ORDER : A short point that arises for consideration in these writ petitions revolves around limitation for recovery of pre-fixed ‘service charges’ from petitioners by respondent under The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short ‘Act’) namely; “Whether New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) was entitled to recover arrears of rent for the period 20.02.2007 ending upto 31.12.2010 by issuing notices of demand dated 12.08.2015?” BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: 2. The New Mangalore Port Trust (for short ‘NMPT’) established under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 enables the said Port to administer, control and manage the matters connected therewith. 3. Respondents in all these petitions were allotted certain area of the unpaved land belonging to the NMPT on a monthly licence fee basis. Respondents had applied to NMPT for allotment of port land for storage of transit cargo as and when required by providing required details of cargo, ship name, importers/exporters name, area required etc. On the basis of such application, NMPT was allotting port land to the applicants/respondents, collect licence fee as per the tariff rates. On completion of transaction, the applicants/respondents would surrender back the allotted port land to the NMPT. Applicants/respondents would only facilitate safe keeping of imported and exported cargo in the port land allotted to them by NMPT. The NMPT extends the licence period or the period of allotment from time to time on payment of licence fee as per the Scale Of Rates (for short ‘SOR’) fixed by the Tariff Authority for Major Ports, which has been constituted under the provisions of Major Port Trust Act, 1963 i.e., as per Section 47A of the Act. The said provision empowers the Tariff Authority to frame SOR from time to time in relation to the service provided by the Port Trust which is inclusive of allotment of land on lease or licence basis. The SOR so notified in the Official Gazette would be binding on all the major Port Trusts. 4. Section 49 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 deals with SOR and conditions for allotment of property belonging to NMPT. The Tariff Authority for major Ports prescribes the SOR for a block period of five years which will be valid for the period specifically indicated in the notification. The process of fixation of SOR is undertaken by considering the objections of the stake holders, allottees or lease holders etc. The Tariff Authority for major Ports prescribes the SOR for a block period of five years which will be valid for the period specifically indicated in the notification. The process of fixation of SOR is undertaken by considering the objections of the stake holders, allottees or lease holders etc. and the Tariff Authority for major Ports would then prescribe the SOR. 5. NMPT forwarded a proposal on 05.03.2007 for fixation of SOR for the period of five years commencing from 20.02.2007 to 19.02.2012 by requesting the Tariff Authority to revise the SOR upwards as per the Land Policy Guidelines. The Tariff Authority issued a notification on 16.06.2010 fixing the lease rentals, which was revised on 23.07.2010 for the block period of five years commencing from 20.02.2007 to 19.02.2012. 6. A demand notice dated 27.05.2011 came to be issued to the respondents herein seeking payment of difference of licence fee on account of the notification dated 23.07.2010 (Annexure-C). The respondents questioned the same by filing Writ Petition Nos.34541/2011 & 34784/2011 contending that revision of rates for the period from 20.02.2007 till the issuance of notification dated 23.07.2010 amounts to revision of rates with retrospective effect. Said writ petitions came to be dismissed by order dated 28.06.2013 (Annexure-F) and thereafter fresh demand notices came to be made calling upon the respondents to pay difference of arrears. Respondents have filed Writ Appeal Nos.4400-01/2013 and other connected matters which are pending consideration. On account of there being no order of stay granted in the appeals, NMPT has issued a reminder or fresh notice of demand on 28.03.2015 to respondents by calling upon them to furnish the bank guarantee for the amounts of demand raised. On account of non-payment of the arrears of licence fee/allotment fee or furnishing the bank guarantee as demanded, NMPT initiated proceedings under the provisions of the Act and issued show cause notice under Section 7(3) as to why arrears of licence fee should not be recovered. Reply came to be submitted by respondents contending that the matter is subjudiced and requested the NMPT to await the verdict of pending appeals. Reply came to be submitted by respondents contending that the matter is subjudiced and requested the NMPT to await the verdict of pending appeals. However, the Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the Act proceeded to adjudicate the show cause notices issued to respondents and passed an order under Section 7(1) and (2A) of the Act by confirming the demand and stating thereunder that in the event of respondents failing to pay the sum demanded under the notices along with interest, the difference of licence/allotment fee, same would be recovered as arrears of land revenue by order dated 21.07.2016 (Annexure-P). Being aggrieved by the said order, Misc.Appeal in MA Nos.18 to 49 and 51/2016 was filed before the Principal District Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore who is the designated appellate authority under Section 9 of the Act. The appellate authority allowed the appeals on the issue of limitation by arriving at a conclusion that order passed by the Estate Officer is beyond the period of limitation of three years prescribed under the Limitation Act. Hence, these writ petitions. 7. I have heard the arguments of Sriyuths R Subramanya, learned Advocate appearing for NMPT, Sri Manu, learned Advocate appearing for respondents. 