JUDGMENT : SURENDRA MOHAN, J. 1. The dispute relating to fixation of the fees that could be charged by Private Self Fina6ncing Medical Colleges arises for consideration in this batch of Writ Petitions. As per separate orders that are under challenge in each of these Writ Petitions, the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee for Medical Education in Kerala (AFRC for short) has fixed the fees to be charged by each of the Medical Colleges in the State. The said orders are under challenge in each of these Writ Petitions filed by the respective Medical Colleges. Though separate orders have been passed and different amounts have been fixed as fee for each of the colleges, the contentions on the basis of which the impugned orders are attacked are identical. Therefore, it shall be sufficient that the contentions advanced are considered in common and answered. Such answers would determine the fate of the impugned orders. Inasmuch as the issue involved is with respect to fixation of fees, a number of students have also got impleaded and have addressed arguments. We shall consider all the contentions together. 2. Shorn of individual details, the bare facts that require notice are that, all the Writ Petitioners are self financing medical colleges and that previously the fees to be charged by them used to be fixed on the basis of consensual agreements entered into between the Government and the individual colleges. Such agreements used to provide for charging a lesser fee in respect of students allotted by the Government and a substantially higher fees in respect of the management quota students. Such agreements used to permit the Management to admit students of their choice in the management quota. The situation has now changed and admissions are made on the basis of the ranking of the students in the National Entrance cum Eligibility Test (NEET for short). The allotment of students is done by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. Therefore, at present all students are being charged the same fee, except in the case of Non Resident Indian (NRI) students. The dispute in these cases relates to the fixation of fee for the MBBS degree course for the academic year 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19. The impugned orders are evidenced by exhibits P23 and P24 dated 28.09.2017 in W.P.(C) Nos.31473 of 2017. The dispute in these cases relates to the fixation of fee for the MBBS degree course for the academic year 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19. The impugned orders are evidenced by exhibits P23 and P24 dated 28.09.2017 in W.P.(C) Nos.31473 of 2017. As per exhibit P23 the tuition fee has been fixed at Rs.4,15,000/- per student for the academic year 2016-17, for the year 2017-18 at Rs.4,80,000/- per student and for the academic year 2018-19, the fee has been fixed at Rs.5,54,000/- per student. 3. According to the petitioners, The AFRC has while passing the impugned orders disallowed a number of items of expenditure reflected in the accounts of the College, without any justification. According to some of the Colleges, expenditure amounting to one third of the term fee has been disallowed. The AFRC has exceeded its authority in doing so. It has arrogated to itself, a power that it did not have and scrutinized the audited accounts submitted by the colleges. It is the contention of the petitioners that they have absolute authority to fix the fees. Going by the decisions of the Apex Court, it is not necessary that the fees that are charged should be uniform in respect of all colleges. The fees charged would differ from college to college depending on its location, infrastructure and facilities offered. Accepting the above, the Apex Court has held that the power of the Committee was limited to examining whether the college was indulging in receiving of capitation fee or profiteering. In general therefore, all the petitioners allege that the exercise undertaken by the AFRC far exceeded its powers and for the said reason seek the issue of appropriate orders and directions setting aside the impugned orders. 4. We have heard Sr. Advocates Sri.Kurain George Kannanthanam, Sri. S.Sreekumar, Sri. George Poonthottam, Sri. K.P.Satheesan, Sri. T.A.Shaji and Advocates Chandrasekhar, George Jacob, Parvathy Menon, Babu Karukapadath, Sri. S.P.Aravindakshan Pillai, Rejani Menon, Firoz K.M., Roshan D.Alexander, Millu Dandapani and Sri R.T.Pradeep, T.B.Hood, P.M.Saneer, Sreejith V. at length. We have heard Advocate Jaju Babu(Sr) who appears for the students. We have also heard learned Advocate General as well as Advocate Mrs. Mary Benjamin who appears for the AFRC. 5. A slew of contentions have been put forward by the respective counsel supported by various decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. We have heard Advocate Jaju Babu(Sr) who appears for the students. We have also heard learned Advocate General as well as Advocate Mrs. Mary Benjamin who appears for the AFRC. 5. A slew of contentions have been put forward by the respective counsel supported by various decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. It is not necessary for us to reproduce all the contentions that were advanced on the various aspects highlighted. This is for the reason that, if the impugned orders are found to be in excess of the powers of the AFRC, they have to fall on the said ground alone. It would then be unnecessary for us to consider the other contentions put forward. Therefore, we shall first consider whether the impugned orders are beyond the powers of the AFRC as contended by the petitioners. For the above purpose, it is necessary to take note of and understand the nature and scope of the enquiry that has been permitted to be undertaken by the AFRC. Going by the dicta