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2019 DIGILAW 2216 (RAJ)

Jitendra Vidhudi v. State of Rajasthan

2019-08-19

GOVERDHAN BARDHAR, SABINA

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JUDGMENT 1. Respondents had faced trial in FIR No. 147 dated 25.08.2000 registered at police station Dara under Section 302, 396, 332, 353, 109, 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as 'IPC') and Section 3/25 of Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred as the 'Act'). 2. As per the prosecution story, on the day of incident under trial Anurag Singh was being taken by police officials in a roadways bus for a Court hearing. Four persons entered the bus and the said persons fired at Anurag Singh. The said persons also snatched the rifles from the police officials and then fled away from the spot in a Maruti Car. FIR was lodged on the basis of report submitted by constable Dhanraj. 3. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against accused Raju @ Rajendra Kumar, Hari @ Titodi @ Mahesh Kumar and Lala @ Sudarshan. So far as the respondents and accused Ananad Gurjar are concerned, proceeding against them were kept pending under Section 173(8) Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred as 'Cr.P.C.'). 4. So far as main accused Devendra Rana is concerned, he died in an encounter. Proceedings were initiated against accused Anand Gurjar under Section 299 Cr.P.C., whereas, the challan was presented against the respondents. 5. During the course of arguments, it has transpired that so far as accused Raju @ Rajendra Kumar, Hari @ Titodi @ Mahesh Kumar and Lala @ Sudarshan are concerned, they were acquitted by the trial Court. Respondents were acquitted by the trial Court vide impugned judgment dated 27.01.2011. Hence, the present appeal has been filed by the State challenging the acquittal of the respondents by the trial Court. 6. We have heard learned State counsel as well as learned counsel for respondent No. 2 and have gone through the record available on the file carefully. 7. Learned trial Court has ordered the acquittal of the respondents mainly on the ground that the only evidence available with the prosecution was the identification of the respondents by complainant Dhanraj as well as PW-2 Shivraj and PW-4 Radhey Shyam in an identification parade conducted during investigation. Incident had occurred on 25.08.2000, whereas, the identification parade of the respondents was conducted on 23.01.2004. Incident had occurred on 25.08.2000, whereas, the identification parade of the respondents was conducted on 23.01.2004. Since, there was a lot of delay in conducting the identification parade of the respondents, the same was rendered doubtful as the respondents had been seen by the witnesses only for a minute or so. It has also been noticed by the trial Court that description of the respondents was not mentioned in the report made by the complainant, i.e., Exhibit P-13. Apart from identification parade of the respondents there was no other material on record to establish the involvement of the respondent in the crime-in-question. The other three accused against whom, challan had been presented in the Court had been acquitted by the trial Court. Main accused Devendra Rana had already died. It has been further noticed by the trial Court that as per the prosecution case, four persons had boarded the bus, whereas, eight persons were involved in the case as accused. 8. The reasons given by the trial Court while ordering the acquittal of the respondents are sound reasons. 9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Allarakha K.Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 1 RCR(Criminal) 748 , has held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court. 10. Similarly, in Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura, (2011) 9 SCC 479 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into various judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under: "It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed" 11. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, no ground for grant of leave to appeal is made out. 12. Dismissed.