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2019 DIGILAW 2191 (MAD)

State v. Tr. M. Selvamoorthy

2019-08-27

A.D.JAGADISH CHANDIRA

body2019
ORDER : 1. The Miscellaneous Petition in Crl. M.P. No. 7908/2019 is filed by the State/The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras, to condone the delay of 506 days in filing an appeal against the judgment passed in C.C. No. 08/2013 dated 14.10.2016 by the Court of the Special Judge for the Cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chennai. 2. The Criminal Original Petition in Crl. O.P. No. 26436/2019 is filed by the State represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras, to grant leave to file an appeal before this Court against the judgment passed in C.C. No. 08/2013 dated 14.10.2016 by the Court of the Special Judge for the Cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chennai and Crl. A. No. 26432/2019 is filed against the judgment passed in C.C. No. 08/2013 dated 14.10.2016 by the Court of the Special Judge for the Cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chennai. 3. The brief facts of the case, necessary for the disposal of the above miscellaneous petitions, are as follows:- (a) The case of the defacto complainant, viz. Rajendran, is that he is the owner of Raj Travels Company, which plies bus services from Chennai to Trichy and the bus used to stop at Pallavaram, Tambaram and Guduvancherry to pick up passengers. On 19.10.2011, the accused, Thiru Selvamoorthy, Sub Inspector of Police (Traffic), by abusing his official power, stopped the bus and demanded a sum of Rs. 1000/- from the complainant as illegal gratification/Mamool alleging that if the defacto complainant is not ready and willing to part with the said amount, a case would be registered against him for traffic violation. Again, on 21.10.2011 and on 24.10.2011, the accused contacted the complainant over phone and reiterated his demand of Rs. 1000/- and asked him to come with the money on the same day evening at 5.05 p.m. The complainant, not willing to give the said amount as illegal gratification, made a complaint to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department, Chennai, based on which, a case came to be registered in Crime No. 9/AC/2011-CC-II for the alleged offence u/s. 7 of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988. Subsequent to the trap proceedings and after completion of the phenolphthalein test, the accused was caught red handed. (b) The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined PWs. 1 to 9 and marked Exs. Subsequent to the trap proceedings and after completion of the phenolphthalein test, the accused was caught red handed. (b) The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined PWs. 1 to 9 and marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 14 and M. Os. 1 to 5. (c) The accused stood charged and tried for the commission of the offences under sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 14.10.2016 in C.C. No. 8/2013, had acquitted the appellant rendering a finding that the prosecution has not proved its case of illegal demand and acceptance of bribe, beyond all reasonable doubt. (d) Aggrieved against the said judgment of acquittal, the State had preferred the above appeal with a delay of 871 days. 4. In the affidavit filed in support of Crl. M.P. No. 7908/2019, the State/petitioner/appellant has stated that the judgment impugned herein, was passed by the Trial Court on 14.10.2016 and the application for obtaining the certified copy of the said judgment was made on 17.10.2016 and obtained the same on 25.10.2016. It is further stated that a requisition was made to the Deputy Legal Advisor, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Chennai through the Director, V & AC for legal opinion and the same was obtained on 07.11.2016. It is also stated that the proposal for filing/preferring an appeal against acquittal was forwarded to the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Chennai, who in turn, had forwarded the same to the Principal Secretary to Government (Home), Prohibition and Excise Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 on 27.12.2016. 5. The Deputy Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai, had sent a communication dated 10.01.2017 in Letter No. 97226/Pol-IV-A/2016-1 to the learned Public Prosecutor, High Court, Chennai, seeking his opinion as to whether the judgment of acquittal in C.C. No. 8/2013 is fit for preferring an appeal and vide ROC. OPN. No. 12/2017 dated 07.02.2017, the learned Public Prosecutor, after perusal of the evidence of the witnesses as well as the judgment in extenso, opined that it is not a fit case to prefer an appeal. 6. The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai, vide letter dated 06.06.2017 in No. 97226/Pol-IV-A/2016-6 had requested the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, to offer remarks on the legal opinion given by the learned Public Prosecutor. 7. 6. The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai, vide letter dated 06.06.2017 in No. 97226/Pol-IV-A/2016-6 had requested the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, to offer remarks on the legal opinion given by the learned Public Prosecutor. 7. The Director of DVAC, had furnished a detailed remarks on 13.07.2017 in R.C. No. 228/2011/POL/CC-II, stating that it is a fit case to prefer an appeal against acquittal, based on which, the Deputy Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai, vide letter dated 07.12.2017, had requested the learned Public Prosecutor to offer revised opinion for filing an appeal. 