Maddala Sree Ramakrishna v. Commissioner, Appeals Officer of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration Andhra Pradesh
2019-09-06
C.PRAVEEN KUMAR, M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY, J. 1. The unsuccessful writ petitioner in W.P. No. 26476 of 2003 preferred this writ appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, challenging the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. 2. The parties to the appeal will hereinafter be referred as petitioner and respondents to avoid confusion. 3. The petitioner filed W.P. No. 26476 of 2003 Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the legality and validity of the proceedings of the first respondent dated 07.07.2003 dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner, which was received by him on 27.10.2003 on various grounds. 4. It is alleged that, father of the petitioner purchased an extent of Ac. 20.86 cents in Patta No. 7 (New Patta No. 404) in R.S. No. 86 and 87 situate in T. Sirasapalli Village, Munagapaka Mandal, Anakapalle, Visakhapatnam District, in a public, auction conducted by the Chemudu Estate on 08.11.1944 through Ex. P-3. In addition to the aforesaid land, he also purchased an extent of Ac. 2-00 in the same Patta number by Registered Sale Deed dated 11.01.1956. At the time of purchase, the land was un-surveyed, Memo Rc. No. 2708/54 dated 17.07.1954 issued by the Tahsildar Manager, Anakapalle stating that T. Sirasapalli Village was un-surveyed land. The petitioner's father made an application for survey of the land. As per Memo in Rc. No. 2102154-B dated 12.06.1954 issued by the" Tahsildar Manager, Anakapalle; petitioner's father paid charges for the survey. The land was surveyed in the year 1959 and found to contain an extent of Ac. 29.06 Cts. within the boundaries given by the Diwan of the Estate to petitioner's father and it is marked as 7 bits. The name of the petitioner's father was mutated in the revenue records, RSR, including an extent of 16.32 Acres in R.S. No. 87 bearing Patta No. 7 (New Patta No. 404) marked as Ex. P-2. Consequent upon abolition of estates, the petitioner's father -was granted patta by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Anakapalle, for an extent of Ac. 16.32 cents in R.S. No. 87 bearing Patta No. 7 (New Patta No. 404) marked as Ex. P-2. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner's father preferred revision, before the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam, who by order dated 31.10.1961 granted patta to petitioner's father, for further extent of Ac. 12-14 cents in S. No. 86 in the same Patta No. 7, which is marked as Ex.
P-2. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner's father preferred revision, before the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam, who by order dated 31.10.1961 granted patta to petitioner's father, for further extent of Ac. 12-14 cents in S. No. 86 in the same Patta No. 7, which is marked as Ex. P-1. Thus, patta was granted to the petitioner's father for the total extent of Ac. 28.46 cents in 1961 which had been in the enjoyment of petitioner's family and they have been paying taxes and also that the name of the petitioner's father was mutated in the revenue records, marked as Ex. P-5 before the primary authority. 5. While the matter stood thus, one Dadi Thati Naidu S/o. Ramaiah, father of respondent Nos. 5 to 10, after lapse of 20 years filed a Revision before the Director of Settlement, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad claiming an extent of Ac. 1.80 cents in S. No. 86 Part and an extent of Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/1 & 2. Though the said claim was made after lapse of 20 years without any basis, more particularly, based on two fictitious sale deeds dated 04.10.1933 and 18.06.1934, the vendor lost his title, as they were rent defaulters to the Estate authorities. Therefore, the very execution of the two sale deeds is by playing fraud on the estate authorities knowing fully well that the land would be auctioned in the Court by the Chemudu Estate for recovery of rent. The estate authorities filed a suit, O.S. No. 879 of 1939 against the vendors for arrears of rent and the land, was auctioned in E.P. No. 324 of 1942 by the District Munsif, Visakhapatnam. Therefore, the sale deeds are invalid and they will not confer any title on the said Dadi Thati Naidu. Moreover, Dadi Thati Naidu should have followed the procedure contemplated under Section 145 of Estate Lands Act, but without following the said procedure, claimed the relief, thereby he is disentitled to claim Patta for an extent of Ac. 1-80 cents in Sy. No. 86 Part and an extent of Ac. 2 in S. No. 87/1 & 2. 6.
