JUDGMENT : 1. Appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment/order dated 10.12.2014 passed by the Trial Court, whereby, he was convicted and sentenced qua offence punishable under Sections 342 and 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). 2. FIR No. 220 dated 15.10.2012 was registered at Police Station Dabi, District Bundi for offence punishable under Sections 323, 307 and 342 IPC on the statement of Sugna Bai. It was stated by Sugna Bai that on account of dispute with her husband Ramesh, she had got married to Shankar with the consent of her parents about one month prior to the incident. For about 20 days after marriage, her husband had kept her well, but thereafter, her husband Shankar used to give beatings to her under the influence of liquor and did not allow her to talk to any person. On 15.10.2012 at about 12.30 p.m., she had gone to her parental house. Her husband Shankar came there and told her to return home and prepare meals for him as he was hungry. She immediately returned to her rented room and started cutting Ladyfinger. Her husband Shankar came there under the influence of liquor and started giving her fist and kick blows and also pressed her neck. She rescued herself with great difficulty. Then, Shankar brought a bottle of Kerosene oil and after bolting the door poured the same on her and set her on fire and thereafter, fled away from the spot. 3. Statement of Sugna Bai was also recorded by the Magistrate, wherein, she also stated that she had been set on fire by her husband after pouring kerosene oil on her. Sugna Bai died on 19.10.2012 and thereafter, offence under Section 302 IPC was added in the FIR. 4. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the appellant. 5. Charges were framed against the appellant under Sections 302 and 342 IPC. Appellant did not plead guilty to the charges framed against him and claimed trial. 6. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined fifteen witnesses. Appellant when examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after the close of prosecution evidence, prayed that he was innocent. 7. Appellant did not examine any witness in his defence. 8. Appellant did not plead guilty to the charges framed against him and claimed trial. 6. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined fifteen witnesses. Appellant when examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after the close of prosecution evidence, prayed that he was innocent. 7. Appellant did not examine any witness in his defence. 8. Trial court vide impugned judgment/order dated 10.12.2014 ordered the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 342 and 302 IPC. Hence, the present appeal by the appellant. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has been falsely involved in this case. Material witnesses PW-2 Brij Mohan and PW-3 Mamta Bai have not supported the prosecution case, during trial. 10. Learned State Counsel has opposed the appeal. 11. Present case relates to murder of Sugna Bai. FIR was registered on the basis of the statement made by the deceased herself before the police. 12. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthu Kutty And Another Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N. in (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases 113, as under:- "Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1992) SC 1817: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 764) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164) (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC 1994]. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 SCC 264). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v. State of M.P., AIR (1982) SC 1021]. (vi) A dying declaration with suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P., [1981] 2 SCC 654) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505]. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505]. (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1988) SC 912]. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Medan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519]. (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1982) SC 839]." 13. As per the FIR, deceased had stated that while she was cutting ladyfinger, appellant came there under the influence of liquor and gave her kick and fist blows and also pressed her neck. However, she managed to rescue herself, but appellant then brought a bottle of kerosene oil and bolted the room from inside and poured the same over her and set her on fire. Statement of the deceased was also recorded by the Magistrate on 15.10.2012, i.e., Exhibit-P-20. A perusal of the said document also reveals that the deceased had stated that she had been set on fire by her husband. She has also stated that her husband suspected her and whenever she would look at some boy, he would fight with her and he was a liquor addict. 14. Thus, the case rests on dying declarations suffered by the deceased. 15. Exhibit-P-20 dying declaration of the deceased has been proved by PW-12 Ajay Kumar Sharma, Chief Judicial Magistrate. The said witness has deposed that he had recorded the statement of the deceased after obtaining her fitness certificate from the doctor available on duty. 14. Thus, the case rests on dying declarations suffered by the deceased. 15. Exhibit-P-20 dying declaration of the deceased has been proved by PW-12 Ajay Kumar Sharma, Chief Judicial Magistrate. The said witness has deposed that he had recorded the statement of the deceased after obtaining her fitness certificate from the doctor available on duty. He further deposed that Sugna Bai was conscious and was in a position to make a statement when he had recorded the same. 16. PW-15 Doctor Tej Pratap Singh deposed that on 15.10.2012, Sugna Bai, wife of Shankar was admitted in the hospital as a case of 80% burn injuries. She was admitted in the burn unit. Her statement was recorded by the Magistrate after obtaining her fitness certificate from him. He proved the noting made by him on Exhibit-P-20 to the effect that the "patient is fit for statement". 17. PW-9 Doctor Navneet Parashar deposed that on 19.10.2012, he had conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of deceased Sugna Bai. He proved the report Exhibit-P-16 in this regard. He deposed that the deceased had suffered 80% burn injuries. As per Exhibit-P-16, cause of death of the deceased was due to septicemia as a result of ante-mortem burns. 18. PW-2 Brij Mohan and PW-3 Mamta Bai have not supported the prosecution case during trial. 19. PW-4 Bhairu Lal, father of the deceased deposed that appellant used to take liquor and had set his daughter on fire after taking liquor. Sugna Bai had told him that she had been set on fire by the appellant after bolting the door. 20. PW-8 Shanti Bai, mother of the deceased deposed that she was resident of Dhaneshwar. Appellant-Shankar had taken a room on rent in the same area. Appellant used to take liquor and used to give beatings to Sugna Bai. Appellant after setting on fire her daughter, had run away from the spot. When she reached the house of her daughter, she found that the persons present there had extinguished the fire. She had seen Shankar running away from the spot. Police had reached the spot and had recorded the statement of her daughter. 21. In the present case, dying declarations suffered by the deceased inspire confidence. When she reached the house of her daughter, she found that the persons present there had extinguished the fire. She had seen Shankar running away from the spot. Police had reached the spot and had recorded the statement of her daughter. 21. In the present case, dying declarations suffered by the deceased inspire confidence. FIR was registered on the basis of the statement of the deceased and her statement was also immediately recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate after obtaining her fitness certificate from the doctor. There was no reason for the deceased to have falsely involved the appellant in this case, especially after she had suffered 80% burn injuries. From the dying declarations suffered by the deceased it stands duly established that she had been set on fire by the appellant after pouring kerosene oil on her. There was no provocation at the part of the deceased at the time of the commission of crime. Rather from the statement of the deceased, which form parts of the FIR, it is evident that the appellant had bolted the door from inside before committing the crime and after setting his wife on fire, he had fled away from the spot. 22. Thus, the prosecution had been successful in proving its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt with regard to charges framed against him. 23. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, learned trial court had, thus, rightly ordered conviction and sentence of the appellant. No ground for interference is made out. 24. Dismissed.