JUDGMENT : Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J. Heard Sri Vishnu Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Hem Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3/1, 3/2 and 4. Facts:- 2. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that one "Divan Vidyawati Badrinath of Shrinagar (State of Jammu and Kashmir)" was the original owner and landlady of House No.CK-19/8, Mohalla Thatheri Bazar, City Varanasi, which is a four storeyed building. The aforesaid original owner and landlady appointed one Sri Raghunath Mishra as her Agent to look after and collect rent of the aforesaid house and for that purpose, permitted him to use one room of the house at the first floor. The petitioner is the son of the Agent Raghunath Mishra. 3. The aforesaid original owner and landlady bequeathed the house in question to "Sri Vikramajeet Singh, Sanatan Dharm College, Kanpur" which She mentioned in para (e) of her registered will deed dated 11.02.1960, which was approved by Hon'ble Jammu and Kashmir High Court in case No.51 of 1964. In the said document, it was also mentioned that Raghunath Mishra son of Jawahar Lal Mishra was occupying a portion in the house in question as her Agent. When the agent Raghunath Mishra did not furnish account and rent, the original owner and landlady terminated the agent and his licence vide notice dated 29.05.1958. Thereafter, she filed a suit being O.S. No.35 of 1961 (Smt. Vidyawati Devi vs. Raghunath Mishra) in the court of Civil Judge, Varanasi for eviction of Raghunath Mishra, which was decreed by judgment and decree dated 17.05.1988 and she was declared to be the owner of the house in question and Raghunath Mishra to be her Agent and Caretaker and the defendants were directed not to interfere in realisation of rent. Against the judgment dated 17.05.1988, the petitioner filed Civil Appeal No.600 of 1988 (Vishwanath Mishra vs. Narendra Jeet Singh) which was dismissed by judgment dated 30.05.1998 passed by the A.D.J. Vth Varanasi. Against this judgment, the petitioner filed Second Appeal No.1196 of 1998 (Vishwanath Misra vs. Ratan Shankar Chaurasia) in which an interim order dated 03.09.1998 staying the decree subject to depositing Rs.2,500/- per month was passed. The said Second Appeal is stated to be pending. 4. Against this judgment, the petitioner filed Second Appeal No.1196 of 1998 (Vishwanath Misra vs. Ratan Shankar Chaurasia) in which an interim order dated 03.09.1998 staying the decree subject to depositing Rs.2,500/- per month was passed. The said Second Appeal is stated to be pending. 4. The aforesaid Sri Vikramajeet Singh Sanatan Dharm College, Kanpur passed a resolution dated 02.02.1983 authorising its President Narendra Jeet Singh to execute sale deed of the house in question in favour of Ratan Shankar Chaurasiya and others (respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein) and accordingly a registered sale deed of the house in question dated 25.03.1983 was executed in favour of the aforesaid Ratan Shankar Chaurasiya and others. The aforesaid purchasers got their names mutated in records of Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi under the order of the Tax Superintendent dated 06.07.1985. As per order of the Additional Commissioner, Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi dated 05.11.1960, the name of Raghunath Mishra (father of the petitioner) was recorded as Agent of Smt. Vidyawati Badrinath. As per copies of assessments passed by Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi, the name of Raghunath Mishra is mentioned as Agent of the original owner and landlady Smt. Vidyawati Badrinath. 5. In the house in question, one Smt. Satyabhama Devi was a tenant of some portion on the first floor who died on 02.01.1985. She was having no son but only three daughters, who were married. The petitioner Vishwnath Mishra filed release application dated 10.01.1985 under Section 16(1)(b) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 for release of the accommodation which was in occupation of the tenant late Smt. Satyabhama Devi. In his release application, the petitioner stated that he is in bona fide need of the tenanted premises of the first floor for his personal use. A release application was also filed by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 (purchasers of the house by registered sale deed dated 25.03.1983). The release applications were registered as Case No.3 of 1985. In his release application, the petitioner stated that he is in bona fide need of the tenanted premises of the first floor for his personal use. A release application was also filed by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 (purchasers of the house by registered sale deed dated 25.03.1983). The release applications were registered as Case No.3 of 1985. By the impugned order dated 22.07.1988, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi allowed the release application of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and rejected the release application of the petitioner recording the conclusion as under:- ^^eSaus leLr i=koyh dk lE;d vkoyksdu fd;kA iz'uxr Hkou la0 lh0 ds0 19@8 BBsjh cktkj 'kgj okjk.klh ds Hkou Lokeh ds fu/kkZj.k dks dksbZ vf/kdkj bl U;k;ky; dks ugha gS ijUrq izFke vfr0 flfoy tt] okjk.klh egksn; ds vkns'k fnukad 17-5-1988 ds vUrxZr okn la0&35 lu~ 1961 }kjk ;g rF; fufoZokn :i ls fl) fd;k tk pqdk gS fd iz'uxr Hkou ds Hkou Lokeh izkFkhZ Jh fo'oukFk feJ ugha gS cfYd mUgsa mlls csn[ky djus dk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS bl izdkj izkFkhZ Jh fo'oukFk feJ ds fueqZfDr izkFkZuk i= fnukad 10-1-85 dks Lohdkj djus dks dksbZ vkSfpR; gh ugha gSA nhokuh vnkyr ds vkns'k fnukad 17-5-1988 esa okn fcUnq la0&20] 21 o 22 ds fu.kZ; esa U;k;ky; }kjk ;g fuf.kZr fd;k x;k gS fd oknh la0&1 Jherh fnokfuuh cnzhukFk lkfgck }kjk Jh ujsUnzthr flag dks Hkou la0&lh0ds0 19@08 BBsjh cktkj] okjk.klh dk ,DthD;wVj mfpr Lo0 Jherh lR;Hkkek nsoh }kjk iz'uxr Hkou la[;k& lh0ds 19@8] BBsjh cktkj 'kgj okjk.klh ds izFke ry dk ,d nks njh dejk] ,d dksBjh e; nkyku o vU; Hkkx tks muds fdjk;snkjh esa Fkk] vkifRrdrkZx.k Jh jtu 'kadj pkSjfl;k vkfn ds i{k esa fueqZDr fd;k tkrk gSA vkSipkfjd vkns'k fuxZr gksA** 6. Aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 22.07.1988 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi, the petitioner filed Rent Revision No.150 of 1988 (Dr. Vishwanath Mishra vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi and another) under Section 18 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 in which he claimed himself to be the landlord of the house in question on the ground that his grandfather Jawahar Lal Mishra and thereafter his father Raghunath Mishra and now he is in possession of the house in question. The aforesaid Rent Revision No.150 of 1988 (Dr. The aforesaid Rent Revision No.150 of 1988 (Dr. Vishwanath Mishra vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi and another), was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 24.10.2000 passed by the XIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi. The aforesaid Rent Revision No.150 of 1988 (Dr. Vishwanath Mishra vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi and another), was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 24.10.2000 passed by the XIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi. The revisional court recorded its findings as under: ^^eSaus ,d i{kh; izkFkhZ dks lquk ,oa i=koyh dk v/;;u fd;kA fookfnr edku lh-ds- 19@8 BBsjh cktkj] 'kgj okjk.klh esa fLFkr gS] bl ij fookn ugha gSA iz'uxr Hkou ds ftl va'k ds ckjs esa] ftldk fooj.k izkFkhZ ds fueqZfDr izkFkZuk&i= ds vUr esa fn;k x;k gS] fueqZfDr vkns'k pkgk x;k gS mlesa Jherh lR;Hkkek fdjk;snkj jgha] ftudh e`R;q gks xbZ] bl ij Hkh fookn ugha gSA izkFkhZ fuxjkuhdrkZ dh vksj ls ;g dgk x;k fd voj U;k;ky; us i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; dks utjUnkt djrs gq, euekus rjhds ls fu.kZ; fn;k gS] tcfd fookfnr edku dk okdbZ ekfyd rjhd izkFkhZ fo'oukFk feJ gSaA vc ns[kuk gS fd D;k fookfnr edku dk Lokeh i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ls izkFkhZ fl) gksrk gSA ;g lR; gS fd vf/kfu;e la[;k&13@72 dh /kkjk&16 ¼1½¼ch½ esa fueqZfDr vkns'k ikfjr djrs le; dsoy yS.MykMZ ns[kk tkuk vko';d gS] LokfeRo ns[kuk vko';d ughaA ysfdu pwafd bl ekeys esa foi{khx.k jru'kadj pksjfl;k vkfn us izkFkhZ dks edku ekfyd dk ds;j Vsdj ¼,tsUV½ crk;k gS] blfy, fueqZfDr izkFkZuk&i= ds fujLrkj.k esa i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ls LokfeRo ij fopkj djuk vko';d gS] D;ksafd ,tsUV /kkjk 3 ¼ts½ ,DV ua0&13@1972 ds vuqlkj yS.MykMZ rks gks ldrk gS] ysfdu blh /kkjk&3 ¼th½ ds vuqlkj ,tsUV yS.MykMZ /kkjk& 16 ¼v½ vFkok /kkjk&21 ds vUrxZr viuh vko';drk o mi;ksx ds fy, fueqZfDr dk izkFkZuk &i= ugha ns ldrk gSA izkFkhZ us ;g dgk gS fd fookfnr edku ds ekfyd igys mlds ckck tokgj feJ Fks mlds ckn mlds firk j?kqukFk feJ gq, vkSj vc og ekfyd gSA LokfeRo oknh ds ckck dks dSls izkIr gqvk] blds ckjs esa dgha dqN oknh us ugha dgkA tc fd foi{khx.k us lwph 149 ls 19 vnn dkxtkr nkf[ky fd;k gS ftlesa izFke dkxt izkFkZuk i= j?kqukFk lEor 1986 dk gS] ftlesa j?kqukFk feJ us tks izkFkhZ ds firk gS ;g lkQ Lohdkj fd;k gS fd fookfnr edku dh feyfd;r ls mUgsa dksbZ rkYyqdkr o okLrk ljksdkj ugha gSA dkxt la[;k&156 gqdqeukek vlk<+ 15 lEor 1986 ckcr fu;qfDr j?kqukFk feJ ,tsUV@ds;j Vsdj