8. It is the contention of Sri Subramanya, learned Advocate appearing for NMPT that appellate authority erred in not noticing that proceedings were initiated by the Estate Officer under the amended Act, 1971 and not under the Act, 1958. He would contend that the decision referred to by the appellate authority, which was relied upon by the respondents was pertaining to 1958 Act and there was no prohibition under the said Act in filing the suit and as such, in said circumstances, the appeal could not have been allowed on the issue of limitation. He would further contend that Act 1971 is a complete code, since it empowers the Estate Officer to initiate proceedings for recovery of possession as well as arrears of rent and damages by holding summary proceedings and there is no limitation prescribed either for recovery of possession or recovery of arrears of rent/damages. Hence, he contends that Limitation Act which is a general law has no application to Act, 1971, which is a special statute brought into force for recovery of possession and arrears of rent. Hence, he contends that Limitation Act which is a general law has no application to Act, 1971, which is a special statute brought into force for recovery of possession and arrears of rent. He would submit that under the Act 1971, Limitation Act has not been made applicable either by incorporation or by reference and this has been ignored by the appellate authority. He would also contend that Act, 1971 being a special law prevails over general law and as such, Limitation Act, 1963, which is a general law would be applicable for institution of suit or other proceedings before Court of law. Hence, proceedings initiated under Act, 1971, cannot be equated with proceedings instituted before a Court of law unless the special statute providing for it. 8.1) He would also draw the attention of the Court to Section 15 of the Act to contend that it imposes a clear ban on maintenance of suit or any proceedings before a Civil Court and as such, general law of limitation which would be applicable to Courts or its proceedings, cannot be applied and as such, authorities under the Act are empowered to recover arrears of rent or damages by initiating proceedings under the Act, as if law of limitation not being applicable. 8.2) He would also contend demand notices was issued to respondents immediately after notification by Tariff Authority for major Ports, whereunder SOR, insofar as allotment of Port lands is concerned, came to be revised and as such, NMPT was justified in proceeding to recover the arrears of rent under the Act and there is no delay or latches, inasmuch as, demand notices were issued to respondents right from 2011 itself. He would also contend that allotment of port land in favour of respondents were subject to payment of revision of SOR as and when revised by the Tariff Authority and respondents having agreed to pay the revised rates as and when revised, there is a contractual obligation to pay the revised rates and now they cannot be allowed to take shelter under the law of limitation, inasmuch as, transaction in question falls with the realm of contract. 8.3) In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the following judgments: (i) (1976)3 SCC 407 : NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE vs KALU RAM & ANOTHER (ii) (2009)5 SCC 791 : COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE vs HONGO INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER (iii) (2017)2 SCC 350 : PATEL BROTHERS vs STATE OF ASSAM AND OTHERS (iv) 1980 M.P.L.J. 429: L.S.NAIR vs HINDUSTAN STEEL LIMITED, BHILAI AND OTHERS (v) UNREPORTED DECISION IN W.P.(C) NO.3210/2000 DATED 24.09.2012: SHARMA MONTESSORI SCHOOL vs UNION OF INDIA (vi) UNREPORTED DECISION IN W.P.(C) NO.538/2012 DATED 14.05.2013: G.R.GUPTA vs LOKSABHA SECRETARIAT (vii) (2004)11 SCC 456: L.S.SYNTHETIC LIMITED vs FAIR GROWTH FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED & OTHERS (viii) UNREPORTED DECISION IN W.P.NO.9851/2013: THE ASSOCIATION OF RECOGNIZED AGENTS REGIONAL AND STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY vs THE CHIEF ENGINEER & OTHERS 9. Per contra, Sri Manu, learned Advocate appearing for respondents would support the judgment of appellate court and contends that debt which is sought to be recovered from the respondents relates to the period 2007 to 2010 i.e., 20.02.2007 up to 23.07.2010/01.12.2010 for which demand notices had been issued during May, June, October, 2011 and during December 2012. The right to recover said amount due even assuming that NMPT had such right, limitation to recover the same expired after three years i.e., February 2010/July 2013 and at the most, period of stay operating against NMPT i.e., 09.09.2011/ 12.09.2011/ 20.09.2011/ 28.09.2011/ 21.07.2011/ 13.12.2012 to date of dismissal of writ petitions i.e., 28.06.2013 would get excluded and mere issuance of fresh notices would not revive the cause of action and as such, appellate authority has rightly held that revised SOR sought to be recovered from the respondents was time barred. Hence, by relying upon the following judgments, he prays for dismissal of the writ petitions. (i) 1966(1) ILR P & H 145 = 1965(67) PLR 1190: KALU RAM vs NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND ANOTHER (ii) AIR 2011 SC 3619 : BANATWALA AND COMPANY vs L.I.C. INDIA AND ANOTHER (iii) (2010)4 CALCUTTA LAW TIMES 591: M/S.AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION OF EASTERN INDIA & OTHERS vs THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF KOLKATA & OTHERS (iv) UNREPORTED JUDGMENT OF HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA RENDERED IN C.O 1063/2008 DATED 19.08.2015: THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA vs N/S-COSTAL ROADWAYS LTD. DISCUSSION AND ADJUDICATION ON THE POINT OF LIMITATION TO RECOVER PRE-FIXED CHARGES FROM PETITIONERS BY RESPONDENTS. 10. DISCUSSION AND ADJUDICATION ON THE POINT OF LIMITATION TO RECOVER PRE-FIXED CHARGES FROM PETITIONERS BY RESPONDENTS. 10. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised at the bar, this Court is of the considered view that Section 7 as well as Section 15 of the Act, which has a bearing on the point formulated requires to be extracted. The Public Premises Act, 1971, came to be substituted by repealing The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. The judgments which have been pressed into service and relied upon by both the sides relates to both pre and post-amendment. Hence, for purposes of immediate reference, relevant provisions of both Acts are extracted herein below. Public Premises Act, Public Premises Act, 1958 1971 7. Power to recover rent or damages in respect of public premises as arrears of land revenue -(1) Where any person is in arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, the estate officer may, by order, require that person to pay the same within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order. 