JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. On 15.4.2012 Smt. Rupashree Debnath, aged 16 years died as a result of multiple organ failure arising out of burn injuries (80%). In relation to the said crime, her husband Jhutan Das stands convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, IPC). Independently and additionally, Jhutan Das and his parents Sukha Ranjan Das and Sabita Das stand convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC. 2. Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 27.8.2015 is subject matter of challenge in these appeals on the following grounds urged before us : (a) There is unexplained and inordinate delay of 18 hours in lodging the FIR; (b) no independent witness from the neighbourhood was either associated or examined in Court; (c) trial stands vitiated on account of non-examination of one witness who allegedly witnessed the incident; (d) it being a case of circumstantial evidence, testimonies of family members of the deceased, being interested witnesses, required corroboration, in any event there testimonies are full of improvements and embellishments rendering them to be unbelievable and the witnesses unreliable; (e) prognosis of the burn injury caused by use of Kerosene oil is not supported by the father of the deceased or other evidence, scientific nature. (f) additionally, on behalf of the accused parents, it is argued that there is no iota of evidence of their complicity in the crime. 3. Certain facts are not in dispute: (a) Marriage between accused Jhutan Das and Smt. Rupashree Debnath was solemnized sometime in the year 2010; (b) on 15.4.2012 the wife died as a result of burn injuries; and (c) the incident took place within 7 years of marriage, in the matrimonial house, where the parties i.e. the husband and the wife, had been residing together till her last. Also from the record, unrefutedly, it stands revealed that at the time of marriage, age of the deceased was 16 years and that of her husband (accused) 18 years. 4. Through the testimonies of 18 witnesses, prosecution wants the Court to believe that after eloping the deceased, accused solemnized his marriage with her. With initial reservation, parents of the deceased accepted such relationship and then all was well. From the wedlock, a female child was also born. 4. Through the testimonies of 18 witnesses, prosecution wants the Court to believe that after eloping the deceased, accused solemnized his marriage with her. With initial reservation, parents of the deceased accepted such relationship and then all was well. From the wedlock, a female child was also born. However, just six months prior to the incident, all the accused persons started subjecting the deceased to ill-treatment by raising a dowry demand of Rs.40,000/-, which was never met. Continuously she was subjected to cruelties and eventually on 15.4.2012, they set her on fire by pouring Kerosene oil. On 16.4.2012 at 14:25 hours, Uttam Kr. Debnath, father of the deceased, lodged an FIR which was investigated by police officials Sri Tapas Deb (PW-14) and Sri Arunodaya Das (PW-17). Investigation revealed the accused to have murdered the deceased for non-fulfillment of dowry demand. As such, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 5. The accused were charged for having committed offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of IPC. Alternative charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC was also framed. 6. We notice that the trial Court has not returned any findings with respect to the alternate charge. We also notice that the trial Court has found only the husband to have committed an offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC. It is a matter of record that neither the complainant nor the State has preferred any appeal assailing the findings or the judgment rendered by the trial Court. It is only the convicts who have preferred these appeals. Crl.A. No.21/2015 stands preferred by Sri Sukha Ranjan Das and Smt. Sabita Das and Crl.A(J) No.45/2015 stands preferred by Sri Jhutan Das. 7. It has come in the testimony of Sri Arunodaya Das (PW-17) that on 15.4.2012 at about 11.10 p.m., the Duty Officer of Melaghar Police Station received information on telephone that the deceased had committed suicide by setting herself on fire, in relation to which an entry was made. He reached the spot for verifying such information and found the deceased lying on the floor of house of accused Jhutan Das. The injured had sustained serious burn injuries and arranged her to be taken to the Melaghar Sub-Divisional Hospital where the doctor declared her dead. He reached the spot for verifying such information and found the deceased lying on the floor of house of accused Jhutan Das. The injured had sustained serious burn injuries and arranged her to be taken to the Melaghar Sub-Divisional Hospital where the doctor declared her dead. The following day, i.e. on 16.4.2012, pursuant to the request made to the SDM, Sonamura, surathal report (Inquest Report)(Exhibit-2/3) was prepared in the presence of the Executive Magistrate and other witnesses. Postmortem was got conducted and viscera of the deceased collected. On completion of formalities, body was handed over to the father namely Sri Uttam Debnath who, on 16.4.2012 itself lodged a formal complaint of dowry death and as such, request was made to the concerned Superintendent of Police for making appropriate arrangements of investigation. Pursuant to certain directions, he continued with the investigation and recorded statements of the father and one Sri Subhash Debnath (PW-2), uncle of the deceased. From the place of occurrence of the incident, he seized one blue coloured plastic drum having smell of Kerosene oil and burnt orange coloured cloth (parda) vide memo (Exhibit-3/2), in the presence of independent witnesses. Since accused Jhutan Das had also sustained burn injuries, he was also got medically treated. 