gSA dkxt la[;k&159 udy olh;rukek gS] ftls fo|korh nsoh us ch-,l-,l-Mh- dkyst dkuiqj ds i{k esa fookfnr edku dk fu"ikfnr fd;k gSA 35 lu~ 1961 ewy okn dh izfr dkxt la[;k&162 gS] ftls fo|korh nsoh us oknh o mlds firk ds fo:) nkf[ky fd;k gSA blds vykok dkxt la[;k&168 yxk;r 188 fglkc ,oa i= gSa] ftls j?kqukFk feJ us nhokfuuh fo|korh nsoh o LVsV tEew d'ehj dks Hkstk gSA dkxt la[;k&194 dj fu/kkZj.k vf/kdkjh dks lu~ 1959 esa Hkstk x;k i= gSA blesa j?kqukFk feJ us vius dks ,tsUV vkQ vejukFk fookfnr edku ds lEcU/k esa crk;k gSA bu reke vfHkys[kh; lk{;] ftldk fooj.k voj U;k;ky; us ugha fd;k gS] ls Li"V gks tkrk gS fd fookfnr edku nhoku LVsV tEew d'ehj dk jgk] ckn esa Jherh fo|korh nsoh nhokfuuh dks izkIr gqvk vkSj fnokfuuh us bl edku dh olh;r ch0,l0,l0Mh0 dkyst dkuiqj ds i{k esa dj nhA ;g lHkh vfHkys[k o rF; 147 x 'kiFk i= rks jru 'kadj pkSjfl;k }kjk fd;k x;k gS ls lefFkZr gSA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls vij vk;qDr ds fu.kZ; fnukafd 5-11-60 dk gokyk nsrs gq, dgk x;k fd fookfnr edku ij uxj egkikfydk ds dkxtkr esa mldk uke ntZ gSA esjs fopkj ls ;g fu.kZ; tks dkxt la[;k 207 gS izkFkhZ dks ykHk ugha nsrk] D;ksafd blesa izkFkhZ ds firk j?kqukFk feJ dk uke crkSj ,tsUV Jherh fo|korh nsoh vafdr gSA f}rh; nkf[ky [kkfjt vihy dk fu.kZ; fnukafdr 24-4-91 tks f}rh; vij ftyk tt] okjk.klh }kjk jru 'kadj pkSjfl;k cuke uxj egkikfydk vkfn esa ikfjr fd;k x;k gS rFkk y?kqokn U;k;k/kh'k }kjk fo'oukFk feJ cuke txr fd'kksj feJ y?kqokn la[;k&495@79 esa tks fu.kZ; fnukad 24-8-91 dks fn;k x;k gS] buds vk/kkj ij Hkh fookfnr edku dk Lokeh izkFkhZ ugha dgk tk ldrk] cfYd ek= og ,tsUV jgkA uxj ikfydk] okjk.klh ds dj fu/kkZj.k iaftdk dh udy izkFkhZ us nkf[ky fd;k gS] ftlesa Hkh j?kqukFk feJ ,tsUV cnzhukFk vafdr gSA bl rjg i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ftudk fopkj.k voj U;k;ky; esa ugha fd;k gS] ls Hkh bl Lrj ij ;g Li"V gS fd oknh vius firk ds le; ls ek= fookfnr edku dk ,tsUV gSA /kkjk 3 ¼ts½ vf/kfu;e la[;k&13@72 esa og ,tsUV ds ukrs yS.MykMZ gS] ysfdu mls viuh vko';drk o t:jr ds fy, edku dks fueqZDr djkus dk vf/kdkj ugha gSA izkFkhZ dk ;g dFku fd voj U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; LokfeRo ds lUnHkZ esa lk{; ds foijhr gS] ,slk ugha dgk tk ldrkA voj U;k;ky; us ewy okn la[;k&35@61 esa ikfjr fu.kZ; ds vk/kkj ij viuk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k gSA mDr fu.kZ; esa Jherh fo|korh nsoh dks fookfnr edku dk ekfyd ?kksf"kr fd;k x;k gSA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls ;g dgk fd mDr fu.kZ; dh fMØh dk fØ;kUo;u ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vihy la[;k&600@88 fo'oukFk cuke ujsUnzthr esa ikfjr vkns'k ls LVs gS] blfy, mDr ewy okn 35@61 ds vk/kkj ij ikfjr voj U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; voS/kkfud gSA esjs fopkj ls izkFkhZ dh ;g cgl Hkh mfpr ugha gS] D;ksafd ewy okn la[;k 35@61 esa mijksDr fMØh vikLr ugha gqbZ gS] bldk fØ;kUo;u Hkh LFkfxr ugha gS] cfYd bl fMØh ds vk/kkj ij djk;s tkus okys fu"iknu dks ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; us vius vkns'k fnukafdr 19-12-88 ls LFkkfxr fd;k gSA vr% ,slk ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd ekeyk la[;k 35@61 esa fo}ku flfoy tt }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; lekIr gks pqdk gSA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls fu.khZr fof/k ,-vkj-lh- 1980 i`"V 388 Jherh dsylk'oklh cuke prqFkZ vij ftyk tt vkfn] ,-vkj-lh- 1981 i`"V&43 dqoaj xqykc cuke ftyk vkiwfrZ vf/kdkjh vkfn ,-vkj-lh- 1980 i`"V&502 rstHkku enu cuke f}rh; vij ftyk tt bykgkckn vkfn] ,-vkj-lh- 1982 i`"V&120 j?kqukFk izlkn cuke izFke vij ftyk tt] uSuhrky dk gokyk fn;k x;kA bu lHkh fu.khZr fofy;ksa esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; us ewyr% ;g fl)kUr izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd tgka LoRo lEcU/kh ew<+ iz'u ckn esa mBrk gS ogka LoRo lEcU/kh ,sls iz'u dks fu.khZr djuk fueqZfDr izkFkZuk&i= ds fuLrkj.k ds nkSjku mfpr ugha gS D;ksafd ;g laf{kIr dk;Zokgh gSA esjs fopkj ls mDr fu.khZr fof/k;ksa dk ykHk orZeku ekeys esa izkFkhZ dks ugha fn;k tk ldrk] D;ksafd ;gka i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ls izkFkZuk&i= ds fuLrkj.k ds fy, LokfeRo dk fu/kkZj.k djuk iwjh rjg lEHko gSA bl Lrj ij ;g iz'u fu.khZr fd;k tk ldrk gS fd izkFkhZ ,tsUV gS ;k ekfydA okLro esa Loro dk fu/kkZj.k ewy okn la[;k&35@61 dh fMØh ls gks pqdk gS] ftldk fu.kZ; Hkh i=koyh ij miyC/k gSA vr% ,slk ugha dgk tk ldrk fd voj U;k;ky; us LoRo ds ckjs esa vius {ks=kf/kdkj dk vfrØe.k djrs gq, fu.kZ; fn;k gSA vxyk fcUnq vo/kkj.k gsrq ;g gS fd D;k Lo0 lR;Hkkek o izkFkhZ dk fj'rk fdjk;snkj o yS.MykMZ dk jgk rFkk jru'kadj pkSjfl;k vtuxh O;fDr gSa vkSj muls bl edku ls dksbZ eryc ugha gSA tgka rd lR;Hkkek o izkFkhZ ds chp fdjk;snkj o yS.MykMZ ds fj'rs dk iz'u gS] ;g i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ls lkfcr gS] ysfdu izkFkhZ yS.MykMZ fdjk;k olwyus ds fy, ,tsUV dh gSfl;r ls Fkk] okLrfod Lokeh dh gSfl;r ls ughaA izkjEHk eas lR;Hkkek dh nks yM+fd;ksa us vkifRr nkf[ky djds izkFkhZ ds izkFkZuk&i= dk fojks/k fd;k FkkA fnus'k dqekj foeyk vxzoky ds iq= us dkxt la[;k&40 x viuk 'kiFk&i= nsdj foi{kh jru'kadj pkSjfl;k ds dsl dks Lohdkj fd;k gS vkSj ;g dgk gS fd fookfnr edku nhoku LVsV tEew d'ehj dh lEifRr gS vkSj izkFkhZ ek= mldk ds;jVsdj o ,tsUV gSA ckn esa fnus'k dqekj vxzoky us viuk ,d 'kiFk i= nsdj izkFkhZ ds dsl dks Lohdkj fd;k gS] ysfdu bl LohdkjksfDr ls dksbZ vlj ugha iM+rk gS vkSj blls izkFkhZ fookfnr edku dk okLrfod Lokeh ugha cu tk;sxkA vf/kd ls vf/kd o ,tsUV@ds;jVsdj gksxkA tSlk fd eSaus crk;k gS fd ,tsUV vius mi;ksx o vko';drk ds fy, /kkjk&16¼2½¼ch½ ds vUrxZr Hkou dks fueqZDr ugha djk ldrkA jru 'kadj pkSjfl;k ds lEcU/k esa oknh dh vksj ls ;g dgk x;k fd ;g edku o fdjk;snkj ds fy, vtuch O;fDr gSA bl lUnHkZ esa tks izkFkhZ dk dFku gS ;g Hkh ekuus ;ksX; ugha gSA Jherh fo|korh nsoh nhokfuuh us ,d olh;rukek fnukad 3-10-60 dks fu"ikfnr djds fookfnr edku dk LokfeRo ch-,l-,l-Mh- dkyst dkuiqj dks ns fn;kA mudh e`R;q ds ckn edku ekfyd ch-,l-,l-Mh- dkyst gqvk vkSj ch-,l-,l-Mh- dkyst ds lfpo rFkk v/;{k ujsUnz thr flag us ,d cSukek fnukad 25-3-83 dks fu"ikfnr djds fookfnr Hkou jru'kadj pkSjfl;k o muds iq=ksa dks csp fn;kA cSukek dh Nk;k izfr dkxt la[;k&113 i=koyh esa nkf[ky gSA bl rjg fookfnr edku ds lUnHkZ esa jru 'kadj pkSjfl;k dks vtuch O;fDr ugha dgk tk ldrkA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls ;g dgk x;k fd jru'kadj pkSjfl;k vkfnus ewy okn la[;k&35@61 esa i{k cuus dk izkFkZuk i= fn;k Fkk] ftls fo}ku flfoy tt }kjk Lohdkj dj fy;k x;k Fkk] ftlds fo:) fuxjkuh ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa izkFkhZ us nkf[ky dh vkSj jru'kadj pkSjfl;k vkfn i{k ugha cu ik;sA esjs fopkj ls blls dksbZ vUrj ugha iM+rk gSA ;fn ewy okn la[;k&35@61 ds okn fcUnqvksa dk fuLrkj.k jru 'kadj pkSjfl;k dks fcuk i{k cuk;s fd;k tk ldrk Fkk rks mUgsa i{k ughsa cuk;k x;k] ysfdu muds i{k u cuk;s tkus ls mudk cSukek ,oa fookfnr Hkou ds lUnHkZ esa fn;k x;k vf/kdkj lekIr ugha gks tk;sxkA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls ,d rF; ;g j[kk x;k fd cSukek fu"ikfnr djus ls jksdus ds fy, ewy okn la[;k 223@79 fo'oukFk feJ cuke ujsUnz thr flag nkf[ky fd;k x;k Fkk] ftlesa cSukek fu"iknu ls izfroknh dks jksdk x;k FkkA blds ckotwn izfroknh us fu"iknu fd;k] vr% cSukek 'kwU; gS] esjs fopkj ls ,slk ugha gSA nkSjku okn dksbZ cSukek tgka fu"ikfnr gqvk gS ogka okn ds vfUre fu.kZ; ij mldk vfLrRo fuHkZj djrk gS] ewyr% cSukek 'kwU; ugha gSA bl rjg esjs fopkj ls fookfnr lEifRr dk LokfeRo cSukes ds ckn ls jru'kadj pkSjfl;k vkfn ds ikl o izkFkhZ dh vksj ls ,d cgl ;g dh xbZ fd jru'kadj pkSjfl;k }kjk fueZqfDr dk dksbZ izkFkZuk i= ugha fn;k x;k Fkk] blds ckotwn Hkh voj U;k;ky; us mlds i{k esa fueqZfDr vkns'k fn;kA esjs fopkj ls voj U;k;ky; dk vkns'k bl vk/kkj ij voS/kkfud ugha gS D;ksafd /kkjk 16 ¼2½¼ch½ dh dk;Zokgh laf{kIr dk;Zokgh gksrh gSA blesa vkifRr o izkFkZuk i= ij fopkj djus ds mijkUr ;fn U;k;ky; vkifRr drkZ ds rF; dks lgh ekurk gS rks fueqZfDr vkns'k vkifRrdrkZ ds i{k esa fd;k tk ldrk gS rFkk bl vk/kkj ij voj U;k;ky; dk vkns'k voS/kkfud ugha gSA izkFkhZ i{k dh vksj ls ,d rF; ;g j[kk x;k gS fd voj U;k;ky; ds fo:) mUgksaus LFkkukUrj.k izkFkZuk i= ftykf/kdkjh egksn; ds ;gka izLrqr fd;k FkkA ftykf/kdkjh us i=koyh ryc dh Fkh] ysfdu bl LFkkukUrj.k ds rF; dks utjvUnkt djrs gq, voj U;k;ky; }kjk fu.kZ; ikfjr fd;k x;k gS ftlls izkFkhZ dk fgr izHkkfor gqvk gSA esjs fopkj ls izkFkhZ dk ;g Hkh dFku ekuus ;ksX; ugha gS D;ksafd LFkkukUrj.k izkFkZuk i= ij Qkby ryc gksus ls vFkok LFkkukUrj.k izkFkZuk&i= fn;s tkus ls U;k;ky; dksbZ fu.kZ; nsus ls oafpr ugha gks tkrk] tc rd fd eqdnes dh dk;Zokgh dks izoj U;k;ky; LFkfxr u dj nsA oSls Hkh tks fu.kZ; voj U;k;ky; }kjk fn;k x;k gS] mlls ,slk ugha yxrk fd ukjkt gksdj vFkok lk{; o fof/k ds fl)kUrksa dh frykatyh nsdj vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gSA ,slk Hkh ugha gS fd LFkkukUrj.k izkFkZuk&i= fn;s tkus ds ckotwn voj U;k;ky; }kjk fu.kZ; ikfjr djus ls voS/kkfud rjhds ls izkFkhZ dk fgr izHkkfor gqvk gSA mijksDr foospuk ls esjs fopkj ls fo}ku fdjk;k fu;a=.k ,oa fu"dklu vf/kdkjh }kjk fn;k x;k fu.kZ; iw.kZr;k rF; o fof/k ds vuqlkj gSA fu.kZ; ikfjr djus esa fdjk;k fu;a=.k ,oa fu"dklu vf/kdkjh us vius {ks=kf/kdkj ds ijs dk;Z ugha fd;k gS vkSj u {ks=kf/kdkj dk iz;ksx djus esa vlQy gq, gSaA fu"d"kZr% ;g fuxjkuh cyghu gS vkSj fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA vkns'k fuxjkuhdrkZ dh ;g fuxjkuh lO;; fujLr dh tkrh gSA fueqZfDr okn la[;k&3@85 fo'oukFk feJ cuke+ ljdkj esa fdjk;k fu;a=.k o fu"dklu vf/kdkjh }kjk fnukad 22-7-88 dks ikfjr fu.kZ; iq"V fd;k tkrk gSA** 7. Aggrieved with the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi dated 22.07.1988 under Section 16(1)(b) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 in Case No.3 of 1985 rejecting the release application of the petitioner dated 08.01.1985 and the impugned judgment dated 24.10.2000 in Rent Revision No.150 of 1988 passed by the XIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi, the petitioner had filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which has been subsequently amended as a petition under Article 227. 