7. Power to require payment of rent or damages in respect of public premises – (1) Where any person is in arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, the estate officer may, by order, require that person to pay the same within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order. (2) Where any person is, or has at any time been, in unauthorized occupation of any public premises, the estate officer may, having regard to such principles of assessment of damages as may be prescribed, assess the damages on account of the use and occupation of such premises and may, by order, require that person to pay the damages within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order: Provided that no such order shall be made until after the issue of a notice in writing to the person calling upon him to show cause within such time as may be specified in the notice why such order should not be made, and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been considered by the estate officer. (2) Where any person is, or has at any time been, in unauthorized occupation of any public premises, the estate officer may, having regard to such principles of assessment of damages as may be prescribed, assess the damages on account of the use and occupation of such premises and may, by order, require that person to pay the damages within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order. (2A) While making an order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the estate officer may direct that the arrears of rent or, as the case may be, damages shall be payable together with simple interest at such rate as may be prescribed, not being a rate exceeding the current rate of interest within the meaning of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978). (3) No order under subsection (1) or sub-section (2) shall be made against any person until after the issue of a notice in writing to the person calling upon him to show cause (within seven days from the date of issue thereof), why such order should not be made, and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been considered by the estate officer. (4) Every order under this section shall be made by the estate officer as expeditiously as possible and all endeavour shall be made by him to issue the order within fifteen days of the date specified in the notice. 15. (4) Every order under this section shall be made by the estate officer as expeditiously as possible and all endeavour shall be made by him to issue the order within fifteen days of the date specified in the notice. 15. Bar of jurisdiction:- No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of ---- (a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorized occupation of any public premises, or (b) the removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, cattle or  other animal from public premises under section 5A, or (c) the demolition of any building or other structure  made, or ordered to be made, under section 5B, or (cc) the sealing of any erection or work or of any public premises under section 5C, or (d) the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of section 7 or damages payable under sub-section (2), or interest payable under sub-section (2A), of that section, or (e) the recovery of --- (i) costs of removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, cattle or other animal under section 5A, or (ii) expenses of demolition under section 5B, or (iii) costs awarded to the Central Government or statutory authority under sub-section (5) of section 9, or (iv) any portion of such rent, damages, costs of removal, expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central Government or the statutory authority. Central Government or statutory authority under sub-section (5) of section 9, or (iv) any portion of such rent, damages, costs of removal, expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central Government or the statutory authority. .11. A plain reading of Section 7 of 1971 Act would indicate that Estate Officer is empowered to recover rent or damages from any person who is in arrears in respect of any public premises. Further reading of sub-section (1) of Section 7 would indicate that Estate Officer may, by order, require such person to pay arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order. Further reading of sub-section (1) of Section 7 would indicate that Estate Officer may, by order, require such person to pay arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, within such time and in such instalments as may be specified in the order. Whereas, sub-section (2) of Section 7 would indicate, any person who is or has been at any time been, in unauthorized occupation of any public premises, would be liable to pay damages, as may be assessed by the Estate Officer having regard to such principles of assessment of damages as may be prescribed and require such person to pay damages on account of use and occupation of such premises within such time and in such installments as may be specified in the order. Thus, prima facie Section 7 of the Act would clearly indicate that sub-section (1) relates to ordering payment of arrears of rent and sub-section (2) relates to payment of assessed damages. Sub-section (2A) of Section 7 of 1971 Act came to be inserted by Act 61 of 1980 w.e.f. 20.12.1980, which would indicate that Estate Officer while making an order either under subsection (1) or sub-section (2), may direct that the arrears of rent, or, as the case may be, damages shall be payable together with simple interest at such rate as may be prescribed, not exceeding the current rate of interest within the meaning of the Interest Act, 1978. Under sub-section (3) of Section 7 of 1971 Act a notice is required to be issued to the person in occupation of the public premises by calling upon him to show cause within seven days from the date of issue of notice thereof, as to why an order should not be made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of the Act and if objections are not filed, the Estate Officer would be empowered to pass orders. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 came to be inserted by Act 2 of 2015 with effect from 22.06.2015 and same would indicate that Estate Officer should take all steps to pass order as expeditiously as possible and endeavour should be made to issue such order within 15 days of the date specified in the notice. 12. Section 15 of the 1971 Act was not found under 1958 Act and there is no dispute in this regard. 12. Section 15 of the 1971 Act was not found under 1958 Act and there is no dispute in this regard. Section 15 of 1971 Act was substituted by Act 61/1980 with effect from 20.12.1980. 13. A plain reading of Section 15 would clearly indicate that it bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of eviction of authorized occupant of a public premises and matters connected therewith including recovery of arrears of rent or damages. Constitutional validity of Section 15 of 1971 Act was under challenge before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of HARI SINGH VS. MILITARY ESTATE OFFICER vs. DELHI CIRCLE, DELHI CANTT, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2205 whereunder, it came to be held that Section 15 is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 14. It is in the background of above referred statutory provisions, rival contentions raised by the learned Advocates requires to be examined. By touching upon the facts in all these petitions, it can be noticed that a demand has been raised on respondents by NMPT claiming differential arrears of rent for the period 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 by issuing a notice of demand on different dates and demanding payment of amounts as specified in the said notices claiming that Tariff Authority for major ports has revised the scale of SOR, which came to be published in the Central Gazette Notification dated 23.07.2010. Questioning the legality of said notices, respondents herein had filed writ petitions before this Court, in which, interim orders came to be passed and ultimately writ petitions came to be dismissed by order dated 28.06.2013 as already observed herein above. During this interregnum, there was stay of demand. Thereafter, fresh demand notices came to be issued during 2013 and 2015 to respondents claiming arrears of rent for the period 20.02.2007 till the date of notice. It is thereafter notices under Section 7 of the Public Premises Act came to be issued during 2015 and an order came to be passed by the Estate Officer on 21.07.2016 determining the arrears of rent payable by each of the respondents together with interest. It is thereafter notices under Section 7 of the Public Premises Act came to be issued during 2015 and an order came to be passed by the Estate Officer on 21.07.2016 determining the arrears of rent payable by each of the respondents together with interest. For the purposes of convenience and immediate reference the details of demand notices, period of arrears of rent demanded including amount due, details of writ petitions filed challenging said demand notices, date of interim order, date of disposal of writ petitions, date of issuance of fresh demand notice and for what period demand was made, are extracted in the tabular column herein below: Writ Petition No Period of Demand Demand Notice date Interim Order Fresh Demand Notice Demand for the Period Notice under PP Act 4398/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 27.05.2011 27.05.2011 09.09.2011 15.01.2015 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 280.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 15.01.2015 12.08.2015 4428/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4431/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 1358/2018 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 27.05.2011 04.10.2011 20.09.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.08.2015 3913/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 21.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3915/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 12.05.2011 16.06.2011 12.09.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3919/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3905/2018 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.05.2011 27.05.2011 04.10.2011 28.09.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.08.2015 12.08.2015 3908/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3918/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 27.05.2011 09.09.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3910/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3914/2018 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 27.05.2011 04.10.2011 28.09.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.08.2015 3903/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 27.05.2011 21.07.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 12.08.2015 3906/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3912/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 12.05.2011 09.09.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3917/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4403/2018 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.05.2011, 14.10.2011, 19.11.2011, 19.04.2012,  01.08.2012 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.08.2015 4404/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4433/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4434/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 3909/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4430/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.06.2013 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 15.02.2016 3911/2008 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 27.05.2011 04.10.2011 04.11.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.08.2015 3916/2018 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 27.05.2011 27.05.2011 04.10.2011 04.10.2011 12.09.