8. The learned Public Prosecutor had addressed a letter dated 11.12.2017 to the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai, to place the entire case before the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu, for getting further opinion and the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu, vide letter dated 14.11.2018 in ROC. OPN. NO. 166/AGVN/2018, addressed to the Deputy Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai, had opined that an appeal should be filed against the judgment of the Trial Court. 9. The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9, after careful examination of the proposal of the Directorate of DVAC and the opinion of the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu, decided that it is a fit case to prefer an appeal and vide letter dated 11.02.2019, had requested the learned Public Prosecutor to prefer an appeal against acquittal and the learned Public Prosecutor, upon the requisition of the Government and after complete perusal of the records, sent a communication to the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, CC-II Detachment, Chennai-16, to furnish the original certified copy of the judgment, typed set of papers and the CD file and accordingly, the appeal came to be filed with a delay of 871 days. 10. The respondent/accused, M. Selvamoorthy, had filed a counter affidavit denying the charges leveled against him by the prosecution in C.C. No. 8/2013 and stated that the Trial Court, on proper appreciation of evidence and record, had rightly acquitted him. 10. The respondent/accused, M. Selvamoorthy, had filed a counter affidavit denying the charges leveled against him by the prosecution in C.C. No. 8/2013 and stated that the Trial Court, on proper appreciation of evidence and record, had rightly acquitted him. He had put forth the following contentions regarding the miscellaneous petition filed on behalf of the State for condonation of delay of 871 days in preferring the appeal:- (a) The appeal against acquittal should have been preferred within 90 days from the date of judgment, i.e. 25.10.2016 and the period of limitation expires on 25.01.2017. However, the officials of DVAC and other Government Officials have committed wilful negligence and inaction in filing the present appeal with a huge delay of 871 days and that it is an abuse of process of law and the same had affected the valuable right and personal liberty of the respondent/accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (b) Initially, the miscellaneous petition in Crl. M.P. No. 7908/2019 was filed to condone the delay of 506 days in preferring the appeal and when the matter came up for hearing, the learned counsel for the respondent/accused had pointed out the delay as 871 days and once again, the State represented by the Inspector of Police, had sought for time to file an amendment petition. Accordingly, Crl. M.P. No. 9990/2019 came to be filed on 19.07.2019. (c) It is further stated that there exist considerable delay at every stage in obtaining legal opinion from the respective officials and the said delay has not been properly and sufficiently explained by the State except stating that due to administrative reasons, the delay had occurred. 11. Mr. K. Prabakar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the petitioner/ appellant/State made the following submissions:- (i) Sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner/appellant/State for the delay of 871 days in preferring the criminal appeal. (ii) It is a case of acquittal under the Prevention of Corruption Act and in such cases, the public interest cannot be allowed to suffer and thereby, the Court has to deal with the case on merits in order to render substantial justice. G. Ramegowda, Major and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, 1988 (2) SCC 142 . (ii) It is a case of acquittal under the Prevention of Corruption Act and in such cases, the public interest cannot be allowed to suffer and thereby, the Court has to deal with the case on merits in order to render substantial justice. G. Ramegowda, Major and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, 1988 (2) SCC 142 . In Ramegowda's case, the Apex Court took into consideration that the delay had occurred due to fraud and unusual conduct of Government Pleader and had condoned the delay in the interest of justice. (iii) The State or Public Body or an Entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, 2013 (12) SCC 649 . (iv) Further, there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (v) The expression ''sufficient cause'' as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice and the same cannot be rendered ineffective by skilful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. State of Karnataka vs. Y. Mohideen Kunhi (dead) by LRs. and Others, 2009 (13) SCC 192 . (vi) Adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protract public justice and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal. State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan, 2008 (14) SCC 582 . (vii) Placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in State of Nagaland vs. Lipok Ao and Others, 2005 (3) SCC 752 a submission was made to the effect that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the said decision, by holding that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible, had held that proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion vested in the Court. It has also held that a pragmatic approach should be taken in a justice oriented process and that the Court should decide the matter on merit. It has also held that a pragmatic approach should be taken in a justice oriented process and that the Court should decide the matter on merit. It was further held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that when substantial justice and technical approach are pitted against each other, the former has to be preferred. (viii) It is further submitted in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Y. Moideen Kunhi (Dead) by LRs. and Others, 2009 (13) SCC 192 , the Hon'ble Apex Court had condoned the delay of 6500 days in filing an appeal against the order of Land Tribunal, noting the fact that vast tracts of land and large sum of revenue were involved and that the appeal was filed belatedly to protect unscrupulous litigants. (ix) The reason exhibited by the petitioner/appellant/State is genuine and there is no mala-fide intention for filing the appeal with such a delay. Placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ummer vs. Pottengal Subida and Others, 2018 (15) SCC 127 . (x) Where the reason and explanation offered for the delay is convincing and acceptable, the petition should not be dismissed on the sole ground of delay State of U.P. vs. Bahadur Singh and Others, 1983 (3) SCC 73 . 