8. By order dated 30.11.2012 passed by this court, the petition was dismissed, which was challenged by the petitioner in Civil Appeal No.1328 of 2017. By order dated 01.02.2017 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the aforesaid order of this court dated 30.11.2012 was quashed and the matter was remanded with the following observations: "Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the impugned order of the High Court suffers from a misdirection in law. What was necessary for the High Court was to determine as to who is the landlord of the premises in question that is to say to whom the rent of the building was payable. It was not necessary to determine the question of title in such a situation which is secondary. Thus, it would have been appropriate in the interest of justice if the High Court has determined this question. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider it appropriate to set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High court and remand the case back to the High court for a decision on the question as to who is the landlord of the premises in question. We order accordingly. The High Court shall also decide the application afresh for release of the premises in question in accordance with such finding. The High Court is requested to decide the matter as expeditiously as possible on its own merits and in accordance with law. With the aforesaid directions, the appeal is disposed of." 9. A counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 3/4 dated 3011.2017 has been filed which has been replied by the petitioner by rejoinder affidavit dated 4.2.2018. Paragraph Nos. With the aforesaid directions, the appeal is disposed of." 9. A counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 3/4 dated 3011.2017 has been filed which has been replied by the petitioner by rejoinder affidavit dated 4.2.2018. Paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit and its reply in paragraph no.7 of the aforesaid rejoinder affidavit are reproduced below: Counter Affidavit Rejoinder Affidavit Para-6.That when agent Raghu Nath Mishra did not furnish account and rent, the land lady, vide notice dated 29/05/1958 terminated the license and filed a suit no.35 of 1961 (Smt. Vidyawati Devi v/s Raghu Nath Mishra) for ejectment and arrear of rent, before Civil Judge, Varanasi. During pendency of suit Smt. Diwan Vidyawati Badi Nath died on 14/06/1964, substituted by Narendra Jeet Singh and Sushil Devi and later on answering respondents were also substituted after purchase of the premises through registered sale deed dated 06.04.1983. Para-7. That during pendency of above noted suit before trial court, Sri Narendra Jit Singh, Secretary of the B.S.S.D College, on 06/04/1983 executed a registered sale deed in favour of answering respondent namely Sri Ratanshankar Chaurasia (respondent no.3, now deceased ) and his three sons namely, Bhola Nath Chaurasia, Jawahar Lal Chaurasia, Gopal Ji Chaurasia, jointly. A true copy of the registered sale deed dated 06/04/1983 is being filed as Annexure No.CA-1 to this Counter affidavit. Para-7. That the contents of paragraph nos. 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit are matter of record which may verified therefrom. However it is further submitted that there is no transfer deed/alleged will deed alleged to be executed by Smt. Diwan Vidyawati Badri Nath, Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir) in favour of B.S.S.D. College, Kanpur, hence the sale deed dated 06.04.1983 executed in favour of answering respondent by the said college/Sri Narendra Jeet Singh is without any basis and is void document and confirms no right, titled and interest in favour of the answering respondent. Submission on behalf of the Petitioner:- 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits as under: (i) The petitioner being an agent of the owner of the house in question namely, Smt. Vidyawati Badrinath, is the landlord of the disputed house and, therefore his release application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act, should have been allowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits as under: (i) The petitioner being an agent of the owner of the house in question namely, Smt. Vidyawati Badrinath, is the landlord of the disputed house and, therefore his release application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act, should have been allowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. District Judge, Kanpur, (2004) 1 ARC 409(Paragraph No.5) in which it has been held that under Section 3(j) of the Act, a person authorised to manage the tenanted property and to collect its rent on behalf of the landlord is also landlord under Section 3(j) of the Act. (ii) In the impugned judgment dated 24.10.2000 in Rent Revision No.150 of 1988, the revisional court has held the petitioner to be landlord as evident from the finding recorded at running page-120 of the petition. Therefore, there was no occasion for the court below to uphold the order passed under Section 16(1)(b) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 dated 22.07.1988 in Case No.3 of 1985 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi. (iii) In another S.C.C. Suit No.495 of 1979 (Dr. Vishwanath Mishra vs. Jagat Kishore Mishra) decided on 24.08.1991 the petitioner was held to be the landlord. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment dated 24.10.2000, the revisional court should have accepted the petitioner as landlord of the disputed house No.CK-19/8, Thatheri Bazar, City Varanasi. (iv) The release application under Section 16(1)(b) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 was filed by the petitioner on 10.01.1985 for release of the disputed accommodation in occupation of the tenant Late Smt. Satyabhama Devi, for the self need. Therefore, it was liable to be allowed. (v) The release applications under Section 16(1)(b) were filed by the petitioner as well as by the respondent Nos.3 and 4. The petitioner has shown his bona fide need but the respondent Nos.3 and 4 have not shown their bona fide need in their release application for the disputed accommodation. Consequently, the release application of the petitioner was liable to be allowed and the release application of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 was liable to be rejected. The petitioner has shown his bona fide need but the respondent Nos.3 and 4 have not shown their bona fide need in their release application for the disputed accommodation. Consequently, the release application of the petitioner was liable to be allowed and the release application of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 was liable to be rejected. But the court below has committed manifest error of law to uphold the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allowing the release application of the respondent Nos.3 and 4. (vi) No finding on the point of bonafide need of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 was recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or the court below in the impugned judgments. Therefore, the release order in favour of the respondent Nos.3 and 4, itself was bad. 11. In support of his submission that the petitioner is the landlord of the disputed house, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of this court in Dr. Sita Ram Gandhi vs. IVth Additional District Judge and another, 1983 ARC 782(Para-10) and Brij Bhushan Sharma vs. Kamla Prasad, (2011) 3 ARC 381 (Paras-8, 9 and 10). 