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.08.2015 3907/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 27.05.2011 02.08.2011 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 12.08.2015 4436/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4399/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4429/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4432/2018 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 19.11.2011 01.02.2012 10.09.2013 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 01.12.2010 12.08.2015 4435/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4437/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 24.05.2011 16.06.2011 12.09.2011 15.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4406/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 4427/2018 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 13.12.2012 27.01.2015 28.03.2015 20.02.2007 to 31.03.2014 12.08.2015 15. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by Estate Officer on 21.07.2016, respective respondents herein filed appeals under Section 9 of the Act before the Principal District Judge, Mangalore, which appeals came to be adjudicated and by impugned order dated 15.03.2017 appeals came to be allowed by arriving at a conclusion that differential arrears of rent claimed by NMPT which pertains to the period 2007-2010 was time barred. It was held that under Article 52 of the Limitation Act, 1963, period prescribed for claiming arrears of rent being three (3) years and the arrears of rent for the period 2007-10 was sought to be recovered by issuing fresh notices on 12.08.2015 and as such claim in respect of arrears of rent was barred by limitation. It is also further held that in the light of order of stay having been passed in writ petitions filed by respondents by questioning notices had been stayed, were to be excluded and if so done, the demand would still be beyond period of 3 years and as such it came to be held claim for payment of arrears of rent was barred by limitation by applying the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE vs. KALU RAM, AIR 1976 SC 1637 . 16. Sri. Subramanya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners has placed heavy reliance on the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of L.S.NAIR vs. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD., BHILAI & OTHERS, (1980) MPLJ 429 to buttress his arguments that provisions of Limitation Act would be inapplicable in respect of proceedings initiated under Public Premises Act, 1971. 17. In the above said judgment it came to be held that Limitation Act has no application to the proceedings initiated before the Estate Officer, who is not a Court. It was also held thereunder that Limitation Act has no application to the proceedings before the Estate Officer as jurisdiction of Civil Court is entirely barred in matters governed by the Public Premises Act and as such, it is difficult to accept the arguments that there is any period of limitation for recovery of damages. By distinguishing KALU RAM’s case, it came to be held that arguments of there being any period of limitation for recovery of damages, can hardly be accepted. By distinguishing KALU RAM’s case, it came to be held that arguments of there being any period of limitation for recovery of damages, can hardly be accepted. In KALU RAM’s case, reliance was placed by construing the words “rent payable” as they occur in Section 7(1) of 1958 Act and as such it came to be held in L.S.NAIR’s case that principles laid down in said case has no application for construing the expression “damages” occurring in Section 7(2) of Public Premises Act, 1971, which deals with power to assess and order payment of damages and where the language used is entirely different. As such it came to be held that Limitation Act cannot be inferentially applied to the proceedings before an Estate Officer. 18. A perusal of the judgment of Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in the matter of KALU RAM vs NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, 1965(67) PLR 1190, would disclose that writ petitioner therein was originally a pavement vendor at Connaught place in New Delhi and New Delhi Municipality Committee (NDMC) demanded rent @ Rs.30 per mensem and being aggrieved by the same, petitioner moved the Rent Controller for fixation of standard rent, which had been fixed at Rs.19-12-0 and being aggrieved by the same, appeal came to be filed and appellate Court fixed the rate of rent at Rs.6-2-0. Though NDMC filed a revision petition which came to be allowed on 13.10.1958 on the ground that Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for fixing any standard rent, it did not take any further steps till the end of December, 1960. It is thereafter, NDMC demanded licence fee in respect of the stall which had been originally allotted to the pavement vendor, which had been vacated in the year 1957. The said demand was resisted to on the ground that claim was time barred. It is thereafter, NDMC demanded licence fee in respect of the stall which had been originally allotted to the pavement vendor, which had been vacated in the year 1957. The said demand was resisted to on the ground that claim was time barred. Though it was contended before High Court by NDMC that it was a licence fee and not a rent and Section 7(1) was inapplicable, High Court arrived at a conclusion that ‘rent’ was not defined under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 and for the first time, it was introduced in the year 1963 by Act No.40 of 1963 retrospectively and Section 2(f) defined the expression ‘rent’ and said amended statute has to be read as if it had been originally passed in the amended form. It was further held that licence fee is also included in the definition of ‘rent’ and can therefore be ultimately recovered as arrears of land revenue. It was further held that rent ‘payable’ that can be recovered under Section 7(3) of the Act, would mean and include ‘legally recoverable rent’ or it has to be restricted to sums ‘otherwise legally recoverable’ and held that it could not extend to recovering debts, which were barred by time. In this background, it came to be held that claim made therein was time barred and prayer of NDMC came to be negatived. 