8. From the testimony of Sri Tapas Deb (PW-14) it is clear that further investigation was carried out by him. He recorded statements of the witnesses; collected the postmortem report and presented the challan in the Court for trial. 9. From the conjoint reading of the cross-examination part of testimonies of these two witnesses, two things emerge; (a) informant Uttam Kr. Debnath did not furnish any explanation for the delay in lodging the FIR and (b)Balaram Paul who furnished information about the incident to the father of the deceased was not examined by him. Since much emphasis is laid on such fact, we deem it appropriate to deal with this issue here itself. 10. Prosecution case does not rest on the testimony of said Balaram Paul. Before we deal with the testimonies, let us examine the contents of the complaint lodged by the father (PW.1). In the complaint, he alleges that on 09.02.2012 one Balaram Paul telephonically informed him that the accused husband was beating the deceased. Immediately, he rushed to the spot and noticed injuries on the body of his daughter, inflicted by her husband. Before we deal with the testimonies, let us examine the contents of the complaint lodged by the father (PW.1). In the complaint, he alleges that on 09.02.2012 one Balaram Paul telephonically informed him that the accused husband was beating the deceased. Immediately, he rushed to the spot and noticed injuries on the body of his daughter, inflicted by her husband. Resultantly, when he sought intervention of the parents (other coaccused), they reiterated dowry demand of Rs.40,000/-. As a part of such conspiracy, on 15.4.2012, all the accused persons killed the deceased by strangulating and setting her on fire after pouring Kerosene oil. 11. The reference of Balaram Paul is only with regard to the alleged incident which took place on 09.02.2012, and not 15.4.2012. We are of the view that by mere non-association of Balaram Paul during investigation or non-examination in Court, the genesis of the prosecution story cannot be said to have been falsified, the edifice to fall for if through the testimonies of other witnesses, guilt stands proven and established beyond reasonable doubt, it would be sufficient to uphold the conviction of the accused. Balaram Paul is a witness only to a single act of assault which in any event stands established by other credible evidence. 12. In any event, trial cannot be said to be vitiated only on account of faulty, incorrect or incomplete investigation, if otherwise this Court is convinced of the prosecution case. 13. Mere error, illegality or defect in investigation cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution story. In fact, Court is duty bound to examine as to whether such fact would result into miscarriage of justice or not. Equally, the accused would be under an obligation to prima facie show as to what prejudice, serious in nature, stands caused to him. [See : Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh & Ors., (2017) 11 SCC 195 (2 Judge Bench); C Muniappan and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 (2 Judge Bench) & Abu Thakir and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (2010) SCC 2119 (2 Judge Bench)]. It is also not the requirement of law that in every case witnesses from the neighborhood must be examined by the police or by the prosecution in the Court, more so in dowry related cases. 14. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (2010) SCC 2119 (2 Judge Bench)]. It is also not the requirement of law that in every case witnesses from the neighborhood must be examined by the police or by the prosecution in the Court, more so in dowry related cases. 14. We do notice that the factum of dowry demand and dowry death was first brought to the notice of the police only on 16.4.2012. There has been a delay of more than 18 hours. However, we find the explanation, plausible and acceptable in nature, emerging in the unrebutted testimony of PW-1 who does state that "I was not in a position even to talk with any person. I lost my mental balance to report anything to the police over the entire episode." We notice that initially the father was silent in explaining the delay, but then can it be said that such fact would be fatal to the prosecution case or that it is a case of an afterthought after due deliberation, with the purported object of false implication of the accused. To our mind, not so. For we find that the incident took place in a remote corner of the State. Parties are residing not in an urban but rural area. Also it took time for the police to reach the spot for carrying out spot investigation. The inquest also was prepared the following day, when itself, the complaint was lodged. Noticeably, accused do not question the role of the police, to be partisan or allege false implication. Hence, the question of delay pales into insignificance, more so when we notice that the accused husband had also sustained burn injuries, which remain unexplained on record and that the unfortunate incident took place in the matrimonial house. 15. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment - creature of an afterthought. It loses its spontaneity. Danger of often exaggerated story creeps in but then this alone is not the settled principle of law. In every case the trial court is duty bound to examine, as to whether the delay is colourded by an afterthought or not. Prompt lodging of the FIR only helps ruling out the possibility of introduction of a new or a distorted fact. Also it lends assurance regarding the truth of the informants" versions. However, delay per se cannot be said to be fatal in all cases. Prompt lodging of the FIR only helps ruling out the possibility of introduction of a new or a distorted fact. Also it lends assurance regarding the truth of the informants" versions. However, delay per se cannot be said to be fatal in all cases. In fact, Courts are duty bound to exhibit sensitivity in the cases of dowry death where victims closest relation are in a state of woe and shock, but then appreciating such fact would also depend upon the attending circumstances and the explanation furnished during trial. Also, mental condition of the close relative needs to be kept in mind. [See: Jitender Kumar v. State of Tripura, (2012) 6 SCC 204 (2 Judge Bench); Manoj Kumar Sharma and ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr., (2016) 9 SCC 1 (2 Judge Bench); Satish Shetty v. State of Karnataka, (2016) 12 SCC 759 (2 Judge Bench); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raghuvir and Anr., (2018) 13 SCC 732 (2 Judge Bench)]. 16. The Apex Court in Kulwant Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 (2 Judge Bench) has observed as under: "25. We may also mention that the issue about the delay in lodging an FIR has been dealt by this Court ad nauseum and we should not make a fetish out of any perceived delay in lodging the FIR. Some time back, one of us (Madan B.Lokur, J.) had occasion to deal with this issue in Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 Scale 224 and it is not necessary to repeat the conclusions arrived at nor is it necessary to reaffirm the principle that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground for throwing away the entire prosecution case as held in Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 204 ." (emphasis supplied) 17. With the issue of delay over, we now proceed to discuss other issues. At this juncture, we take note of what Dr. Abhijit Dasgupta (PW-15), who conducted the postmortem, has opined. Postmortem report (Exhibit-5) stands proven on record. Almost whole of the body stood burnt. The cause of death is burn injuries resulting into multiple organ failure. 18. With the issue of delay over, we now proceed to discuss other issues. At this juncture, we take note of what Dr. Abhijit Dasgupta (PW-15), who conducted the postmortem, has opined. Postmortem report (Exhibit-5) stands proven on record. Almost whole of the body stood burnt. The cause of death is burn injuries resulting into multiple organ failure. 18. From the testimonies of the witnesses, we have discussed thus far, two undisputed facts emerge: (a) death took place as a result of burn injuries and (b) it was as a result of an incident which took place in the matrimonial home, i.e. the house of the accused husband. 19. We notice that through the testimony of Sri Uttam Kr. Debnath (PW-1) it has come on record that all the accused were not residing together. The parents(co-accused) were residing separately, though in close vicinity. It is in this backdrop, we are of the considered view that at least the husband was obliged to furnish plausible explanation about the manner in which his wife sustained such burn injuries. Also how he sustained burn injuries on his hands. It is not his suggested case to the Investigating Officer/Court that the deceased set herself on fire by pouring Kerosene oil. It is nobody’s case that otherwise deceased was temperamental in nature and/or suffering from some depression or ailment prompting her to take away her life. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court the accused was under an obligation to have furnished a plausible explanation. 19.1 It is a settled principle of law that the accused is duty bound to explain the incriminating circumstance proved against him while making a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The Apex Court in Aftab Ahmad Ansari v. State of Uttaranchal, (2010) 2 SCC 583 (2 Judge Bench) and in Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 (2 Judge Bench) has held that either maintaining silence or not furnishing sufficient explanation for such a circumstance is an additional link in the chain of circumstances to sustain the charges against the accused. 20. 20. In fact, in view of the dictum laid down in the said decisions, we find the provisions of 106 of the Evidence Act, 1972 to be squarely applicable in the instant case for the accused had to explain as to how his wife died and as to how he sustained injuries on his hand. 21. The principles stand reiterated in Munna Kumar Upadhya v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174 (2 Judge Bench) in the following terms: "None of the accused, particularly accused No.2, offered any explanation during the recording of their statements under Section 313 CrPC. It is not even disputed before us that the material incriminating evidence was put to accused No. 2 while his statement under Section 313 CrPC was recorded. Except for a vague denial, he stated nothing more. In fact, even in response to a question relating to the injuries that he had suffered, he opted to make a denial, which fact had duly been established by the statements of the investigating officers, doctors and even the witnesses who had seen him immediately after the crime. The statement of Section 313 CrPC is to serve a dual purpose, firstly, to afford to the accused an opportunity to explain his conduct and secondly to