12. Neither any other point has been argued nor any other judgment has been cited before me by learned counsel for the petitioner except those afore-noted. Submission on behalf of the owner-respondents:- 13. Learned counsel for the respondents submits as under: (i) Smt. Diwan Vidyawati Badri Nath was undisputedly owner and landlady of the house in question. Raghunath Mishra (father of the petitioner) was the agent of the aforesaid owner and landlady. Due to non furnishing the account and rent, the aforesaid landlady vide notice dated 29.5.1958 terminated the agent Raghunath Mishra and his licence and filed a suit No.35 of 1961 for ejectment and recovery before the Civil Judge, Varanasi. (ii) During pendency of the suit, Smt. Diwan Vidyawati Badri Nath died on 14.6.1964. She was substituted by Sri Narendra Jeet Singh, Secretary of B.N.S.D. College, Kanpur after the house was purchased by the respondents by registered sale deed dated 6.4.1983, their name was substituted. Averments made paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit dated 30.11.2017, have been admitted by the petitioner in paragraph no.7 of his rejoinder affidavit. Thus, undisputedly, Sri Raghunath Mishra was the agent and his agentship terminated by the owner and landlady Smt. Diwanani Vidyawati Badri Nath. Averments made paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit dated 30.11.2017, have been admitted by the petitioner in paragraph no.7 of his rejoinder affidavit. Thus, undisputedly, Sri Raghunath Mishra was the agent and his agentship terminated by the owner and landlady Smt. Diwanani Vidyawati Badri Nath. Therefore, the petitioner is not landlord and his release application was lawfully rejected by the court below. (iii) The findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/City Magistrate, Varanasi and the revisional court, are the findings of fact based on consideration of relevant evidences on record, whereby it has been held that the respondent purchaser of the property, are the owner and landlord and not the petitioner. These findings of facts are based on consideration of relevant evidences on record, which cannot be interfered with in jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (iv) In the judgment dated 17.5.1988 in Suit No.35 of 1961 (Smt. Vidyawati Devi v. Raghu Nath Mishra), the Civil Judge, Varanasi also declared the aforesaid original owner and landlady to be the owner of the disputed house. (v) Aggrieved with the judgment in O.S. No.35 of 1961, the petitioner herein filed a Civil Appeal No.600 of 1988 (Vishwanath Mishra v. Narendra Jeet Singh), which was dismissed by juddgment dated 30.05.1998 passed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Varanasi and it was concluded that Smt. Diwan Vidyawati Badri Nath was the owner of the disputed house and Sri Jawahar Mishra and Raghunath Mishra were her agent and care-taker of the property who used to submit account to her. It was also found that the petitioner herein admitted the fact that the account of rental income was being submitted to the aforesaid original owner and landlady. In this regard learned counsel for the respondents has specifically referred to findings of the appellate court at internal page 22 of the jdugment dated 30.05.1998 in Civil Appeal No.600 of 1988. (vi) Merely because the agent Raghunath Mishra was collecting rent of the disputed house for and on behalf of the original owner and landlady, he or his son i.e. the present petitioner shall not become landlord within the meaning of Section 3(j) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. 14. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal sharma and others, (1981) 3 SCC 36 (Paragraph nos. 14. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal sharma and others, (1981) 3 SCC 36 (Paragraph nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18) and judgments of this Court in Purqan Ahmad alias Mana and another v. VIIth A.D.J. and others, (2005) AllLJ 119 (Paragraph Nos. 8 and 9) and Mam Chand v. Pramodini Srivastava, (2014) 5 ADJ 231 . DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 15. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 16. It has been admitted before this Court, as also reflected from the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner noted in paragraph 9(i) above, that Diwanani Smt. Vidyawati Badri Nath of Jammu & Kashmir, was the owner and landlady of the disputed house. She had appointed Grandfather of the petitioner and thereafter father of the petitioner as her agent and care-taker of the disputed house. These agents were looking after the house and used to collect rent and submit account to the original owner and landlady. In paragraph-6 of the counter affidavit, the respondents have stated that when agent Raghunath Mishra (father of the petitioner) did not furnish account and rent, the landlady Smt. Diwan Vidyawati Badri Nath terminated his licence. This fact has been admitted by the petitioner in para 7 of the rejoinder affidavit. The petitioner has claimed that he being an agent is the landlord and, therefore his release application dated 10.1.1985 filed for personal need of the portion falling vacant on account of the death of the tenant Smt. Satyabhama Devi on 02.01.1985, should have been allowed. Thus, on the afore-noted admitted facts of the case, the question to be determined in this petition in terms of the direction of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the order dated 1.2.2017, is as under : Question:- "Whether the petitioner being an agent of the original owner and landlady of the house in question, is landlord within the meaning of Section 3(j) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 ?" 17. The aforesaid question has been framed with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties for determination in this petition. Status of Agent/ the petitioner:- 18. Chapter X of the Act, 1872 contains detail provision with regard to agent and agency. 19. The word 'agent' has not been defined in U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The aforesaid question has been framed with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties for determination in this petition. Status of Agent/ the petitioner:- 18. Chapter X of the Act, 1872 contains detail provision with regard to agent and agency. 19. The word 'agent' has not been defined in U.P. Act 13 of 1972. It has been defined in Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act, as under: Section 182 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 182. "An ''agent' is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third person. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called the ''principal'." 20. Since, in the present petition the dispute is limited to the question of an agent to be landlord in terms of Section 3(j) of the Act, therefore, it would be appropriate to examine as to whether an agent or caretaker may interfere in Principal's property and what would be the nature of his possession. These questions have been considered exhaustively by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 21. In Southern Roadways Ltd., Madurai, represented by its Secretary v. S.M. Krishnan, (1989) 4 SCC 603 (Paragraph Nos. 11, 12, 14, 18 and 22), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "11. At the outset, we may state that we are not so much concerned with the rival claims relating to actual possession of the suit premises. Indeed, that is quite irrelevant for the purpose of determining the rights of the company to carry on its business. Mr. Venugopal, learned counsel for the appellant also discreetly did not advert to that controversy. He, however, rested his case on certain facts which are proved or agreed. They may be stated as follows: The company was and is the tenant of the suit premises and has been paying rent to the owner. The lease in respect of the premises has been renewed up to November 22, 1993. it was the company which has executed the lease and not the respondent. The respondent as agent was allowed to remain in possession of the premises. It was only for the purpose of carrying on company, business. His agency has been terminated and his authority to act for the company has been put an end to. These facts are indeed not disputed. The respondent as agent was allowed to remain in possession of the premises. It was only for the purpose of carrying on company, business. His agency has been terminated and his authority to act for the company has been put an end to. These facts are indeed not disputed. On these facts the contention of counsel is that when the agency has been terminated, the respondent has no right to remain in premises or to interfere with the business activities of the company. 12. The force of this argument cannot be gainsaid. Counsel, in our opinion, appears to be on terra firma. The principal has right to carry on business as usual after the removal of his agent. The Courts are rarely willing to imply a term fettering such freedom of the principal unless there is some agreement to the contrary. The agreement between the parties in this case does not confer right on the respondent to continue in possession of the suit premises even after termination of agency. Nor does it preserve right for him to interfere with the company's business. On the contrary, it provides that the respondent could be removed at any time without notice and after removal the company could carry on its business as usual. The company under the terms of the agreement is, therefore, entitled to assert and exercise its right which cannot be disputed or denied by the respondent. 14. There is yet another significant factor to be borne in mind when we deal with the rights of an agent. An agent who receives property or money from or for his principal obtains no interest for himself in the property. When he receives any such property he is bound to keep it separate from his own and that of others. Long ago, Lord Cottenham, L.C. (Foley v. Hill, (1848) 2 HLC 28 : 1843-60 All E.R. (Reprint) 16, 19 said: "... So it is with regard to an agent dealing with property; he obtains no interest himself in the subject-matter beyond his remuneration; he is dealing throughout for another, and though he is not a trustee according to the strict technical meaning of the word, he is quasi a trustee for that particular transaction for which he is engaged." 