Moreover, Dadi Thati Naidu should have followed the procedure contemplated under Section 145 of Estate Lands Act, but without following the said procedure, claimed the relief, thereby he is disentitled to claim Patta for an extent of Ac. 1-80 cents in Sy. No. 86 Part and an extent of Ac. 2 in S. No. 87/1 & 2. 6. As far as second sale deed dated 18.06.1934 is concerned, the vendors of Dadi Thati Naidu had fallen in arrears of rent to the estate authorities and the estate authorities filed a suit O.S. No. 328 of 1932 for recovery of rent and the land was sold in E.P. No. 338 of 1938. The petitioner's father purchased the land in the said Court auction and the same was confirmed in the report filed by the Settlement Deputy Tahsildar after inspection of records and boundaries on the ground that an extent of Ac. 2-00 in R.S. No. 87/1. Hence execution of the said sale deed was without the knowledge of the estate authorities and was an illegal transaction and Dadi Thati Naidu is not entitled to claim any right over the property. 7. The Director by his order dated 21.02.1978 in R.P. No. 196/76 and R.P. No. 210/76 remanded the case to the Settlement Officer with the following observations: "In view of these facts I am of the view that the claim of the 1st Respondent for the entire extent of Ac. 28.46 Cts. for which he has managed to secure a patta from the Settlement Officer is doubtful. However, he can be allowed only Ac. 22.86 Cts. as the Tahsildar has not contested for it after excluding the lands of the petitioner and the area covered by the burial ground. The area covered by burial ground shall be localised and classified as burial ground poramboke so also the area purchased by the revision petitioner shall be localised and granted patta. The orders of the lower court are therefore, set aside and the cases are remanded to the Settlement Officer to inspect the lands in question personally and gives a clear finding and decision on the above lines. The revision petitions are partly allowed." 8. It is specifically contended that there is no oral or documentary evidence to show that petitioner's land of an extent of Ac.
The revision petitions are partly allowed." 8. It is specifically contended that there is no oral or documentary evidence to show that petitioner's land of an extent of Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/2 was being used as a burial ground and there was no claim in the land in S.R.11(a)19/78. It was not a subject matter of the case and no claim was made by the Respondent and there was no issue either before the Settlement officer, Visakhapatnam in S.R.11(a)19/78 nor Director of Settlement. On the other hand the land covered by R.S. No. 8712 to an extent of Ac. 2-00 was also auctioned by the estate authorities in E.P. No. 222 of 1942 in O.S. No. 209 of 1931 and the same was purchased by petitioner's father. As per the endorsement in L.Dis. 11124171 dated 25.09.1971 of the District Collector, Visakhapatnam it was clearly stated that the land covered by S. No. 87/2 is not a burial ground. 9. Thereafter petitioner's father filed a Revision against the order of the Director of Settlement and the Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records in his order File No. P4/1045/79 dated 23.01.1980, concurred with the view of the Director of Settlement and remanded the case to the Settlement Officer. 10. On receipt of record along with order on remand, the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam took up enquiry and unfortunately instead of arraying Dadi Thati Naidu S/o. Ramaiah as a Petitioner and Claimant, petitioner's father was shown as Petitioner/Claimant. Subsequently, the petitioner was brought on record as his legal representative. 11. On an erroneous application of fact and law, the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam by order dated 18.06.1986 declared that Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/2 should be registered as burial ground, and a ryotwari patta in favour of Dadi Thati Naidu for an extent of Ac. 2.00 in S. No. 85 Part and Ac. 1.80 Cts. in S. No. 86 be granted.
