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2019 DIGILAW 219 (HP)

Prem Chand v. Oma Chand

2019-03-05

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2019
JUDGMENT : SANDEEP SHARMA, J. 1. By way of instant Regular Second Appeal, appellant has laid challenge to the judgment and decree dated 1.8.2009 passed by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, (H.P.) in Civil Appeal No. 126/2008, affirming judgment and decree dated 28.6.2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nadaun, District Hamirpur, (H.P.) in Civil Suit No. 324/2001, RBT No. 622/2003, titled Prem Chand versus Oma Chand and others, whereby suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter, 'plaintiff') for fixation of boundary by way of demarcation, came to be dismissed. 2. Necessary facts, which may be relevant for the proper adjudication of the instant appeal, are that the plaintiff filed a suit in the court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nadaun, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, for fixation of boundary by way of demarcation, with consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction qua the land denoted by Khata No. 5 min. Khatauni No. 15, Khasra No. 564 measuring 0-02-65 Hectares and Khatauni No. 19 min., Khasra Nos. 5, 7, 90 and 563, measuring 0-14-38 Hectares, situated in Tika Bhyal, Tappa Balduhak, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh (hereinafter, 'suit land'), against the respondents-defendants (hereinafter, 'defendants') and also for possession of the suit land by way of demolition, in case same is found in possession of the defendants. Plaintiff averred in the plaint that as per Missal Hakiyat for the years 1992-93, suit land is recorded in the ownership of Tika Maheshwar Chand, and he (plaintiff) subsequently vide sale deed No. 741, dated 18.9.1998 purchased the same from him and thus became owner of the suit land. Plaintiff further averred that though mutation on the basis of aforesaid sale deed was entered in his name but same has been rejected wrongly and illegally. Plaintiff further averred that the defendants, are disputing the boundary of the suit land and they have uprooted the same in the third week of October, 2001. Plaintiff further claimed before the court below that the defendants are threatening to raise further construction over the suit land and controversy inter se parties can not be resolved unless and until demarcation is carried out and boundary is fixed by the competent authority. Plaintiff further averred in the plaint that if defendants are found in possession over any part of suit land during demarcation, he may also be held entitled for possession by way of demolition. Plaintiff further averred in the plaint that if defendants are found in possession over any part of suit land during demarcation, he may also be held entitled for possession by way of demolition. While setting up a case that the defendants forcibly and un-authorizedly raised construction over some portion of the suit land, plaintiff also alleged that the defendants got mutation of sale rejected in connivance with the revenue officials. Plaintiff also averred that since he has not claimed any relief against the Public Works Department as well as other estate right holders at this stage, as such they are not necessary and proper parties to the suit. 3. Defendants, by way of written statement, refuted the aforesaid claim put forth by the plaintiff taking preliminary objections qua maintainability, non-joinder of necessary parties, limitation, valuation, estoppel etc. On merits, defendants claimed that the land comprising of Khasra No. 564 is a Gair Mumkin Abadi of defendants by way of construction of cattle shed, Khurli, septic tank and courtyard, which is being used for tethering the cattle. Defendants claimed that they are in possession over the suit land since the times of their ancestors and so far remaining suit land is concerned, defendants claimed that the same is recorded as Sarak, which is existing since the years 1953-54. Defendants claimed that the road existing over the remaining portion of the suit land leads to Rangas and Jihan. Aforesaid road is metalled one and is being used by the public at large and the same has been constructed by the Public Works Department. Defendants further claimed that the Raja of Nadaun, Tika Maheshwar Chand was not the resident of the area and he was simply owner. All the rights over the land in question are with the Tikadarans or inhabitants of the area and now the plaintiff can not claim any right, title or interest in the suit land. Defendants further claimed that the sale deed was got effected by the plaintiff just to drag the defendants and other Tikadarans into unnecessary litigation, because, Raja of Nadaun was never in possession of the suit land. Defendants further claimed that the sale deed was got effected by the plaintiff just to drag the defendants and other Tikadarans into unnecessary litigation, because, Raja of Nadaun was never in possession of the suit land. Defendants, while claiming that they have become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession, set up a case that their possession over Khasra No. 564 is for the last 100 years and their possession over the same is continuous, hostile and to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Defendants also averred in the written statement that the previous owner was not having any title over the suit land, and as such, sale deed, if any, made in favour of the plaintiff is void ab initio, because the same was never accompanied by delivery of possession. Defendants claimed that they never disputed the boundary of the suit land, rather, possession and boundaries are quite clear on the spot. Defendants claimed that the construction of cattle shed, Khurli, septic tank and courtyard for tethering of cattle was raised long back and at no point of time, they were objected either by the previous owner or the plaintiff, as such, plaintiff has no right to raise any objection at this stage. With the aforesaid pleadings, defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit. In the replication, plaintiff, while controverting the contentions of the defendants made in the written statement, reiterated the stand taken in the plaint. 