18. The crux of the mater is that an agent holds the principal's property only on behalf of the principal. The crux of the mater is that an agent holds the principal's property only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no interest for himself in such property. He cannot deny principal's title to property. Nor he can convert it into any other kind or use. His possession is the possession of the principal for all purposes. As the Kerala High Court in Narayani Amma v. Bhaskaran Pillai, (1969) AIR Kerala 214, observed: (AIR p. 217, para 6) "The agent has no possession of his own. What is called a caretaker's possession is the possession of the principal." 22. In this case, the respondent's possession of the suit premises was on behalf of the company and not on his own right. It is, therefore, unnecessary for the company to file suit for recovery of possession. The respondent has no right to remain in possession of the suit premises after termination of his agency. He has also no right to interfere with the company's business. The case, therefore, deserves the grant of temporary injunction. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in our judgment, was justified in issuing the injunction. The Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error in vacating it." 22. In Smt. Chandrakantaben v. Vadilal Bapalal Modi and others, (1989) 2 SCC 630 (Paragraph-19), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fiduciary relationship he cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. Thus, the agent is an extended hand of principal. 23. Thus, an agent who receives property or money from or for his principal obtains no interest for himself in the property. An agent holds the principal's property only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no interest for himself in such property. He cannot deny principal's title to property. Nor he can convert it into any other kind or use. His possession is the possession of the principal for all purposes. The agent has no possession of his own. Caretaker's possession is the possession of the principal. The possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fiduciary relationship he cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. Thus, agent is the extended hand of principal. The agent has no possession of his own. Caretaker's possession is the possession of the principal. The possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fiduciary relationship he cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. Thus, agent is the extended hand of principal. Therefore, father of the petitioner as agent and even assuming the petitioner also to be an agent, has acquired no interest in the disputed property of the Principal Late Divan Vidyawati Badrinath and in view of his fiduciary relationship, he cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. His possession is possession of the principal for all purposes. Whether an agent-qua-tenant is landlord under Section 3(j) and his status against owner/ principal:- 24. Section 3(j) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 defines the word "Landlord" as under: "Unless the context otherwise requires- "Landlord", in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable, and includes, except in clause (g) the agent or attorney, or such person;" 25. Section 3(g) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972, reads as under:- "Unless the context otherwise requires- "Family", in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building, means his or her- (i) spouse; (ii) male lineal descendants; (iii) such parents, grandparents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building;" 26. Section 3(j) of the Act, defines the word 'landlord'. This definition includes an agent or attorney to the landlord except the word in clause (g) which defines the word 'Family'. It is also relevant to mention here that the definition clauses of Section 3 proceeded with the word 'Unless the context is otherwise required'. Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted these words in the case of Ichchapur Industrial Cooperative Society LTD. v. Competent Authority, Oil and Natural Gas Commission and another, (1997) 2 SCC 42 (Paragraph No.27), K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, (1997) 2 SCC 53 (Paragraph Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13) and in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others, (1976) 4 SCC 855 (Paragraph No.12). v. Competent Authority, Oil and Natural Gas Commission and another, (1997) 2 SCC 42 (Paragraph No.27), K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, (1997) 2 SCC 53 (Paragraph Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13) and in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others, (1976) 4 SCC 855 (Paragraph No.12). Relying upon these judgments, this Court in judgment dated 9.9.2019 in S.C.C. Revision No.86 of 2019 (Munnu Yadav v. Ram Kumar Yadav and another) (Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14) held that the phrase 'Unless the contest otherwise requires' indicates that while construing, interpreting and applying the definition clause, the court has to keep in view the legislative mandate and intent and to consider whether the context requires otherwise. Where the definition is preceded with the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires' the connotation is that normally the definition as given in Section should be applied and given effect to but it may be departed from if the context requires. 27. The definition of "landlord" is inclusive in the sense that it is extended to "agent" or "attorney" also. Therefore, a landlord (owner) to whom rent is payable, if has authorized an agent or attorney for the aforesaid purpose of collection of rent, such agent or attorney qua tenant, would also satisfy the definition of landlord under Section 3(j) of Act, 1972. The context in which the term "landlord" has been used can be classified in more than one. The first is in the context of collection of rent. A rent would be payable in respect to a building to owner of building and he would undoubtedly qualify and satisfy the term "landlord". Secondly a lessee having right to further lease out the building and qua the person to whom he let out the premise, such sub-lessee would be 'landlord'. Thirdly if owner of building has authorized an agent to collect rent, vis-a-vis tenant, such agent of owner of building would also be a landlord within Section 3(j) of Act, 1972. Similar is the position of an attorney. 28. Therefore, vis-a-vis tenant, the agent or attorney, who satisfies definition of "landlord" under Section 3(j), would be a person who holds authority as agent or attorney, to represent the true owner of property, to do or not to do, or to act or not to act, in a particular manner, as authorized by owner. 28. Therefore, vis-a-vis tenant, the agent or attorney, who satisfies definition of "landlord" under Section 3(j), would be a person who holds authority as agent or attorney, to represent the true owner of property, to do or not to do, or to act or not to act, in a particular manner, as authorized by owner. The attorney and agent by himself cannot claim to be the owner of property and simultaneously to claim that they satisfy definition of "landlord". 29. In Raj Mohan Krishna vs. Second Additional District Judge, (1993) AIR Allahabad 40(Para-8), this court held that the Prescribed Authority is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction which has been constituted under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, for deciding applications under Section 21 or other provisions enumerated under the Act. It has no jurisdiction at all to examine the correctness or otherwise of a decree passed by a competent Civil Court. The Tribunal has to proceed on the basis that the decree of a Civil Court is a valid decree and has to recognise the rights of the parties on its basis. It has been held in Khem Chand v. IV A.D.J., (1989) 2 ARC 344} that it is not open to any party to challenge the genuineness of a decree of a Civil Court before the Prescribed Authority and so long as the decree is not set aside it has to be accepted as genuine. In the present set of facts, there is a judgment and decree dated 17.05.1988 in O.S. No.35 of 1961 (Smt. Vidyawati Devi vs. Raghunath Mishra) passed by the Civil Judge, Varanasi for eviction of Raghunath Mishra (father of the petitioner) and the Civil Appeal No.600 of 1988 (Vishwanath Mishra vs. Narendra Jeet Singh) filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed by judgment dated 30.05.1998 passed by the court of Additional District Judge Vth Varanasi, against which the petitioner herein filed Second Appeal No.1196 of 1998 (Vishwanath Misra vs. Ratan Shankar Chaurasia), which is stated to be pending. The judgment and decree dated 17.05.1988 passed by the court of Civil Judge, Varanasi in O.S. No.35 of 1961, has admittedly been neither set aside nor modified. 30. The judgment and decree dated 17.05.1988 passed by the court of Civil Judge, Varanasi in O.S. No.35 of 1961, has admittedly been neither set aside nor modified. 