2-00 in S. No. 87/2 should be registered as burial ground, and a ryotwari patta in favour of Dadi Thati Naidu for an extent of Ac. 2.00 in S. No. 85 Part and Ac. 1.80 Cts. in S. No. 86 be granted. Against the order of Settlement Officer, the petitioner preferred a Revision before the Director of Settlement challenging the order on the ground that the Settlement Officer failed to localize correctly various bits of land purchased in a Court auction pursuant to a decree obtained by the Chemudu Zamin Estate and also failed to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 145 of The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1908 (for short 'Estates Land Act'), so also the patta land in favour of the petitioner's father by the Settlement Officer for an extent of Ac. 28-06 cents. But, the Director of Settlement confirmed the order in R.P. No. 2 of 1987 by his order dated 01.04.1999 on an erroneous appreciation of facts and consideration of law. Against the said order, the petitioner filed a Revision before the Commissioner for Survey and Settlement and Land Records, A.P., Hyderabad. On an erroneous view of fact and law, the Commissioner, Appeals dismissed the Revision Petition No. P1/1006/99 by order dated 02.06.2003 communicated by letter dated 07.07.2003. 12. Aggrieved the order, the petitioner filed writ petition before this Court on various grounds, mainly with regard to appreciation of evidence by the authorities under the Act and invalidity of the sale deeds obtained by Dadi Thati Naidu. 13. The learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the petitioner had failed to establish the claim over the schedule lands and the concurrent fact findings recorded by the three authorities cannot be interfered while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition, the present appeal is preferred on various grounds, almost reiterating the contentions. However, the appeal against Respondent Nos. 6 to 10 who are the legal representatives of Dadi Thati Naidu was dismissed for default vide order dated 14.11.2011 and Respondent No. 5 being the only legal representative of the deceased Dadi Thati Naidu is contesting the appeal. 15.
However, the appeal against Respondent Nos. 6 to 10 who are the legal representatives of Dadi Thati Naidu was dismissed for default vide order dated 14.11.2011 and Respondent No. 5 being the only legal representative of the deceased Dadi Thati Naidu is contesting the appeal. 15. The petitioner raised several contentions, more particularly with regard to failure to follow the procedure under Section 145 of Estates Land Act and also the legality of the sale deeds obtained by Dadi Thati Naidu, father of Respondent No. 5 when the property was sold in Court auction for recovery of rent in O.S. No. 879 of 1939. It is also contended that the land of Ac. 2-00 was not classified as burial ground in S.R.11(a)19/78. Therefore, grant of Patta for an extent of Ac. 22-86 cents instead of Ac. 28-46 cents of Chemudu Estate is illegal and highlighted the boundaries of the land for an extent of Ac. 28-46 cents of Chemudu Estate and contended that the order of the learned Single Judge is erroneous on the face of it and the learned Single Judge ought not to have dismissed the writ petition, even without ordering notice and prayed to set-aside the same. 16. During hearing, learned counsel for the appellant Sri N. Ashwini Kumar contended that, when a patta was granted under Section 11 of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short 'Estates Abolition Act') and attained finality, filing of revision by Dhadi Thati Naidu after lapse of 20 years, based on two fictitious sale deeds dated 04.10.1933 and 18.06.1934 and entertaining the said claim by the authorities concerned under the Estates Abolition Act is a serious illegality. It is also contended that the authorities did not record any finding as to whether Dhadi Thati Naidu is a ryot, by necessary enquiry under Section 56(2) of Estates Abolition Act and the competent authority is the Settlement Officer to decide whether Dhadi Thati Naidu and this petitioner are ryots or not and the civil court has no jurisdiction.
It is also contended that the authorities did not record any finding as to whether Dhadi Thati Naidu is a ryot, by necessary enquiry under Section 56(2) of Estates Abolition Act and the competent authority is the Settlement Officer to decide whether Dhadi Thati Naidu and this petitioner are ryots or not and the civil court has no jurisdiction. But the authorities under the Act committed a serious error in negating the relief to this petitioner erroneously and drawn attention of this Court to Section 56(2) and Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act, while placing reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of Apex Court in Maddada Chayanna v. Karnam Narayana and another (1979) 3 SCC 42 and judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in T. Munnswami Naidu and others v. R. Venkata Reddy and others AIR 1978 AP 200 : 1977 ALT 100 (NRC) (F.B.), to contend that the Settlement Officer is alone competent to declare that the petitioner or Dhadi Thati Naidu is a lawful ryot or not. But, the learned Single Judge did not consider the law laid down by the Supreme Court and High Court in the judgments referred supra and committed an error in dismissing the writ petition. 17. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner purchased land in Court auction in O.S. No. 879 of 1939 filed by Chemudu Estate for recovery of rent due by ryots to the estate. Specific boundaries were mentioned in the document executed by the Court in E.P. No. 338 of 1938 after confirmation of auction and thus, the petitioner became the owner for the entire extent within the boundaries according to his contention. Here, the actual dispute is with regard to extent and boundaries. The total extent sold in the execution proceedings is Ac. 16.32 cents in R.S. No. 87 bearing Patta No. 7(New Patta No. 404) marked as Ex. P-2. The father of the petitioner purchased an extent of Ac. 20.86 cents in Patta No. 7 (New Patta No. 404) in R.S. No. 86 and 87 situate in T. Sirasapalli Village, Munagapaka Mandal, Anakapalle, Visakhapatnam District, in the public auction conducted by the Chemudu Estate on 08.11.1944 through Ex. P-3. The petitioner's father further purchased another extent of Ac. 2.00 in same Patta under registered sale deed dated 11.01.1956. Thus, he totally purchased land of an extent of Ac.