4. Learned trial Court, on the basis of aforesaid pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties, framed following issues for determination, on 27.4.2004: 1. "Whether the plaintiff is entitled for fixation of boundaries by way of demarcation as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the possession of the suit land by way of demolition as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is within time as alleged? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from filing the suit as alleged? OPD. 8. Whether the defendants have become owner of the land comprised in Khasra No. 564 by virtue of adverse possession as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from filing the suit as alleged? OPD. 8. Whether the defendants have become owner of the land comprised in Khasra No. 564 by virtue of adverse possession as alleged? OPD. 9. Relief." 5. Subsequently, the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.6.2008, held the plaintiff not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for in the suit having been filed by him for fixation of boundary by way of demarcation as such, dismissed the suit. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, plaintiff filed a civil appeal under S.96 CPC, in the court of learned District Judge, Hamirpur, who, vide judgment and decree dated 1.8.2009, dismissed the same, as a consequence of which, judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, plaintiff has approached this court, in the instant proceedings, praying therein to decree his suit after setting aside judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below. 7. On 30.10.2009, instant Regular Second Appeal having been filed by the plaintiff, came to be admitted on following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether on the basis of evidence on record the plaintiff had proved his valid title over suit land and if his title stood proved and established on the strength of sale deed (Ext. PW-2/A), were the defendants entitled to claim their ownership or possession over the same? 2. Whether in the absence of any proof of the ouster of the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest from suit land, the defendants were lawfully entitled to claim their ownership and possession over the same? 3. Whether the application for additional evidence filed on behalf of appellant/plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC during the pendency of first appeal to place on record the copies of jamabandies to prove the nature of the land in dispute in old revenue record was wrongly dismissed?" 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 9. Solely with a view to explore answer to the aforesaid substantial questions of law, this court, while hearing the learned counsel representing the parties, made a sincere effort to peruse the complete record, especially evidence collected on record, be it ocular or documentary, perusal whereof certainly does not compel this court to agree with the contention of Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate representing the plaintiff that the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are not based upon correct appreciation of evidence, rather, this court finds that both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously. Substantial questions of law No.1 and 2 10. Since substantial questions of law No.1 and 2 are more or less interconnected, same are being taken up together for adjudication, to avoid repetitive discussion of evidence. 11. In the case at hand, plaintiff by way of suit, mainly prayed for fixation of boundary by way of demarcation, so that controversy inter se parties with regard to boundary dispute is resolved. Though careful perusal of the plaint having been filed by the plaintiff reveals that the main suit was for fixation of boundary but in the relief clause of the suit, plaintiff also prayed that a decree for possession of suit land by way of demolition may also be passed in his favour, in case, suit land is found to be in possession of the defendants. In nutshell, case of the plaintiff is that Tika Maheshwar Chand, who is recorded as owner of the suit land, in Misal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadid Sani for the years 1992-93, sold him suit land vide sale deed No. 741 dated 18.9.1998, where after, he became owner of the suit land, as such, defendants being strangers to the suit land, have no right, title or interest over the same. While praying for second relief of permanent prohibitory injunction and for possession, though the plaintiff made an attempt to set up a case that after purchase of suit land by him from Tika Maheshwar Chand, vide sale deed No. 741, dated 18.9.1998, he was put in possession of the same, but, having carefully perused the entire evidence on record adduced by the parties, I am afraid that aforesaid contention put forth by the plaintiff, which has been further reiterated by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, is tenable. As per own case of the plaintiff, mutation in his name pursuant to aforesaid sale deed was entered but the same was rejected subsequently, wrongly and illegally, by the revenue authorities. Close scrutiny of Ext.PW-2/A i.e. original sale deed though suggests that suit land was sold by Tika Maheshwar Chand in favour of the plaintiff and there is recital with regard to delivery of possession of suit land in favour of the plaintiff by