12. Per contra, Mr. Vijay Babu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused, while refuting the submissions made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the petitioner/appellant/State, made the following submissions:- (a) It is an appeal against acquittal filed under section 378(3) Cr.P.C. and under Article 114 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the petitioner/appellant/State had not shown sufficient cause nor given any satisfactory, acceptable and cogent reasons/explanations to condone such a huge delay of 871 days in preferring the appeal against acquittal. (b) There was a considerable delay in each and every stage of movement of file from one table to another and such a delay has not been properly explained by the petitioner/ appellant/State. (c) The only reason assigned/attributed by the petitioner/appellant/State for the delay is due to administrative reasons. (d) Limitation is a valuable right that would accrue to a successful party in a litigation and more so, to an accused in a criminal case who has been acquitted. State by Public Prosecutor vs. Sivasamy and Others. (c) The only reason assigned/attributed by the petitioner/appellant/State for the delay is due to administrative reasons. (d) Limitation is a valuable right that would accrue to a successful party in a litigation and more so, to an accused in a criminal case who has been acquitted. State by Public Prosecutor vs. Sivasamy and Others. (e) The law of limitation binds everybody including the Government and in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions and the claim that on account of administrative reasons, cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being available and used. Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, 2012 (3) SCC 563 . (f) The only reason assigned by the petitioner/appellant/State was that the file was moving from one table to another and such explanation is not acceptable in lieu of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 18933/2019 dated 05.07.2019, District Magistrate, Lucknow and Another vs. Chhotey Lal. (g) It is true that the Court should be liberal in condoning the delay in filing the petition, but the delay is inexcusable unless sufficient cause is shown and if the application does not make out any such cause, there is no bar in dismissing such an application without notice to the other party. (h) The petitioner/appellant/State has acted in negligence, lack of bona fides and inaction and there cannot be any ground for condoning the delay by imposing conditions or costs and that if the Courts start condoning huge delays without sufficient cause being shown and by imposing costs/conditions, then the same would amount to violation of statutory principles and the delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds. (i) The learned counsel vehemently argued that no premium can be shown or given for total lethargy or utter negligence of the State Officers/machinery/agency/instrumentality and condonation of delay caused by such officers cannot be allowed on the ground that such dismissal on the ground of limitation will cause injury to public interest. (i) The learned counsel vehemently argued that no premium can be shown or given for total lethargy or utter negligence of the State Officers/machinery/agency/instrumentality and condonation of delay caused by such officers cannot be allowed on the ground that such dismissal on the ground of limitation will cause injury to public interest. (j) In dealing with the application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its Agencies/Instrumentalities, the Court has, while emphasising that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the condone delay applications filed by the private persons/individuals and that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case as the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken in a slow pace by the officers to push the files from table to table, consumes considerable time causing delay. (k) The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing the appeals and it would be a different matter if the Government makes out a case where public interest is suffered due to the acts of fraud or collusion on the part of the Government officers. Here in the case on hand, no such facts are pleaded and proved and the submission made without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings, cannot be entertained. (l) The grounds urged by the petitioner/appellant/State are fanciful in nature and if the explanation offered is concocted, then the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation and that there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of few days; while the former warrants strict approach, the latter calls for a liberal delineation. (m) Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy and the law of limitation is founded on public policy. (n) It is seen from the affidavit filed in support of the miscellaneous petition that initially, the learned Public Prosecutor had given his opinion that it is not a fit case to prefer an appeal and thus, allowed the period of limitation to lapse and subsequently, pleading that sufficient cause has been established that because of certain circumstances arising before limitation period expired, it was not possible to file the appeal within time. In the case on hand, no such event or circumstance had been shown to show that prior to the expiry of limitation period, there was a possibility of filing the appeal. 