P-3. The petitioner's father further purchased another extent of Ac. 2.00 in same Patta under registered sale deed dated 11.01.1956. Thus, he totally purchased land of an extent of Ac. 22-86 cents, both in the auction and by conveyance. Later, it was got un-surveyed vide Memo Rc. No. 2708/54 dated 17.07.1954 issued by the Tahsildar Manager, Anakapalle and after conducting survey, Memo in Rc. No. 2102154-B dated 12.06.1954 was issued by the Tahsildar Manager, Anakapalle and when the land was surveyed, found Ac. 29.06 Cts. within the boundaries given by the Diwan of the Estate, which was marked into 7 bits. Thus, the petitioner's father purchased only Ac. 22-86 cents in all, in court auction and by registered sale deed. But, the actual extent of land within the boundaries specified sale, executed by executing court is more that the extent sold in the court auction. Therefore, the petitioner is claiming exclusive ownership over entire extent of Ac. 29-06 cents. But/as seen from the findings of the three authorities in hierarchy, the actual land purchased by the petitioner's father was only Ac. 20.86 cents in Patta No. 7 (New Patta No. 404) in R.S. No. 86 and 87 situate in T. Sirasapalli Village, Munagapaka Mandal, Anakapalle, Visakhapatnam District in the auction conducted by Chemudu Estate for recovery of rent by ryot and Ac. 2-00 was purchased by him in the same survey number by registered sale deed. The excess extent covered by Memo in Rc. No. 2102154-B dated 12.06.1954 issued by the Tahsildar Manager, Anakapalle, is Ac. 6-20 cents than the land actually purchased by father of the petitioner. As seen from the orders passed by the authorities, petitioner's land of an extent of Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/2 was being used as a burial ground. Dadi Thati Naidu claimed an extent of Ac. 1-80 cents in Sy. No. 86 Part and an extent of Ac. 2.00 in S. No. 87/1 & 2. Thus, Ac. 3-80 cents was claimed by Dadi Thati Naidu and whereas, Ac. 2-00 was claimed by the Government as burial ground. Therefore, Ac. 5-80 cents was claimed by the Government as well as by Dadi Thati Naidu. Dadi Thati Naidu allegedly purchased the property under two registered sale deeds dated 04.10.1933 and 18.06.1934 from the ryot, whose land was auctioned.
3-80 cents was claimed by Dadi Thati Naidu and whereas, Ac. 2-00 was claimed by the Government as burial ground. Therefore, Ac. 5-80 cents was claimed by the Government as well as by Dadi Thati Naidu. Dadi Thati Naidu allegedly purchased the property under two registered sale deeds dated 04.10.1933 and 18.06.1934 from the ryot, whose land was auctioned. It is not known whether the rent payable to the Zamindar is having any charge over the property and the period for which the rent was due. But, it is clear from the record' that the sale deeds dated 04.10.1933 and 18.06.1934 were executed - much prior to filing of suits O.S. No. 879 of 1939. The Director of Settlements vide order dated 21.02.1978 in R.P. No. 196/76 and R.P. No. 210/76 directed the Settlements Officer to identify the land of the petitioner's father, Dadi Thati Naidu and burial ground and concluded that grant of patta for the entire extent of Ac. 28.46 Cts. the petitioner's father is granted but entitled to only to Ac. 22.86 Cts and remanded the matter to Settlement Officer. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner's father filed revision before the Competent authorities, in hierarchy who was unsuccessful before the authorities. 18. The main endeavour of the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court is that the authorities did not consider the procedure contemplated under Section 145 of Estates Land Act and granted patta in favour of the said Dadi Thati Naidu, though he approached the authorities by filing a revision after lapse of 20 years and committed an error. 19. Section 145 of Estates Land Act deals with recognition of transfer or devolution of holding or portion of a holding. According to it:- 1. Whenever a holdings or any portion thereof is transferred or whenever the same devolves by operation of law, the landholder shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be bound to recognize such transfer or devolution and enter into a fresh engagement or engagements as hereinafter provided. 2. Where a holding or any portion thereof is transferred by the act of a ryot, the landholder on receiving notice thereof in writing from the transferor and the transferee shall recognize the transfer.
