 37. It is a settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. It would be ironic to permit a person to rely upon a law, in violation of which he has obtained the benefits. If an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings consequent thereto will be non est and have to be necessarily set aside. A right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. (Vide Upen Chandra Gogoi v. State of Assam, (1998) 3 SCC 381 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 872 : AIR 1998 SC 1289 ] , Mangal Prasad Tamoli v. Narvadeshwar Mishra, (2005) 3 SCC 422 : AIR 2005 SC 1964 . and Ritesh Tewari v. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 677 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 315 : AIR 2010 SC 3823 .) 38. and Ritesh Tewari v. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 677 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 315 : AIR 2010 SC 3823 .) 38. The concept of adverse possession of lien on post or holding over are not applicable in service jurisprudence. Therefore, continuation of a person wrongly appointed on post does not create any right in his favour. [Vide M.S. Patil (Dr.) v. Gulbarga University, (2010) 10 SCC 63 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 785 : AIR 2010 SC 3783 ].] Eligibility lacking 39. In Prit Singh (Dr.) v. S.K. Mangal, (1993) Supp1 SCC 714 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 246 : (1993) 23 ATC 783 this Court examined the case of a person who did not possess the requisite percentage of marks as per the statutory requirement and held that he cannot hold the post observing: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 12-13) "12. ... It need not be pointed out that the sole object of prescribing qualification that the candidate must have a consistently good academic record with first or high second class Master's degree for appointment to the post of a Principal, is to select a most suitable person in order to maintain excellence and standard of teaching in the institution apart from administration. ... The appellant had not secured even second class marks in his Master of Arts Examination whereas the requirement was first or high second class (55%). The irresistible conclusion is that on the relevant date the appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications. 13. ... on the date of the appointment the appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications and as such his appointment had to be quashed." (emphasis added) 40. In Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission, (2008) 7 SCC 153 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 244 : AIR 2008 SC 1817 ] this Court examined the issue as to whether a person lacking eligibility can be appointed and if so, whether such irregularity/illegality can be cured/condoned. After considering the provisions of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Rules,1983 and the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, this Court came to a conclusion that lacking eligibility as per the rules/advertisement cannot be cured at any stage and making appointment of such a person tantamounts to an illegality and not an irregularity, and thus cannot be cured. After considering the provisions of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Rules,1983 and the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, this Court came to a conclusion that lacking eligibility as per the rules/advertisement cannot be cured at any stage and making appointment of such a person tantamounts to an illegality and not an irregularity, and thus cannot be cured. A person lacking the eligibility cannot approach the court for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through court. 41. This Court in Pramod Kumar, (2008) 7 SCC 153 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 244 : AIR 2008 SC 1817 ] further held as under: (SCC p. 160, para 18) "18. If the essential educational qualification for recruitment to a post is not satisfied, ordinarily the same cannot be condoned. Such an act cannot be ratified. An appointment which is contrary to the statute/statutory rules would be void in law. An illegality cannot be regularised, particularly, when the statute in no unmistakable term says so. Only an irregularity can be. [See State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753. , National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 493 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1152 : AIR 2006 SC 2319 ] and Post Master General v. Tutu Das (Dutta), (2007) 5 SCC 317 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 179] .]" Relaxation 42. In J.P. Kulshrestha (Dr.) v. Allahabad University, (1980) 3 SCC 418 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 436 : AIR 1980 SC 2141 ] issue of relaxation of eligibility came up for consideration before this Court wherein it was held as under: (SCC pp. 425-26, paras 15-16) "15. ... We regretfully but respectfully disagree with the Division Bench and uphold the sense of high second class attributed by the learned Single Judge. The midline takes us to 54% and although it is unpalatable to be mechanical and mathematical, we have to hold that those who have not secured above 54% marks cannot claim to have obtained a high second class and are ineligible. 16. ... We have earlier held that the power to relax, as the Ordinance now runs, insofar as high second class is concerned, does not exist. Inevitably, the appointment of the 3 respondents violate the Ordinance and are, therefore, illegal." (emphasis added) 43. 