30. In Vinod Kumar Agrawal v. XVIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, (2013) 6 AllLJ 110 , a bench of this court considered Section 3(j) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 and after referring to several judgments of this court and of Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as under: "45. In the context of the words "occupation by himself or any members of family" there is a divergence in the opinion; whether these words would apply to anyone and not confined to only owner of property. 46. One of the earliest decision in this regard is Sri Laxkshmi Shanker Misra Vs. The 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, (1977) ARC 7. Hon'ble N.D. Ojha, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed: "'Landlord' as defined in Section 3(j) of the Act in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be payable and includes, except in clause (g) the agent or attorney, of such person. In cases where there is a privity of contract between two persons in pursuance of which rent is payable by one person to the other in respect of a building occupied by him in the capacity of a tenant, the person to whom rent is payable, in view of the agreement, would be the landlord of the person by whom the rent would be payable irrespective of the fact as to who was the actual owner of the property. It would be a case covered by the first part of the definition viz, the landlord would be such person to whom the rent of the building is payable. The position in law would, however, be different of an accommodation falls vacant and the question arises as to who is the landlord to whom notices as contemplated by rules 8 and 9 of the rules aforesaid are to be given before passing an order of allotment. At this stage the second part of the definition would be attracted, viz., the landlord would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable. At this stage the second part of the definition would be attracted, viz., the landlord would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable. It may be emphasised that in either event landlord would be such person to whom rent is or would be payable as the case may be and not the person by whom rent is physically collected on behalf of the landlord would himself become the landlord. Who would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable is the crucial question. It would be the person authorised to let out the building and to recover rent from the tenants. Normally such person would be the owner of the building. However, if the owner has entered into a contract with some other person authorising him to let out the vacant building and to recover rent from the tenants either as his agent or attorney it may be that person who would be called landlord with in the definition of the said term under the Act. Similar may be the case when for the time being either by an order of the court or by operation of some law the right to let out the building and recover rent from the tenants vests in some person other than the owner." (emphasis added) 47. Then in E.E. Dayal Vs. Smt. Phool Mani Dayal and others, 1977 ARC (SN 5) 4 Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. (as His Lordship then was) held that it is difficult to agree that merely because the respondent was permitted by the trust to collect rent, and, the petitioner started paying rent in view of this communication received from the Principal Officer of the Trust, the respondent become landlord of the premises. The mere fact that he was paying rent which was being collected by the respondent on behalf of the Trust, does not mean that she was admitted to be the owner of premises in dispute. The Court further said that for the purpose of Section 21 it cannot be accepted that an attorney or agent who becomes a landlord by virtue of definition clause can file an application for eviction of tenant on the ground that need of attorney or agent is genuine. What is to be seen under Section 21 is the need of the landlord-owner. What is to be seen under Section 21 is the need of the landlord-owner. It may be that the landlord may need the premises for his agent or attorney but that would be different in saying that the Act confers any right on the attorney or agent, himself, to file an application for release of accommodation on the ground that the premises are needed by them for their own personal use. 48. The next decision is Prem Chandra Pachit Vs. Second Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1978 ARC 394, a decision by Hon'ble K.C. Agrawal, J. Therein Prem Chandra Pachit was not owner of building. He claimed to have obtained a Theka of building so as to use the same as lodging house. He filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972 for eviction of one, Ram Lal, a tenant in the building. An objection was raised that Prem Chandra Pachit being not an owner of building, was not a landlord so as to get a right to file application under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972. The Court held that Sri Prem Chandra Pachit being only manager, did not satisfy requirement of Section 21(1)(a) which contemplates that an application can be filed only by a landlord, who needs the accommodation for himself or a member of his family. He (Prem Chandra Pachit) was not member of family of landlord, i.e., the owner of building. 49. The comes a decision of Apex Court in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, (1981) 3 SCC 36 , a judgment rendered by a three Judges Bench. The matter had arisen from Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. There, the definition of expression "landlord" contained in Section 2(d) of Bihar Statute is a bit similar to Section 3(j) of Act, 1972. A provision somewhat similar to Section 21 was in Section 11 thereof. The marked distinction in Bihar and U.P. Rent Statute is one explanation in Section 11(1)(c), which says that in this clause the word "landlord" would not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of Section 2. Despite referring to aforesaid explanation, the stress of Apex Court was that word "occupation" would mean that a person as a matter of right must have the capacity to occupy the building and that must be a person who is owner of building. Despite referring to aforesaid explanation, the stress of Apex Court was that word "occupation" would mean that a person as a matter of right must have the capacity to occupy the building and that must be a person who is owner of building. The relevant observations may be quoted as under: "Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 11 (1) (c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11 (1) (c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the sub-section. By restricting the meaning of expression landlord for the purpose of Section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the buildings for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of sub clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of Section 11(1)(c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clause (c) of Section 11(1) which reads: "Where building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation..." Assuming that the expression 'landlord' has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to clause (d) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression 'landlord' would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word 'owner' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation." (Emphasis added) 50. Here in the above case, the Court read the explanation to be only clarificatory but on principle held that eviction proceeding must be initiated by a landlord, who is the owner of property. 51. Then comes a decision of learned Single Judge (Hon'ble K.C. Agrawal, J.) in Smt. Sughra Begum Vs. Sri Ram and others, (1983) 2 ARC 143. Here in the above case, the Court read the explanation to be only clarificatory but on principle held that eviction proceeding must be initiated by a landlord, who is the owner of property. 51. Then comes a decision of learned Single Judge (Hon'ble K.C. Agrawal, J.) in Smt. Sughra Begum Vs. Sri Ram and others, (1983) 2 ARC 143. Following Apex Court's decision in M.M. Quasim (supra), the Court in paras 8 and 10 said: "8. . . . . . . . Under Section 21 a landlord can move an application for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The fact that only a person who is entitled to occupy can alone move an application indicates that one who is not entitled to occupy or has no right to occupy in his own right cannot apply for release under Section 21. An agent or attorney of an owner of the house may realize the rent of the house in respect of which power is conferred upon him by the owner to do so and for that purpose he may be considered to be landlord within the meaning of that expression defined in Section 3, but such a person would not be entitled to move an application under Section 21." "10. . . . . . For being entitled to apply under Section 21(1), that person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. The expression "occupation for himself or for family members" has been deliberately used by the legislature to manifest its intention that the landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building." (emphasis added) 52. In Naseeruddin and others Vs. Prescribed Authority, Meerut and others, (1988) 1 ARC 517, Hon'ble R.P. Singh, J. in para 5 of the judgment Jalso took the view, "thus an agent or attorney of an owner of a house may realise the rent of house but such a person would not be entitled to make an application under Section 21(1)." 