previous owner, but, if aforesaid document is read juxtaposing Misal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadid Sani for the years 1992-93 (Ext. P-1), it totally belies the stand of the plaintiff, because admittedly in Misal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadid Sani, part of suit land is recorded in the name of defendants and rest of suit land has been shown in possession of Public Works Department. Though, Missal Hakiyat has been referred to in sale deed, Ext. PW-2/A, but it nowhere suggests that previous owner i.e. Tika Maheshwar Chand, who subsequently sold the suit land to the plaintiff, was in possession of the suit land, as such, there is considerable force in the argument of Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, learned counsel representing the defendants that the possession of suit land never came to be delivered to the plaintiff pursuant to sale deed Ext. PW-2/A, as such, there is no question, if any, of his being in possession of the suit land at the time of filing of the suit at hand. 12. Apart from above, careful perusal of certified copy of order dated 30.3.2001 passed by Collector Sub Division, Nadaun, in Case No. 1/2000, titled Prem Chand versus Maheshwar Chand and others, mutation No. 17, dated 12.11.1999 and order dated 20.2.2006 passed by Commissioner, Mandi Division in Case No. 935/2003 titled Prem Chand versus Maheshwar Chand and others (Exts. 12. Apart from above, careful perusal of certified copy of order dated 30.3.2001 passed by Collector Sub Division, Nadaun, in Case No. 1/2000, titled Prem Chand versus Maheshwar Chand and others, mutation No. 17, dated 12.11.1999 and order dated 20.2.2006 passed by Commissioner, Mandi Division in Case No. 935/2003 titled Prem Chand versus Maheshwar Chand and others (Exts. D4 and D5) clearly reveals that the attestation of mutation was rejected by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade Nadaun, vide order dated 12.11.1999, on the ground that neither the suit land was in the possession of the owner when he executed sale deed in favour of the plaintiff nor plaintiff was put in possession of the same. Record further reveals that the aforesaid finding returned by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Nadaun, was laid challenge in appeal before the Financial Commissioner, but the same was dismissed. During arguments in the appeal at hand, learned counsel representing the defendants, while inviting attention of this court to order dated 23.8.2007, passed by this court in CMPMO No. 23 of 2007, contended that being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the Financial Commissioner, plaintiff approached this court. Perusal of order dated 23.8.2007, which is admittedly not a part of the record, clearly reveals that the CMPMO having been filed by plaintiff was dismissed with the observation that the Financial Commissioner has rightly dismissed the petition in limine on the ground that since the plaintiff (petitioner therein) was not in possession of the land, as such, mutation could not have been attested in his favour. Aforesaid finding returned by this court and other revenue authorities has already attained finality because, admittedly, no challenge, if any, was laid to the same. 13. While responding to aforesaid argument made by Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate, Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff argued that mere recital of delivery of possession in the sale deed is sufficient for recording mutation, as such, findings recorded by the revenue authorities are palpably wrong and untenable. Aforesaid argument having been made by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, does not hold much water, because it has specifically come in the evidence that Tika Maheshwar Chand, who sold the suit land to the plaintiff, vide sale deed Ext. Aforesaid argument having been made by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, does not hold much water, because it has specifically come in the evidence that Tika Maheshwar Chand, who sold the suit land to the plaintiff, vide sale deed Ext. PW2/A, was not in possession of the land at the time of sale, as such, there was no occasion for him to deliver the possession of suit land sold by him to the plaintiff. Bare perusal of the orders passed by revenue authorities (Exts. D4 and D5), clearly suggests that the plaintiff was unable to prove on record that he was delivered possession of the land sold to him by Tika Maheshwar Chand, vide sale deed Ext. PW-2/A. Apart from above, perusal of Missal Hakiyat Ext. P1, reveals that there is entry in the remarks column showing that the suit land was allotted to Raja of Nadaun, by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, vide letter No. 1353, dated 11.7.1997, subject to the rights of the estate right holders. Plaintiff, in his cross-examination admitted that Raja of Nadaun is residing in Village Bela, from where suit land is at a distance of 8-10 kms. Plaintiff also admitted that Gair Mumkin Sarak exists over the suit land and same is being used by the public at large. He also admitted that the defendants are estate right holders and they are in possession of a part of suit land by way of Gair Mumkin Abadi as such, Mr. Lal, learned counsel representing the defendants, is right in contending that there is enough land for the estate right holders for exercise of their Bartandari rights. Otherwise also, careful perusal of remarks column of Ext. P1, clearly suggests that Tika Maheshwar Chand was allotted suit land subject to rights of estate right holders and as such, it does not give right, if any, to the plaintiff to have possession of the suit land, because he could not have acquired any superior title to that of previous owner. Since predecessor of the plaintiff i.e. Tika Maheshwar Chand remained out of possession of suit land right from the time of allotment of suit land in his favour by Financial Commissioner, Punjab, version put forth by plaintiff, while claiming relief of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants that he is in possession of the suit land, can not be accepted. 