13. The respondent/accused had placed reliance upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India:- (i) Basawaraj and Another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 (14) SCC 81 (ii) Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Pawan Kumar Saraf, 1999 (2) SCC 400 (iii) Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh and Others, 2010 (8) SCC 685 (iv) Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157 (v) Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another, 2010 (5) SCC 459 (vi) B. Madhuri Goud vs. B. Damodar Reddy, 2012 (12) SCC 693 (vii) Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another, 2008 (17) SCC 448 (viii) P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Another, 1997 (7) SCC 556 (ix) Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, 2013 (1) SCC 649 (x) Popat and Kotecha Property vs. State Bank of India Staff Association, 2005 (7) SCC 510 (xi) Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2011 (4) SCC 363 (xii) Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another vs. State of Gujarat, 1981 (1) SCC 495 (xiii) Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, 2012 (3) SCC 563 (xiv) District Magistrate, Lucknow and Another vs. Chhotey Lal, Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 18933/2019 (xv) The State of Bihar and Others vs. Deo Kumar and Others, Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 13348/2019 14. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and thoroughly scanned through the entire materials available on record and also perused the impugned judgment of acquittal, including the relevant provisions of Law and authorities of various Courts. 15. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and thoroughly scanned through the entire materials available on record and also perused the impugned judgment of acquittal, including the relevant provisions of Law and authorities of various Courts. 15. At the outset, though several judgments/citations have been cited by both sides, this Court does not want to burden this judgment by referring to all those decisions referred and before proceeding to analyse the case on hand as to whether the petitioner/appellant/State had made out a case for condonation of delay by showing sufficient cause and by offering proper, plausible and sufficient explanation, this Court feels it apposite to refer the following judgments to decide the case on hand. 16. In Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, 2012 (3) SCC 563 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraphs No. 28 to 30 and 32, thus:- "28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona-fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. ..... 32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs." 17. In the decision reported in Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Pawan Kumar Saraf and Another, 1999 (2) SCC 400 (Three Judges Bench), the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraphs No. 18 and 21 held thus: ''...18. This Special Leave Petition is barred by 309 days. It is against an order made in revision by the Calcutta High Court upholding the order of the trial Court acquitting the respondent of an offence under sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (''Act'' for short). There is an application by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay in filing this petition. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji, 1987 (2) SCC 107 . It was submitted that the Court should be liberal in condoning the delay. Liberal all right, but delay is inexcusable unless sufficient cause is shown. It is not the law that when an application seeking condonation of delay is filed by the State or any authority, this Court must invariably condone the delay irrespective of whether sufficient cause is shown or not. In Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 , this Court said:- "In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired, the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna vs. Chathappan, ILR (1888-90) 13 Mad 269: "Section 5 gives a Court the discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ''sufficient cause'' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.'' ..... 21. It is, therefore, only when this Court, from the facts stated in the application seeking condonation of delay is prima facie of the view that there could be sufficient cause that notice is required to be issued. If the application does not make out any such cause, there is no bar dismissing the application without notice to the other party. Since no sufficient cause was shown by the petitioner as noted above, we dismissed the petition on the ground of delay.'' (Emphasis supplied) 18. In the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 13348/2019 (The State of Bihar and Others vs. Deo Kumar Singh and Others), dated 09.05.2019, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus:- ''The petitioner-State of Bihar filed an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge before the Division Bench dismissed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that there was no sufficient cause shown for condonation of delay. It is thereafter with a delay of 728 days, that the special leave petition has been filed. It is thereafter with