2. Where a holding or any portion thereof is transferred by the act of a ryot, the landholder on receiving notice thereof in writing from the transferor and the transferee shall recognize the transfer. Any person presenting for registration any document transferring a holding or any " portion thereof shall present therewith a notice in writing signed by the transferor and transferee, and addressed to the landholder asking for recognition of the transfer, and shall also pay to the registering officer such fee as the *(State Government) may prescribe for the transmission of such notice to the landholder. The landholder shall recognize the transfer on receipt of the said notice. 3. Where there is a binding adjudication as to the fact and validity of a transfer of a holding or any portion thereof in any proceeding before a Civil or Revenue Court to which both the transferor and the transferee are parties, the landholder shall, on the production of a certified copy of the judgment, decree or order in such proceeding, be bound to recognize such transfer. 4. Where a holding or any portion thereof is transferred in pursuance of a decree or order of a Civil Court, or by a sale for arrears of rent, or for arrears of Government revenue, or for any demand recoverable as arrears of Government revenue or as arrears of rent, such transfer shall be recognized by the landholder on production of a certified copy of the decree or order establishing the transfer, or in cases in which the transfer is effected by sale under the order of any Court or public officer, on production of the sale certificate or a certified copy thereof. 5. Where a holding or any portion thereof devolves by operation -of law, the landholder on receiving notice thereof in writing from the person on whom the holding has devolved shall recognize the devolution. 6. (a) Where either the transferor or the transferee fails to join the other in applying to the landholder for recognition of the transfer, the transferee or the transferor, or where any dispute arises as to the person or persons on whom the holding or portion thereof has devolved, any person claiming by devolution the holding or portion, may apply to the Collector for an order certifying the transfer or the devolution as the case may be.
(b) The Collector, after giving notice to the transferor or transferee or other person interested and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit as to the fact and validity of the transfer or as to/the person or persons on whom the holding or portion has devolved, may pass an order certifying the transfer or devolution as the case may be. On production of a certified copy of such order the landholder shall be bound to recognize the transfer or the devolution. (c) Nothing in this sub-section shall bar any suit in a Civil Court for establishing or setting aside any transfer or for enforcing any claim based on a devolution by operation of law. 7. Where the landholder has recognized the transfer or devolution of any holding or portion thereof under the foregoing provisions of this section- (i) in case the transfer or devolution is of the entire holding, the landholder shall be bound to enter into a separate engagement with the transferee or the person on whom the holding devolves, or if there is more than one such transferee or person, into a joint engagement with such transferees or persons; (ii) in case the transfer or devolution is of a portion of the holding and the portion is not defined by metes and bounds, the landholder shall be bound to enter into a joint engagement with the transferor and the transferee and the other co-sharers, if any, or with the person or persons on whom the portion of the holding devolves and the other co-sharers, if any:- Provided that if the transferor has ceased to possess any interest in the holding, his name may with his consent be omitted from such engagement; (iii) in case the transfer or devolution is of a " portion of the holding and the portion is defined by metes and bounds the landholder shall be bound to enter into separate engagements with the holders of the subdivisions: Provided that the landholder shall not be bound to enter into such engagements unless each of the subdivisions conforms to the rules made by the State Government in that behalf. 8. In any case falling under the proviso to clause (iii) of sub-section (7), where the landholder does not enter into separate engagements with the holders of the subdivisions he shall be bound to enter into an engagement with them jointly. 9.
