ORDER : T. Rajani, J. This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed seeking to set aside the G.O.Ms.No.55, Backward Classes Welfare (C), dated 10.07.2019, of the 1st respondent with regard to the cancellation of petitioner’s appointment through G.O.Ms.No.7, Bacmward Classes Welfare (C) Department, dated 12.01.2019 i.e., Sl.No.8, and subsequently to continue the petitioner as Chairman of A.P.Medara Finance Corporation Ltd., as per G.O.Ms.No.7, Backward Classes Welfare (C) Dept., dated 12.01.2019 of the 2nd respondent for the remaining period by paying arrears of monthly salary as well as other remuneration with interest. 2. Heard Sri K. Rama Koteswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri P. Sudhakar Reddy, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the 3rd respondent; learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare and learned Government Pleader for GAD appearing for respondents 1, 2 and 4. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Chairman of Andhra Pradesh Medara Finance Corporation Ltd, by virtue of G.O.Rt.No.871, General Administration (POLL.C) Dept., dated 18.04.2017 by the 3rd respondent for a period of two years. The 2nd respondent issued another of G.O.Ms.No.7, Backward Classes Welfare(C) Department, dated 12.01.201, the 2nd respondent. Immediately, the petitioner assumed charge and gave a joining report to the Principal Secretary to the Government BC Welfare Department. Even though the petitioner took the charge as Chairman, he was not yet paid remuneration and subsequently, the said nomination was cancelled by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.55, dated 10.07.2019. Aggrieved by the said cancellation, the petitioner approached this court by way of this writ petition. 4. The contention of the petitioner’s counsel is that without assigning any reasons, the cancellation of the nomination cannot be done. He argues that the principles of natural justice have to be followed in every case of termination of the services and in this case, no reasons were disclosed in the said order of cancellation. In support of the said contention, he relies on the ruling of the Apex Court reported in CCT V. SHUKLA & BROS., (2010) 4 SCC 785 wherein the Supreme Court, at paragraph 14, observed that the principles of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case could vitiate the order itself. These observations came to be made by the apex court while dealing with an order passed by the judicial authority, without assigning reasons. The apex court also observed that the order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The court also observed that an order without reasons may cause prejudice to the affected party and hamper the proper administration of justice. It held that the said principle would apply not only apply to administrative or executive actions, but also to judicial pronouncements. 5. In the light of the above judgment, it has to be seen whether there is any rationality in passing of the impugned order and whether the said judgment is a ruling on the present fact situation. Before that, it can be seen that the post of the petitioner is a nominated post at the pleasure of the respondents. 6. The Additional Advocate General contends that the post, being a post at the pleasure of the respondents, needs no notice and no enquiry before termination of the said services. The learned Additional Advocate General also takes the help of the ruling of the apex court reported in KRISHNA BULAJI BORATE VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, 2001 AIR SCW 337, wherein it was held that when the removal of a person from a nominated post is not stigmatic, the question of giving opportunity of hearing before removal, does not arise. It also observed that the appointment of the appellant therein is under the doctrine of pleasure and hence, any such termination there could be in violation of principles of natural justice. It also held that before the impugned order there would not arise any question of giving opportunity and, in fact, there cannot be any violation of principles of natural justice. It also went on to say that the removal in that case did not either caste any stigma nor lead to any penal consequences and that would clearly reveal doctrine of pleasure which is implicit. It also observed that in any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or implicit. It also went on to say that the removal in that case did not either caste any stigma nor lead to any penal consequences and that would clearly reveal doctrine of pleasure which is implicit. It also observed that in any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any provision to spell to read with other provisions of the statute if so intended to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit words that sub-serve the intent of the legislature. It was also observed therein that in that case, the initial nomination of the women members itself depends on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government and if such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political consideration, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority to any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. So far as the nominated members are concerned, it was observed that the legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. 7. In this case, undisputedly the post of the petitioner is a nominated post. The salary, which is allegedly paid to the petitioner, is not in fact a salary and it is only a remuneration, which was paid on consolidated basis. 8. Hence, viewed from any angle, the nomination of the petitioner as Chairman of the A.P. Medara Finance Corporation Ltd., is only at the pleasure of the Government and the petitioner cannot claim any vested right over the said post. In the said circumstances, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner cannot be taken help of to accept the contention of the petitioner’s counsel. With the above observations, the Writ petition is dismissed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.