16. ... We have earlier held that the power to relax, as the Ordinance now runs, insofar as high second class is concerned, does not exist. Inevitably, the appointment of the 3 respondents violate the Ordinance and are, therefore, illegal." (emphasis added) 43. In Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan, (1993) Supp3 SCC 168 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 951 : (1993) 25 ATC 234] this Court again dealt with the power of relaxation of minimum qualifications as the statutory provisions applicable therein provided for relaxation, but to what extent and under what circumstances, such power could be exercised was not provided therein. Thus, this Court issued the following directions: (SCC p. 176, para 11) "A. The University must note that the qualifications it advertises for the posts should not be at variance with those prescribed by its Ordinance/Statutes. B. The candidates selected must be qualified as on the last date for making applications for the posts in question or on the date to be specifically mentioned in the advertisement/notification for the purpose. ... C. When the University or its Selection Committee relaxes the minimum required qualifications, unless it is specifically stated in the advertisement/notification both that the qualifications will be relaxed and also the conditions on which they will be relaxed, the relaxation will be illegal. D. The University/Selection Committee must mention in its proceedings of selection the reasons for making relaxations, if any, in respect of each of the candidates in whose favour relaxation is made. E. The minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee should be preserved for a sufficiently long time, and if the selection process is challenged until the challenge is finally disposed of. An adverse inference is liable to be drawn if the minutes are destroyed or a plea is taken that they are not available." (emphasis added) 44. In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214 : AIR 1984 SC 541 . this Court while dealing with the same issue, held that once it is established that there is no power to relax the essential qualifications, the entire process of selection of the candidate was in contravention of the established norms prescribed by advertisement. The power to relax must be clearly spelt out and cannot otherwise be exercised. 45. this Court while dealing with the same issue, held that once it is established that there is no power to relax the essential qualifications, the entire process of selection of the candidate was in contravention of the established norms prescribed by advertisement. The power to relax must be clearly spelt out and cannot otherwise be exercised. 45. In A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna, (2005) 4 SCC 154 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 452. this Court held that: (SCC p. 160, para 15) "15. Another aspect which this Court has highlighted is scope for relaxation of norms. ... Once it is most satisfactorily established that the Selection Committee did not have the power to relax essential qualification, the entire process of selection so far as the selected candidate is concerned gets vitiated." (emphasis supplied) 46. This Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Sajal Kumar Roy, (2006) 8 SCC 671 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 23] held: (SCC p. 675, para 11) "11. ... The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age-limits. ... The requirements to comply with the rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with fairly and reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners thereof." (emphasis added) 47. In Food Corpn. of India v. Bhanu Lodh, (2005) 3 SCC 618 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 433 : AIR 2005 SC 2775 ] this Court held: (SCC p. 628, para 12) "12. ... Even assuming that there is a power of relaxation under the Regulations, ... the power of relaxation cannot be exercised in such a manner that it completely distorts the Regulations. The power of relaxation is intended to be used in marginal cases.... We do not think that they are intended as an ''open sesame' for all and sundry. The wholesale go-by given to the Regulations, and the manner in which the recruitment process was being done, was very much reviewable as a policy directive, in exercise of the power of the Central Government under Section 6(2) of the Act." 48. We do not think that they are intended as an ''open sesame' for all and sundry. The wholesale go-by given to the Regulations, and the manner in which the recruitment process was being done, was very much reviewable as a policy directive, in exercise of the power of the Central Government under Section 6(2) of the Act." 48. In Bhanu Prasad Panda (Dr.) v. Sambalpur University, (2001) 8 SCC 532 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 14] one of the questions raised has been as to whether a person not possessing the required eligibility of qualification i.e. 55% marks in Master's degree can be appointed in view of the fact that UGC refused to grant relaxation. On the issue of relaxation of eligibility, the Court held as under: (SCC p. 536, para 5) "5. ... the essential requirement of academic qualification of a particular standard and grade viz. 55%, in the ''relevant subject' for which the post is advertised, cannot be rendered redundant or violated.... ... The rejection by UGC of the request of the Department in this case to relax the condition relating to 55% marks at postgraduation level ... is to be the last word on the claim of the appellant and there could be no further controversy raised in this regard." (emphasis added) 49. In view of the above, this Court held that the appointment of the appellant therein has rightly been quashed as he did not possess the requisite eligibility of 55% marks in Master's course. 