53. The above phrase in Section 21(1)(a), in the context of bona fide need of persons, for whose benefit such application can be filed, the definition of family was given an expansion, in some authorities, namely, Misri Lal Vs. The above phrase in Section 21(1)(a), in the context of bona fide need of persons, for whose benefit such application can be filed, the definition of family was given an expansion, in some authorities, namely, Misri Lal Vs. Special Judge (Additional District Judge), Gorakhpur and others, (1988) 2 ARC 430. Hon'ble R.K. Gulati, J. extended it to the domestic servants of landlord. The Court said, though technically, he may not satisfy the definition of family, under Section 3(g) of the Act yet it may be included in spirit. Similarly it was extended to mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandchildren etc.; but in the context of the meaning of the word "landlord", who can initiate the proceedings, the position remains slightly complex. 54. In Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and another Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and others, (1996) 2 ARC 14 Hon'ble Sudhir Narain, J. in para 7 of the judgment observed: "7. . . . . . . The word ' landlord' in the context of Section 21(1)(a) will mean only such person who is not only entitled to realise the rent but also has a right under law to occupy for his personal use and such person alone can file application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. Respondent no.4 is owner and landlord of the premises in question and if she has authorized her husband to realise the rent, he cannot file an application for release under Section 21(1-A) of the Act in his own right." (Emphasis added) 55. In Fakaruddin Khan ((Dead) through Lrs Salma Khan, widow and Salman Khan, son) Vs. Xth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, (1998) 1 ARC 449 Hon'ble S.R. Singh, J. following Apex Court's decision in M.M. Quasim (supra), in para 8, said: "The term "landlord" in Section 21(1-A) of the Act connotes landlord in the sense of being the owner of the building." 56. In Furqan Ahmad Alias Mana and another Vs. VIIth A.D.J. and others, (2005) 2 AWC 1161 Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala, J. following decisions in Sri Laxkshmi Shanker Misra (supra); Smt. Sughra Begum (supra); and, Naseeruddin (supra) in para 10 of the judgment, said: "10. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. A person who has been authorised to realize the rent on behalf of the landlord becomes the landlord as contemplated under Section 3 (f) of the Act. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. A person who has been authorised to realize the rent on behalf of the landlord becomes the landlord as contemplated under Section 3 (f) of the Act. But the said agent cannot file a release application for his own need or for his family members under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act inasmuch as he is not the owner of the premises in question. The expression "occupation for himself or for family members" as provided under Section 21 (1) of the Act means that the person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. Obviously, the agent is not authorized to occupy the premises in his own right. Therefore, the agent could not file an application for release of the premises for his own personal need." (Emphasis added) 57. A discordant note, I find in Udai Singh Bhanuvanshi Vs. Kunj Behari Tewari, (2002) 1 AWC 647 , wherein Hon'ble A.K. Yog, J. observed that there is no reason to read the word "ownership" in the context of expression "landlord" when legislature itself in Section 3(j) has not confined itself to the owner. However, His Lordship further clarified the position by observing that there was a finding in the judgment of court below in the case before the Court that Kunj Behari Tewari was authorised to realise rent as "landlord". In respect to this finding that he was authorised to realise rent as landlord, there was no challenge. The Court observed that his status as landlord of accommodation was not challenged earlier and thus cannot be allowed to be assailed for the first time before this Court. That is how the Court distinguished earlier decisions in Smt. Sughra Begum (supra); Smt. Ved Rani Diwan (supra); and M.M. Quasim (supra). Para 20 of the judgment clarifying above observations, reads as under: "20. In the cases of Smt. Sughra Begum, Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and M.M. Quasim (supra), this Court held that an 'agent' or such other person cannot maintain release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The facts of the above cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In the present case in hand. In the cases of Smt. Sughra Begum, Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and M.M. Quasim (supra), this Court held that an 'agent' or such other person cannot maintain release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The facts of the above cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In the present case in hand. 'Kunj Behari Tewari', who filed release application, was authorised to realise rent as 'landlord' and thus his status as the owner/ landlord of the accommodation as already discussed above, cannot be questioned or assailed in the present proceedings." (Emphasis added) 58. For the purpose of Section 20 also this Court finds that who can institute suit is not specifically mentioned but from a careful reading of scheme it does not appear that a suit for ejectment can be filed by a mere agent or attorney even though the real owner/landlord has not joined the proceedings. If a tenant has been inducted by the owner, it is difficult to accept that his tenancy can be terminated by an agent or attorney, unless so permitted by the owner. 59. Further when there are more than one person satisfying the definition of "landlord", it is the landlord who has better rights or title over property who would exclude others. In order to attract Section 3(f) the plaintiff seeking ejectment of tenant has to show that there is denial of title of landlord. The word "title" here goes not to the authority of landlord to collect mere rent but here the title is something more than that. It is for this reason, and knowing it well that without possessing status of landlord, having semblance of ownership over property in dispute the petitioner would not succeed, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rest his claim with respect to his status as owner. His status as owner and landlord of tenanted building, is basically founded on the agreement for sale, power of attorney, and free hold deed executed by Collector, Allahabad in 1999 in his favour. 60. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that concept of "ownership" is not to be imported here, as definition of "landlord" itself is an extended one so as to take within its ambit an agent or attorney also. 61. The submission, in the manner it is sought to be advanced, I find difficult to accept. 60. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that concept of "ownership" is not to be imported here, as definition of "landlord" itself is an extended one so as to take within its ambit an agent or attorney also. 61. The submission, in the manner it is sought to be advanced, I find difficult to accept. The definition of "landlord" contained in definition clause has to be read in the context as discussed above. When somebody is authorised to collect rent, he is merely a collector of rent. The rent though is payable to him, in view of instructions issued by landlord-owner, to the tenant, that the rent should be paid to such an agent or attorney, and, in that sense, the agent or attorney may also be included or covered within the definition of "landlord", but his status is fortuitous and with the change of instructions of landlord-owner to tenant, he may/can loose such status at any point of time. 67. The above decisions fortify the view now being taken that a person when would satisfy the term "landlord", has to be looked into, in the light of statutory provisions, and in the context of other provisions of the Act concerned and the relevant facts of the case in hand. No universal principle can be applied in this regard." 