laid down by the Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ], an eleven Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held that, the right to establish and administer an educational institution is part of the fundamental right of an individual under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The word “occupation” occurring in the said Article has been held to be wide enough to take in the establishment and running of an educational institution. Therefore, the said right can be subject only to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6). In paragraph 50 of the said decision, it has been held as follows:- 50. The right to establish and administer broadly comprises the following rights:- (a) to admit students: (b) to set up a reasonable fee structure: (c) to constitute a governing body; (d) to appoint staff (teaching and non-teaching); and (e) to take action if there is dereliction of duty on the part of any employees. [Emphasis supplied] It is clear from the above that, the right of the institutions is not a limitless right to fix whatever amount they feel as fees. The Apex Court has cautiously worded the right confining the same to set up a “reasonable” fee structure. [Emphasis supplied] It is clear from the above that, the right of the institutions is not a limitless right to fix whatever amount they feel as fees. The Apex Court has cautiously worded the right confining the same to set up a “reasonable” fee structure. It has also been held that Article 26(a) would be another source of the right to establish and maintain educational institutions for religious and charitable purposes. Therefore, even religious denominations or sections that do not fall under Article 29(1) or 30(1) have the right to establish and to set up educational institutions. 6. Thus, the right to establish and administer a private Medical College would be an “occupation” within the meaning of the Article 19(1)(g) which can be subject to only reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Such restrictions are imposed in public interest. The Apex Court has further held that the fixation of a rigid fee structure by the State would not be acceptable as a reasonable restriction. At the same time, the Court has cautioned to add that, the conduct of an educational institution is not a business and is not to be conducted with the object of generating profit. Paragraph 57 of T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (Supra), illuminating in this regard, reads as under: 57. We, however, wish to emphasize one point, and that is that inasmuch as the occupation of education is, in a sense, regarded as charitable, the government can provide regulations that will ensure excellence in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering by the institution. Since the object of setting up an educational institution is by definition "charitable", it is clear that an educational institution cannot charge such a fee as is not required for the purpose of fulfilling that object. To put it differently, in the establishment of an educational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution. To put it differently, in the establishment of an educational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution. [Emphasis supplied] What is clear from the above is that, while admitting the right of an educational institution to fix its own fees, it has been laid down that charging of capitation fee and profiteering is forbidden and that, the fee should not be exploitative. What is expected is the fixation of a fee that would take care of the expenses for conducting the course, leaving a reasonable revenue surplus. What follows from the above therefore is that, though an educational institution would have the right to fix its fee, it cannot charge a fee that is not required for the purpose of conducting the course. It cannot also indulge in profiteering or charging of capitation fee. Such right is subject, in addition, to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) also. In other words, the right of an educational institution to stipulate fee is not a limitless right, but is subject to regulation on the grounds referred to above. A contention was put forward by one of the counsel, Sri. George Poonthottam, Senior Advocate, that an institution may decide to provide even an expensive BMW car to its Principal, which is the choice of the institution and cannot be questioned by the AFRC. The said contention if accepted, would amount to stretching the contours of the right beyond all reasonable limits. A college may provide an expensive car to its Principal but when the expenditure thereof is sought to be recovered from the students as fee, the law has to step in to say that it is not a reasonable expenditure incurred for the conduct of the course Therefore, it is held that though an educational institution has the right to fix the fee, it has to be fixed keeping in mind the parameters that flow from the dictum laid down by the Apex Court and whether the fee has been so fixed or not, is an aspect that the AFRC would have to examine. If the fee is fixed in a manner that does not bear any relation to the expenditure involved for conducting the course, the fee so fixed cannot be accepted as a reasonable fee. Therefore, since no educational institution has the right to charge a fee that is not reasonable, the AFRC would have to step in and disallow the charging of any unreasonable fee for the further reason that it would also amount to profiteering. 7. On the above aspect, in Islamic Academy of Education V. State of Karnataka [ (2003) 6 SCC 697 ], while answering the first question that arose for consideration of the Court, namely, whether the educational institutions are entitled to fix their own fee structure, the Apex Court has held as under. 