use denials of established facts as incriminating evidence against him. It was expected of the accused to render proper explanation for his injuries and his conduct. However, he opted to deny the same and in fact even gave false replies to the questions posed to him. If the accused gave incorrect or false answers during the course of his statement under Section 313CrPC, the Court can draw an adverse inference against him. The accused in the present case has not only failed to explain his conduct, in the manner in which every person of normal prudence would be expected to explain but had even given incorrect and false answers. In the present case, the Court not only draws an adverse inference, but such conduct of the accused would also tilt the case in favour of the prosecution." [Also : Jitender Kumar(supra); Neel Kumar alias Anil Kumar (supra); Phula Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) 4 SCC 9 (2 Judge Bench); The State of Tripura v. Sanvlo Naik and Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 54 (2 Judge Bench)]. 22. 22. Further the Apex Court in Phula Singh (supra), has observed that "11. if the accused has been given the freedom to remain silent during the investigation as well as before the court, then the accused may choose to maintain silence or even remain in complete denial when his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is being recorded. However, in such an event, the court would be entitled to draw an inference, including such adverse inference against the accused as may be permissible in accordance with law." 23. Under identical circumstances where death has taken place in the house of the accused, the Apex Court in Chandra Bhawan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 6 SCC 670 (2 Judge Bench) while holding the accused not to have sufficiently explained the circumstance in which the incident occurred observed as under: "32. We also find that both the accused (appellants herein) in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 failed to give any explanation when asked about the circumstances in which the incident occurred in their house. When the incident admittedly occurred in their house, the appellants were required to explain the circumstances in which Satyawati died. They, however, failed to give any explanation." 24. It is also settled principle of law that with the prosecution having discharged its initial burden of establishing the ingredients, raising statutory presumption of complicity of the accused in the crime, burden of proving innocence or rebutting such presumption is on the accused. [Pathan Hussain Basha v. State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 594 (2 Judge Bench)]. What is the meaning of the expression "beyond reasonable doubt" stands explained in Yogesh Singh (supra). 25. It is true that there is no eyewitness to the occurrence of the incident and the prosecution case is primarily based on circumstantial evidence. It is equally true that none from the neighbourhood stands associated or examined in Court, but then it is not the requirement of law that in every case, witness from the neighbourhood needs to be associated or examined provided in that matter, testimonies of the relatives stand corroborated. 26. It is equally true that relatives who deposed against the accused are always interested in ensuring successful completion of trial culminating into conviction. 26. It is equally true that relatives who deposed against the accused are always interested in ensuring successful completion of trial culminating into conviction. But then, as per law laid down by the Apex Court in their testimonies, if otherwise found to be fully inspiring confidence, being consistent with the prosecution case, are not required to be discarded merely for the reason that they are interested parties. 27. We repeat that no doubt, relatives are interested in the success of trial but then this itself cannot be a ground to discard their testimony, more so when their depositions are found to be fully inspiring the confidence and no embellishments/contradictions or exaggerations are highlighted indicating the witnesses to be unreliable or their depositions untrustworthy. 28. What are the factors to be kept in mind while appreciating the testimony of an interested witness are now well settled. The term interested postulates with the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing the accused person, under all circumstances and in any event that is to say, somehow or the other convicted, either on account of animus or for some other reason which the witness may be harbouring against the accused. Mere relationship is not sufficient to discredit the witness, more so in the absence of any material, even prima facie indicating the intent of false implication. Relatives do have interest in ensuring successful culmination of trial for after all they are the aggrieved persons but then this in itself cannot be said to be a factor of not accounting for their testimonies which, in any event, has to be appreciated and scrutinized in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. [See: Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202 (4 Judge Bench); State of Rajasthan v. Kalki and Anr., (1981) 2 SCC 752 (3 Judge Bench); Jitender Kumar (supra); Yogesh Singh (supra); Arjun and Anr. v. State of Chattisgarh, (2017) 3 SCC 247 (2 Judge Bench); Kuna alias Snajaya Behera v. State of Odisha, (2018) 1 SCC 296 (2 Judge Bench)]. The Apex Court has used the words "intrinsically reliable or inherently probable" being the essential ingredients for relying upon the testimonies of such witness. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ballabh Das and Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 703 (2 Judge Bench)]. 29. The Apex Court has used the words "intrinsically reliable or inherently probable" being the essential ingredients for relying upon the testimonies of such witness. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ballabh Das and Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 703 (2 Judge Bench)]. 29. We repeat that there is no eye witness to the incident and the prosecution case is primarily that of circumstantial evidence. But then, this is not in relation to dowry demands. 30. A Constitution Bench (5 Judge) of the Apex Court in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 74 has fully explained the concept of circumstantial evidence for determining innocence or guilt of the accused which has to be deduced from the material on record. And, what is required to be kept in mind by the Court, while appreciating such evidence, stands reiterated by the Apex Court in Bhim Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 4 SCC 281 (2 Judge Bench) that when conviction is solely based on circumstantial evidence, then there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances, for benefit thereof, would come to the accused as a principle benefit of doubt. On the question of any reasonable hypothesis, the Court held that if some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other reasonable hypothesis, then the accused is not entitled such benefit of doubt. However, in assessing such evidence, imaginary possibilities have no place for Court only considers ordinary human probabilities. 31. On the question of any reasonable hypothesis, the Court held that if some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other reasonable hypothesis, then the accused is not entitled such benefit of doubt. However, in assessing such evidence, imaginary possibilities have no place for Court only considers ordinary human probabilities. 31. Earlier Apex Court in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 (3 Judge Bench) culled out the following tests guiding the Courts in deterring the grant of two accused in a case of circumstantial evidence; (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 32. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 (2 Judge Bench), the Apex Court clarified that in a criminal trial, the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in civil proceedings. Further, in a criminal trial however intriguing the facts and circumstances of the case may be, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. Thus requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after introduction of S. 498A, I.P.C and S. 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about his complicity in the crime. Thus requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after introduction of S. 498A, I.P.C and S. 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about his complicity in the crime. Further it must be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether charges made against the accused stand proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. It observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject matter. The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law." (emphasis supplied). 33. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684 (2 Judge Bench) while dealing with cases relating to women the Apex Court held that: "The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities or insignificant lacune in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women." 34. Applying the aforesaid principles let us discuss the evidence of the relevant witnesses. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women." 34. Applying the aforesaid principles let us discuss the evidence of the relevant witnesses. Prosecution case primarily rests upon the testimonies of relatives of the deceased namely, Sri Uttam Kumar Debnath(PW-1), Sri Subhash Debnath (PW-2), Smt. Shipra Debnath (PW-4), Smt. Jayanti Deb (Das) (PW-5), Sri Prasenjit Debnath (PW-7), Sri Narayan Debnath (PW-9) and Smt. Binasri Debnath (PW-16). 35. PW-1 states that two years prior to the incident, accused "enticed away" the deceased and solemnized his marriage, where after parties started residing together and gave birth to a female child. Further, six months prior to the incident (which means sometime in January, 2012 for the incident took place on the 15th July, 2012) accused Jhutan Das started pressurizing the deceased and all the accused subjected her to ill-treatment by raising a demand of Rs.40,000/-. Acts of ill-treatment were brought to his notice by the deceased but due to financial constraints, he could not fulfill such demands. On many occasions, she was brutally assaulted. "One day" at about 9.30 p.m., one Balaram Paul informed that the deceased was being physically assaulted by her husband and in-laws. Ensuring that her cries are not heard by anyone, accused had loudly played a musical instrument. Upon receipt of such information, he immediately reached the spot and saw his daughter lying on the floor in a "precarious condition". There were injuries on her body. At that time, only accused Jhutan Das was in the house. Immediately he brought the matter to the notice of co-accused Sukha Ranjan Das and Sabita Das who were residing separately at a distance of 200 metres. However, Sukha Ranjan Das not only reiterated the dowry demand but threatened of aggravating the mental torture. Also he proposed transfer of ownership of 3 kanis of land having rubber plantation. On 