14. 14. Leaving everything aside, if cross-examination conducted upon PW-1 is read in its entirety, he himself admitted that Abadi of defendants is existing over the part of suit land comprising of Khasra No. 564, whereas, rest of the suit land comprised of Khasra Nos. 5, 7, 90 and 563 is in the shape of Gair Mumkin Sarak constructed by Public Works Department during the years 1953-54. Plaintiff, in his cross-examination, categorically admitted the factum with regard to existence of road over the suit land being used by public at large and also of Abadi of defendants for the last 15-20 years. Most importantly, plaintiff, in his cross-examination, admitted that the settlement operation in the area, where the suit land is situate, was conducted in the years 1982-83 and during settlement operation, revenue record was prepared as per factual position on the spot. If cross-examination conducted upon the plaintiff is read in its entirety, he, in no uncertain terms, admitted possession of the defendants as well as of Public Works Department over the suit land, as such, learned Courts below rightly held him not entitled to maintain the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants. 15. Interestingly, in the suit at hand, plaintiff chose not to implead Public Works Department as a defendant, despite having averred in the plaint that there is road existing over the suit land, constructed by the Public Works Department. In his cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that the suit land comprising of Khasra Nos. 5,7, 90 and 563 is in the shape of Gair Mumkin Sarak and same has been constructed by the Public Works Department during the years 1954-55, which certainly compels this court to conclude that the plaintiff was in the knowledge of the fact that the suit land is already in possession of the defendants and Public Works Department, who have constructed permanent structures thereupon but despite that he chose to purchase suit land vide sale deed, Ext. PW-2/A. 16. As has been noticed herein above, settlement operation in the area, where suit land is situate, took place during the years 1982-83, where after, record was prepared as per factual position on the spot, as such, factum with regard to construction of permanent structures i.e. cattle shed, Khurli, septic tank and courtyard was very much in the knowledge of the plaintiff, who subsequently purchased the suit land vide sale deed Ext. PW-2/A, that too after having seen Misal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadid Sani, for the years 1992-93 (Ext. P1), wherein part of suit land is recorded in possession of the defendants and rest of the suit land in possession of Public Works Department. 17. Even if submission having been made by Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, that the plaintiff has successfully proved on record that he possessed valid title qua the suit land, especially when plea of adverse possession having been taken by the defendants was not accepted, is taken to be correct, no relief as prayed in the alternative in the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and possession could be granted in favour of the plaintiff, in light of evidence adduced on record by plaintiff, wherein he miserably failed to prove his possession over the suit land. Though, material available on record suggests that the plaintiff by way of placing on record Ext.PW-2/A i.e. sale deed proved his title to certain extent, but since the plaintiff failed to prove his possession over the suit land, courts below rightly observed that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants. Needless to say, party intending to seek relief of permanent prohibitory injunction is required to prove that he/she is in possession of suit land, and defendant is trying to invade his/her possession and, in case, person seeking such relief, is not able to prove aforesaid material ingredients, he/she can not be held entitled for the relief of injunction, as has been rightly held by the learned Courts below, while placing reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Sri Thimmaiah vs. Shabira and others. 18. The question, whether the plaintiff is owner of suit land, on the basis of Ext. PW-2/A, could not be gone into in the present suit having been filed by the plaintiff, which was primarily for fixation of boundary by way of demarcation, rather, plaintiff ought to have filed a suit for declaration against the defendants and Public Works Department, seeking therein declaration that he has become owner of suit land, on the basis of sale deed, executed in his favour by Tika Maheshwar Chand, vide sale deed, Ext. PW-2/A, against the defendants, who have otherwise successfully proved in the instant proceedings that they are in possession of suit land since the times of their ancestors. PW-2/A, against the defendants, who have otherwise successfully proved in the instant proceedings that they are in possession of suit land since the times of their ancestors. Mere rejection of the plea of adverse possession having been taken by the defendants in the instant proceedings, could not be a ground for the plaintiff to claim that he is true owner and is entitled for possession, especially when there is ample material available on record suggestive of the fact that Tika Maheshwar Chand, from whom, plaintiff purchased the suit land was allotted land by Financial Commissioner, Punjab vide letter No. 1353 dated 11.3.1897, subject to rights of the estate right holders, meaning thereby no sale transaction could be effected by him against the rights of the estate right holders like defendants. 