JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Vijay Kumar Dwivedi, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent and perused the record. 2. Petitioner's claim is that in respect of work performed by him, he is entitled for recovery of Rs.2,29,765.16 but his claim has been rejected by respondent-1 vide order dated 31.7.2000. 3. Basically writ petition is for recovery of money therefore, in effect, it is a suit for recovery of money and since claim of petitioner is not an admitted claim as it has already been rejected by respondent-1 vide order dated 31.7.2000, we do not find that writ petition is maintainable hence petitioner has remedy in common law. 4. It is true that writ petition for enforcement of contractual matter is not absolutely barred but when petitioner seeks recovery of money claiming to have fallen due as a result of performance of a contract and claim is not admitted by respondents, matter requires evidence for adjudication and hence remedy in common law by filing suit for recovery of money must be filed and writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution should not be entertained. 5. The question, whether for the purpose of recovery of money pursuant to contract, writ petition under Article 226 would be maintainable has been considered in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and another Vs. Dolly Das, (1999) 4 SCC 450 wherein Court said that in absence of any constitutional or statutory rights being involved, a writ proceeding would not lie to enforce contractual obligations even if it is sought to be enforced against State or to avoid contractual liability arising thereto. In the absence of any statutory right, Article 226 cannot be availed to claim any money in respect of breach of contract or tort or otherwise. 6. In Kerala State Electricity Board and another Vs. Kurien E. Kalathil and others, (2000) 6 SCC 293 , Court said that interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be subject-matter of a writ petition. Whether a contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of contract is violated, ordinarily remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. Whether a contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of contract is violated, ordinarily remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Disputes arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies have power to contract or deal with property like private parties. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. When it is not shown that contract is statutory and parties are within the realm of their authority, contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. The disputes relating to interpretation of terms and conditions of such contract cannot be agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court further said: "That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition." 7. Following the above authorities, a Division Bench of this Court in M/S Prabhu Construction Company through its Proprietor Vs. State of U.P. and another (Writ C No. 25075 of 2014) decided on 05.05.2014 said as under: "In the present case, there is nothing on the record which may persuade us to hold that the contract is a statutory contract. Following the above authorities, a Division Bench of this Court in M/S Prabhu Construction Company through its Proprietor Vs. State of U.P. and another (Writ C No. 25075 of 2014) decided on 05.05.2014 said as under: "In the present case, there is nothing on the record which may persuade us to hold that the contract is a statutory contract. The remedy of the contractor, if he is aggrieved by non-payment, would be to either file an ordinary civil suit or if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, to invoke the terms of the agreement." 8. Court also relied on its earlier decision in M/s R.S. Associate Vs. State of U.P. and others (Writ-C No. 11544 of 2014) decided on 24.02.2014. 9. Again in Alaska Tech Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 6 ADJ 591 , a Division Bench of this Court observed as under: "2. We are of the view that, in a matter of this nature which pertains to alleged non-payment of dues under a contract for supply of goods, it would neither be prudent nor judicious for this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to grant relief, which is in substance, is a prayer for a money decree. These matters, it must be emphasized, are not those relating to statutory contracts but are purely non-statutory contracts. Whether work has been satisfactorily performed, whether the rates which had been quoted are in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether the goods were of a quality as mandated, and above all, whether the claim is within limitation or otherwise, are issues which cannot appropriately be adjudicated upon under Article 226 of the Constitution." 10. The same view has been reiterated in M/S Goyal Stationary Mart through its Proprietor State of U.P. (Misc. Bench No. 10971 of 2015) decided on 27.11.2015, Budh Gramin Sansthan Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 7 ADJ 29 , Kaka Advertising Agency Vs. U.P. Technical University and others, (2014) 11 ADJ 227 , M/s A.K. Constructions Vs. State of U.P. and others (Misc. Bench No. 1909 of 2014) decided on 07.03.2014, Major Travels through Proprietor Vs. State of U.P. and others (Misc. Bench No. 3472 of 2014) decided on 25.04.2014 and Uttaranchal Paper Converters and Publishers through Proprietor Vs. State of U.P. and others (Misc. Bench No. 3898 of 2015) decided on 13.05.2014. 11. State of U.P. and others (Misc. Bench No. 1909 of 2014) decided on 07.03.2014, Major Travels through Proprietor Vs. State of U.P. and others (Misc. Bench No. 3472 of 2014) decided on 25.04.2014 and Uttaranchal Paper Converters and Publishers through Proprietor Vs. State of U.P. and others (Misc. Bench No. 3898 of 2015) decided on 13.05.2014. 