15.7.2012, this witness spoke with the deceased on phone. Later at about 10.30-10.35 p.m. hearing cries from the matrimonial house of his daughter, he ran and on reaching found the deceased lying dead inside the room. Accused Jhutan Das who had sustained burn injuries on his right hand was sitting outside the bedroom and the other co-accused were there in the courtyard. When queried, Jhutan Das maintained silence, pretending as though he was in a state of shock over his wifes death. Accused Jhutan Das who had sustained burn injuries on his right hand was sitting outside the bedroom and the other co-accused were there in the courtyard. When queried, Jhutan Das maintained silence, pretending as though he was in a state of shock over his wifes death. Noticing the mosquito net covering the bed and finding other articles, including the bicycle to be intact and only one curtain of the door to be slightly burnt, he gathered an impression that after murdering the deceased, accused had set her on fire. In the meantime, friends and relatives assembled and someone informed the police. The deceased was taken to the hospital where she was declared dead. It was in the hospital that he lodged a written report (Exhibit-1). The incident occurred within two years of marriage. 36. From the cross-examination part of his testimony, we do not find the veracity of his statement or his credit to be impeached in any manner. Fully inspiring in confidence, it is free from embellishments, impeachments and contradictions. Nonexamination of neighbours would not render his testimony, in any manner, to be doubtful. It does not require corroboration at all. It is true that he does not remember the date and time when his daughter was beaten up, but then he clarifies by stating that "I am not in a position at this stage to say" so. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that such statement was recorded after a period of two years in Court. Be that as it may, assuming hypothetically that the incident in relation to which Balaram Paul apprised the accused remains unproven, however from the other part of his testimony, to our mind, the factum of dowry demand remains fully established about which there is no doubt. There is a demand; of a specific amount and/or property; the persons to whom and by whom it was so made. On his sole testimony the charge of dowry demand and cruelty stands proven against all the accused persons. 37. Sri Subhash Debnath (PW-2) is the uncle of the deceased. His testimony though in the nature of hearsay only corroborates what is so stated by PW-1. 38. Smt. Shipra Debnath (PW-4) who is the mother of the accused substantially corroborates what is so stated by her husband Sri Uttam Kr. Debnath (PW-1). 37. Sri Subhash Debnath (PW-2) is the uncle of the deceased. His testimony though in the nature of hearsay only corroborates what is so stated by PW-1. 38. Smt. Shipra Debnath (PW-4) who is the mother of the accused substantially corroborates what is so stated by her husband Sri Uttam Kr. Debnath (PW-1). However, we do notice there are two contradictions in her statement; (i) the time of marriage, which she unlike her husband refers to be 4 years prior to the incident and (ii) her husband agreeing to meet the demand. But then, to our mind, this would, in no manner, render the testimony of her husband to be unbelievable, impeaching his credit, for she is categorical about (a) the dowry demand; (b) made by the accused; (c) of a sum of Rs.40,000/-; (d) deceased being subjected to cruelty (constant pressure), both mental and physical; and (e) in the night of 15.4.2012, cries coming from the house of the deceased when her husband went to see as to what had really happened. 39. Discrepancies, contradictions, embellishment, and improvements are bound to be there with the long passage of time. How best to appreciate their testimonies stand explained by the Apex Court in Yogesh Singh (supra) in the following terms: "29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs no special emphasis to state that every omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. [See Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649 ; Leela Ram (dead) through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana and Another, (1999) 9 SCC 525 ; Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors., (2004) 9 SCC 186 ; Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191 ; Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri, (2012) 4 SCC 124 ; Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 and Mrittunjoy Biswas v. Pranab alias Kuti Biswas and Anr., (2013) 12 SCC 796 )]. 44. In the present case, we do not find any major contradiction either in the evidence of the witnesses or any conflict in medical or ocular evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the respondents. The minor improvements, embellishments etc., apart from being far yield of human faculties are insignificant and ought to be ignored since the evidence of the witnesses otherwise overwhelmingly corroborate each other in material particulars." 40. At this juncture, we may also observe that the alleged acts of cruelty were never reported to the police, but then this, according to us, would again not render the prosecution case to be vulnerable, for we notice the parties to hail from a rural areas, apart from the fact that it was a love marriage and perhaps, prudently, the parents would have wanted the parties to live happily, without much altercation and adjust with the passage of time. 41. It is not that in every case, non-disclosure of factum of cruelty to the members of the society, neighbours or relatives who are not close can be fatal. Each case has to be seen in the attending facts and circumstances. [See : Monju Roy and others, (2015) 13 SCC 693 (2 Judge Bench); Union of India v. Sanjeev v. Despande, (2014) 13 SCC 525 (2 Judge Bench)]. 