50. In the absence of an enabling provision for grant of relaxation, no relaxation can be made. Even if such a power is provided under the statute, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily. (See Union of India v. Dharam Pal, (2009) 4 SCC 170 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 790].) Such a power cannot be exercised treating it to be an implied, incidental or necessary power for execution of the statutory provisions. Even an implied power is to be exercised with care and caution with reasonable means to remove the obstructions or overcome the resistance in enforcing the statutory provisions or executing its command. Incidental and ancillary powers cannot be used in utter disregard of the object of the statute. Such power can be exercised only to make such legislation effective so that the ultimate power will not become illusory, which otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the legislature. Incidental and ancillary powers cannot be used in utter disregard of the object of the statute. Such power can be exercised only to make such legislation effective so that the ultimate power will not become illusory, which otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the legislature. (Vide Matajog Dobey v. H.S. Bhari, (1956) AIR SC 44 : 1956 Cri LJ 140] and State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412 .) 51. More so, relaxation in this manner is tantamount to changing the selection criteria after initiation of selection process, which is not permissible at all. Rules of the game cannot be changed after the game is over. (Vide K. Manjusree v. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 841 : AIR 2008 SC 1470 ] and Ramesh Kumar v. High Court of Delhi, (2010) 3 SCC 104 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 756 : AIR 2010 SC 3714 )" So far as the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner was not given the proper opportunity to defend his case nor proper enquiry was done in the matter in question is concerned, the same has got no force because in the present case, as per the pleadings on record as well as the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the position emerges out is to the effect that the petitioner did not possess the requite qualification to be appointed on the post of Research Assistant i.e. B.Sc. Krishi, as such, giving opportunity of hearing was a mere formality. The present case, in facts of the case, is covered under the phrase "useless formality theory". With regard to phrase "useless formality theory", the Apex Court in the case judgment passed in the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 , observed as under:- "Point 5 20. This is the crucial point in this case. As already stated under Point 4, in the case of Mr Mansoor Ali Khan, notice calling for an explanation had not been issued under Rule 5(8)(i) of the 1969 Rules. Question is whether interference is not called for in the special circumstances of the case. 21. This is the crucial point in this case. As already stated under Point 4, in the case of Mr Mansoor Ali Khan, notice calling for an explanation had not been issued under Rule 5(8)(i) of the 1969 Rules. Question is whether interference is not called for in the special circumstances of the case. 21. As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P., (1966) AIR SC 828 : (1966) 2 SCR 172 ] it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice. 22. In M.C. Mehta, (1999) 6 SCC 237 ] it was pointed out that at one time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 (HL)] that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other "de facto" prejudice needed to be proved. But, since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in our country. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 Chinnappa Reddy, J. followed Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 (HL)] and set aside the order of supersession of the New Delhi Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice though notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer. 23. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor case, (1980) 4 SCC 379 laid down two exceptions (at SCC p. 395) namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. 23. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor case, (1980) 4 SCC 379 laid down two exceptions (at SCC p. 395) namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, (1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wade's Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-75), as follows: (SCC p. 58, para 31) "[I]t is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. ... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth." Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717]. In that case, the principle of "prejudice" has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., (1996) 5 SCC 460 25. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta, (1999) 6 SCC 237 referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case. 26. It will be sufficient, for the purpose of the case of Mr Mansoor Ali Khan to show that his case will fall within the exceptions stated by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 , namely, that on the admitted or indisputable facts, only one view is possible. In that event no prejudice can be said to have been caused to Mr Mansoor Ali Khan though notice has not been issued." 