154. The fee structure, thus, in relation to each and every college must be determined separately keeping in view several factors, including facilities available, infrastructure made available, the age of the institution, investment made, future plan for expansion and betterment of the educational standard etc. The case of each institution in this behalf is required to be considered by an appropriate Committee. For the said purpose, even the books of accounts maintained by the institution may have to be looked into. Whatever is determined by the Committee by way of a fee structure having regard to relevant factors, some of which are enumerated hereinbefore, the management of the institution would not be entitled to charge anything more. After directing the State Government to set up in each State, Committees headed by a retired High Court Judge to scrutinize the exercise of fixation of fee, the Constitution Bench has in paragraph 7 held as follows:-- Each educational Institute must place before this Committee, well in advance of the academic year, its proposed fee structure. Along with the proposed fee structure all relevant documents and books of accounts must also be produced before the committee for their scrutiny. The Committee shall then decide whether the fees proposed by that institute are justified and are not profiteering or charging capitation fee. The Committee will be at liberty to approve the fee structure or to propose some other fee which can be charged by the institute. The fee fixed by the committee shall be binding for a period of three years, at the end of which period the institute would be at liberty to apply for revision. The Committee will be at liberty to approve the fee structure or to propose some other fee which can be charged by the institute. The fee fixed by the committee shall be binding for a period of three years, at the end of which period the institute would be at liberty to apply for revision. Once fees are fixed by the Committee, the institute cannot charge either directly or indirectly any other amount over and above the amount fixed as fees. If any other amount is charged, under any other head or guise e.g. donations the same would amount to charging of capitation fee. The Governments/ appropriate authorities should consider framing appropriate regulations, if not already, framed, where under if it is found that an institution is charging capitation fees or profiteering that institution can be appropriately penalised and also face the prospect of losing its recognition/affiliation. [Emphasis supplied] It can be seen from the above that, the Committee has been directed to be constituted with the power to examine and scruitinize the fee fixed by each educational institution with reference to the books of accounts, with the assistance of a qualified Chartered Accountant to find out whether the fee was reasonable. It has been laid down that, the Committee would be within its powers to either approve the fee structure or to propose some other fee. The above dictum has been followed by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in Modern School v. Union of India [ (2004) 5 SCC 583 ], reiterating that the right to fix fee was subject to the restrictions that there should be no profiteering or charging of capitation fee. Though reasonable surplus could be generated, the surplus cannot be diverted for any other use or purposes or for personal gains or for other business or enterprise. Therefore, the concept of surplus will also be qualified by the word “reasonable” and such surplus would have to be ploughed back, for the betterment of the institution. In the result, the question as to whether the surplus sought to be generated is reasonable or not and whether the same is meant to be utilised for the betterment of the institution are also aspects that would have to be examined by the Committee. 8. The above aspect has been considered again in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [ (2005) 6 SCC 537 ]. 8. The above aspect has been considered again in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [ (2005) 6 SCC 537 ]. Considering the question as to whether the matter of fee payable by the students to educational institutions could be the subject matter of regulation, the Apex Court has held that the right to set up a reasonable fee structure was also a component of the right to establish and administer an institution. Every institution was free to devise its own fee structure subject to the limitation that there can be no profiteering or charging of capitation fee either directly or indirectly or in any form. Here again, the stipulation is clear that, an educational institution has the right to charge only a “reasonable” fee and that, there shall be no profiteering or charging of capitation fee. It has also been clearly laid down that, such right is subject to regulation for the purpose of ensuring that there was no profiteering or charging of capitation fee. Paragraph 129 which is relevant in the above context is extracted hereunder. 129. In Pai Foundation, it has been very clearly held at several places that unaided professional institutions should be given greater autonomy in determination of admission procedure and fee structure. State regulation should be minimal and only with a view to maintain fairness and transparency in admission procedure and to check exploitation of the students by charging exorbitant money or capitation fees. [Emphasis supplied] Therefore, State Regulation with a view to check exploitation of the students by charging exorbitant money or capitation fees has also been prohibited. 