19. This judgment of High Court was carried before the Hon’ble Apex Court by NDMC, which has been reported in NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE vs. KALU RAM, AIR 1976 SC 1637 . In the said appeal, contention of the NDMC was to the effect that Section 7 of the Act empowered said authority to recover arrears of rent even if it is time barred. This contention came to be considered and rejected by holding that Section 7 is a provision providing for special procedure to realize arrears of rent by adopting summary procedure. It was further held said provision did not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt, which was otherwise time barred. This contention came to be considered and rejected by holding that Section 7 is a provision providing for special procedure to realize arrears of rent by adopting summary procedure. It was further held said provision did not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt, which was otherwise time barred. In fact, Section 15 of the Act which was introduced into 1971 Act whereunder there was bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit or proceeding for recovery of arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of Section 7 or damages payable under sub-section (2), or interest payable under subsection (2A) of Section 7 which was pressed into service therein also came to be considered and held that High Court in the said decision was not concerned with arrears of rent by public authority, action against which would get ousted in view of the provision of Section 15 of Public Premises Act as also one against eviction. As noticed herein above and at the cost of repetition it requires to be noticed that in L.S.NAIR’s case the High Court of Madhya Pradesh itself has held that principles enunciated in KALU RAM’s case by Punjab High Court was with reference to “rent payable” and the issue involved in L.S.NAIR’s case related to recovery of “damages” and as such construction of expression “rent payable” would have no application to “damages”. In other words, distinction came to be drawn between “rent payable” and “payment of damages”. As such, contention with regard to Limitation Act not being applicable or there being no limitation for recovering arrears of rent under Section 7(1) by the Estate Officer as canvassed by learned Advocate appearing for NMPT, cannot be accepted. 20. Judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in KALU RAM’s case came to be considered by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of L.S.NAIR vs. HINDUSTHAN STEEL LIMITED, BHILAI AND OTHERS reported in 1980 M.P.L.J. 429. In L.S.NAIR’s case, it was noticed by Division Bench that petitioner therein was an employee who was allotted quarters by the management by order dated 03.08.1966 and his services came to be terminated on 08.04.1967 w.e.f. 10.04.1967 on payment of one month salary. In L.S.NAIR’s case, it was noticed by Division Bench that petitioner therein was an employee who was allotted quarters by the management by order dated 03.08.1966 and his services came to be terminated on 08.04.1967 w.e.f. 10.04.1967 on payment of one month salary. Since the extant service rules provided that an employee who resigns or retires or is terminated or transferred, would not be allowed to retain the quarters for a period exceeding one month from the date of occurrence of vacant and an employee who retains such quarters beyond said prescribed period except with written permission from the management, would be treated as unauthorized occupant and eviction proceedings would be initiated against him. Hence, on termination of services of petitioner therein proceedings was initiated under the Public Premises Act, 1971, by filing an application on 30.06.1973 by claiming Rs.3,788.89/-of standard rent as damages i.e., @ Rs.46/-p.m. apart from other charges of electricity etc., for the period 10.04.1967 to 30.06.1973, further damages @ Rs.46/-p.m. and electricity charges was also demanded from 01.07.1973 till delivery of vacant possession. Application of company was allowed by Estate Officer and appeal filed before District Judge was dismissed on 28.04.1975. A petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India was filed raising several contentions. One of the prime contention related to “recovery of standard rent from the date of termination of service is bar and petitioner can be made liable to pay only rent agreed”. It was further contended by the petitioner that standard rent which jurisdictional officer had directed to pay was from the date of termination is nothing but damages for use and occupation and as the petitioner is ceased to have a right to continue with occupation of quarters from the date of termination, is liable to pay damages. Division Bench having noticed that rate of damages was not challenged before the District Judge, it was held same cannot be challenged before the Division Bench. 21. It was also held that Section 7(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act which authorizes the Estate Officer to assess the damages on account of the use and occupation of premises and by order requiring the person to pay damages, to show that there is only rule of limitation by which the Estate Officer is governed. 21. It was also held that Section 7(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act which authorizes the Estate Officer to assess the damages on account of the use and occupation of premises and by order requiring the person to pay damages, to show that there is only rule of limitation by which the Estate Officer is governed. It is further held that as the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before the Estate Officer and as the jurisdictional Civil Court is entirely barred in the matters governed by Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, it is difficult to accept the argument that there is any period of limitation for recovery of damages. It is also further held in the Punjab case i.e., KALU RAM’s case on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel therein that expression “rent payable” as they occur in Section 7(1) of the Public Premises Act, 1958 is to be construed to mean “rent legally recoverable by a suit”. It is also further held that dicta by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in KALU RAM’s case had no application for construing Section 7(2) of the Public Premises Act, 1971, which deals with the power to assess and order ‘payment of damages’. and where the language used is entirely different. 