31. Section 16(1)(b) of the Act 1972 provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate may by order, release the whole or any part of such building or any land appurtenant thereto in favour of the landlord. Sub-Section (2) of Section 16, as relevant for the purpose of the present case; provides that no release order under Clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) shall be made unless the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto, is bona fide required, by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling. The petitioner alleging himself to be an agent or caretaker of the owner of the disputed house, filed the release application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act 1972 for his personal need, whereas sub-Section (2) of Section 16 provides for a release order when the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling. Thus, for the purposes of Section 16(1)(b), the petitioner having filed application for release of the disputed accommodation for his personal need as agent is not landlord under Section 3(j) of the Act 1972. The owner-respondents have also filed release application which was allowed by the impugned order. The petitioner at best being only a caretaker or agent of the owners, cannot claim himself to be landlord against the owners-landlords of the building. He is not entitled to occupy the disputed house in his own right and get the accommodation released in his favour as against the owners of the house. The definition of landlord in Section 3(j) of the Act 1972 has to be read in the context as discussed above. 32. Therefore, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi has not committed any error of law to reject the release application of the petitioner by the impugned order dated 22.07.1988 passed in Case No.3 of 1985 and to release the accommodation in favour of the respondents-owners and landlords. The court of 13th Additional District Judge, Varanasi has also not committed any error of law to dismiss the Rent Revision No.150 of 1988 (Dr. Vishwanth Sharma vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi and another) filed by the petitioner. The impugned order and the judgment are based on consideration of relevant evidences on record which cannot be interfered with in jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Conclusion:- 33. The conclusions reached by me in foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, are briefly summarized as under: (i) An agent who receives property or money from or for his principal obtains no interest for himself in the property. An agent holds the principal's property only on behalf of the principal. Conclusion:- 33. The conclusions reached by me in foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, are briefly summarized as under: (i) An agent who receives property or money from or for his principal obtains no interest for himself in the property. An agent holds the principal's property only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no interest for himself in such property. He cannot deny principal's title to property. Nor he can convert it into any other kind or use. His possession is the possession of the principal for all purposes. The agent has no possession of his own. Caretaker's possession is the possession of the principal. The possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fiduciary relationship he cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. An agent is the extended hand of principal. Therefore, father of the petitioner as agent and even assuming the petitioner also to be an agent or caretaker, has acquired no interest in the disputed property of the Principal Divanani Late Vidyawati Badrinath and in view of his fiduciary relationship, he cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. His possession is possession of the principal for all purposes. (ii) The phrase 'Unless the contest otherwise requires' proceeded with the definition clauses of Section 3 indicates that while construing, interpreting and applying the definition clause, the court has to keep in view the legislative mandate and intent and to consider whether the context requires otherwise. Where the definition is preceded with the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires' the connotation is that normally the definition as given in Section should be applied and given effect to but it may be departed from if the context requires. (iii) The definition of "landlord" is inclusive in the sense that it is extended to "agent" or "attorney" also. Therefore, a landlord (owner) to whom rent is payable, if has authorized an agent or attorney for the purpose of collection of rent, such agent or attorney qua tenant, would also satisfy the definition of landlord under Section 3(j) of Act, 1972. Therefore, a landlord (owner) to whom rent is payable, if has authorized an agent or attorney for the purpose of collection of rent, such agent or attorney qua tenant, would also satisfy the definition of landlord under Section 3(j) of Act, 1972. Therefore, vis-a-vis tenant, the agent or attorney, who satisfies definition of "landlord" under Section 3(j), would be a person who holds authority as agent or attorney, to represent the true owner of property, to do or not to do, or to act or not to act, in a particular manner, as authorized by owner. The attorney or agent by himself cannot claim to be the owner of property and simultaneously to claim that they satisfy definition of "landlord". (iv) Prescribed Authority is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction which has been constituted under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, for deciding applications under Section 21 or other provisions enumerated under the Act. It has no jurisdiction at all to examine the correctness or otherwise of a decree passed by a competent Civil Court. The Tribunal has to proceed on the basis that the decree of a Civil Court is a valid decree and has to recognise the rights of the parties on its basis. It has been held in Khem Chand v. IV A.D.J., (1989) 2 ARC 344} that it is not open to any party to challenge the genuineness of a decree of a Civil Court before the Prescribed Authority and so long as the decree is not set aside it has to be accepted as genuine. In the present set of facts, there is a judgment and decree dated 17.05.1988 in O.S. No.35 of 1961 (Smt. Vidyawati Devi vs. Raghunath Mishra) passed by the Civil Judge, Varanasi for eviction of Raghunath Mishra (father of the petitioner) and against it the Civil Appeal No.600 of 1988 (Vishwanath Mishra vs. Narendra Jeet Singh) filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed by judgment dated 30.05.1998 passed by the court of Additional District Judge Vth Varanasi, against which the petitioner herein filed Second Appeal No.1196 of 1998 (Vishwanath Misra vs. Ratan Shankar Chaurasia), which is stated to be pending. The judgment and decree dated 17.05.1988 passed by the court of Civil Judge, Varanasi in O.S. No.35 of 1961, has admittedly been neither set aside nor modified. The judgment and decree dated 17.05.1988 passed by the court of Civil Judge, Varanasi in O.S. No.35 of 1961, has admittedly been neither set aside nor modified. (v) Section 16(1)(b) of the Act 1972 provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate may by order, release the whole or any part of such building or any land appurtenant thereto in favour of the landlord. Sub-Section (2) of Section 16, as relevant for the purpose of the present case; provides that no release order under Clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) shall be made unless the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto, is bona fide required, by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling. The petitioner alleging himself to be an agent or caretaker of the owner of the disputed house, filed the release application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act 1972 for his personal need, whereas sub-Section (2) of Section 16 provides for a release order when the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling. Thus, for the purposes of Section 16(1)(b), the petitioner having filed application for release of the disputed accommodation for his personal need as agent is not landlord under Section 3(j) of the Act 1972. The owner-respondents have also filed release application which was allowed by the impugned order. The petitioner at best being only a caretaker or agent of the owners, cannot claim himself to be landlord against the owners-landlords of the building. He is not entitled to occupy the disputed house in his own right and get the accommodation released in his favour as against the owners of the house. He is not landlord. The definition of landlord in Section 3(j) of the Act 1972 has to be read in the context as discussed above. He is not entitled to occupy the disputed house in his own right and get the accommodation released in his favour as against the owners of the house. He is not landlord. The definition of landlord in Section 3(j) of the Act 1972 has to be read in the context as discussed above. (vi) Therefore, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi has not committed any error of law to reject the release application of the petitioner by the impugned order dated 22.07.1988 passed in Case No.3 of 1985 and to release the accommodation in favour of the respondents-owners and landlords. The court of 13th Additional District Judge, Varanasi has also not committed any error of law to dismiss the Rent Revision No.150 of 1988 (Dr. Vishwanth Sharma vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ City Magistrate, Varanasi and another) filed by the petitioner. 34. The impugned order and the judgment are based on consideration of relevant evidences on record which cannot be interfered with in jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. For all the reasons afore-stated, I do not find any merit in this petition. Therefore, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.