9. The Apex Court has considered the question of fixation of fee again in Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2016) 7 SCC 353 ]. Reiterating the law laid down in the earlier decisions referred to above, the Apex Court has held in paragraph 71 as follows:- 71. We may again remind ourselves that though right to establish and manage educational institution is treated as a right to carry on 'occupation', which is the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g), the Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation had also cautioned such educational institution not to indulge in profiteering or commercialisation. That judgment also completely bars these educational institutions from charging capitation fee. That judgment also completely bars these educational institutions from charging capitation fee. This is considered by the appellants themselves that commercialisation and exploitation is not permissible and the educational institutions are supposed to run on 'no profit, no loss basis'. No doubt, it was also recognised that cost of education may vary from institution to institution and in this respect many variable factors may have to be taken into account while fixing the fee. It is also recognized that the educational institutions may charge the fee that would take care of various expenses incurred by these educational institutions plus provision for the expansion of education for future generation. At the same time, unreasonable demand cannot be made from the present students and their parents. For this purpose, only a 'reasonable surplus' can be generated. [Emphasis supplied] 10. Paragraphs 74 and 75 also being relevant in the context are extracted. 74. The principles enunciated in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and P.A. Inamdar were applied in the case of Islamic Academy of Education where a challenge was mounted against the directions issued by the Director of Education to the recognised unaided schools under Section 24(3) read with Section 18(4) and 18(5) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, inter alia, directing that no fees/funds collected from parents/students would be transferred from the Recognised Unaided School Fund to a Society or Trust or any other institution. After examining the directions and the accounting principles in detail, this Court upheld the said directions on the ground that it was open to the State to regulate the fee in such a manner so as to ensure that no profiteering or commercialisation of education takes place. 75. To put it in a nutshell, though the fee can be fixed by the educational institutions and it may vary from institution to institution depending upon the quality of education provided by each of such institutions commercialisation is not permissible. In order to see that the educational institutions are not indulging in commercialisation and exploitation, the Government is equipped with necessary powers to take regulatory measures and to ensure that these educational institutions keep playing vital and pivotal role to spread education and not to make money. In order to see that the educational institutions are not indulging in commercialisation and exploitation, the Government is equipped with necessary powers to take regulatory measures and to ensure that these educational institutions keep playing vital and pivotal role to spread education and not to make money. So much so, the Court was categorical in holding that when it comes to the notice of the Government that a particular institution was charging fee or other charges which are excessive, it has a right to issue directions to such an institution to reduce the same. [Emphasis supplied] 11. In the said decision, the regulatory measures imposed by the State of Madhya Pradesh were found to be justified. It was found that, it was the educational institution that would suggest the fee that is proposed to be charged and that the function of the committee was only to point out whether the fees proposed amount to profiteering or commercialization of the institution. 12. What emerges from an examination of the dicta laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to above is that, though each educational institution has the right to stipulate the fee, such right is not an absolute right free of regulation. In the first place, the right to conduct an educational institution being part of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is subject to “reasonable” restrictions that the State is permitted to impose under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Secondly, the right of an educational institution is only to charge “reasonable” fee. The fee has to be fixed taking into account the expenses involved for the conduct of the course, which would have a bearing on the infrastructure as well as the facilities provided. The fee so fixed would have to be non exploitative. No profiteering or charging of capitation fee is permissible but “reasonable” surplus could be generated, keeping an eye on future expansion. Such surplus has to be utilized for the betterment of the institution. The fee so fixed would have to be non exploitative. No profiteering or charging of capitation fee is permissible but “reasonable” surplus could be generated, keeping an eye on future expansion. Such surplus has to be utilized for the betterment of the institution. Whether an institution has fixed its fee, in a reasonable manner, whether the surplus generated is reasonable, whether there is profiteering or charging of capitation fee, whether the fee fixed is non exploitative and whether the surplus that is sought to be generated is planned to be utilized for the betterment of the institution are aspects that the Committee, in these cases, the AFRC would have to examine. Therefore, the contentions that, the function of the AFRC is only to accept the fee that is suggested by the educational institution, that the Committee does not have the power to disallow any expenditure and that it has no power to fix a different fee cannot be accepted in the light of authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court. The said contentions are therefore rejected. Apart from the above, the Government also has the power to direct a college to reduce the fee where the fee charged is found to be excessive. 