22. It is trite law that in the matters of interpretation of statutes, contextual interpretation is a safe course which requires to be adopted. Expression used in the Section would take its colour from the language employed therein and the words and phrases surrounding the provision has to be taken note of by applying doctrine of ‘noscitur a sociis’ 23. Yet another contention which came to be raised is, “recovery of damages for a period beyond 3 years was time-barred and Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before Estate Officer, who is not a Court”, by relying upon NDMC vs. KALU RAM case reported in 1967 Pat.L.J 1119. It is in this background, it came to be held by the Division Bench there is nothing under Section 7(2), which authorizes the Estate Officer to assess the damages on account of use and occupation of premises and by order, require that person to pay damages, to show that there is only Rule of Limitation by which Estate Officer is governed. Hence, it was held that Limitation Act has no application to proceed before the Estate Officer as the jurisdictional Civil Court is entirely barred in the matters governed by Public Premises Act. It was further held that arguments of there being any period of limitation for recovery of damages cannot be accepted. Hence, a line of distinction was sought to be drawn by arriving at a conclusion that in KALU RAM’s case the reliance of which placed, had construing words “rent payable” occurring under Section (1) of 1958 Act by construing them as “rent legally recoverable by a suit” and same would have no application for construing the expression found in Section 7(2) of Public Premises Act, 1971, which deals with the power to assess and order of payment of ‘damages’ and the language used is entirely different. In this context it came to be held by the Division Bench that Section 15 of the Public Premises Act, 1971, which bars the suit and remedy under the Act can only be availed of and in such situation Limitation Act cannot be inferentially applied to the proceedings before Estate Officer. 24. It is also further held that dicta laid down by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in KALU RAM’s case had no application for construing the expression “damages” found in Section 7(2) of the Public Premises Act, 1971, which deals with the power to assess and order payment of damages and the language used is entirely different. It came to be held in L.S.NAIR’s case to the following effect: “10. It was also submitted that xxx recovery of damages. The Punjab case on which reliance was placed, construed the words “rent payable” as they occurred in section 7(i) of the Public Premises Act, 1958, and construed them to mean “rent legally recoverable by a suit” . The case has no application for construing section 7(2) of the Public Premises Act, 1971, which deals with the power to assess and order payment of damages and where the language used is entirely different. Further, section 15 of the 1971 Act now bars a suit and the remedy under the Act is the only remedy which can be availed of. In such a situation, the Limitation Act cannot be inferentially applied to proceedings before the Estate Officer.” 25. Further, section 15 of the 1971 Act now bars a suit and the remedy under the Act is the only remedy which can be availed of. In such a situation, the Limitation Act cannot be inferentially applied to proceedings before the Estate Officer.” 25. In fact judgment of Kalu Ram’s case was carried before the Hon’ble Apex Court in 1976 3 SCC 407 = AIR 1976 SC 1637 as already noticed above whereunder Apex Court held that expression “payable” occurring in sub-section (1) generally means which should be paid. It is further held if the recovery of any fee is barred under Limitation Act, it is difficult to hold that jurisdictional Estate officer could still insist said amount was payable. It was further held that duty cast on the authority to determine the arrears of rent, determination must be in accordance with law. It was held to the following effect: “As would appear from the terms of the section, it provides a summary procedure for the recovery of arrears of rent. It was argued that since section 7 did not put a time limit for taking steps under that section and as the limitation prescribed for a suit to recover the amount did not apply to a proceeding under this section, the High Court was in error in upholding the respondent's objection. In support of his contention that a debt remained due though barred by limitation, Mr. Hardy relied on a number of authorities, both Indian and English. We do not consider it necessary to refer to these decisions because the proposition is not disputed that the statute of limitation bars the remedy without touching the right. Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which was in force at the relevant time however provided that the right to any property was extinguished on the expiry of the period prescribed by the Act for instituting a suit for possession of the property. But on the facts of this case no question of a suit for possession of any property arises and section 28 has no application. It is not questioned that a creditor whose suit is barred by limitation, if he has any other legal remedy permitting him to enforce his claim, would be free to avail of it. But the question in every such case is whether the particular statute permits such a course. It is not questioned that a creditor whose suit is barred by limitation, if he has any other legal remedy permitting him to enforce his claim, would be free to avail of it. But the question in every such case is whether the particular statute permits such a course. Does section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 create a right to realise arrears of rent without any limitation of time ? Under section 7 the Estate Officer may order any person who is in arrears of rent 'payable' in respect of any public premises to pay the same within such time and in such instalments as he may specify in the order. Before however the order is made, a notice must issue calling upon the defaulter to show cause way such order should not he made and, if he raised any objection, the Estate Officer must consider the same and the evidence produced in support of it. Thus the Estate Officer has to determine upon hearing the objection the amount of rent in arrears which is 'payable.' The word 'payable' is somewhat indefinite in import and its meaning must he gathered from the context in which it occurs. 