a delay of 728 days, that the special leave petition has been filed. The reason given for seeking condonation of this extraordinary 728 days is as under:- ''2. that the petitioner State is filing the present special leave petition after obtaining all the sanctions from the respective departments and took time to receive the affidavit and vakalatnama from the concerned department, hence there is delay in filing the present matter.'' We are the view that a clear signal has to sent to the Government Authorities that they cannot approach the Court as and when they please, on account of gross incompetence of their officers and that too, without taking any action against the concerned officers. No detail of this delay of 728 days have been given as if there is an inherent right to seek condonation of delay by State Government. The law of limitation apparently does not apply to the State Government according to its conduct. That such condonation of delay is no more admissible on the pretext of Government working lethargy is clear from the judgment of this Court in The Chief Post Master General vs. Living Media India Limited, 2012 (3) SCC 563 . We strongly deprecate the causal manner in which the Division Bench was approached and also this Court has been approached; the objective possibly being to get a certificate of dismissal from this Court. This is complete wastage of judicial time and the petitioners must pay for the same. We, thus dismiss the special leave petition on delay and impost cost on the petitioners of Rs. 20,000/- to be recovered from the officers responsible for this delay and be deposited with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre, within four weeks. Certificate of recovery be filed in this Court. We also direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar to look into this matter to ensure better management of the legal cases. Consequently, the special leave petition is dismissed in the aforesaid terms.'' 19. In yet another recent decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 18933/2019 (District Magistrate, Lucknow and Another vs. Chhotey Lal) dated 05.07.2019, has held thus:- ''There is a delay of 1453 days. The application for condonation of delay shows that file was moved after two years of passing of the impugned order. In yet another recent decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 18933/2019 (District Magistrate, Lucknow and Another vs. Chhotey Lal) dated 05.07.2019, has held thus:- ''There is a delay of 1453 days. The application for condonation of delay shows that file was moved after two years of passing of the impugned order. There is no explanation forthcoming for such an inordinate delay showing that the matter has been dealt with by the concerned officer negligently. The only explanation given for such an inordinate delay is that the file was moving from one table to another. It is always open to the petitioners to proceed for appropriate departmental action against any erring official. The special leave petition is dismissed on the ground of delay. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.'' 20. In State by Public Prosecutor vs. Sivasamy and Others, 1991 (1) MWN (Cri.) 188, a Division Bench of this Court had held thus:- "5. Admittedly the judgment which is sought to be appealed was delivered on 4.2.1987 and the last date for filing the appeal against acquittal was 5.5.1987. As per the first affidavit filed by the Joint Secretary to Government, the proposal from the Collector of Tiruchirappalli was received by the Government for the first time on 24.8.1987. There upon it was processed and the appeal was filed on 8.10.1987. In the additional affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary, it is stated that though the judgment of the trial court was passed on 4.2.1987, the District Magistrate, Tiruchirappalli received the opinion of the trial court Public Prosecutor on 24.6.1987 long after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is further stated that the delay of 155 days has occurred on the part of the District Magistrate and Collector, Tiruchirappalli, in filing the appeal before this court. On a perusal of both the affidavits, it is clear that the delay for not filing the appeal within the statutory period has not at all been explained. It is stated in the original affidavit filed by the Joint Secretary that the Government received the proposal from the Collector on 24.8.1987, that is about 3 months and 19 days after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is stated in the original affidavit filed by the Joint Secretary that the Government received the proposal from the Collector on 24.8.1987, that is about 3 months and 19 days after the expiry of the period of limitation. Though it is stated that the delay of 155 days has occurred on the part of the District Magistrate and Collector, Tiruchirappalli, he has not filed any affidavit and the reason for the delay has not been explained by him. It has been stated in both the affidavits that the reason for the delay was purely on account of administrative set up. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this court to the order in Crl. M.P. No. 6316 of 1985 dated 24.11.1987 State by Public Prosecutor vs. K. Subramaniam and Others wherein a Division Bench of this court dismissed the petitioner condoning the delay of 37 days in filing an appeal, holding that "The accused have been acquitted of the charge of murder and they have gained a valuable right by lapse of time and this right cannot be taken away by mere averment that the delay is due to administrative set up. The Government have been given an extended period of limitation and if they are not prepared to avail of that and want to seek a further time, it must be satisfactorily established that they have been prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the appeal in time. That requirement has not been established in this case. We do not therefore think that this is a fit case for condoning the delay." The Division Bench dismissed the petition. In Crl. M.P. No. 4655 of 1977 State by Public Prosecutor vs. Chinnappan and Others there was a delay of 101 days in filing appeal against acquittal. There also it has been stated that the delay is due to administrative reasons. A Division Bench of this court dismissed the petition holding that the reason given by the Petitioner is not at all sufficient to excuse the inordinate delay in filing appeal against acquittal. In yet another case, in Crl. M.P. No. 4636 of 1987 State Rep. by Public Prosecutor, Madras vs. Pichai Kannu and Others there was a delay of 109 days in filing appeal. A Division Bench of this court held. "Last date for filing the appeal before this Court is on 23.6.1986. In yet another case, in Crl. M.P. No. 4636 of 1987 State Rep. by Public Prosecutor, Madras vs. Pichai Kannu and Others there was a delay of 109 days in filing appeal. A Division Bench of this court held. "Last date for filing the appeal before this Court is on 23.6.1986. The proposal from the Collector of Thanjavur was received after the period of limitation is over i.e., on 24.9.1986. Each day delay in filing the appeal has not been explained. Hence, the petition is dismissed. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh vs. State of Gujarat, 1981 L.W. (Crl.) 282. Their Lordship of the Supreme Court held: "Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But, when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event of circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstances arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause and the High Court erred in condoning the delay." 6. Applying the ratio laid down in the above quoted decision to the facts of the case, it is seen that there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay in not filing the appeal within the period of limitation and in regard to the subsequent delay after the expiry of the period of limitation, it is only stated that it was administrative delay without giving any reason except stating the various dates when the file moved from the concerned authorities. The petitioner has miserably failed to explain the inordinate delay of 155 days. Though there is an averment that there is delay of 155 days on the part of the District Magistrate and Collector, Tiruchirappalli in filing the appeal, it has not been explained as to how the delay has occurred. The petitioner has miserably failed to explain the inordinate delay of 155 days. Though there is an averment that there is delay of 155 days on the part of the District Magistrate and Collector, Tiruchirappalli in filing the appeal, it has not been explained as to how the delay has occurred. As rightly pointed out in the counter, limitation is a valuable right that would accrue to a successful party in a litigation and more so to an accused in a criminal case who has been acquitted. For all these reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has miserably failed to explain the delay satisfactorily and as such the petition deserves to be dismissed.'' 21. In view of the above principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court, in the decisions cited supra, now analysing the facts of the present case, the following tabular column would indicate the delay in each and every stage, right from the date of judgment in C.C. No. 8/2013, till the date of filing of the condone delay petition along with the Memorandum of Grounds in preferring the above criminal appeal: S. No. Date From To Remarks No. of days delay 1 14.10.2016 Trial Court -- Impugned Judgment of conviction came to be passed. -- 2 17.10.2016 CC-II Detachment Trial Court Applied for the Certified copy of the judgment 3 25.10.2016 Trial Court CC-II Detachment Obtained the Certified copy of the judgment 4 03.11.2016 CC-II Detachment Deputy Legal Advisor, DVAC, Chennai Sought for Legal Opinion 5 07.11.2016 DLA CC-II Legal Opinion obtained 4 days 6 21.12.2016 Legal Advisor DVAC Legal Opinion for filing appeal 44 days 7 27.12.2016 DVAC The Principal Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department Sent Proposal for filing an appeal 6 days 8 10.01.2017 The Deputy Secretary to Government, Home [Pol-IV.A] The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Madras For obtaining opinion as to whether the case is fit for filing an appeal against acquittal 14 days 9 07.02.2017 The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Madras The Deputy Secretary to Government, Home [Pol-IV.A] Opined that it is not a fit case for filing an appeal against acquittal 28 days 10 06.06.2017 The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home [Pol.IV.A] DVAC To offer remarks on the legal opinion given by the Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras 119 days 11 13.07.2017 DVAC The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home [Pol.IV.A] Furnished Remarks 37 days 12 03.08.2017 Joint Secretary to Government DVAC To offer view as to whether departmental action can be initiated 21 days 13 11.10.2017 DVAC The Additional Chief Secretary to Government To consider the view of DVAC on it is a fit case to file an appeal 69 days 14 07.12.2017 The Deputy Secretary to Government, Home [Pol.IV.A] The Public Prosecutor To offer revised considered opinion for filing an appeal against acquittal 57 days 15 11.12.2017 Public Prosecutor [I/C] The Deputy Secretary to Government, Home [Pol.IV.A] To place the entire matter before the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu for getting further opinion 4 days 16 26.12.2017 The Deputy Secretary to Government, Home [Pol.IV-A] The Advocate General of