19. It is well settled that if a wrong has been committed by the respondents in respect to some other persons, that will not provide a cause of action to claim parity on the ground of equal treatment since the equality in law under Article 14 is applicable for claiming parity in respect to legal and authorized acts. Two wrongs will not make one right. (See: State of Bihar and others Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another, (2000) AIR SC 2306; Union of India and another Vs. International Trading Co. and another, (2003) AIR SC 3983; Lalit Mohan Pandey Vs. Pooran Singh and others, (2004) AIR SC 2303; M/s Anand Buttons Ltd. etc. Vs. State of Haryana and others,2005 AIR SC 5565; and Kastha Niwarak G.S.S. Maryadit, Indor Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another, (2000) AIR SC 2306; Union of India and another Vs. International Trading Co. and another, (2003) AIR SC 3983; Lalit Mohan Pandey Vs. Pooran Singh and others, (2004) AIR SC 2303; M/s Anand Buttons Ltd. etc. Vs. State of Haryana and others,2005 AIR SC 5565; and Kastha Niwarak G.S.S. Maryadit, Indor Vs. President, Indore Development Authority, (2006) AIR SC 1142). 20. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Gulam Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2009) 13 JT 422 SC in para 11 and 12 held as under:- "11. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that keeping in view the equal protection clause contained in Articles 14 of the Constitution of India as also Article 16 thereof, all the employees should be treated equally. Equality clause however, must be enforced in legality and not illegality. 12. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that Article 14 is a positive concept. The Constitution does not envisage enforcement of the equality clause where a person has got an undue benefit by reason of an illegal act." 21. In the case of State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , the Apex Court observed as under:- "Article 14 56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745 : AIR 1995 SC 705 . , Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2003) 3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346 : AIR 2003 SC 1241 . , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164 : AIR 2005 SC 565 ] , K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581 : AIR 2006 SC 898 ] , Krishan Bhatt v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 24 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 783. , Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 1019] and Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, (2010) 2 SCC 422 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 385 : AIR 2010 SC 3455 ].) 57. This principle also applies to judicial pronouncements. , Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 1019] and Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, (2010) 2 SCC 422 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 385 : AIR 2010 SC 3455 ].) 57. This principle also applies to judicial pronouncements. Once the court comes to the conclusion that a wrong order has been passed, it becomes the solemn duty of the court to rectify the mistake rather than perpetuate the same. While dealing with a similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P., (1993) Supp4 SCC 536 : AIR 1993 SC 1048 ] observed as under: (SCC p. 551, para 12) "12. ... ''2. ... To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this, we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter, 1847 1 NY 3: A.M.Y. p. 18] at p. 18: "a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible and, therefore, ever ready to learn: great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead: and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors".' [As observed in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 43 , p. 46, para 2.] " (See also Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, (1995) 3 SCC 619 , Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P., (2004) 7 SCC 558 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1989] and Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan v. CBI, (2006) 5 SCC 752 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 83 : AIR 2006 SC 2449 ].)" 22. Keeping in view the admitted fact that the petitioner is not qualified for the post of Research Assistant, as he does not possess the degree of B.Sc. Agriculture, and settled legal proposition regarding relaxation of eligibility/qualification prescribed for a particular post to the effect that the same can not be relaxed and appointment of a person who does not possess the qualification of the post would be void as well as the principles related to "Useless Formality Theory" and principle of "Negative Equality", which are applicable in the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned orders dated 02.08.2011 and 17.03.2012 passed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. 23. 2 and 3 respectively. 23. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any illegality in the impugned orders dated 02.08.2011 and 17.03.2012, passed by the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 (Annexure Nos. 1 and 2 to the writ petition). 24. Resultantly, the writ petition for it lacks merit. Hence, dismissed with no order as to costs.