8. In any case falling under the proviso to clause (iii) of sub-section (7), where the landholder does not enter into separate engagements with the holders of the subdivisions he shall be bound to enter into an engagement with them jointly. 9. The distribution of rent between the subdivisions referred to in clause (iii) of sub-section (7) shall be made in the, first instance by the landholder. If the distribution of rents be delayed for over six months or is not assented to by any of the parties concerned, the Collector shall on application by any such party make such distribution and the same shall be binding on the landholder and on all the other parties concerned. 10. The transfer of a holding or the recognition thereof by the landholder shall in no way affect the charge on the holding or the lands comprised therein for the rent which secured due thereon prior to the date of the transfer or its or their liability therefore. 11. The provisions of this section shall apply to the partition of a holding among the co-sharers as if it were a transfer. 20. According to the contention of this petitioner, the procedure contemplated under Section 145 of the Estates Land Act was not followed by Dadi Thati Naidu by issuing notice as required under sub-section (2) of Section 145 of the Estates Land Act. 21. Dadi Thati Naidu is a transferee of title from his vendor, though it is a part of estate land i.e., Chemudu Estate. It is not known whether transfer was recognized or not and no record is placed in support of the procedure followed for recognition of the transfer. The authorities under the Act did not accept this contention assigning specific reasons in the order under challenge in the writ petition and in the appeal. In the absence of any material produced by both the parties, it is difficult to accept this contention, at this stage, that the transfer effected by the ryot in favour of Dadi Thati Naidu was not recognized. Therefore, we are unable to accept this contention to set-aside the grant for non-compliance of Section 145 of Estates Land Act. 22.
In the absence of any material produced by both the parties, it is difficult to accept this contention, at this stage, that the transfer effected by the ryot in favour of Dadi Thati Naidu was not recognized. Therefore, we are unable to accept this contention to set-aside the grant for non-compliance of Section 145 of Estates Land Act. 22. Even, if the procedure is not followed under Section 145 of the Estates Land Act, the ryot can approach the authorities for issue of patta under Section 11 of Estate Abolition Act and the Settlement Officer may accept such claim and issue a patta in favour of. the transferee for the ryoti land which was properly included in the Estate by exercising power under Section 11 of Estate Abolition Act. Accordingly, the petitioner's father himself approached the authorities and obtained patta initially, for Ac. 20-86 cents and later in revision, his claim was accepted and issued patta. But, on account of revision filed by Dadi Thati Naidu before the Director of Settlement and Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records, the matter was remanded to the Settlement Officer, who by order dated 18.06.1986 declared that, Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/2 should be registered as burial ground, and a ryotwari patta in favour of Dadi Thati Naidu in an extent of Ac. 1.20 in S. No. 85 Part and Ac. 1.80 Cts. in S. No. 86 be granted on personal inspection by Settlement Officer. Thereupon, strictly adhering to the directions of the Director of Settlement and Commissioner, Survey, Settlement and Land Records, the Settlement Officer inspected and passed an order, which was confirmed by all the three authorities in the hierarchy. Therefore, as per the fact findings recorded by the authorities, patta was granted in favour of Dadi Thati Naidu for an extent of Ac. 1.20 in S. No. 85 Part and Ac. 1.80 Cts. in S. No. 86, while deleting Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/2 as burial ground and did not grant patta in favour of the petitioner's father and thus the patta was granted to an extent of Ac. 22-86 cents only. 23.
1.20 in S. No. 85 Part and Ac. 1.80 Cts. in S. No. 86, while deleting Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/2 as burial ground and did not grant patta in favour of the petitioner's father and thus the patta was granted to an extent of Ac. 22-86 cents only. 23. The other ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the procedure contemplated under Section 56(2) of Estates Abolition Act, alone, is to be followed to decide whether the said Dadi Thati Naidu is a ryot or not to grant patta in his favour to an extent of Ac. 1.80 cents in S. No. 86 Part and an extent of Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/1 & 2 vide sale deeds dated 04.10.1933 and 18.06.1934. No such enquiry was conducted as required under Section 56(2) of the Estates Abolition Act. 24. Section 56 of Estates Abolition Act deals with decision of certain disputes arising after an estate is notified and according to it:- 1. Where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer. 2. Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable-to be questioned in any Court of Law. 25. The power of the Settlement Officer under Section 56 to decide as to who is the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, only for the purpose of the other two clauses, that is, for the purpose of realization of the arrears of rent and not for the purpose of issuing patta. (vide K. Madurai v. M. Madurai AIR 1969 Mad. 14 ). Therefore, as per the power conferred on the Settlement Officer, the Settlement Officer has to decide whether the petitioner or Dadi Thati Naidu are the ryots within the definition of 'ryot'. 26.