Tamil Nadu To offer opinion for filing an appeal against acquittal 15 days 17 01.02.2018 DVAC The Additional Chief Secretary to Government Requested to communicate if any orders issued 37 days 18 20.04.2018 DVAC The Additional Chief Secretary to Government Requested to communicate if any orders issued 78 days 19 14.05.2018 The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home [Pol.IV-A] DVAC Informed that the opinion of the Advocate General of Tamil Nadu has been called for 24 days 20 30.08.2018 The Deputy Secretary to Government The Advocate General of Tamil Nadu To offer opinion for filing an appeal against acquittal 108 days 21 14.11.2018 The Advocate General of Tamil Nadu The Deputy Secretary to Government Opined that an appeal should be filed against the judgment 45 days 22 11.01.2019 The Additional Chief Secretary to Government Home [Pol-IV.A] The Public Prosecutor To prefer an appeal before this Court, against acquittal 39 days 23 11.02.2019 DVAC The Public Prosecutor Requested to prefer an appeal 31 days 24 10.06.2019 Filed an appeal against acquittal 119 days TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS DELAY 899 Days 22. From the above, this Court is able to see that there had been a lethargic and ineffective administration by the petitioner/appellant/State at various stage of moving the file from one table to another, in particular, between 10.01.2017 and 07.02.2017; 07.02.2017 and 06.06.2017; 06.06.2017 and 13.07.2017; 13.07.2017 and 03.08.2017; 03.08.2017 and 11.10.2017; 11.10.2017 and 07.12.2017; 26.12.2017 and 01.02.2018; 01.02.2018 and 20.04.2018; 14.05.2018 and 30.08.2018; 30.08.2018 and 14.11.2018; 14.11.2018 and 11.01.2019; 11.01.2019 and 11.02.2019 and 11.02.2019 and 10.06.2019. 23. It is seen from the above Tabular Column that the learned Public Prosecutor, has, originally given an opinion on 07.02.2017, stating that it is not a fit case for filing an appeal and thereafter, after a considerable delay, nearly after ten months, which has not been properly explained, opinion had been sought for from the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu by the Deputy Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, Secretariat, Chennai, on 26.12.2017, to offer an opinion for filing an appeal against acquittal and a reminder requisition was also sent to the learned Advocate General on 30.08.2018 and even after obtaining the opinion from the learned Advocate General on 14.11.2018, the appeal had not been filed immediately and had been filed after 11 months. The file was moving from one table to another and finally, on 11.01.2019, the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home (Pol-IV-A) Department, has given consent to file the appeal and even then, there had been a delay of nearly five months in preferring the appeal against acquittal. 24. I have gone through the affidavit filed in support of Crl. M.P. No. 7908/2019 and also consciously perused the entire records. Originally, an affidavit has been casually filed without properly calculating the number of days delay. Thereafter, a petition for amendment in Crl. M.P. No. 9990/2019 has been filed and even in the said amendment petition, no pleadings had been made showing sufficient cause and offering plausible and tenable explanations. In the opinion of this Court, the petitioner/appellant/State has neither shown any sufficient cause nor offered any plausible, probable and acceptable explanation for condoning such a huge delay except citing administrative delay and stating the various dates when the file moved from the concerned authorities. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case wherein, the inordinate delay could be condoned and the appeal could be entertained. 25. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case wherein, the inordinate delay could be condoned and the appeal could be entertained. 25. Since the subject matter of the case is an appeal against acquittal in a Corruption case, this Court also has a duty to analyse the judgment of the Trial Court with regard to public interest. This Court, while analysing the merits of the case, is able to see that the Trial Court had acquitted the respondent/accused. It is the case where the respondent/accused had been charged for the offences u/s. 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A perusal of the evidence of PW-2 would go to show that PW-2 has been partly treated as hostile and the Trial Court had held that the prosecution was not able to prove the demand made by the respondent/accused to the driver and cleaner of the bus and taking into consideration, the evidence of PW-2 and finding that the demand has not been proved by the prosecution and that the driver of the bus who had informed to PW-2 about the respondent/accused demanding money, has not been examined, the Trial Court had granted benefit of doubt to the respondent/accused and acquitted him of all the charges levelled against him. This Court, on a thorough scrutiny of the impugned judgment of acquittal, is of the considerable view that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the respondent/accused and the Trial Court, on an elaborate consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, had rendered a detailed judgment on 14.10.2016, acquitting the respondent/accused. This Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the judgment of acquittal. 26. This Court is of the opinion that even by not condoning the delay, no grave prejudice will be caused to the petitioner/Appellant/State or to the public interest. 27. In the result, the petition in Crl. M.P. No. 7908/2019 stands DISMISSED. Consequently, the petition seeking leave to file an appeal against acquittal in Crl. O.P. No. 26436/2019 as well as the criminal appeal in Crl. A. No. 26432/2019 stand DISMISSED at the SR Stage itself.