42. Smt. Bakul Debnath (PW-6) and Sri Prasenjit Debnath (PW-7) also corroborate what is so stated by PW-1. Sri Narayan Debnath (PW-9) is the uncle of the deceased. [See : Monju Roy and others, (2015) 13 SCC 693 (2 Judge Bench); Union of India v. Sanjeev v. Despande, (2014) 13 SCC 525 (2 Judge Bench)]. 42. Smt. Bakul Debnath (PW-6) and Sri Prasenjit Debnath (PW-7) also corroborate what is so stated by PW-1. Sri Narayan Debnath (PW-9) is the uncle of the deceased. On the issue of dowry demand, with regard to the time and amount as also the acts of ill-treatment he corroborates the testimony of PW-1. Also hearing cries, he reached the spot where he noticed the body of the deceased lying on the floor with burn injuries. He noticed smell of Kerosene oil. This witness, as is so stated by PW-1, wants the Court to believe that the deceased was first murdered whereafter her body was burnt. 43. Smt. Binasri Debnath (PW-16) is the eldest sister of the deceased. Significantly, she does state that at the night of the incident, she had spoken with her sister on telephone and was told that the accused had tortured her for not meeting the demand. But then which one of the accused, she does not state. After some time, hearing cries coming from the house of the accused, she tried to reach but could not, as she had to take care of her mother, who as has come on record had fainted. Later on, she learnt from her father that the accused had killed the deceased by setting her on fire. Significantly, this witness in the cross-examination part of her testimony does mention of having informed the police of the telephonic conversation which she had had with her sister. 44. The theory of "last seen together" is squarely applicable in the instant case as has been so held by the Apex Court in Ganpat Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 16 SCC 353 (2 Judge Bench). 45. Hence, testimonies of all the witnesses cumulatively establish the factum of dowry demand, the acts of cruelty meted out to the deceased by all the accused persons; accused Jhutan Das and Sukha Ranjan Das and Smt. Sabita Das to be residing separately; at the time of the occurrence only accused Jhutan Das was present in the house with burn injuries on his hand, but accused Sukha Ranjan Das and Smt. Sabita Das who also reached the spot were outside in the courtyard. The body of the deceased in a burnt condition was taken to the hospital where she was declared dead. 46. We do find the prosecution to have established through the testimonies of relations of the deceased that a sum of Rs.40,000/- was demanded, not only by husband but also by his parents. In fact, father suggested transfer of land in lieu thereof. This was in relation to an incident which had taken place six months prior to the death. As such, their complicity in relation to the offence under Section 498-A stands conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt. The deceased was subjected to cruelty i.e. harassed with a view to coerce her to meet an unlawful dowry demand which was never meet. In the instant case, presumption, statutory in nature under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, is thus clearly invokeable. 47. Persistently her husband pressed such demand and subjected her to cruelty, also physical in nature. On the date of the incident, the deceased had spoken with her sister, informing the demand being pressed by her husband. Father of the deceased does state that when he reached the spot i.e. the matrimonial house, he found his daughter lying on the floor with the body burnt. Also accused husband had sustained burn injury on his hand. Well, the accused has not furnished any explanation as to how he or his wife sustained the burn injury. It is not his case that he tried to douse the fire which resulted into such injuries. It is a matter of record that the death is unnatural. It took place within 7 years of marriage. It was caused by a burn injury. Consistently, dowry demand, specific in nature was made by the husband of the deceased. As such statutory presumption under the provisions of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is clearly unshakeable. 48. In this backdrop, we do not find the findings returned by the Court below holding accused Jhutan Das to have committed an offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC as also under Section 498A of IPC and the remaining two accused Sukha Ranjan Das and Sabita Das to have committed an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC not to be borne out from the record or based on incorrect and improper appreciation of the material on record or misinterpretation/misapplication of the provisions of law. 49. 49. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons both the appeals, assailing the judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sonamura, West Tripura in Case No. Sessions Trial 45(WT/S) of 2013 titled as The State of Tripura v. Jhutan Das and Ors., stand dismissed. Interim order(s), if any, stands vacated. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. 50. In view of the dismissal of the appeal the bail bonds of the appellants (Sri Sukha Ranjan Das and Smt. Sabita Das) stands cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the trial Court within 1(one) month from today to serve out the remaining sentence failing which the trial Court shall take action in accordance with law.