(vide K. Madurai v. M. Madurai AIR 1969 Mad. 14 ). Therefore, as per the power conferred on the Settlement Officer, the Settlement Officer has to decide whether the petitioner or Dadi Thati Naidu are the ryots within the definition of 'ryot'. 26. According to Section 3(15) of Estates Land Act, "Ryot" means a person who holds for the purpose of agriculture ryoti land in an estate on condition of paying to the landholder the rent which is legally due upon it. 'Ryoti land' is defined under Section 3(16) of the Estates Land Act and according to it, Ryoti Land means cultivable land in an estate other than private land but does not include- (a) beds and bunds of tanks and of supply, drainage surplus or irrigation channels; (b) threshing-floor, cattle-stands, village-sites, and other lands situated in any estate when are set apart for the common use of the villagers; (c) lands granted on service tenure either free of rent or on favourable rates of rent if granted before the passing of this Act or free of rent if granted after that date, so long as the service tenure subsists. 27. In the present facts of the case, it was not the dispute whether the father of this petitioner or Dadi Thati Naidu are the ryots within the definition of Section 3(15) of Estates Land Act. Therefore, the enquiry contemplated under Section 56 of Estates Abolition Act need not be conducted when there was no clear dispute as to whether Dadi Thati Naidu is a ryot or not. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of Apex Court in Maddada Chayanna v. Karnam Narayana and another (1979) 3 SCC 42 (referred supra), and judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in T. Munuswami Naidu and others v. R. Venkata Reddy and others AIR 1978 AP 200 : 1977 ALT 100 (NRC) (F.B.) (referred supra), wherein, the Apex Court and this Court in the above referred two judgments discussed the scope of Section 56(1) & (2). In T. Munuswami Naidu and others v. R. Venkata Reddy and others AIR 1978 AP 200 : 1977 ALT 100 (NRC) (F.B.) (referred supra), in the said case an application is made under Section 11 claiming patta, settlement officer decided the matter under Section 56(1)(C) declaring petitioner as lawful ryot.
In T. Munuswami Naidu and others v. R. Venkata Reddy and others AIR 1978 AP 200 : 1977 ALT 100 (NRC) (F.B.) (referred supra), in the said case an application is made under Section 11 claiming patta, settlement officer decided the matter under Section 56(1)(C) declaring petitioner as lawful ryot. In appeal before the appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal opined that application was relating to 'patta' under Section 11 is not maintainable under Section 56(1)(C), as the settlement officer can decide question of lawful ryot for all purpose of Act including granting ryotwari pattas under Section 11. 29. Therefore, such decision as to grant of patta holding that Dadi Thati Naidu is a ryot or not for the purpose of issuing patta under Section 11 is to be challenged only before the Tribunal, but not before the authorities, in fact, no application was filed before the Settlement Officer to decide whether Dadi Thati Naidu or the petitioner's father are ryots in respect of land which they are independently claiming. But, for the first time such issue was raised before the learned Single Judge in the writ petition. Such pleas cannot be entertained at this stage and even otherwise, when the Settlement Officer holds that Dadi Thati Naidu is entitled for patta over an extent of Ac. 1.80 cents in S. No. 86 Part and an extent of Ac. 2-00 in S. No. 87/1 & 2 by virtue of sale deeds dated 04.10.1933 and 18.06.1934, it is impliedly accepting the contention of Dadi Thati Naidu that he is a ryot with the meaning of Section 3(15) of Estates Land Act. The same was confirmed by the authorities consistently in the hierarchy. Such fact findings cannot be interfered by the learned Single Judge or by this Court. 30. If, for any reason, this petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the Settlement Officer, and confirmed by the authorities in hierarchy and issued patta in favour of Dadi Thati Naidu, then the petitioner can approach the Civil Court for declaratory relief, notwithstanding the grant of patta. Instead of resorting to such litigation, the petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition and after dismissal of the writ petition, preferred the present appeal. 31.