19. As far as proof with regard to ouster of plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest from the suit land is concerned, it is/was not the defendants, who are/were required to prove the ouster of the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest, rather, onus to prove possession over the suit land is/was upon the plaintiff, who categorically claimed before the court below that pursuant to sale deed, Ext. PW-2/A, he was delivered possession of the suit land. Suit at hand has been filed by plaintiff, praying therein for alternative relief of possession and permanent prohibitory injunction, and as such, it is/was expected of him to prove that he is in possession of the suit land, and is being ousted forcibly by the defendants, who have no right, title or interest over the same. Substantial questions of law No.1 and 2 are answered accordingly. Substantial question of law No.3 20. There is no force in the argument of Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate that the learned Court below erred in dismissing the application filed by the plaintiff for leading additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, whereby he intended to place on record copies of Jamabandis to prove nature of land and dispute and old revenue record. Close scrutiny of the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, reveals that the plaintiff by way of aforesaid application sought permission of the court to place on record copies of old Jamabandis, which show nature of Khasra Nos. 154 and 157 min as Gair Mumkin Sarak and Gair Mumkin Gohar and Banjar Kadeem etc. 21. Close scrutiny of the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, reveals that the plaintiff by way of aforesaid application sought permission of the court to place on record copies of old Jamabandis, which show nature of Khasra Nos. 154 and 157 min as Gair Mumkin Sarak and Gair Mumkin Gohar and Banjar Kadeem etc. 21. Interestingly, plaint if is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that the plaintiff filed suit with respect to Khasra Nos. 564, 5, 7, 90 and 563 and there is no mention, if any, with respect to aforesaid Khasra numbers in the copies of Jamabandis sought to be placed on record by the plaintiff by way of application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, except Khasra No. 157, which corresponds to those Khasra numbers. Moreover, Khasra Nos. 5, 7, 90 and 563 are recorded in the revenue record as road under the control of Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department, whom plaintiff chose not to implead as defendant, as such, learned first appellate Court rightly arrived at a conclusion that the Khasra numbers mentioned in copies of Jamabandis are not relevant and accordingly dismissed the application. Otherwise also, this court, after having perused aforesaid documents, intended to be placed on record by way of additional evidence, has no hesitation to conclude that same are not relevant for the adjudication of the controversy between the parties, especially when no relief is/was sought by the plaintiff against the Public Works Department. Substantial question of law No.3 is also answered accordingly. 22. Now, it would be appropriate to deal with the specific objection raised by the learned counsel representing the defendants with regard to maintainability and jurisdiction of this Court, while examining concurrent findings returned by both the Courts below. Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate, invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held: "16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained." (p.269) 23. Perusal of the judgment, referred hereinabove, suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. There can be no quarrel (dispute) with regard to aforesaid observation made by the Court and true it is that in normal circumstances High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, are restrained from re-appreciating the evidence available on record. 24. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs and Others vs. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2013) 15 SCC 161 wherein the Court held: "35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below : (SCC pp.555-56) "24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same." 25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Parminder Singh versus Gurpreet Singh, Civil Appeal No. 3612 of 2009, decided on 25.7.2017, has held as under: "(14) In our considered opinion, the findings recorded by the three courts on facts, which are based on appreciation of evidence undertaken by the three Courts, are essentially in the nature of concurrent findings of fact and, therefore, such findings are binding on this Court. Indeed, such findings were equally binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal. (15) It is more so when these findings were neither found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings nor these findings were found to be against the evidence, nor against the pleadings and lastly, nor against any provision of law." 26. It is quite apparent from aforesaid exposition of law that concurrent findings of facts and law recorded by both the learned Courts below can not be interfered with unless same are found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings. In the case at hand, as has been discussed in detail, there is no perversity as such in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, rather same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, deserve to be upheld. 27. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above, I find no merit in the appeal at hand, which is accordingly dismissed. Judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below are upheld. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, are vacated.