13. All the counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners have placed strong reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kerala Self Financing Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala [ (2017) 4 KLT 809 ] where the scope of the powers of the AFRC has been considered. In the said decision, the Bench considered a challenge against the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 15 of 2017 for short). Considering the scope of Section 8 of the said enactment which confer powers on the AFRC to determine the fee that can be charged by an institution in respect of each medical course, it has been held that the statutory provision should not be understood as conferring a power to “fix the fee”. The provision has been read down by the Division Bench holding that, the power to fix fee only means that the fee should not vary from student to student for a fixed period. The provision has been read down by the Division Bench holding that, the power to fix fee only means that the fee should not vary from student to student for a fixed period. Insofar as regulation of the fee fixed by an Educational Institution is concerned, it is held that the powers of the AFRC would be limited to examining whether there was profiteering or charging of capitation fee. It has also been held that wherever a particular item in the fee structure is held to be bad as profiteering, the Committee would have to give reasons for such finding. Reasons are necessary to be provided, since a statutory appeal to the High Court is provided by section 12 of the Enactment. Paragraph 50 of the said decision lays down the above parameters. 14. The above aspect has been reiterated and expatiated further in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the said decision, which reads as under: 53. Again, at the cost of repetition, we may say that under the garb of fee fixation, the Committee cannot start regulating the occupation and administration of the medical colleges itself. It is not open to the Committee to start considering whether an expense claimed by the institution as reasonable and necessary, is not appropriate, for, that would be impeaching upon the financial autonomy of the institution. What is appropriate, reasonable and required for the proper functioning of an institution is a matter to be decided by the management of the institution and the only scope available to the Committee is to see that the fee, which is in proportion to the expenses claimed, does not amount to profiteering or have a capitation fee element in it. All the decisions of the Apex Court, including the decision in Modern Dental College & Research Centre's case (supra), have clearly held that even a reasonable surplus has to be allowed to be generated, the colleges have to gather funds for improvements, for adding infrastructure and equipments, which are by any means not cheap. These are matters which cannot be considered by the Committee to be irrelevant for a surplus. They are not to act as super Income-tax Officers. Regulation may be necessary and permissible for a purpose, but over regulation is bad and has always proved counter productive. These are matters which cannot be considered by the Committee to be irrelevant for a surplus. They are not to act as super Income-tax Officers. Regulation may be necessary and permissible for a purpose, but over regulation is bad and has always proved counter productive. 54.We may also add here that, for the purpose of scrutinising the accounts, the Committee can formulate a policy of directing the colleges to submit audited accounts for the last three previous years, as submitted to the income-tax authorities, showing clearly various breakups and with the help of the Chartered Accountant, who appropriately should have been a Cost Accountant, analyse the figures for profiteering and the capitation fee aspect. But certainly, the Committee cannot go into the desirability or appropriateness of the expenses incurred as per its own notion or standards. 15. Placing reliance on the above observations, it is contended by the respective counsel that the AFRC has erred in disallowing a number of expenses of fees of the different colleges and therefore, the impugned orders are all unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 16. Though it was held by the Division Bench in the passages extracted above that the only two grounds on which the fee suggested by the educational institutions could be scruitinized by AFRC are to see whether it was tainted with the element of profiteering and capitation fee, we are of the opinion that in addition the AFRC would also have to examine whether the proposed fee was reasonable, whether it was non exploitative and also whether the reasonable surplus generated was proposed to be used for the benefit of the institution itself. The above parameters as evident from the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions commencing from TMA Pai (Supra) to the decision in Modern Dental College (Supra) cannot be lost sight of or ignored. Therefore, we hold that in addition to the considerations to which the Division Bench in K.S.F. Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala (Supra) has adverted to, the other parameters stipulated by the Apex Court would also have to be made part of its scrutiny by the AFRC. 17. Therefore, we hold that in addition to the considerations to which the Division Bench in K.S.F. Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala (Supra) has adverted to, the other parameters stipulated by the Apex Court would also have to be made part of its scrutiny by the AFRC. 17. The contentions advanced on behalf of the Writ Petitioners show that, the institutions are under the impression that, they have an unbridled right to propose the fee as deemed fit by them and that the AFRC has no power or authority to disallow or delete any of the elements in the proposed fee. Or in other words, their contention is that, they have an absolute right to stipulate the fee. In the light of the above contention, we deem it necessary to clear the confusion and to explain the decision in K.S.F. Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala (Supra). As we have already seen from the dicta laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions to which reference has been made above that, apart from the enquiry to be directed towards eschewing all elements of profiteering and charging of capitation fee, there are other aspects that are required to be scrutinized and determined by the Committee. It is for the said purpose that the Committee has been directed to be constituted by the Apex Court. Such additional considerations are that the fee proposed shall be reasonable, meaning thereby that it should have a reasonable correlation to the expenditure that is expected to be incurred for conducting the course. A reasonable surplus to provide for future expansion is also permitted. At the same time, it has to be ensured that such surplus is actually utilised for the betterment of the institution. The proposed fee shall also be non exploitative. Neither the dictum in Malankara Orthodox SCM College v. Fee Regulatory Committee (Supra) nor the dictum in K.S.F. Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala has held that such additional considerations are out of bounds of the enquiry to be conducted by the AFRC. Since the Apex Court has held such considerations also to be material, the enquiry to be conducted by the AFRC would have to consider the said aspects also. Since the Apex Court has held such considerations also to be material, the enquiry to be conducted by the AFRC would have to consider the said aspects also. Therefore, the contention that the AFRC shall consider only whether the fee proposed is tainted with the twin elements of profiteering or capitation fee cannot be accepted. The observations in the decisions referred to above are therefore to be understood as having referred only to those two elements, without touching upon the importance of the other elements over which also, the enquiry of the AFRC would have to be conducted. When so understood, we find no substance in the contentions advanced on behalf of the Writ Petitioners. 18. To sum up therefore, the AFRC would have to subject the fee suggested by an educational institution to a close scrutiny to ascertain whether the fee was reasonable, whether there were elements of profiteering or capitation fee therein and also to see whether the proposed fee was non exploitative. Though the fee is expected to vary from college to college there cannot be a variation that is beyond reasonable proportions. This is because for the conduct of an MBBS course, the requirements would normally be identical, though the expenditure may vary marginally depending on the location of the college, the infrastructure provided as well as the facilities offered. Therefore, the conclusion as to whether the fee fixed is reasonable or not would also depend on a comparison of the fee charged by other colleges under similar circumstances. Such an examination also would be necessary in order to ensure that the fee charged is reasonable. The fact that it is the students and their parents who have to bear the fee that is stipulated, that it is they who are likely to be the victims of the exploitation and profiteering at the hands of the medical institutions are also facts that would have to be borne in mind, while scrutinizing the legitimacy of the proposed fee. While, the AFRC can only regulate the fee charged, going by the dictum in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra) where the proposed fee is found to be exploitative, a reasonable fee could be fixed by the AFRC, placing reliance on the materials produced before it. While, the AFRC can only regulate the fee charged, going by the dictum in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra) where the proposed fee is found to be exploitative, a reasonable fee could be fixed by the AFRC, placing reliance on the materials produced before it. The said power is inherent in the power to regulate the right of a medical educational institution to fix its fee, such regulation would include the power to exclude the elements of profiteering, capitation fee, unreasonableness and exploitative factors and to confine the fee within permissible limits. Unless such a power is conceded, it would be futile to say that the right to fix fee of an educational institution is subject to regulation by the AFRC. 19. Another aspect to which our attention has been drawn is that, the colleges have been adopting an attitude of non-cooperation with the AFRC by not providing proper materials or records. Finally, truck-loads of records had been dumped before the Committee leaving it to wade through loads of paper, to pick out the relevant materials. We wish to emphasize here that, it is the duty of the colleges to cooperate with the AFRC and to comply with its directions, in letter and spirit. If a Trust is conducting the college, what is expected is not to produce all the accounting details of the Trust also before the AFRC but to confine the records to the relevant material that would throw light on the expenditure expected to be incurred for conducting the course in question. Many of the Medical Colleges, apart from the MBBS Course conduct various Post Graduate Courses as well as Diploma Courses, besides paramedical courses. The fee for the different courses are fixed taking into account the expenses involved in the conduct of those courses and not taking the cost of establishing the institution itself. 