'Payable' generally means that which should be paid. If the person in arrears raises a dispute as to the amount, the Estate Officer in determining the amount payable cannot ignore the existing laws. If the recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate Officer could still insist that the said amount was payable. When a duty is cast on an authority to determine the arrears of rent, the determination must be in accordance with law. Section 7 only provides a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. When a duty is cast on an authority to determine the arrears of rent, the determination must be in accordance with law. Section 7 only provides a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. Construing the expression "any money due" in section 186 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 the Privy Council held in Hans Raj Gupta and others v. Official Liquidators of the Dehradun Mussorie Electric Tramway Company Ltd. (1) that this meant moneys due and recoverable in suit by the company, and observed: "it is a section which creates a special procedure for obtaining payment of moneys; it is not a section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new rights." We are clear that the word "payable" in section 7, in the context in which it occurs, means "legally recoverable." Admittedly a suit to recover the arrears instituted on the day the order under section 7 was made would have been barred by limitation. The amount in question was therefore irrecoverable. This being the position, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.” Thus, provisions of Limitation Act, would be applicable to the proceedings initiated under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, insofar as it relates to recovery of arrears of rent. 26. Keeping the aforesaid analysis in mind when facts on hand are examined, it would emerge from the records that NMPT had contended that fresh rates were required to be fixed by TAMP with effect from 20.02.2007 and since proposal fixing the rates had expired in the year 2007 and as such proposal had been submitted by NMPT to TAMP proposing 2% escalation per annum, which came to be considered and by notification dated 23.07.2010 it was approved and made effective from 20.02.2007 by virtue of which rates came to be revised and this fact had been intimated to respondents by Circular dated 31.01.2011 to pay revised amounts and as such they are liable to pay said amount. As already noticed hereinabove, respondents herein on receiving said notice of demand had approached this Court by filing writ petitions where interim order of stay came to be granted on 09.09.2011 and said writ petitions came to be dismissed on 28.06.2013 and as such fresh notices of demand came to be raised between January’ 2015 to March’ 2015 as per demand notices referred to in the tabular column extracted above, which has not been paid and as such it was contended by NMPT that respondents are liable to pay the revised amount. This has been negatived by the trial Court on the ground of same being time barred. Proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent has been initiated by issuance of notice on 12.08.2015, which was in pursuance to the demand notice issued during January’ 2015. Thus, at the most, the period during which demand had been stayed in the respective writ petitions filed by respondents herein would get excluded for the purposes of computing the limitation of 3 years. Demand for arrears of rent or differential in rent relates to period 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010 and thus, period of 3 years to recover the arrears of rent would expire on completion of 3 years. Demand notice came to be issued during the year 2011. Even assuming for a moment that notification dated 23.07.2010 was the effective date on which NMPT was empowered to seek or recovery of arrears of rent, same has to be construed as the starting point of limitation to reckon the period of 3 years as indicated in Article 52 of Limitation Act. Thus, 3 years would come to an end on 22.07.2013. Notice of demand came to be issued during the year 2011-12 and same had been stayed by this Court by granting interim order of 09.09.2011, which was in operation till dismissal of the writ petition on 28.06.2013. Thus, period from 09.09.2011 to 28.06.2013 if reckoned for the purposes of exclusion of 3 years, it would be 1 year 299 days and even if this period is excluded for the purposes of computing or reckoning the limitation, proceedings ought to have been initiated on or before 24.05.2015. Whereas proceedings under Section 7(1) has been initiated by issue of notice dated 12.08.2015, which was clearly time barred and consequential order dated 21.07.2016 passed by the Estate Officer determining the arrears of rent was also time barred. Whereas proceedings under Section 7(1) has been initiated by issue of notice dated 12.08.2015, which was clearly time barred and consequential order dated 21.07.2016 passed by the Estate Officer determining the arrears of rent was also time barred. As such, conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge that arrears of rent or Stevedore charges demanded from respondents were time barred and conclusion drawn by the trial court is just and correct, which would not call for interference at the hands of this Court. 27. However, it is made clear that in the light of order dated 28.06.2013 passed in W.P.Nos.34541/2011 & 34781/2011 and connected matters being pending in W.A.No.4490/2013 and connected matters and undertaking if any given by the respondents, it would be open for the petitioners to work out its rights in accordance with said undertaking. 28. It is also made further clear that issue involved in these writ petitions, which has been adjudicated relates to the demand for arrears of differential rent for the period 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010, which has been held as time barred and no opinion is expressed with regard to right of the petitioners for the subsequent period, if any. For the reasons aforestated, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER : (i) Writ petitions are hereby dismissed. (ii) Order dated 15.03.2017 passed in M.A.Nos.18 to 49/2016 and 51/2016