ORDER : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. 1. This is second appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 29.5.2014 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Nimbaheda whereby, he has confirmed the judgment and decree dated 4.2.2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Nimbaheda, District Chittorgarh in Civil Original Suit No. 30/2005 whereby, the suit has been decreed in favour of the plaintiffs for declaration and permanent injunction. 2. Both the Courts below have reached to factual finding that the property of Dhannaji Chamar was never sold to Parthaji. The document placed by the appellants in defence Ex. A/1 was found to be only an agreement for sale subject to certain conditions and there was no sale deed executed in favour of the appellant. Taking into consideration the factual aspects and evidence which have come on record, the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs holding that plot ward no. 1, Satkhanda, as per the details in the plaint, was in the title and ownership of legal representatives of late Dhannaji and other family members and they were entitled to a decree of permanent injunction against the appellants. The appellate court in its judgment dated 29.5.2014 has reexamined the factual aspects and evidence which have come on record and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that there is a perversity in Ex. A/1 and submits that no title document was produced by the plaintiffs to prove their title on the land in question. 4. I have considered the submissions. Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 requires this Court to interfere only when this Court is satisfied that there is substantial question of law. In (2019) 6 SCC 46 - S. Subramanian vs. S. Ramasamy and others, the Apex Court has held as under:- "7.4 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per catena of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of 'a substantial question of law' is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.
The Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of 'a substantial question of law' is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in Second Appeal." Similarly in (2019) 6 SCC 409 - Thulasidhara and another vs. Narayanappa and others, the Apex Court reiterated the law as laid down in (2001) 1 SCC 434 - Ishwar Dass Jain vs. Sohan Lal, that it is only when there is a substantial question of law that this Court would interfere. In the present case, as noted above, this Court is satisfied that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court have given cogent reasons on appreciation of evidence on record and more particularly, on the document Ex. A/1 to reach to the conclusion for granting decree for permanent injunction. Concurrent findings of the Courts below on fact and law do not call for interference. No substantial question of law is involved in this case. 5. Accordingly, this second appeal, being devoid of merits, is hereby dismissed. Record be sent back. All pending applications stand disposed of.