11. Following the above authorities, a Division Bench of this Court has also taken same view in Writ Petition (Writ-C) No. 42697 of 2002 (M/S Jai Goswami Electric Works Alld. Vs. Union Of India through' D.R.M. and Others) decided on 19.05.2016. 12. Further, it appears that writ petition has been filed in a circuitous way for the reason that the amount, petitioner is claiming, relates to the period of 1998, and his claim was rejected as long back on 31.7.2000 (Annexure 12 to the writ petition). A suit for recovery of the same has become barred by limitation therefore, in order to avoid legal obstruction, this writ petition has been filed since claim has become barred by limitation long back and cannot be claimed by filing a suit. 13. Though period of limitation prescribed under Indian Limitation Act,1963 (hereinafter referred to as "Act,1963) as such is not applicable to a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, but, principle of undue delay and laches are applicable. In the present case, claim relates to the period of 1998 and order rejecting claim was passed in July,2000, but, this writ petition has been filed in September,2019 without explaining delay and laches. The only explanation is that petitioner had filed Writ Petition No.8202 of 2000, which was disposed of vide judgment dated 16.02.2000 directing respondents-Competent Authority to pass a reasoned order and thereafter order dated 31.07.2000 was passed. How aforesaid order can give rise to a fresh cause of action of filing writ petition in 2019 without explaining laches is not stated anywhere. 14. Delay and laches constitute substantial reason for disentitling relief in equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh and others, (2007) 4 JT 253 SC, the Apex Court observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. In New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh and others, (2007) 4 JT 253 SC, the Apex Court observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. It was held that delay and laches were relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In M/S Lipton India Ltd. And others vs. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 JT 71 SC, and M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India and others, (1995) 5 SCC 628 it was held that though there was no period of limitation provided for filing a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within reasonable time. In K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty Vs. State of Mysore, (1961) AIR SC 993, it was said that representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa Vs. Pyari Mohan Samantaray and others, (1976) AIR SC 2617 and State of Orissa and others Vs. Arun Kumar Patnaik and others, (1976) 3 SCC 579 and the said view has also been followed in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India and others, (2007) AIR SC 1330= 2007(1) Supreme 455 and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra). The aforesaid authorities of the Apex Court has also been followed by this Court in Chunvad Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and others, (2008) 4 ESC 2423 . This has been followed in Virender Chaudhary Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 297 . In S.S. Balu and another Vs. State of Kerala and others, (2009) 2 SCC 479 the Apex Court held that it is well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioners approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on account of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to other candidates who have got the benefit. In Yunus Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2009) 3 SCC 281 the Court referred to the observations of Sir Barnesdelay Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. In Yunus Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2009) 3 SCC 281 the Court referred to the observations of Sir Barnesdelay Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 239 and held as under: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. . . . . . . Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 15. The third obstruction is that in fact petitioner has already failed, inasmuch as, after order dated 31.07.2000 petitioner filed Writ Petition No.4134 of 2003, and the same was dismissed on 28.08.2008. The order reads as under : "1. This is a writ petition for direction to respondents to pay the money. 2. We have heard counsel for the petitioner and Standing Counsel for the respondents. 3. Petitioner may if he is so advised file a suit. 4. With this observation the writ petition is dismissed." 16. After dismissal of above writ petition, no writ petition afresh was maintainable still present writ petition has been filed without stating fact of dismissal of writ petition in para 1 of writ petition though for the same claim, writ petition was already dismissed. 17. Last but not the least, obstruction before petitioner is that his claim has been rejected by respondent-1, meaning thereby, claim of payment of petitioner is not an admitted claim. 17. Last but not the least, obstruction before petitioner is that his claim has been rejected by respondent-1, meaning thereby, claim of payment of petitioner is not an admitted claim. Whether rejection is justified and petitioner is entitled for payment of money pursuant to alleged work performed by him and that too to the satisfaction and in terms of contract, is an issue which needs evidence, which cannot be decided in a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution but can be a subject matter of civil suit, but, unfortunately petitioner has allowed the same to become barred by limitation. 18. What the petitioner has already lost, cannot be restored or revived by filing fresh writ petition. In fact this attempt of petitioner is nothing but gross abuse of process of law. 19. In view thereof, writ petition is dismissed.