Instead of resorting to such litigation, the petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition and after dismissal of the writ petition, preferred the present appeal. 31. In Nallipattu Ramakrishna Reddy v. Kasala Balaiah and another 1987 (1) ALT 120 the point that arose for consideration was whether the civil court has jurisdiction to go into the questions existing under Section 13 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948, and after reviewing the entire law, relying of the Apex Court in State of Tamilnadu v. Ramalingasioamigul 1985 (2) ALT 93 (NRC), wherein the Apex Court held that the order passed by the settlement authority either granting or refusing to grant ryotwari patta to a ryot under Section 11 of the Act must be regarded as having been passed to achieve the purposes of the Act as mentioned in Section 64-C and that must have reference only to the purpose of revenue collection and therefore, any decision rendered by the Settlement Officer while taking a decision for the aforesaid purpose is not final and is subject to the decision of the civil court. It was pointed out that there was distinction between proceedings under Section 11 of the Act on the one hand and proceedings under Section 12, 13 and 14 of the Act. In respect of Section 11, there is no express provision for any enquiry into the nature of character of the land before granting or refusing to grant such patta to the applicant whereas the specific provision for such enquiry is made in Sections 12 to 14 of the Act. The decision arrived at under Section 11 of the Act is arrived at in a summary manner for the purpose of granting or refusing patta while considering the question of payment of assessment. A summary decision of this type is an enquiry conducted for revenue purposes cannot be regarded as final or conclusive so as to constitute a bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court in adjudicating upon the same issue arising in a suit filed by a ryot on the basis of his title and long" and uninterrupted possession. Further the Supreme Court held that the Tribunals constituted under the Act do not have the power to grant the various reliefs which can be granted by the Civil Court.
Further the Supreme Court held that the Tribunals constituted under the Act do not have the power to grant the various reliefs which can be granted by the Civil Court. Therefore, the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the questions arising under Section 11 of the Act notwithstanding any earlier decision of the Settlement Authority as to the persons entitled to the grant of patta under Section 11 of the Act. 32. In Sajana Granites v. Manduva Srinivasa Rao 2002 (10) ALT 466, the Division Bench of this Court held that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide the issue of title inspite of the earlier decision of Settlement Officer granting patta under Section 11 of the Act. 33. In State of A.P. v. B. Venkatamtna and others 2004 (6) ALT 189 : 2004 (5) ALD 605 this Court by following the judgment in (referred 2002 (10) ALT 466 supra), held as follows: "If that be so, there is no patta granted in the instant case to any other person and there is no evidence to show that it is a Government land. Even in respect of the Government lands, whoever was in continuous possession from 1940 onwards, they are entitled for grant of ryotwari patta. Insofar as the non-khalsa villages i.e., Jagir villages is concerned, there is no dispute that the cultivators are entitled for the pattedari rights and therefore, I am of the opinion that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is maintainable." 34. In view of the law declared by the Apex Court and followed by this Court, it is left open to this petitioner to challenge the title irrespective of the patta granted by the authorities concerned. This Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the learned Single Judge or in appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent cannot decide such issue. 35. This writ appeal is liable to be dismissed on another ground that the present writ appeal against Respondent Nos. 6 to 10 who are the legal representatives of Dadi Thati Naidu was dismissed for default vide order dated 14.11.2011 and Respondent No. 5 being the only legal representative of the deceased Dadi Thati Naidu is contesting the appeal. As the writ appeal cannot be decided in the absence of Respondent Nos.
6 to 10 who are the legal representatives of Dadi Thati Naidu was dismissed for default vide order dated 14.11.2011 and Respondent No. 5 being the only legal representative of the deceased Dadi Thati Naidu is contesting the appeal. As the writ appeal cannot be decided in the absence of Respondent Nos. 6 to 10, who are the parties throughout and more particularly, before the learned Single Judge also, this writ appeal is liable to be dismissed. In view of our foregoing discussion, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed, as it is devoid of merits. However, it is left open to the petitioner to agitate his pleas with regard to title to the property before competent authority by following the principle laid down by the Apex Court in State of Tamilnadu v. Ramalingaswamigul 1985 (2) ALT 93 (NRC) (stated supra) and followed by this Court in Nallipattu Ramakrishna Reddy v. Kasala Balaiah and another 1987 (1) ALT 120 (stated supra), if advised. 36. In the result, writ appeal is dismissed, affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 26476 of 2003, leaving it open to the petitioner to challenge the title before appropriate forum. 37. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.