20. In the above context, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that permission for establishment of a new Medical College or new course of study is granted by the Central Government under the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the MCI Act for short). 20. In the above context, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that permission for establishment of a new Medical College or new course of study is granted by the Central Government under the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the MCI Act for short). Such permission is granted only to those organizations that fulfill all the criteria stipulated by “The Establishment of New Medical Colleges, Opening of Higher Courses of Study and Increase of Admission Capacity in Medical Colleges Regulation, 1993” (hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Regulation for short). The qualifying criteria that are to be satisfied for submitting an application to establish a new medical college stipulate that an applicant should be in ownership and management of a hospital of not less than 300 beds with necessary infrastructural facilities which is capable of being developed into a teaching institution as prescribed by the Medical Council of India in the vicinity of the proposed Medical College. It is also necessary for the applicant to have a feasible and time bound programme to provide additional beds and infrastructural facilities for the purpose of upgradation of the same. The application that has to be submitted, has to contain the details of the all the necessary infrastructure and facilities stipulated by the 1993 Regulation, for being considered. Similar requirements are stipulated for the grant of permission to start a new medical course in an existing Medical College. Therefore, it is only those applicants who possess the basic requirements of eligibility stipulated by the MCI Act and the 1993 Regulation who are entitled to seek permission to start a new medical college or a new course. Therefore, the cost of putting such infrastructure or other facilities in place cannot be considered as part of the expenditure to conduct the MBBS or any other similar course. 21. We have noticed that in the case of DM Education & Research Foundation, Wayanad, the equipments necessary for conducting a course are owned by a sister organization - Trust from which the equipments are taken on hire and hefty amounts are accounted as hire charges paid. Such methods that cause steep escalation in the cost of conducting the course has to be avoided. Such methods that cause steep escalation in the cost of conducting the course has to be avoided. Whenever there is an unusual disparity in the expenditure that are shown by a particular institution, the same would be required to be scrutinized closely to find out whether there is an exploitative element involved. All such exploitative elements would have to be eschewed, carefully. 22. In the totality of the aspects to which we have adverted above, to hold that the enquiry of the AFRC should be limited towards excluding the twin evils of profiteering and capitation fee alone, would not be correct. Since AFRC is a regulatory body that has been constituted pursuant to the directions of the Apex Court already referred to above, it would have to consider all the other parameters stipulated by the Apex Court also. At the risk of repetition, it is necessary for the AFRC to primarily consider whether there is profiteering or charging of capitation fee. It has next to consider whether the proposed fee is reasonable, whether the same is exploitative, since it has to be assured that the fee charged is non-exploitative, that the surplus proposed is reasonable and that the same would be ploughed back for the betterment of the institution. Unless the above aspects are also examined and found to be in order, a fee proposed by the institution cannot be approved. In the process, the AFRC may have to disallow many an item of fee proposed or an element that is found to be exploitative. Since the College and its representatives are heard before the order of the AFRC is passed, it is for the institution to satisfy the AFRC at the time of hearing that each of the elements that form part of the fee proposed is necessary for the conduct of the course. To insist that the AFRC should give the college, a further opportunity of hearing and an opportunity to explain matters after the AFRC finds an element to be inadmissible would render the entire process unworkable. The only workable method is for the AFRC to pass its orders disallowing the elements that are inadmissible, leaving the college to work out its remedies against such order, if dissatisfied, in appropriate proceedings. The only workable method is for the AFRC to pass its orders disallowing the elements that are inadmissible, leaving the college to work out its remedies against such order, if dissatisfied, in appropriate proceedings. Therefore, the contention of the Writ Petitioners that after the hearing is conducted if the AFRC finds an item of expenditure or fee to be inadmissible, that fact should be brought to the notice of College and a further opportunity of being heard as well as a chance to rectify the defect should be granted cannot be accepted. Though the counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in Malankara Orthodox SCM College v. Fee Regulatory Committee [ 2007(4) KLT 530 ], Cochin University of Science & Technology v. Thomas P. John [ (2008) 8 SCC 82 ] and K.S.F. Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala (Supra) in support of their contention that the AFRC has no power to disallow any expenses, we do not agree. What the decisions have laid down is only that the AFRC should not undertake an examination of the accounts of the college in the manner in which a Chartered Accountant examines the same. As found above, the nature of the enquiry to be conducted by the AFRC is totally different and is aimed at eliminating the impermissible ingredients on the basis of the dicta laid down by the Apex Court and for ensuring that the fee charged is reasonable. The Apex Court has also directed that the exercise of fixation of the fee has to be undertaken sufficiently well before the time for commencement of admissions so that there would be finality regarding the fee to be charged when the prospectus is issued. The said result can be achieved only if the colleges cooperate with the AFRC by providing all relevant documents and materials, without intimidating the AFRC with irrelevant materials. 23. Another contention put forward by the counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that, the impugned orders are all passed by two or three members of the Committee and not by all the members thereof sitting together. In some cases, the matter was heard by two or three members, but the impugned orders are signed by five members. None of the orders have been passed by the Committee with its full quorum. In some cases, the matter was heard by two or three members, but the impugned orders are signed by five members. None of the orders have been passed by the Committee with its full quorum. Reliance is placed on the Division Bench decision of this Court in K.S.F. Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala (Supra) particularly paragraphs 65 to 69 thereof, to point out that section 5(3) of the Act 15 of 2017 that fixed the quorum has been set aside and the said decision has become final. It is therefore contended that, the impugned orders are all liable to be set aside. 24. Section 5(3) of Act 15 of 2017 had fixed the quorum for meeting of the AFRC to be four. The Chairperson or in his absence, a members of the committee elected from among the members present in the meeting is permitted to preside over the meeting, as per section 5(2). As per Section 3, the Committee is constituted of as many as ten members of whom as many as five are high Government officials. The Division Bench has in K.S.F. Dental College Managements Consortium v. State of Kerala (Supra) found the composition of the Committee to be unwieldy. However Section 5(3) that prescribed the quorum to be 4 has been set aside by the Division Bench as unsustainable. The resultant position is that, no quorum is prescribed for the meeting of the Committee. Therefore, all the members thereof would have to be present. 25. However, the counsel appearing for the Committee draws our attention to sub sections (6) and (7) of Section 4 which permits the committee to formulate its own procedure to contend that all members need not be present at its meetings. The said provisions are reproduced hereunder for convenience of reference:- (6) No act or proceedings of the Committee shall be deemed to be invalid by reason of any defect or irregularity in its constitution or on the ground of existence of any vacancy in the office of any member. (7) The Committee shall regulate its own procedure for the conduct of its business. 26. What the above provisions provide is only that, no act or proceedings of the Committee shall be invalid for the reason of any defect or irregularity in its constitution. (7) The Committee shall regulate its own procedure for the conduct of its business. 26. What the above provisions provide is only that, no act or proceedings of the Committee shall be invalid for the reason of any defect or irregularity in its constitution. Here, there is no irregularity in the constitution of the Committee and therefore, the said provision can have no application here. Sub section (7) empowers the Committee to regulate its procedures for the conduct of its business. The said provision also cannot replace the provision stipulating the quorum. The said provision would entitle the Committee only to regulate its own procedure. In view of the above, we are not satisfied that the above provisions are sufficient to cure the defects of the impugned orders. The judgment of the Division Bench referred to above has become final and binding. Therefore, the impugned orders not having been passed by the AFRC with its full quorum cannot be sustained. In the result, all these Writ Petitions are allowed with the following directions:- (a) The impugned orders passed by the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee in these Writ Petitions are all set aside. (b) The Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee shall pass fresh orders in the matter in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within a period of two months of the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. (c) The fee fixed by the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee as per the impugned orders in these Writ Petitions shall continue to be in force as provisional fees until fresh orders are passed by the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee fixing the fees of the respective colleges in accordance with the above directions. There shall be no order as to costs.

Principal, KMCT Medical College v. Fee Regulatyory Committee